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**The formulation of promise in English
medical texts (1500-1600): Description and
analysis from a relevance theory perspective**

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Abbreviations

<i>CoER</i>	<i>Corpus of Early English Recipes</i>
<i>EAGLES</i>	Expert Advisory Group on Language Engineering Standards
<i>ES</i>	Efficacy statement(s)
<i>IFIDs</i>	Illocutionary force indicating devices
<i>inf.</i>	Infinitive
<i>LGSWE</i>	<i>Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English</i> (Biber et. 1999)
<i>NP</i>	Noun phrase
<i>OnICoMt</i>	<i>Online Interface for Corpus Management</i>
<i>RT</i>	Relevance theory
<i>SAT</i>	Speech act theory

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis aims at analysing promissory speech acts in a corpus of English medical texts written between 1500-1600. The texts have been excerpted from the *Corpus of Early English Recipes*, an electronic compilation of recipe texts covering different periods of the history of the English language, i.e. 1375-1900. This electronic corpus is being compiled by the *Tecnologías Emergentes aplicadas a la Lengua y a la Literatura* research unit at the *Instituto para el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación en Comunicaciones* at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. The search for linguistic data has been carried out thanks to the *Online Interface for Corpus Management*, an information retrieval tool which has been designed and implemented for the corpus management tasks.

Medical recipe texts written before the birth of modern scientific writing, at least as we know it today, seem to be an adequate genre for the inclusion of expressions aimed at validating the efficacy of the end product. These passages have been labelled as incidental data (Stannard 1982), statements of efficacy (Hunt 1990) and efficacy phrases (Jones 1998) in earlier scholarly literature. At first sight, they may be taken as promises of efficacy since the producer of the text is attesting the value of the therapy. However, it is hypothesised in this thesis that a closer look at the context in which they are embedded may render interpretations that are different from promissory speech acts.

These stretches of discourse will be analysed following the relevance-theoretic approach to comprehension because this theory has been proved to be efficient in the interpretation of several linguistic phenomena, including speech acts. In addition, relevance theory provides us with a unified theoretical framework which allows for the inclusion of contextual information in the interpretation process in a comprehensive way. Context is to be widely understood as the network of assumptions derived from (i) the interpretation of utterances

occurring earlier in the communicative situation, (ii) the addition of encyclopaedic information, and (iii) the addition of information which is immediately observable from the environment. The role of context, I contend, is crucial in the determination of the illocutionary force of these utterances.

As will be apparent from the research reported here, there is a wide range of linguistic resources intervening in the formulation of apparent promises of efficacy. These elements may have several pragmatic functions depending on the specific contexts in which they occur, but all of them may be considered to be indicators of authorial attitudes. In the light of their complex nature in terms of both form and function, the analysis of the fragments will be combined with the theoretical insights of the stance approach to communication and text construction.

This research aims to contribute to the field of historical speech act analysis and, more generally, to the field of historical pragmatics in the sense that the pragmatics of specific speech act functions, i.e. promises, will be described and analysed in terms of modern pragmatic theories, i.e. speech act theory, relevance theory and stance. I should like to point out at this stage that this thesis is not aimed to be a diachronic study of the formulation of promissory speech acts as the corpus of study is not large enough so as to allow for the tracing of specific communicative functions and their linguistic manifestations at different points in time in the history of the English language.

1.2 Objectives and methodological procedures

The main objective I have envisaged in this thesis is the description and analysis of the formulation of promises in English medical recipe texts written between 1500-1600 by following the relevance-theoretic approach to utterance interpretation. The fulfilment of this objective goes hand in hand with the fulfilment of some others that I shall comment on in the remainder of this section.

The analysis of any speech act in a historical text must necessarily take as point of departure the theoretical frames of reference provided by modern theories because the notion of speech act is in itself a relatively recent one. Although there is a lack of consensus in many terminological and methodological issues from a

synchronic perspective, Austin's (1975) and Searle's (1969) pioneering works are still quite influential. The theoretical and methodological procedures followed in this thesis as regards taxonomical issues of speech acts coincide with the ones proposed by Searle because his contribution to the development of speech act theory is to date the most comprehensive one. Moreover, the Searlean approach to promises in terms of constitutive rules captures a great deal of the pragmatics of this type of commissive speech act in an exhaustive way and so these are also taken as the starting point of the analysis.

As regards the interpretation of stretches of discourse which may be potential promises of efficacy, this relies on relevance theory as formulated by Sperber and Wilson (1995). In spite of the fact that this theory may be said to show some theoretical weaknesses, for instance, as regards its suitability to account for modality (Traugott 2003), its potential to account for the explanation of several linguistic phenomena, including speech acts, has been satisfactorily proved, even from a historical perspective (Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002). This derives from the plausibility of the ostensive-inferential model of communication as applied to human cognition, which after all, is a universal.

Additionally, the stance approach to communication and text construction is also adopted in this thesis because the theoretical and explanatory insights it offers as for the identification of the linguistic resources intervening in the formulation of potential promises of efficacy obviously enriches the analysis of the pragmatics of these expressions.

Lastly, the methodological procedures concerning the quantification of data combine both computerised searches and manual analyses. Following Kohnen's (2004) ideas about the initial selection of forms that might be considered to be typical manifestations of a given speech act, I have instructed the *Online Interface for Corpus Management* to search for some specific items frequently found in potential promises of efficacy, i.e. *shall*, *will*, *proved*, *probatum* and *good*, as well as some orthographic variants. The information retrieved by the corpus tool have been checked manually afterwards. Moreover, micro-analyses of the texts are in order so as to quantify other "hidden manifestations" (Kohnen 2007: 139).

1.3 Outline to thesis

The contents of this thesis are organised into seven chapters. The first chapter presents the main objectives pursued in this research as well as some indications as for the methodological procedures that are followed in order to fulfil them. The structure in which the information is arranged is also provided here. The second chapter offers the description of the corpus of study, that is, the *Corpus of Early English Recipes*. The general objectives of the compilation, its source materials, the selection criteria and the internal organisation of the texts are first given. Then, the texts are assessed in terms of both text type features and genre characteristics. A description of the information retrieval tool which has been designed and implemented to accompany the corpus, i.e. the *Online Interface for Corpus Management*, is also provided. In this case, some of its technical features, the interface description and the search possibilities offered by this tool are referred to.

The third chapter describes the theoretical framework which guides this thesis, that is, speech act theory and relevance theory. These two theories provide this research with a sound theoretical basis for the analysis of promissory speech acts in medical recipes at different levels: speech act theory is used to first identify the illocutionary force value of potential promises of efficacy. Relevance theory, on its part, is used to account for the process of utterance interpretation so as to determine whether or not efficacy statements are ultimately understood as actual promises of efficacy. The main tenets behind these two theories are described in some detail and special attention is given to the inferential approach to communication as outlined in speech act theory and later on developed by relevance theory.

The fourth chapter contains the characterisation of the specific type of speech act which is addressed in this thesis, that is, the promise. The chapter begins by revising the constituent elements of promises by following Reinach (1983) and then focuses on the constitutive rules which have to obtain for the successful performance of promises by following Searle (1969). Efficacy statements are then described in relation to promissory speech acts. The chapter ends up by touching upon some methodological issues concerning the analysis of speech acts in general and promises in particular in a historical perspective.

