|Title:||Study and validation of eavesdropping scenarios over a visible light communication channel||Authors:||Guerra Yánez, Víctor
|UNESCO Clasification:||33 Ciencias tecnológicas||Keywords:||Visible light communication
Information assurance, et al
|Issue Date:||2017||Journal:||Sensors||Abstract:||The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has.||URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/10553/24868||ISSN:||1424-8220||DOI:||10.3390/s17112687||Source:||Sensors [ISSN 1424-8220], v. 17 (11), article number 2687||Rights:||by-nc-nd||URL:||http://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85035138315|
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