|Title:||R&D investment as a signal in corporate takeovers||Authors:||Socorro Quevedo, María Del Pilar||UNESCO Clasification:||5311 Organización y dirección de empresas||Keywords:||Dirección de empresas
|Issue Date:||2009||Journal:||Managerial and Decision Economics||Abstract:||The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that takeover threats have on firms' preacquisition R&D intensity. Critics of takeovers usually argue that takeover threats may reduce target firms' R&D investments. However, I find that target firms may increase R&D investment in order to signal their compatibility with the acquiring firm. The identity of the acquired firm depends on the market size and target firms' efficiency and compatibility. Through R&D investments, target firms may affect this result, signaling potential outsiders the kind of competition they may face, and forcing them to accept lower takeover offers.||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10553/76494||ISSN:||0143-6570||DOI:||10.1002/mde.1456||Source:||Managerial And Decision Economics[ISSN 0143-6570],v. 30 (5), p. 335-350, (Julio 2009)|
|Appears in Collections:||Artículos|
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