The fifth chapter outlines the stance approach to the analysis of efficacy statements by specifying the main linguistic resources involved in their expression and having an impact on the identification of the illocutionary force. The stance approach covers diverse linguistic resources, but this thesis only focuses on (i) modality as realised by the modals verbs *shall* and *will*, (ii) evaluation as realised by evaluative adjectives and adverbs as well as lexical verbs, and (iii) evidentiality as realised by lexical evidential verbs. Some relevant examples are offered in order to illustrate their occurrence as indicators of authorial attitudes in the corpus of study.

The sixth chapter presents the results of the analysis and the discussion of the findings following the relevance-theoretic approach to interpretation. The last chapter offers the conclusions derived from the present research. This is followed by the list of references which are divided into primary and secondary sources.

Chapter 2. Corpus description

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the description of the corpus used to carry out the study here presented, namely, the *Corpus of Early English Recipes* (Alonso-Almeida et al. forthcoming). This corpus aims at compiling Middle English, early Modern English and late Modern English recipe texts. The description will be offered in several steps: I shall firstly refer to the general objectives of the compilation, its source materials, the selection criteria, and its internal organisation. The next step is the characterisation of the recipe text in terms of text type features and genre characteristics. In order to do so, I shall concentrate on the systemic functional approach which has been successfully applied to the study of this genre. Finally, I will describe the information retrieval tool which has been designed and implemented for the corpus management tasks, that is, the *Online Interface for Corpus Management*.

2.2 *Corpus of Early English Recipes*

The origins of the *Corpus of Early English Recipes* (hereinafter CoER) date back to 2002. Its compilation began in the Department of Modern Philology at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria where there had been a long tradition in the study and edition of medical texts (Alonso-Almeida 1997, 2000; Ortega-Barrera 2002, 2005; Vega-Déniz 2002, 2009; Quintana-Toledo 2008; Santana-Muñoz 2008). The project is now being developed by the *Tecnologías Emergentes aplicadas a la Lengua y la Literatura* research unit at the *Instituto para el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación en Comunicaciones* at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.

CoER can be roughly described as a monogeneric diachronic corpus since it aims at gathering together recipe texts from different stages in the development of the English language, i.e. Middle English, early Modern English and late Modern English. It is the aim of this section to describe CoER in depth by referring to its objectives, source materials and selection criteria. The main objective of CoER is to compile early English recipes which can serve as material for research in fields like (historical) linguistics, (historical) pragmatics, (historical) discourse analysis and diachronic ESP (recently labelled as such in Alonso-Almeida and Marrero-Morales (2011)). In addition, research will be facilitated by an information retrieval tool which has been designed for such a purpose.

The team's motivation for the choice of the recipe genre has been determined by the fact that recipes seem to have had a wide audience since they can be found in both the remedybook and the learned traditions of writing (Taavitsainen 2001a: 86). Recipes belonging to the latter were targeted at a specialist audience while recipes belonging to the former were written not only for a specialist audience but also for lay people (Taavitsainen 2001a: 88). As such and in general, recipe texts were intended for a heterogeneous group of people. Moreover, extant recipe texts surpass the number of surviving manuscripts in libraries providing large amounts of material for the analysis of language change.

As for the source materials of this compilation, the team has chosen two renowned databases, namely *Early English Books Online* (<http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home>) and *Eighteenth Century Collections Online* (<http://mlr.com/DigitalCollections/products/ecco>), besides library reels. *Early English Books Online* is one of the most complete online catalogues of the first printed books in England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland and British North America between 1473 and 1700. *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*, on its part, provides researchers with hundreds of works printed in Great Britain during the 18th century, though not only in English since titles in other languages can be found as well. The interfaces of these databases have made the search for the material easier. It has been primarily guided by the use of keywords, i.e. *recipe*, *medicine*, *cookery*. The criteria for selecting the texts initially retrieved after keyword searches were completely random except for the fact that first editions were preferred and the documents had to contain a significant number of recipes.

The chronological organisation of the corpus follows the indications provided by Taavitsainen's and Pahta's (1997) *Corpus of early English medical writing 1375-1750*, where there is a division between two periods, that is, 1375-1550 as representative of Middle English, and 1550-1750 for early Modern English. As the authors put forward, the time span they take for late Middle English does not coincide with the traditional division for this period in diachronic studies of the English language. They made the decision to change the traditional period division for this one on the basis of extralinguistic parameters: 1375 indicates the year in which vernacular medical writings re-appeared and 1550 signals the approximate time in which the medieval way of thinking started to be superseded by a new one based on observation (Taavitsainen and Pahta 1997: 73). Another period covering the time span between 1750 and 1900 will be added to CoER so as to allow users to have a more complete picture of the recipe genre.

The recipe texts which have been excerpted to build this compilation have been also organised in relation to their topic following the categories in Voigts and Kurtz (2000) as shown in Table 1 below:

Fields	Examples
Alchemical processes	alchemical, artificial jewels, soap
Animals	falconry, fishing, veterinary
Botany	arboriculture, horticulture
Food and drink	ale, culinary, wine
Medicine	dental, gynaecology and obstetrics, herbals, medical, ophthalmology
Other daily activities	book production, clothworking, ink, lacemaking, leather

Table 1. Topic organisation in CoER following Voigts and Kurtz (2000).

The complete catalogue of categories include the following: alchemical, ale, arboriculture, artificial jewels, book production, clothworking, cosmetic, culinary, dental, dyes and pigments, falconry, fishing, glue, gunpowder, gynaecology and obstetrics, horticulture, hunting, ink, leather, medical, metallurgy, ophthalmology,

soap, veterinary, wax and wine. Two categories of those listed by Voigts and Kurtz (2000), namely, magic and taking birds, have not been included in CoER.

As for the specific texts which have been used for the present research, they are shown in Table 2 below as they appear in *Early English Books Online*. Abbreviations as used throughout this thesis are also provided for ease of reference:

Title	Author	Date	Abbrev.
<i>Here begynneth a newe boke of medecynes intytulyd or callyd the Treasure of pore men whiche sheweth many dyuerse good medecines for dyuerse certayn dysseases as in the table of this present boke more playnly shall appere</i>	Anonymous	1526	TPM
<i>This is the myrour or glasse of helth necessary and nedefull for euery person to loke in, that wyll kepe theyr body from the syckenes of the pestylence: and it sheweth howe the planettes raygne, in euery houre of the daye and the nyght: with the natures and exposicions of the .xii. sygnes, deuided by the .xii. monthes of the yere</i>	Thomas Moulton	1531	MGH
<i>The kegment [sic] of life wherunto is added A treatyse of the pestilence, with The booke of children newly corrected and enlarged by T. Phayer</i>	Jean Goeurot, Thomas Phayer	1546	RLP
<i>The treasurie of healte conteynyng many profitable medycines, gathered out of Hypocrates, Galen and Auycen, / by one Petrus Hyspanus & translated into Englysh by Humfre Lloyde who hath added therunto the causes and sygnes of euerye dysease, wyth the Aphorismes of Hypocrates, and Iacobus de Partybus, redacted to a certayne order according to the membres of mans body, and a compendious table conteynyng the purging and confortatyue medycynes, with the exposicyon of certayne names & weyghtes in</i>	Pope John XXI, Jacques Desparts, Dyocles of Carystus	1550	THM

