|Title:||Social comparisons in wage delegation: experimental evidence||Authors:||Charness, Gary
Lacomba, Juan A.
Pérez Sánchez, José María
|UNESCO Clasification:||5307 Teoría económica||Keywords:||Delegation
Social comparisons, et al
|Issue Date:||2016||Journal:||Experimental Economics||Abstract:||We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10553/55704||ISSN:||1386-4157||DOI:||10.1007/s10683-015-9448-x||Source:||Experimental Economics [ISSN 1386-4157], v.19 (2), p. 433–459|
|Appears in Collections:||Artículos|
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