Identificador persistente para citar o vincular este elemento: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/55704
Título: Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence
Autores/as: Charness, Gary
Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
Lacomba, Juan A.
Lagos, Francisco
Pérez Sánchez, José María 
Clasificación UNESCO: 5307 Teoría económica
Palabras clave: Delegation
Discrimination
Experiment
Real effort
Social comparisons, et al.
Fecha de publicación: 2016
Publicación seriada: Experimental Economics 
Resumen: We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/55704
ISSN: 1386-4157
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9448-x
Fuente: Experimental Economics [ISSN 1386-4157], v.19 (2), p. 433–459
Colección:Artículos
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