<i>this boke contayned, wyth an epystle of Diocles unto kyng Antigonus, at ye request of the right honorable Lord Stafford, for the noble pryncesse and his especial good lady the Duches of Northumberlande</i>				
<i>This lytle practice of Iohannes de Vigo, in medicine, is translated our of Latin into Englyshe, for the health of the body of man</i>	Giovanni da Vigo	1564	PIV	
<i>A booke of soueraigne approued medicines and remedies as well for sundry diseases within the body as also for all sores, woundes, ... Not onely very necessary and profitable, but also commodious for all suche as shall vouchsafe to practise and vse the same</i>	Anonymous	1577	BSM	
<i>A thousand notable things, of sundry sortes Wherof some are wonderfull, some straunge, some pleasant, diuers necessary, a great sort profitable and many very precious</i>	Thomas Lupton	1579	TNT	
<i>The first part of the key of philosophie</i>	John Hester, Paracelsus, Philippus Hermanni	1580	FKP	
<i>A right profitable booke for all disseases Called The pathway to health: wherein are to be found most excellent and approued medicines of great vertue, as also notable potions and drinkes, and for the destillinge of diuers pretious waters, and making of oyles and other comfortable receiptes for the health of the body, neuer before imprinted</i>	Peter Levens	1582	TPH	
<i>The good husvvifes iewell VVherein is to he [sic] found most excellend [sic] and rare deuises for conceites in cookery, found out by the practise of Thomas Dawson</i>	A. T.	1596	GHI	
<i>A rich store-house or treasury for the diseased</i>	Thomas Dawson	1596	RST	

*Wherein, are many approued medicines for diuers
and sundry diseases, which haue been long hidden,
and not come to light before this time*

Table 2. Specific texts from CoER used in the analysis.

2.2.1 The recipe genre

The last two decades have witnessed a growing interest in the study of the recipe genre. The focus of attention has been placed on several aspects such as genre and/or text type issues (Stannard 1982; Hunt 1990; Görlach 1992; Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999; Carroll 1999, 2004; Taavitsainen 2001a), discursive features (Carroll 2003; Alonso-Almeida 2005) and pragmatic characteristics (Taavitsainen 2000, 2001b; Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002; Alonso-Almeida 2008b; Quintana-Toledo 2009a, 2009b).

The concepts of genre and text type have been subject to much confusion in both linguistic and literary theory from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives (Lee 2001; Moessner 2001; Taavitsainen 2001c). However, there have been some scholarly efforts in order to try to clarify their status as distinct concepts. For instance, the issue of genre theory has been addressed in medical texts from a historical standpoint by Taavitsainen (1988; 2001a), Pahta (1998) and Alonso-Almeida (2008a, 2008b), among others, and, in contemporary English by authors like Martin (1984), Swales (1987, 1990), Biber (1988), Devitt (1993, 2000) and Bex (1996). Some agreement has been reached, though, in the sense that the concept of genre is often associated with features external to texts and the concept of text type is frequently related to internal linguistic characteristics of texts (Biber 1988; Taavitsainen 2001a).

An overview of these two concepts as well as their application to the study of historical texts, i.e. Middle English and early Modern English medical texts, can be found in Alonso-Almeida (1998-1999, 2002b, 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming a). I will follow the background he provides in these contributions to clarify these concepts and other related notions. Definitions of genre tend to group texts in relation to their external characteristics, mainly in relation to their functions. In this sense, Martin (1984: 25) defines this concept as “a staged, goal-oriented, purposeful activity in which speakers engage as members of our culture”. Biber

(1988: 170) adds that “genre categories are determined on the basis of external criteria relating to the speaker’s purpose and topic; they are assigned on the basis of use rather than on the basis of form”. The notion of stage as raised by Martin in his definition of genre above is extended by other authors within a functional systemic framework. For example, Hasan’s (1985: 63-63) and Eggins’s (1994: 41) work on this notion resulted in the association of the basic organisation of genres to the labels generic structure potential and actual generic structure: all genres have a certain ideal structure which includes all the possible stages they can have. This corresponds to the generic structure potential. These stages may or may not be present in an actual instance of a genre, the resulting structure being what they call actual generic structure.

Martin’s and Biber’s definitions of the concept of genre emphasise its social and functional character. It should be noted that the latter makes reference to topic as a criterion for assigning texts to certain genres, but this notion, in its strictest sense, can only be determined on the basis of vocabulary which is something internal to texts. This was firstly pointed out by Görlach (1992: 747) in his diachronic study of the culinary recipe text where he claims that both cookery and medical recipes are formally similar. Furthermore, the Expert Advisory Group on Language Engineering Standards do also pursue this view and they note that “in the classification of topic, the internal evidence is primary” (EAGLES 1996: 5). Except for this, both Martin’s and Biber’s definitions seem to be suitable for the purposes of this thesis.

The contribution by Görlach (1992) stands as the first one to the analysis of recipes in a historical dimension. His definition of text type reads as follows: “a specified linguistic pattern in which formal/structural characteristics have been conventionalized in a specific culture for certain well-defined and standardized uses of language” (Görlach 1992: 738). His analysis of the cookery recipe from Old English to early Modern English is based on three parameters, namely, social features, technical features and linguistic features. Social features include aspects such as “the language used and the audience addressed” (Görlach 1992: 746). Technical features, on their part, cover aspects related to the structural organisation of the texts and the vocabulary employed. Lastly, linguistic features have to do with the grammatical elements present in texts. This author somehow

invokes the notion of stage for the description of the structural development of recipes when referring to “standardization of arrangement” (Görlach 1992: 746).

The distinction between internal and external features as criteria for the assignment of texts into text types and genres, respectively, seems to be blurred in Görlach’s definition of text type since he includes social features as a parameter for analysing the recipe text type. Biber’s (1988: 170) definition of the term, in contrast, highlights the internal linguistic characterisation of texts. According to him, text types are “groupings of texts that are similar with respect to their linguistic form, irrespective of genre categories”. In this sense, Werlich (1976) proposed a five-class taxonomy of text types on the basis of the linguistic features which can be found in texts: descriptive, narrative, expository, argumentative and instructive.

The concept of register is very often invoked when talking about genre theory. The two terms tend to be used interchangeably in the literature (Lee 2001: 41) and, although overlap might be said to exist between them, there are certain differences. On the one hand, genre is a more general concept as it is associated with the cultural setting in which genres emerge as well as with the social functions attached to them (Swales 1990; Bhatia 1993). On the other hand, register might be seen as a narrower concept since it is related to immediate situational contexts. As Eggins (1994: 32) puts it, “genre and register are at two different levels of abstraction. Genre, or context of culture, can be seen as more abstract, more general – we can recognize a particular genre even if we are not sure exactly what the situational context is”. Let us consider the culinary recipe as an example; in this case the genre is the recipe, the text type is instructive and the register is cooking. The systemic functional approach to grammar has developed these ideas which can be diagrammatically represented as shown in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Relationship between language and context in the systemic functional tradition (Martin 1993: 132).

