Identificador persistente para citar o vincular este elemento: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/76488
Título: Optimal technology policy under asymmetric information in a research joint venture
Autores/as: Socorro Quevedo, María Del Pilar 
Clasificación UNESCO: 5311 Organización y dirección de empresas
531104 Organización de recursos humanos
Palabras clave: R-And-D
Moral Hazard
D Cooperation
Teams
Organization, et al.
Fecha de publicación: 2007
Publicación seriada: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
Resumen: We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of an RJV, assuming that Government intervention is subject to an additional adverse selection problem caused by its inability to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to distinguish perfectly the value of the potential innovation. The advantage of monitoring tools relative to subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government can obtain about firms' R&D performance.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/76488
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.002
Fuente: Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization[ISSN 0167-2681],v. 62 (1), p. 76-97, (Enero 2007)
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