



***In fact* and *actually* in English history texts (1700-1900)**

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I analyse evidential devices as stancetaking markers in history scientific texts from the Modern English period (1700-1900). For this, I will use the *Corpus of History English Texts* (CHET), one of the subcorpora within the *Coruña Corpus*, focussing the attention on how these adverbial devices are used to express interpersonal meanings (Hoye 1997; Biber and Finegan 1988). The adverbials selected for this study, *actually* and *in fact*, are said to show authorial stance, therefore they are categorised as epistemic adverbs. From the excerpts available, their use by eighteenth and nineteenth century writers of history texts will be described showing that depending on the context, they may fulfil several pragmatic functions, e.g. indicating different degrees of authorial commitment and detachment towards the information presented, persuasion or politeness and it will be analysed as well how authors use those devices to negotiate interactional meanings with their potential readers, mostly colleagues.

Keywords: actually, in fact, evidentiality, Coruña Corpus, stance, Modern English

1. Introduction

This paper explores authorial stance as expressed by the use of *actually* and *in (the point of) fact* in the *Corpus of History English Texts*, one of the subcorpora of the *Coruña Corpus* (Universidad of A Coruña, Spain). In general, most scholars show their agreement to the fact that adverbials are one of the grammatical categories that most noticeably contribute to the expression of interpersonal meanings (Hoye 1997;

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Biber and Finegan 1988). From a pragmatic standpoint, the adverbial expressions *actually* and *in (the point of) fact* are said to indicate “a high degree of epistemic certainty (e.g. *actually, certainly, in fact*) to a greater extent than other stance adverbs” (Gray and Biber, 2012: 25-26).

The aim of this paper is to identify stance adverbs in the history texts written in English and compiled for this corpus, and analyse their pragmatic functions. I will describe their use by eighteenth and nineteenth century writers of history texts in terms of authorial position. It will be shown that, depending on the context; they may fulfil several pragmatic functions. Some of these may be the indication of different degrees of authorial commitment and detachment towards the information presented, the expression of persuasion, and the signalling of politeness in discourse, among others. To attain this goal, a corpus-based analysis of *actually* and *in fact* has been conducted.

The structure of this paper is, as follows. Firstly, the theoretical framework I follow in order to characterise stance and stancetaking features in the corpus interrogated is presented. At this stage, I also comment on earlier literature on adverbials as matter of contextualisation. The next section offers a description of the *Corpus of History English Texts* (CHET), and the method of analysis. Then, I evaluate the findings and comment on some relevant examples to illustrate how *actually* and *in fact* function in the corpus. Finally, I offer a set of conclusions drawn from this.

2. The theoretical framework of stance

2.1. The concept of *stance*

In general terms, scholars tend to consider the concept of *stance* as “the attitude of a person or organization towards something; a standpoint” (Oxford English Dictionary). Exhaustive studies on how language is normally used to express opinions and attitudes have been often conducted. However, it does not exist scientific agreement on the exact extent of its scope yet. I have selected diverse scholars’ definitions of the term to evince this absence of conceptual evenness:

Stance relates to the expression of the speakers and writers’ “personal feelings, attitudes and value judgements, or assessments” (Biber et al., 1999: 966).

Stance “can be seen as an attitudinal dimension and includes features which refer to the ways writers present themselves and convey their judgements, opinions and commitments. It is the way that writers intrude to stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back and disguise their involvement (Hyland, 2005: 176).

Stance represents “a public act by social actor, achieved dialogically through overt

communicative means of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and other), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field" (Du Bois, 2007: 163).

"Stance is generally understood to have to do with the methods, linguistic and other, by which interactants create and signal relationships with the propositions they utter and the people they interact with" (Johnstone, 2009: 30-31).

Stance concerns "the writer's identity as well as the writer's expression of attitudes, feelings, or judgements" (Dzung Pho, 2013: 3).

Although these five definitions have some variations among them, they share an essential feature, which is that they pinpoint the evaluative dimension of stance. The concept of stance is generally understood as the way in which speakers appraise people, objects and ideas, but it also covers self-evaluation, as Alonso-Almeida (2015: 1) claims.