In the same line of thought, Whittaker and Martín-Rojo (1999: 154) advocate for a stratification of context into (i) context of culture and (ii) context of situation. The former is a more general stratum into which the latter is subsumed and they correspond to genre and register respectively. As context of situation, register determines the lexicogrammatical choices the speaker/writer makes in a certain communicative situation so, as such, the notion of register is probabilistic as noted by Martin (1983: 6) since the users of a language have to evaluate which stylistic features, among those at their disposal, fit best into the communicative event they are engaged.

Register is, moreover, conceived as a configuration of choices between three variables, namely, field, mode and tenor (Halliday 1985; Eggins 1994: 52) whose relations can be schematically represented as shown in Figure 2 below. Field can be taken as “what the language is being used to talk about”, mode as “the role language is playing in the interaction”, and tenor as “the role relationships between the interactants” (Eggins 1994: 52). Variations in these variables are determined by the immediate situational parameters of the communicative event and so, language will be used differently in the spoken and in the written modes.

Similarly, power relations as indicated by the tenor will bring about significant differences in the way an individual addresses his/her supervisor in the workplace and the way s/he addresses a close friend. Finally, field variations are also to be expected since it is not the same to talk about last night's *The tonight show with Jay Leno* than to talk about recent trends in cognitive linguistics.




Figure 2. Relationship between genre, register and language (adapted from Eggins and Martin 1997: 243).

Halliday (1970, 1985) worked out three metafunctions of language in relation to the three register variables, i.e. interpersonal, ideational and textual, as can be seen in Figure 2 above. The ideational metafunction is related to the field. It has to do with “the speaker’s experience of the real world, including the inner world of his own consciousness” (Halliday 1970: 143). The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with the tenor in the sense that it “serves to establish and maintain social relations: for the expression of social roles, [...] and also for getting things done” (Halliday 1970: 143). Lastly, the textual metafunction as related to the mode “enables the speaker or writer to construct texts, [...] and enables the listener or reader to distinguish a text from a random set of sentences” (Halliday 1970: 143).

As cultural artefacts in general and texts in particular, recipes can be assessed in terms of both external and internal criteria. As already stated, while external criteria apply to the relationships that hold between a given text and its purpose in a particular sociohistorical context, internal criteria apply to its internal linguistic features. Textual assessment made on the basis of these two standards roughly correspond to classifying texts in terms of genre and text type features, both of which have been successfully applied to research on recipes (Carroll 1999, 2004; Taavitsainen 2001a, 2001c; Alonso-Almeida 2008b). However, there has been some scholarly disagreement as regards the identification of stages in recipes so that several classifications have been put forward.

All scholars doing research in the recipe genre identify the title as a stage (Stannard 1982; Hunt 1990; Görlach 1992; Taavitsainen 2001a; Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999, 2002b, 2008a; Grund 2003; Mäkinen 2004, 2011), even though there are differences in terminology, i.e. *title* (Görlach 1992; Taavitsainen 2001a; Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999, 2002b), *purpose* (Stannard 1982; Mäkinen 2004, 2011), *rubric* (Hunt 1990) and *heading* (Grund 2003). Its function is that of providing the user of the text with a clear indication of the contents.

The following sections of the recipe are frequently identified as those where the producer of the text lists the ingredients and offers the procedure of preparation. While some authors keep them as distinct (Stannard 1982; Hunt 1990; Görlach 1992; Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999, 2002b; Grund 2003; Mäkinen 2004, 2011), Taavitsainen (2001a) opts for joining them together and labelling them as *instructional part*. As Alonso-Almeida (forthcoming a) notes, Taavitsainen's decision is based on the fact that the ingredients are not always specified without making reference to the indications on how to prepare them. Nevertheless, there are recipes in which the procedure of preparation is not given and so Alonso-Almeida prefers to consider them as two independent sections. The labels given to these sections are *ingredients and equipment*, and *rules of procedure* (Stannard 1982), *composition* and *preparation* (Hunt 1990), *ingredients* and *procedure* (Görlach 1992; Mäkinen 2004, 2011), *ingredients* and *preparation* (Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999, 2002b), and *substances* and *procedure* (Grund 2003).

Scholars agree in identifying the next section as one in which the producer of the text instructs its user on how to apply the medical product or, alternatively, on how to serve the food if the recipe is culinary rather than medical. The names given to this section include *application and administration* (Stannard 1982), *application* (Hunt 1990; Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999, 2002b), *how to serve* (Görlach 1992), *explanations of application* (Taavitsainen 2001a), and *results* (Grund 2003; Mäkinen 2004, 2011). Alonso-Almeida (2002a) identifies another section, namely, *storage*, which is aimed at indicating how to store a given product as conveniently as possible so as to use it in the future.

The last section identified by scholars is often used to assert the efficacy of the remedy and so it can only be found in medical recipes. This tends to be formulaic in nature and it may also include some extra information regarding the source of the recipe. The names given to this section are also varied, i.e. *rationale/incidental data* (Stannard 1982), *statement of efficacy* (Hunt 1990), *efficacy phrase* (Jones 1998) *efficacy* (Taavitsainen 2001a), *closing formula* (Grund 2003) and *justification* (Mäkinen 2004).

The terminology I will be using in this thesis is the one employed by Alonso-Almeida (1998-1999, 2002b, forthcoming a) since his approach to the recipe genre shows little ambiguity and seems to be less confusing than the rest of nomenclatures employed by other researchers. I shall now illustrate the status of the recipe as a genre. The information included in round brackets in the body of the recipe corresponds with the labels for specific stages:

(1) (TiTle) ¶An Oyle for all manner of Aches, Bruyses, and streyning of the Synewes . / (Ingredients) ¶Take a quart of Neatsfoote Oyle, and a pynt of - Ox gall, ¶Oxe gall, halfe a pynt of Aquavitæ, a pynt of - Rosewater, Bay leaves, Rosemary stamped stripped from the Stalkes, strawberry leaves, roots and - strings, Lavinder Cotton, of every of these halfe a handfull, (Preparation) beat them small, and putt them into the - foresaid stuffe, and seeth it over a soft fire of ~- Coles in a Panne of a Gallon, and at your owne - pill lett not the fflame touch your stuffe, lett it seeth very well, and then take it off, and lett it stand vntill it bee almost cold; Then straine it through a course - Lynnen Cloth, but not the bottome of the liquour, (Storage) Then putt it in a glasse, and soe keepe it . (Application) And when you are pained, annoynt your greife withall, (Efficacy) and you shall fynd present remedy by Gods grace (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

The actual generic structure of the recipe in (1) is as follows: $TT \wedge I \wedge P \wedge S \wedge A \wedge E$. This example contains all the possible stages that can occur in a recipe text

whose generic structure potential corresponds with the following: (TT) * I ^ P * (A) * (S) * (E). Following the systemic functional nomenclature, the stage label which appears within round brackets is optional. The asterisk is an indicator of variable position, and the circumflex, on its part, shows fixed position.

Within the medical register, recipes are intended to provide their audience with instructions so as to prepare efficient medical products. The first stage of (1) is the title which contains clear indications of what the remedy is for. The next stage is the ingredients section in which all the elements needed for the preparation are specified. The third stage is the preparation section which shows the exact order in which the ingredients have to be combined. The storage section comes next, and it shows the user how to store the resulting product so as to use it safely in the future. The application section offers the instructions on how to apply the medicine to the patient. The last section contains the efficacy statement which asserts the positive outcome of the disease after the right administration of the product.

