Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/70183
Title: Political ties and corporate tax burden in Spain
Other Titles: Conexiones políticas y presión fiscal empresarial en España
Authors: Bona Sánchez, Carolina 
Pérez Alemán, Jerónimo 
Santana Martín, Domingo Javier 
UNESCO Clasification: 5301 Política fiscal y hacienda pública nacionales
Keywords: Board Of Directors
Corporate Tax Burden
Family Control
Politically Connected Boards
Impuestos
Issue Date: 2020
Journal: Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad 
Abstract: This work examines the relationship between political ties and tax burden in a sample of non-financial Spanish-listed firms during the period 2003–2013. Moreover, we analyse whether such incidence is dependent upon family control. In a context where political ties exist for business strategy reasons rather than for public policy ones, our results reveal that politically connected boards reduce tax burden. Thus, for politically connected firms, the benefits of tax avoidance strategies outweigh their associated costs and risks. Furthermore, our results also show that politically connected family firms increase tax burden. These results are consistent with family firms’ distinctive features, increasing the costs and risks derived from strategies aimed at decreasing the tax burden in the presence of political ties. Alternatively, this latter result might also be explained by a greater need to legitimise corporate behaviour using tax policy for politically connected family firms.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10553/70183
ISSN: 0210-2412
DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2019.1573049
Source: Revista Espanola de Financiacion y Contabilidad[ISSN 0210-2412],v. 49 (1), p. 74-93
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