Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/47429
Title: Cournot oligopolistic competition in spatially separated markets: The Stackelberg equilibrium
Authors: Dorta González, Pablo 
Santos Peñate, Dolores Rosa 
Suárez Vega, Rafael Ricardo 
UNESCO Clasification: 531004 Operaciones comerciales internacionales
Keywords: Localización de mercados
Modelos económetricos
Issue Date: 2004
Publisher: 0570-1864
Journal: Annals of Regional Science 
Abstract: Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving r firms. There are n spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage in the model by Sarkar et al. (1997) is studied. When the demand in each market is sufficiently large, equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/47429
ISSN: 0570-1864
DOI: 10.1007/s00168-003-0155-8
Source: Annals of Regional Science[ISSN 0570-1864],v. 38, p. 499-511
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