As regards the text type, this is instructive as indicated by the use of imperative forms (Alonso-Almeida 2008b: 175), i.e. *take, beat, putt, seeth, lett, straine, keepe, annoynt*. The topic of the recipe is determined by the lexical choices made by the producer of the text which are mainly related to (i) cooking, i.e. *quart, pynt, handfull, soft fire of coles, panne, glasse*, (ii) plant names and other ingredients, i.e. *oyle, neatsfoote oyle, oxe gall, aquavita, rosewater, bay leaves, rosemary, strawberry leaves, roots and strings, lavender cotton*, and (iii) diseases and body parts, i.e. *aches, bruises, streyning of the synewes, pained, griefe, remedy*.

The remainder of this section will be devoted to describing the recipe genre in terms of text type features. In order to do so, I shall concentrate on each section individually. All the examples have been excerpted from CoER and some of them from our corpus of study. Square brackets in the body of the recipe are used to indicate the point where each section begins and ends. Sources are indicated in between round brackets.

2.2.1.1 Title

Titles are used to indicate the contents of the recipes. They tend to be visually differentiated from the body of the recipe, i.e. centre alignment and italic typeface, allowing the reader to identify more easily where each recipe begins. They are sometimes absent as recipes are inserted one following another. Some of the most frequent syntactic patterns associated with titles are shown in Table 3:

Syntactic patterns	Examples
NP	<i>A good laxatiue</i> (PIV)
NP + <i>for</i> + NP	<i>A soueraigne oyntment for an ache or bruise</i> (BSM)
NP + <i>to</i> inf. + NP	<i>An other remedie to take out the fyre of a burninge or scaldinge</i> (BSM)
<i>To</i> inf. + NP	<i>To make oile of the skull of a man</i> (FKP)
<i>For</i> + <i>to</i> inf. + NP	<i>For to heale a mans yerde, that is sore swolened of the stone</i> (PIV)
<i>For</i> + NP	<i>For the Emerodes</i> (PIV)
<i>How</i> + <i>to</i> inf. + NP	<i>How to make the said Aqua fortis</i> (FKP)

Table 3. Most recurrent syntactic patterns in titles.

Other linguistic features include the presence of deictic elements, mainly anaphoric referential devices such as *another* and *the same*, i.e. *Another present remedie for a Quartaine Ague, and for the drought that commenth thereof* (RST) and *An other for the same* (BSM), both of which also have a textual function as they signal the beginning of new recipes. In addition, adjectives are often employed so as to offer a positive evaluation of the remedies, i.e. *A good drinke for wounded men* (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93) and *A soueraigne proued medicine for the pin and web in the eye, to be made in May* (BSM). Finally, the lexis employed in titles is normally related to diseases, body parts and medical products.

2.2.1.2 Ingredients

The aim of this stage is to provide the reader with the list of ingredients for the preparation of the recipe; therefore, the lexis used here is related to plant names and other organic and mineral substances together with numerals and weight references. Take (2) and (3) as examples:

(2) ¶ffor a surfeit [¶Take a gallon of aquavita, & halfe a bushell of pop<pie> dryd, 2 or 3 handfull of cloue gilliflowers, 2 ounc<es> of sugar candy, 6 or 8 dates; a quarter of pan<...> of raisons in ye sun stoned, carroway amiseeds, sw<eet> fennil seeds of each halfe an ounce, one ounce of quoris .] Let this stand in a pott in ye sun 2 mon<ths> in ye heate of sumer then strayne it out for vse (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

(3) ¶For the Plage. Cap .i. [Take Bolearmoniacke q. & and Terrasagellara ob. Oleus Sacratine q. Mixxe electe ob.] beate them all in powder fyne, and for to drinke at once. [take .iii.d. weyght then take a sponefull of water af Scabias. Pympernell .j. sponeful, Turmentyl .i. spone full Detayne .i. sponefull of Dragons, one spoonefull, of Vinegre .i. sponefull or more, Tryacle as much as a Hasell nutte,] mixte them al together and giue the pa<cie>nt to brincke cold the quantityt aforenamed. And if he be infecte, this purgacion purgeth, and wher the foreariseth, make a great plaster of gal banum clene clensed, and lay therto (PIV)

As said above the semantic fields are related to (i) plants, i.e. *poppie*, *gilliflowers*, *fennil*, *Bolearmoniacke*, *Scabias*, (ii) numerals, i.e. *one*, *2*, *3*, *.i.*, (iii) weight measures, i.e. *gallon*, *handful*, *ounce*, *sponefull*, and (iv) other compound substances, i.e. *aquavita*, *Tryacle*. This section opens up with the imperative *take* and the ingredients are coordinated by means of punctuation marks and/or the conjunction *and/&*. They do not all necessarily appear grouped together as instructions for preparation and application, i.e. *beate them all in powder fyne*, *and for to drinke at once*, are sometimes inserted in between some ingredients as in recipe (3).

2.2.1.3 Preparation

This stage contains instructions for the exact preparation of the remedies and, consequently, the verbal forms which are used here are imperatives. Culinary terms are often employed as well as others typically used in the ingredients section, since, as I pointed out earlier, these two stages are sometimes given together. Let us focus on recipes (4) and (5):

(4) ¶ffor the Tooth-Ach or swelling the mouth . / ¶Take halfe a pynt of good vinegre, [and sett it on soft fire, and putt therein a handfull of Hopp, and lett it boyle till halfe the vinegre bee consumed; - Then take it off and straine out the Hopp, and sett - the vinegre over the fire againe, and cover it, and lett it seeth softly a prettie while, then take it off,] and (as hott as you may suffer it) putt one spoonefull - in your mouth, and hold it a good while, and then - spitt it out againe, and doe soe four or five tymes, - and it taketh away the paine quickly (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

(5) ¶For any man or woman that is sore wasted by syckenes, or by any other thinge. Cap .xi. [Take Lokes heads washed, let chop them smal as ye can, then put them in a pot wyth water, then take ye mary bones that be clene, and the flesh with al, & let breke a lytle, and boile these to<->gather gither, and after that take out the mary, faire and clene, and cast in again in to the pottle wortes that were boiled ouer the fyre then straine it & put therto powder of Peper, Ginger, Canell, Nutmegges,] and therof eate fyrst and laste, and this shal restore any man, or woman without doubt (PIV)

These two examples show how the ingredients and the preparation sections cannot always be clearly differentiated as every time a new ingredient is given the writer also instructs the reader on what to do with it. The instructional part of the recipe is characterised by the use of culinary verbs in the imperative form, i.e. *sett*, *boyle*, *straine*, *cover*, *cast*, which are coordinated by *and*/*&* conjunctions and *then*. Other semantic fields include ingredients and containers, i.e. *pot*. Time expressions are also used, i.e. *till*, *a prettie while*, and *after*, *again*.