The very same notions of stance and evaluation leads us to consider another set of related concepts, which includes *metadiscourse* (Hyland 2005), *evidentiality* (Chafe 1986; Diewald et al. 2009), *commitment* (Branbater and Dendale 2008), *affect* (Ochs 1989), *epistemic modality* (Nuyts 2001; Cornillie 2009), *reinforcement* or *strengthening* (Brown 2011), and *vagueness* in language (Myers 1989; Channell 1994). These concepts have received scholarly attention as rhetorical devices to express mitigation and strengthening of propositional content (*P*).

The approach to stance followed in this paper is the one developed in the *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English* (Biber et al. 1999). The working definition is that stance is the expression of "personal feelings, attitudes and value judgements, or assessments" (Biber et al. 1999: 763). Stance can be conveyed by means of several linguistic elements such as lexis, grammar and some other paralinguistic structures. For the time being, I will focus my attention only on the evidential devices under inspection, *actually* and *in fact*. Biber et al. (1999) categorise them as stance adverbs, which are defined, as follows:

Epistemic stance adverbials and attitude stance adverbials both comment on the content of a proposition. Epistemic markers express the speaker's judgment about the certainty, reliability, and limitations of the proposition; they can also comment on the source of the information. Attitude stance adverbials convey the speaker's attitude or value judgment about the proposition's content.

Moreover, Biber et al. support a broad sense of the term epistemic; hence following their taxonomy, within the category of epistemic stance adverbials, we can find subdivisions. Being those adverbials organised into six subtypes expressing (1) 'doubt and certainty' (e.g. *perhaps*, *probably*), (2) 'source of knowledge' (e.g.

apparently, evidently), (3) 'actuality and reality' (e.g. *in fact, really, actually*), (4) 'limitation' (e.g. *in most cases, mainly, generally*), (5) 'viewpoint or perspective' (e.g. *in our view, from our perspective*), (6) 'imprecision' (e.g. *like, sort of, roughly, so to speak*) (Biber *et al.* 1999: 59-60).

The adverbs object of this analysis lies into category (3): actuality and reality. Sometimes it can be difficult to discriminate a stance adverbial from a discourse marker. As will be deduced from the analysis of the excerpts that will be presented in this study. There are already some studies dealing with how linguistic devices, both lexical and grammatical, were used in Middle English texts and Early Modern English texts, respectively, to express stance concluding that a strategic use of stance items had certain impact on their audience, and how these texts were accepted. In our case, the uses of *actually* and *in fact* on texts from the Early Modern English period will be analysed. Chafe's model establishes that all adverbs can be considered as evidentials. Generally speaking, evidential devices are used to negotiate authority in social interaction.

The concept of evidentiality is closely associated to the one of stance and epistemic modality. For some researchers evidentiality is considered as a subdomain of epistemic modality but there are others who consider evidentiality as an independent category: "Evidentiality is concerned with indicating the information source the speaker is relying on to make a claim. This places this category next to epistemic modality without, however, merging them into one" (Diewald, Kresic and Smirnova 2009: 190).

The notion of epistemic modality is commonly linked with the ideas of truth, commitment, reliability and authorial responsibility in relation to the strength of the writers' claims (Lorés Sanz 2011; Stukker *et al.* 2009; Traugott 1989). In this study, we consider evidentiality and epistemic modality as two separate categories following Cornillie (2009) proposal, which states that evidentiality "refers to the reasoning processes that lead to a proposition" (2009: 47), whilst on the other hand, epistemic modality "evaluates the likelihood that this proposition is true" (2009:47).

Generally speaking, evidences can be divided into direct and indirect and subdivided into attested, reported and inferring (Willet 1988) as shown in the following table. These different types of evidences imply different degrees of reliability, being considered more reliable for instance a claim based on sensory experience instead of another one based on a hearsay event. It may be considered that specifying the type of evidence a writer has to make claim can be used to strengthen its content.




Figure 1. Types of evidence (after Willet 1988).

2.2. Adverbs

Commonly, adverbials are deemed as pragmatic markers or particles, which have procedural meaning. Watts (1988) claims that pragmatic markers such as *actually* and *really*, have procedural meaning guiding the search for relevance. One of the functions of these markers “will always be to modify some propositional structure or part of it” (Watts 1988: 255). However, though it is their main function, it is not the only one as will be seen from the excerpts presented.

