Identificador persistente para citar o vincular este elemento: https://accedacris.ulpgc.es/jspui/handle/10553/150794
Título: Media attention and multidimensional board diversity
Autores/as: Bona Sánchez, Carolina 
Peña Martel, Dévora Esther 
Pérez Alemán, Jerónimo 
Santana Martín, Domingo Javier 
Clasificación UNESCO: 531104 Organización de recursos humanos
Palabras clave: Board Of Directors
Controlling Owners
Diversity
Media Attention
Corporate Social Performance, et al.
Fecha de publicación: 2025
Publicación seriada: Review of Managerial Science 
Resumen: This study examines how media scrutiny influences multidimensional board diversity in a context where the main corporate governance concern is the potential expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling owners. We measure board diversity using the Blau index, which captures multiple dimensions, including gender, age, nationality, tenure, and education. Our findings show that greater media coverage tends to promote more diverse boards. When companies come under media attention, whether receiving approval or criticism, they often respond by signalling alignment with social expectations. In this context, board diversification becomes a visible yet low-risk adjustment that preserves internal control structures while addressing external scrutiny. Moreover, the tone of the coverage also matters, with favourable media coverage enhancing the reputational value of board diversity and encouraging visible appointments that signal responsiveness to public expectations without necessarily altering internal power dynamics. However, negative coverage may be perceived as a threat to internal power structures, leading controlling shareholders to resist governance reforms that could destabilise key relationships or expose internal disagreements. The study highlights how entrenched ownership structures can limit the role of media scrutiny in shaping multidimensional board diversity. The results also suggest that policymakers should consider both the tone of media coverage and controlling shareholders’ incentives when designing governance reforms.
URI: https://accedacris.ulpgc.es/jspui/handle/10553/150794
ISSN: 1863-6683
DOI: 10.1007/s11846-025-00943-5
Fuente: Review of Managerial Science[ISSN 1863-6683], (Enero 2025)
Colección:Artículos
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