2.2.1.4 Application

The application stage indicates how the medical product has to be used to achieve the desired effects. Imperative verbal forms are used here as well as verbs with coercive meaning (Alonso-Almeida 2008b: 176). Lexis covers fields such as anatomy, medical products, time expressions and numerals. Consider (6) and (7) for illustration:

(6) ¶A Medicine for a contynuall Headach . / Take Betony water, and take a Cloth three or - four fold, and but three fingers breadth, wett it well in Betony water, [and lay it to your forehead cold, - lett the Cloth (being well wett) come round about the - Head, and tye it fast, and in three or four tymes thus doing,] it will helpe you, when the Cloth is drye wett it againe (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

(7) ¶For the suffocacion of the moder. Capit .xvii. ¶Take Assefetida, Oppentibaicum, & Castor .i.d. of eche, and Galbanum steped in Uineger, & so let

this Galbanum be layde on the coles, [and let him smell therto, and the other .iii. aforsayd melt together,] and make in a ball, [and let him vse to smell therto] (PIV)

Imperatives such as *lay* and *tye* indicate how to administer the resulting product which in the case of (6) has to be applied to the forehead and tied around the head in the form of a wet cloth. In (7), on its part, the remedy has to be smelt by the patient. Verbs with coercive meaning are employed, too, as in *let him smell therto*. The syntactic pattern normally associated with verbs like *let* is as follows: verb + object + infinitive. *Gif* is another verb with coercive meaning (Alonso-Almeida 2008b: 176) frequently used. Lastly, numerals and time expressions indicate the dose and the frequency of administration, i.e. *in three or four tymes thus doing*.

2.2.1.5 Storage

This stage provides information regarding how to keep the medical product for later use. As Carroll (2005-2006: 307) reckons, this section was firstly identified by Alonso-Almeida (2002a). The lexical fields primarily involve the names of containers and verbs such as *put*, *keep*, *stop* and *close*. Take (8) for instance:

(8) A soueraigne bath for al lamenesse. Take a blacke sheepes heade with the wool on it, and doo out the braynes & tongue, & wipe the head cleane, then put it into two gallons of fayre water, with a pecke of Culuerage, otherwise called Arse smart, beyng fyrste cleane pyked and washed, and so seeth them al together, tyl the bones fal from the flesh, & scum it cleane in the seethyng, that don, take out the bones, [and the rest put into a close earthen pan, or pot, and so keepe it,] takyng at once as much of the broth, flesh, and hearbes, as shal suffice to bath the lame place withal, vsyng it euenyng and mornyng, as hot as it may be suffered, keping the place warme with a linnen cloth betwixt the bathyngs (BSM)

2.2.1.6 Efficacy statement

This is aimed at asserting the positive outcome of the disease after the administration of the remedy. Different labels have been given to this section in earlier literature, for instance, *incidental data* (Stannard 1982), *statements of efficacy* (Hunt 1990) and *efficacy phrases* (Jones 1998). Since this sort of expressions is the focus of attention of this thesis, these will be looked into in depth in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.3 (**page 122**) in the context of promissory speech acts. For the time being, I shall provide some examples as illustration to briefly describe them formally:

(9) ¶For any man or woman that is sore wasted by syckenes, or by any other thinge. Cap .xi. Take Lekes heads washed, let chop them smal as ye can, then put them in a pot wyth water, then take ye mary bones that be clene, and the flesh with al, & let breke a lytle, and boile these to<->gather gither, and after that take out the mary, faire and clene, and cast in again in to the potte wortes that were boiled ouer the fyre then straine it & put therto powder of Peper, Ginger, Canell, Nutmegges, and therof eate fyrst and laste, [and this shal restore any man, or woman without doubt] (PIV)

(10) ¶ffor the Toothach . / ¶If the Ach of the Teeth come of Abundance of Humours, then Launce the Goomes betwixt the Teeth which ¶which doe paine you . And your forefinger being - first wett in your mouth, dipp him in the powder - of Euphorbium, which you shall have at the Apothecaries, and rubb your said Goomes and teeth therewith, that they may bleed, [and you shall find speedy remedye by Gods grace] (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

(11) For bleeding at the nose. Take a dram of Bolae armoniacke washed, and myxe it in rose water, and plantayne water, and drinke it. then binde the extreme partes as hard as you may, and after make a tente of graeke nettles, and put into his nose. Moreouer it is good that the patient do hold in his hand egremonie with the roote and all, and drinke the iuice of knottgrasse, [the blood will staunch] (TPH)

(12) An Excellent Remedie for a Quartaine Ague. Take an Oxe Gall, and as much Aqua composite, and put thereto a quarter of an ounce of Pepper, brused but a very little, and two pennyworth of Trieacle, and annointe the handes stomacke and wistes, with the aforesaide thinges, being all mingled together, halfe an houre before ye fitte commeth, but let it be laide too, as hote as the Patient may suffer it, and let him sweate well vpon it, [and this will speedily helpe him, Probatum est] (RST)

There is a tendency for this stage to appear at the end of recipes as noted by Jones (1998: 201) who points out that efficacy phrases “are found in this final closing position”, but it is also possible to find them somewhere else such as in marginal notes (Alonso-Almeida 1998-1999: 62; Pahta 2004: 92). Formally speaking, they are often complete sentences with different types of subject, either nominal as in (11) or pronominal as in (9), (10) and (12), plus a verbal form with *shall* or *will* followed by an infinitive, i.e. *shal restore* in (9), *shall find* in (10), *will staunch* in (11) and *will helpe* in (12). From a semantic point of view, they are always related to recovery from illnesses by the administration of given medical products.

2.3 *Online Interface for Corpus Management*

The *Online Interface for Corpus Management* (hereinafter OnICoMt) is an information retrieval tool which has been specifically designed to manage and interrogate CoER. Its design and implementation has been carried out at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria since 2008 by the *Tecnologías Emergentes aplicadas a la Lengua y a la Literatura* research unit at the *Instituto para el Desarrollo Tecnológico para la Innovación en las Comunicaciones* in collaboration with a group of undergraduate students of the Computer Science Department of the same university. The development of this information retrieval tool is still in its testing phase, but the search engine has indeed proven to be efficient in the retrieval of linguistic data. The remainder of this section focuses on describing OnICoMt and its use for linguistic research in CoER.

The first section presented below contains some details as regards the technical features of OnICoMt. I will offer a brief description of the free software tools which have been used by its developers, but without deepening too much into them since this falls beyond the actual scope of this thesis. The second section holds the interface description and the search possibilities which are allowed by the application thanks to an extended query syntax.

2.3.1 *Free software tools*

Technically speaking, OnICoMt has been thought of as free software-based project where different free software tools have been employed, changed and improved so as to achieve an efficient application for linguistic research. The philosophy behind the use of free software tools consists in providing the user with freedom “to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software” (Stallman 2002: 43). Stallman (2002: 43) specifies four freedoms in this respect:

Freedom 0: The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.

Freedom 1: The freedom to study how the program works and adapt it to your needs. (Access to the source code is a precondition for this).

Freedom 2: The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor.

Freedom 3: The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that the whole community benefits. (Access to the source code is a precondition for this).

This philosophy presents certain advantages as for the design and implementation of OnICoMt: firstly, and most importantly, there is no need to start from scratch as there is an exhaustive catalogue of software tools which can be used and modified as desired to model the application the team had in mind. Secondly, and obviously, the cost of free software tools is reduced to a minimum so that they can be used and installed in several computers without paying for that, contrary to what happens in the case of proprietary software.