Greenbaum’s (1969) studies on adverbials have generally encompassed three main types, namely adjuncts, disjuncts and conjuncts. While Quirk et al. (1972, 1985) adopt Greenbaum’s terminology; Biber et al. (1999: 763) use circumstance, stance and linking adverbials as the corresponding terms. Within Systemic Functional Linguistics, Halliday (2004: 123ff) puts forward a similar categorisation comprising three types as well: circumstantial, modal and conjunctive adjuncts. Generally speaking, adverbials contributing to referential meaning have been referred to as adjuncts or circumstantial adverbials; those fulfilling connective and text-organising functions are conjuncts or conjunctive/linking adverbials; and adverbials conveying the speaker’s evaluation of the propositional information are disjuncts or modal adverbials. The adverbials *actually* and *in fact* fall precisely under this last category.

Focusing specifically on those adverbials expressing some evaluation of the propositional information, Greenbaum (1969) and Quirk et al. (1985) identify a group of adverbs, which provide a “comment about the truth-value of what is said”. Greenbaum (1969) distinguishes between adverbs that “merely express shades of doubt or certainty” and adverbs that “in addition refer to the observation or perception of a state of affairs”. Quirk et al. (1985), on their part, distinguish between adverbs that “express conviction” and adverbs that “express some degree of doubt”, and similarly, Biber and Finegan (1988, 1989) deal with “surely-adverbials” and “maybe-adverbials”. Biber et al. (1999), in contrast, take all of these adverbials to be under the label epistemic stance adverbs conveying doubt or certainty. In the same

line as Greenbaum's (1969) original distinction, Biber et al. (1999) and Fraser (1996) further distinguish between adverbials that merely convey degrees of certainty and adverbials that indicate the type of source.

As seen in this section, the study of the notion of stance is relevant as "it seems to be the motivation for variation and change in language from both a sociolinguistic and a diachronic perspective" (Alonso-Almeida 2015). The usefulness of corpora to analyse the occurrences of linguistic phenomena such as this one is undeniable since it gives us the chance to scrutinise the occurrences in real contexts, in other words, in real language. Conversely, the most troublesome aspect of using a corpus to analyse this type of linguistic phenomena has to do with their pragmatic dimension. Hence, our methodology based on the computer processing of the texts needs to be accompanied by a meticulous visual assessment of the occurrences and their contexts.

3. Corpus description

The Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing currently includes three subcorpus: the first subcorpus compiled was The Corpus of English Texts on Astronomy (CETA), the second one was The Corpus of English Philosophy Texts and The Corpus of English History Texts (henceforth CHET) is the third subcorpus, and it covers the Modern English period. It is precisely this last subcorpus the one we use for the purpose of this study.

In this sense, several scientific landmarks have been taken into account in order to limit the time-span represented in the subcorpus. The first text in CHET dates back to 1704. The end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century have been recognised by Taavitsainen and Pahta (1997) as the moment at which the medieval scholastic thought-style started to be gradually superseded by new patterns of thought and new methodological procedures based on observation started to be used. The foundation of the Royal Society in 1660 and the publication of the guidelines for presenting scientific works in a clear and simple way had a lot to do in this process. The last text in CHET dates back to 1895.

Again, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century roughly coincide with some important events in the history of science such as the discovery of the electron (1896), the formulation of Planck's Quantum Theory (1900) and the publication of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (1905). Obviously, all of these events brought about the need to change scientific discursive patterns as put forward by Huxley in the 1897 International Congress of Mathematics. As regards the genres represented in CHET, there are samples of articles, essays, lectures,

textbooks and treatises written by both male and female authors.