Bearing all this in mind, the first step the developers took was to study a whole range of tools they had at their disposal so as to know which ones fit best into the team's idea of what OnICoMt should be like. To begin with, they decided to use the GNU/Linux operating system (<http://www.gnu.org/>) in the server machine where OnICoMt is to be executed. The development of this operating system has benefited from its being free and so there have been frequent releases of programmes and applications for joint use, i.e. distributions. Debian (<http://www.debian.org/index.en.html>) and Ubuntu (<http://www.ubuntu.com/>) are the distributions chosen in this case because they offer useful server applications such as Ubuntu Server (<http://www.ubuntu.com/server>).

Any electronic corpus needs a search engine so as to allow the user to carry out efficient searches. OnICoMt permits researchers to search for specific linguistic items in CoER thanks to Sphinx (<http://sphinxsearch.com/>). Sphinx is a potent full-text search engine which has been originally developed by Andrew Aksyonoff in the absence of a satisfactory search engine which could mainly provide him with (i) high search quality and (ii) high search speed in websites. He kept on finding difficulties in relation to the ranking methods of the results obtained, i.e. these were not really ranked by relevance, and searches took a long time when stopwords were looked into. Sphinx is the outcome of his research in his quest for a solution.

Apart from the texts themselves which conform any electronic corpus, there is some extra information which has to be taken into account not only as regards the corpus organisation but also in queries the user may wish to make, for instance, title, author, year of publication or file size, among many others. In order

to store and manage all the information contained in CoER, both texts themselves and metadata, OnICoMt makes use of MySQL (<http://www.mysql.com/products/community/>). This is a database management system which is based on the relational model of databases (Codd 1970). It is precisely characterised by organising data in vertical columns and horizontal rows as a way of creating relations between them. The data stored in a MySQL database can be read directly by Sphinx and so used in searches.

OnICoMt aims at being a web-hosted application with dynamic content. Its developers have opted for using PHP (<http://www.php.net/>) which is a scripting language widely used for such a purpose. It is perfectly compatible with already existing HTML code and they can be mixed, and with both Sphinx and MySQL so that it can retrieve any necessary information from them, and show it on-screen to the user.

Of these software tools I have just briefly described, Sphinx is certainly the one with real implications for linguistic research, so I shall now focus on its features in some detail.

2.3.1.1 Sphinx

Sphinx is at the core of OnICoMt and it provides the application with a powerful search engine. It has been thought of as a tool to be used together with other applications. In general terms, it is capable of providing its users with the possibility of doing fast searches in big text collections, i.e. in compilations of both large texts and large amounts of small texts. The results obtained after a given search has been performed are then ranked by relevance on the basis of a combination of phrase proximity and statistical ranking. Some of its technical features will be addressed below. All the information contained herewith has been taken from the *Sphinx 0.9.9 Reference Manual* as presented in its webpage (<http://sphinxsearch.com/>).

2.3.1.1.1 Indexing

Indexing can be referred to as the process by means of which text data are given a certain structure so that the search engine is able to do queries as optimised as possible. Sphinx is capable of managing text data coming from different sources

such as HTML files, SQL databases or plain text files. In the particular case of OnICoMt, the data sources are plain text files so that once texts have been typed, they are saved as .txt files and then uploaded to the MySQL database.

2.3.1.1.2 Attributes

Texts from CoER are not simply stored as mere texts; there are certain attributes associated to them. These attributes are extra values which can be used while performing queries as an additional way of filtering out the results. There can be as many attributes as one may wish, but obviously, a long list of attributes would make searches slower. The team have decided to include the following attributes for the texts in CoER: *Author*, *Year*, *Title*, *Short title*, *Place of publication*, *Publishing house*, *Genre* and *Genre sections*, *Topic*, *Dialect* and *Transcriber*. Attributes are especially useful when the user wants to restrict his/her search to texts with specific characteristics, for example, to texts written by the same author, in a particular time span or of a given genre. In the case of this thesis, searches will be driven by the attributes *year*, i.e. 1500-1600, *genre*, i.e. recipe, and *topic*, i.e. medical.

Some points should be noted here: first of all, the team have chosen to add the attribute *short title* in contrast with *title* in order to facilitate searches when the user is working with texts s/he knows well. On those occasions, s/he does not have to type the whole title of the texts s/he wants to search into. Secondly, there is an attribute *genre* even though OnICoMt is to be used with CoER, a monogeneric corpus. This is so because the recipes transcribed do not necessarily appear as separate portions of text clearly differentiated from other parts of texts which are not recipes strictly speaking. They may be, for instance, inserted within a letter which is clearly a different genre. In such a case, distinctions in genre will be indicated by means of codification: the search engine will be instructed to search for information only in the recipe and not in the letter. The team have carefully read the texts to identify different genres which have been tagged accordingly. As regards the attribute *topic*, recipes in CoER are not only medical as there are also culinary and others for different purposes. This attribute has been included in order to filter out results according to their topic. Lastly, the attribute *transcriber* has been included here mainly for internal organisational purposes as

it is very useful for the team to know who transcribed a given text. Nevertheless, this attribute can be also useful for common searches since a team member may wish to make a search in all the texts s/he transcribed.

2.3.1.1.3 Searching

Sphinx allows the user to make searches by using both simple and complex query syntactic patterns. Simple queries are performed by using a traditional Boolean syntax while complex queries demand a specific query syntax which the search engine is capable of understanding without having to do extra programming.

The Boolean query syntax allows the use of the operators AND, OR and NOT. The AND operator is made explicit by using an & symbol; the OR operator by a | symbol; and the NOT operator by a – symbol or a ! symbol. Let us focus on the following examples to clarify how this syntax works in Sphinx:

(13) AND operator:

approued & oyntment

(14) OR operator:

approued | proued

(15) NOT operator:

approued –oyntment

approued ! oyntment

After a query with an AND operator as in (13), Sphinx will retrieve text fragments where the two items, i.e. *approued* and *oyntment* appear together in the same sequence. A search as in (14) with the OR operator will result in showing fragments of texts containing one of the two items, that is, fragments containing the items *approued* and *proued* will be shown separately. After a query as in (15), the search engine will recover portions of texts containing only the item *approued* and not the item *oyntment*. As noted by its developer, when no operator is specified, Sphinx will interpret a given search as one with a default AND operator so that if the user types *approued oyntment*, Sphinx will search for *approued & oyntment*.

As regards the extended query syntax, Sphinx permits users to make fairly refined searches thanks to various operators and modifiers different from the ones employed for Boolean queries. They can be used to make searches of specific items in the content of the texts themselves and/or in any field of the attributes. I

shall now illustrate how they are used and the sort of queries that can be made with them:

(16) FIELD SEARCH operator:

@title medicines

@title remedies @body plasters

This operator allows users to make searches by restricting them to the fields of the attributes. Fields are indicated immediately after a @ symbol and the keyword to be searched for. It is possible to make queries in a single field, i.e. @title medicines, or in a combination of fields, i.e. @title remedies @body plasters. Queries like these will generate a list of texts with the keywords medicines and remedies in the title and plasters in the body.

(17) FIELD POSITION LIMIT modifier:

@body[25] proued

Sphinx offers the possibility of restricting searches not only to fields, but also to the position the keyword occupies within a given field. The position limit is signalled by means of a number inserted in between square brackets. The query given above means that the item proued has to be found within the first twenty five first words of the body of the text.

(18) MULTIPLE FIELD SEARCH operator:

@(title,body) proued

The same keyword can be searched for into different fields at the same time as well. The fields to be searched into are inserted in between round brackets and separated by a comma following the @ symbol. The query shown in (18) means that the item proued will be searched for in both the title and the body of the text.