Figure 2. Distribution of words per genre (Crespo and Moskowich, 2015)

CHET has not a large size, as it includes approximately 400.000 words. Each of the texts compiled in this subcorpus cover around 10.000 words. The distribution of words per century is rather balanced, 201,794 of the words compiled belong to the eighteenth century whilst 202,823 belong to the nineteenth one. Among others, I have used the *Coruña Corpus Tool* for quantification and text retrieval. Then manual analyses have been performed as well in order to check stance adverbs' functions in context. This tool simplifies the research to be done and the use of this tool combined with manual analysis is useful to obtain more accurate results. This data is necessary, as it has been demonstrated on previous studies that 1,000-word samples are not sufficient for the study of variation within the scientific register (Biber, 1993). Essentially because the scientific register was not as standardized at that time as it is nowadays (Crespo and Moskowich, 2015).

4. Analysis

My computerised analysis of the corpus reveals that the sample available for the study is quite limited, as there appear not many occurrences of *actually* and *in (point of) fact* as evidentials in CHET. There are 9 tokens of *actually* and 13 cases of *in fact*, and 2 of *in point of fact*. These forms present an unbalanced distribution in our corpus since all the examples excerpted belong to the nineteenth century.

Eighteenth century samples have not been found in the present corpus. *The Cambridge Dictionary* considers the discourse markers under scrutiny as semantically closed. In the same vein, the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines *actually* as a synonym to *in fact*:

- (a) in act or in fact: really trying to find out what actually happened;
- (b) in point of fact —used to suggest something unexpected.

4.1. In fact

According to the *Collins Dictionary*, the discourse marker *in fact* or *in point of fact* can be used (1) “to indicate that you are giving more detailed information about what you have just said” exemplified as follows: *We’ve had a pretty bad time while you were away. In fact, we very nearly split up this time.* Or (2) “to introduce or draw attention to a comment that modifies, contradicts or contrasts with a previous statement” and provides the following example: *That sounds rather simple, but in fact it’s very difficult.*

All the cases found of *in fact* in CHET date back to the nineteenth century. As to the position of this marker, it is generally found in topic position in a clause. It can also occur finally when the communicative situation is informal, as the *Cambridge Dictionary* registers. Hence, it does not occupy a fixed position in the propositional structure in our data. This can be seen in the following excerpts, where *in fact* is placed before or after the lexical verb:

- (1) the whole of the English household resigned their functions to the corresponding officers for Scotland, whose places were mostly hereditary, and who very nobly discharged the duties of hospitality which at the same time devolved upon them. Such **in fact** was the excessive expense thus incurred by many of the Scottish nobles, bent on vindicating their country from the reproach of poverty, as to bring upon them embarrassments the chagrin of which has been suggested as one of the motives of that disaffection to their prince which quickly succeeded to these vehement demonstrations of loyal sentiment [...] (1833 Aikin)
- (2) Through a fraud of the lord-register in taking the votes, the articles appeared to be carried, although the majority was **in fact** against them: lord Rothes demanded a scrutiny, but it was authoritatively refused by the king, unless that nobleman would take upon himself to charge the lord-register with the capital crime of wilfully falsifying the votes, which, on failure of proof, subjected the saccuser to the like punishment. (1833 Aikin)

In my view, the uses of *in fact* in examples (1) and (2) indicate evidential meaning. Regarding the semantic meanings mentioned above, in the majority of the

examples, the authors use *in fact* to indicate that they are providing more details about the topic, or they add some details to clarify something, such as in example (1). The use of this adverbial follows from the speaker's analysis of the evidences at hand. Example (2) contains an intersubjective use of *in fact*, as the speaker seems to indicate that the meaning manifested in the propositional content suggests an inclusive source. Thus, *in fact* can be safely substituted by "we all know". This idea is reinforced by the co-text of the adverbial, which reads "the majority was **in fact** against them", thus sharing responsibility of his claim with third parties, i.e. "the majority". In this specific case, *in fact* seems to express procedural meaning, as it suggests a contrast between the information presented previously and that given after the adverb, so reinforcing the value of "against" after *in fact* in this instance.

In occurrences (3) and (4) *in fact* is employed to strengthen the propositional content.

- (3) It appears from Prynne's narrative of the proceedings against him on account of the Histriomastix, that Noy exhibited considerable reluctance to prosecute; and **in fact** took no step in the business till urged by Laud, who had employed Heylyn to extract the passages regarded as libellous. (1833 Aikin)
- (4) In the mean time, without collecting all the matter relating to the history of Tara, which would **in fact** be nothing less than a history of Ireland, it will be necessary, for the satisfaction of the reader, and the completeness of this memoir, to bring forward the notices of the more remarkable events in connexion with its early state, whether apparently authentic or apocryphal, without minutely canvassing their claims to credibility. (1839 Petrie)

In both cases *in fact* can be substituted by *really*. From a pragmatic perspective, *really* is considered as a booster, and so it comes to reinforce the propositional content of the utterance in which it is inserted. In (3) *in fact* strengthens the idea that "he didn't want to prosecute and did nothing until *Laud* urged him" to do so. Whilst in case (4) it contributes to boost the idea concerning the fact that the history of Tara is nothing more than the history of Ireland.

Examples (5), (6), (7) and (8), below, have in common that, from a grammatical perspective, *in fact* are given as appositions in the utterances in which they are inserted:

- (5) This instance occurs in the last line of the quatrain, where [quotation] "war-songs" is incorrectly given as the translation of Duil Rosgadhach, which is, **in fact**, simply the title of Cennfaela's Commentary on the Laws, as appears from Cormac's Glossary, in which it is frequently

- quoted. (1839 Petrie)
- (6) This bishop had, **in fact**, signed the invitation to the Prince of Orange, it may be remembered; he was one of the seven. (1840 Smyth)
- (7) The real truth was, that Tissaphernes was wavering between Sparta and Athens, —doing, **in fact**, what Alcibiades himself had recommended, — sometimes appearing to favour one, and sometimes the other. (1857 Sewell)
- (8) We had maltsters to supply nut-brown ale; butchers, juicy sirloins; glovers, gloves; shoemakers, shoes; **in fact**, representatives of all the trades that now contribute to the social requirements of the age. (1862 Bennett)

Having said this, it should be considered that their pragmatic functions are not alike in all the cases. Occurrences (5), (6) and (7) are procedural and indicate contrast between the information presented before and after the adverb. In example (8) the author uses *in fact* to summarize the information previously presented as a list in this utterance. In example (9) below, the adverbial is used to introduce an explicative, and so its evidential meaning is dubious:

- (9) Here was a perpetual medley of "fast" and loose characters, drunkards, swearers, Bacchanalians, Cyprians —**in fact**, the vile human sweepings of both town and country. (1862 Bennett)

The adverbial in this case introduces a covert explicative clause, and so the author characterises *drunkards*, *swearers*, *Cyprians*, etc. as people of the lowest moral condition and extraction, thus stating clearly his stance towards this social aspect. As pointed before, the use of *in fact* in this example is not evidential, as it results from a desire to introduce a new clearer description of the author's feelings towards the topic. So, it seems to indicate procedural meaning rather than anything else.

Examples (10) and (11) are indeed evidentials as shown by the context in which they appear:

- (10) After the student has perused the history in Hume and Rapin, and compared it with the parliamentary debates of Cobbett, he will see that the indictment that was afterwards preferred against James by the two houses of legislature was strictly founded **in fact**, point by point. (1840 Smyth)
- (11) It is very material to observe that the declaration and enactment was totally on the popular side, was declaratory entirely and exclusively of the rights and liberties of the people, in no respect of the prerogatives of the crown; the Bill of Rights was **in fact** a new Magna Charta; a new petition of right; a new enrolment of the prerogatives, if I may so speak, of the democratic part of the constitution, which, though consented to

by William, an elected prince, and perhaps even thought necessary to his own justification and security, could only have been extorted by force from any reigning hereditary monarch, (1840 Smyth)

In (10), the use of *in fact* results from an authorial intention to make clear that the preference for the indictment against James was far beyond any shadow of doubt, as it was "strictly founded... point by point". The word *strictly* reinforces this idea of factuality. The same adverbial *in fact* in (11) also owns evidentiary qualification, and so it might well be substituted for other evidential words, such as *obviously*, *clearly*, and *evidently*, for example. The identification of the said "Bill of Rights" is nothing else than a "Magna Carta", and the use of *in fact* seems to indicate that this comparison is not a matter of debate for the author.

4.2. In point of fact and actually

The *Oxford English Dictionary* states that the expression *in point of fact* is used "to emphasize the truth of an assertion, especially one opposite to what might be expected or what has been asserted", and the dictionary also registers the other adverbial expression under scrutiny in this study, *actually*, as a synonym.

4.2.1. In point of fact and actually

As can be seen from the two examples available in CHET given below, this adverbial expression shows reinforcement of meaning:

- (12) We now therefore turn to consider what this intelligent statesman, really and **in point of fact**, was able at last to accomplish for the cause of religious liberty in England, at that time the most enlightened country in Europe in all the principles of civil liberty. (1840 Smyth)
- (13) [...] if I may so speak, of the democratic part of the constitution, which, though consented to by William, an elected prince, and perhaps even thought necessary to his own justification and security, could only have been extorted by force from any reigning hereditary monarch, and, **in point of fact**, was certainly not procured by the English nation on this occasion, till the regular possessor of the crown had ceased to wear it, and till the country had appeared in a state of positive and successful resistance to his authority. (1840 Smyth)

The form *in point of fact* is not very common in the language, so it is not surprising to find only two cases in our data, both from 1840 and same authorship. The *Oxford English Dictionary* records this adverb as early as 1628 and indicates low frequency of usage in Present-day English. The use of this form refers to actual state of events, and appears parenthetically in between commas in our instances. In example (12), the adverbial comes together with the adverbial *really*, which also refers to factuality.

The combination of these two adverbials reinforces the idea of resemblance to truth concerning the events described. Likewise, the combination of *in point of fact* and *certainly* in (13) insists on the accuracy of the information presented to the extent that these two adverbials together renders the idea of the association of the concepts of democracy and despotic government undebatable.

4.2.1. Actually

In the case of *actually*, in this corpus, it is mainly used in pre-verbal position. The meaning associated to this adverb in dictionaries is related to the truth or facts of a situation. The *Oxford English Dictionary* lists the following meanings to *actually*:

- (a) to emphasize that something someone has said or done is surprising
- (b) to express “a contradictory or unexpected opinion or when correcting someone”
- (c) “to introduce a new topic or to add information to a previous statement.”

Regarding its position, *actually* is even more flexible than *in fact*. However, Oh (2000) found no difference between *actually* in final position and in initial position.

Occurrences in medial position in examples (15), and (16) and (17) express a contradictory or unexpected information:

- (15) Their opinion was so unfavourable, that Isabella's patronage, if not **actually** withdrawn, was indefinitely deferred; and he was told that nothing could be done until the war with the Moors should be over. (1828 Callcott).
- (16) But the Spartans were rather afraid that Tissaphernes, the satrap who had once been the friend of Alcibiades, would try to injure their cause with the young prince, for he was never heartily an ally of the Spartans, although he had not **actually** broken off the alliance with them. It was necessary, therefore, that the Spartans should have some clever person to keep up the friendship of Cyrus, and there was no one more likely to do this than Lysander. (1857 Sewell).
- (17) The cardinal de Bourbon, from his sick bed at Gaillon, offered contribution; while the count de Soissons, humbled but not submissive, **actually** prayed to be employed in the royal service. (1860 Freer).

Example (15) shows a case of *actually* in the protasis part of the conditional. This combination of *if* followed by *not actually* expresses a supposed contradiction concerning two ideas, which cannot coexist at a same time. The phrasing *if not actually withdrawn* given as an apposition seems to suggest some degree of doubt that Isabella's patronage was simply suspended or withdrawn. Instance (16) offers a case of *actually*, which is used to emphasize the meaning of *broken off*, as this event is not really expected after being informed that “he was never heartily an ally of the

Spartans". Finally, contrast is also indicated by the use of *actually* in (17) to establish a difference between the actions taken by Cardinal de Bourbon and Count de Soissons.

Examples (18), (19), (20), (21), (22) and (23) excerpted in our corpus present cases of *actually*, which emphasize the propositional content, or add new information:

- (18) Whilst sir Edward Coke was **actually** lying on his death-bed, sir Francis Windebank, secretary of state, was sent with an order of council to search his house for dangerous or seditious papers, by virtue of which he carried off his Commentary on Littleton, to which was prefixed a history of his life written by his own hand, several of his unpublished works on legal subjects, and fifty-one other manuscripts, one of which was his will. (1833 Aikin).
- (19) To such tranquil declaimers on the merit of casting away life and property, in preference to bowing the head to a storm, it is obvious to reply, that had they changed situations with those who **actually** felt the distress, it is more than probable they would have seen good reason to adopt the very conduct, which in the fulness of security they take upon them to condemn. (1800 Stock).
- (20) After the return of peace the intrigue was renewed, and in 1631 a treaty was **actually** drawn up and signed by Cottington on one part and Olivarez on the other, which stipulated that in consideration of the interference of king Philip for the restoration of the palatine, a certain number of English ships should cooperate with a Spanish fleet in the invasion of Holland. (1833 Aikin).

All the cases given above present a similar structure, and so *actually* precedes the lexical verb all times in order to give emphasis to the propositional content. In (18), the author wants to emphasize the fact that Sir Edward Coke was near to his death at the moment of searching his house for the desired evidences. This emphatic use of *actually* is also seen in example (19) with the intention of signalling those people who have "felt the distress" only. Likewise, in instance (20), *actually* is placed before the main verb to reinforce its meaning and give prominence to the information presented. Here, the idea of factuality concerning the existence of the treaty between Spain and England is clearly marked by *actually*, which could well be replaced by "already". This calls for the truth of the information offered.

In the following instances, *actually* reports on the truth of the event described:

- (21) But happily for one of the most important of all causes, the cause of civil liberty, the experiment was really made; and all that the

- exclusionists had foreseen, all that with very manly wisdom they had endeavoured to prevent, **actually** took place. (1840 Smyth).
- (22) It was towards the middle of the afternoon, that a cloud of dust gave notice that the army of Artaxerxes was **actually** drawing near. Then, a dark mass was seen moving steadily forwards, brightened at times by the sparkling light which flashed from the armour and the weapons of the soldiers. (1857 Sewell).
- (23) After the death of Alfred, however, England, and indeed the whole of Britain, became a prey to the Scandinavian freebooters from Denmark and Norway. Norwegian chiefs landing in the north of Scotland, converted the half of it into a Norwegian kingdom; and for a period of twenty-six years (1016-1042), England was **actually** under Danish rule. The complete conquest of England, however, was reserved for the Normans, or naturalised Scandinavians of France, under the celebrated William, Duke of Normandy, who landed at Hastings, on the 14th of October 1066, with 60,000 followers; and after defeating the native forces under the last of the Anglo-Saxon descendants of Egbert, made himself master of the whole of England. (1855 Masson).

The use of *actually* in (21) supports the accuracy of the information. In this case, it is beyond doubt for the speaker that the exclusionists' predictions became real. This idea of factuality is recorded in *actually*, as in (22). The use of the adverbial in this case is justified by the evidence put forward earlier in the text, i.e. the presence of "a cloud of dust". In (23), *actually* seems to function as a logical marker to include the evidences specified in the text preceding this adverbial regarding the Scandinavian background of England. Another interpretation relates to the truth of the statement, and so *actually* is used as an intensifier and may be replaced by "really" or "truly".

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined authorial stance as expressed by the use of *actually* and *in fact* in the *Corpus of English History Texts* (CHET). These adverbs are used differently in the corpus. The forms with *fact* occur more often than *actually*. All the examples found are from the nineteenth-century compilation of the corpus. The form *in fact* is normally found in topical position to strengthen its evidential meaning. Likewise, the related evidential forms *in point of fact* and *actually* seek to report on the accuracy of the information given. From the examples analysed, it seems that *in fact* indicates intersubjective position towards the information presented so as to declare shared responsibility. From a pragmatic standpoint, *in fact* can be categorised as a booster. Non-evidential uses of this adverbial reflect procedural meaning to suggest a particular reading of the text. In the case of

actually, this adverbial is syntactically more flexible than *in fact*. Medial *actually* is used to express a contradictory or unexpected information. In short, the nineteenth-century adverbs analysed are often used indexically to evince authorial perspective.

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