(19) ALL FIELD SEARCH operator:

@* remedies

This operator permits users to search for keywords in all the fields of the attributes. This all-field search is performed by typing an asterisk after the @ symbol followed by the item to be searched for. The sample search will retrieve all the texts in whose attributes (all of them) the word remedies can be found.

(20) PHRASE SEARCH operator:

“by Gods grace”

The search engine can be instructed to look for exact phrases without variations whatsoever. In this case, the exact phrase has to be typed in between inverted

commas. In a query like this, Sphinx will only retrieve texts containing the phrase as specified, omitting results like *“by Godes grace”*.

(21) PROXIMITY SEARCH operator:

“proofe seene”~10

Sphinx can be also instructed to make queries by proximity by typing the keywords in between inverted commas followed by a ~ symbol and the limit in the number of words which can separate the items. The example above means that the search engine will recover fragments which contain the items *proofe* and *seene* being separated by no more than ten words.

(22) QUORUM MATCHING operator:

“and you shal have present remedy by Gods grace”/3

In searches performed with this operator the keywords are again typed in between inverted commas followed by a slash and a number indicating the number of words of the ones constituting the phrase that, at least, have to be found by the search engine. This query will match those fragments in which at least three of the words constituting the phrase *“and you shal have present remedy by Gods grace”* are present.

(23) STRICT ORDER operator:

shal << fynd << remedy

Sphinx is capable of making searches of items in order of appearance as typed by the user. The keywords have to be separated by a double < symbol. A search like the one in (23) will result in showing those fragments containing the items specified, but only in the exact sequence shown so that a match like *remedy shal fynd* is not possible.

(24) EXACT FORM modifier:

=drink

Sphinx is capable of searching for keywords which occur exactly in the form specified by the user by typing a = symbol before the keyword. The sample query shown in (24) will match documents containing *drink*, but not *drinking* for instance. However, if the = symbol is not typed, the query will also match documents containing *drinking* since the stemmed keyword matches.

(25) FIELD-START and FIELD-END modifier:

^Another proued\$

The search engine allows the user to search for specific keywords which have to be contained at the very beginning and at the very end of a given field. If the

keyword is to be searched into the beginning of a field, it is introduced by a ^ symbol and, if it is to be looked for at the end of a field, the keyword has to be preceded by a \$ symbol. In this example, Sphinx will retrieve fragments where the items *Another* and *proued* appear at the beginning and the end, respectively and exactly.

2.3.2 Interface description

OnICoMt aims at offering the user an application which is easy to handle in which case its interface needs to be clear and intuitive. Its structural organisation has been designed so as to offer relevant information and functionality, and to avoid unnecessary complications to the researcher making queries. Some navigation tabs can be found at the top of the main page in order to guide the user into the different pages. These tabs are the following: *Home*, *Search*, *Examine*, *Favourites*, *History*, *Upload*, *Help*, *Configuration*, *Administration* and *Contact*.

Home is the main page of OnICoMt where users are directed after having logged in. In order to do so they must have previously asked the administrator for a username and a password which are given under certain circumstances, i.e. after agreeing on certain terms and conditions, for instance, as regards acknowledgment and how to cite the application. This page contains general information about the application, that is, what OnICoMt is, the technology which has been used for its implementation and how it can be exploited in linguistic research.

Search is the page where users can make queries. It is organised into four sections: *Content*, *Attributes*, *Filter results* and *Show results*. This page allows the user to make both general and specific searches. A general search is made by introducing an item in the section *Content*, and so Sphinx will make a search for that specific item in the content of all texts indexed in CoER. A specific search, on its part, is made by using the *Attributes* section where the user can specify the items which have to appear in the attributes of the texts, i.e. *Author*, *Title*, *Short title*, *Place of publication*, *Publishing house*, *Genre*, *Topic*, *Dialect* and *Transcriber*. The *Attributes* section contains a field named *Any field* which has been added so as to facilitate searches since once an item has been introduced in it, the search engine will retrieve all the texts where the said item can be found in at least one of their attributes.

Specific searches can be also made by indicating other type of restrictions as the ones shown in *Filter results*, i.e. *Sex*, *Year*, *Word count* and *Search in genre*. The field *Sex* allows the user to search in texts in relation to their authorship, that is, in texts whose author is a man or a woman, i.e. *Male* or *Female* respectively. When a user chooses *Male* or *Female*, s/he can also choose between *Only* and *At least*. *Only* will allow the user to make queries in texts whose authors are only men or women, whereas *At least* will permit him/her to make searches in texts whose authors are at least one man or one woman. Options in this field do also include *All*, in which case Sphinx will make searches in texts irrespective of their author's being men or women.

Year allows users to make searches restricted by dates. Options here are *All*, *From*, *Between* and *Up to*. Searches where *All* has been chosen will retrieve all texts regardless of the date they were written. *From* will retrieve texts written in the year indicated or later than that. *Between* allows to search in a range of dates as specified by the user. *Up to* will retrieve texts written in the year indicated or earlier than that.

Searches can be restricted by the number of words in texts, i.e. *Word count*. These can be specified by a minimum of words, i.e. *Minimum*; a maximum of words, i.e. *Maximum*; or by a range, i.e. *Between*, introduced by the user.

Restrictions in genre can be indicated in *Search in genre* where the user can choose between all the genres already identified by the transcribers and *Unknown*, in which case Sphinx makes a search in texts no matter what their genre is.

The section *Show results* offers different configuration possibilities as regards the way the user wants the results to be shown on-screen. The results can be firstly sorted out by the attributes attached to texts such as *Identifying number* (assigned by OnICoMt once a text is uploaded into the database), *Author*, *Year*, *Word count*, *Genre*, *Topic*, *Dialect*, *Transcriber*, *Title*, *Short title*, *Place of publication*, *Publishing house*, *Upload date* and *Last modified date*. Moreover, the results can be sorted out in ascending or descending order.

Results per page specify the number of texts which can be shown in a single page, for instance, 10, 25 or 50 texts per page. In case a given search generates more results than the ones indicated here, the number of pages in which the rest of

the results are displayed will appear at the bottom of the page providing the user with direct links to these pages.

Fragments per result (10, 25, 50) provides the user with the possibility of choosing the number of fragments of texts which contain the item specified in the section *Content* and so sorting out fragments per result can only be used when an item has been typed into the content box.

Lastly, *Show results* does also permit the user to choose the length of fragments as specified in the number of characters, i.e. *Fragment size* 100, 150, 250, 350, 500. The values specified here are simply approximate since the application will only show complete words.

Once the user has typed the items to be searched for in the different fields, has specified the ways s/he wants Sphinx to filter results and has indicated how s/he wants the results to be shown, a search can be made by clicking on the magnifying glass icon. OnICoMt then goes through all the information introduced by the user and, in case there are mistakes in the search form, it will refresh the page by indicating where the mistakes are so that the user can correct them. When everything is correct, the search is performed.

After a search is made, a new page is displayed. The information shown on top of it corresponds to data as regards the query made, the number of results retrieved and the time Sphinx took to make the search. Right below there is a small tool bar which again allows the user to choose between different ways of showing results, i.e. *Results per page*, *Fragments per result*, *Fragment size*, and *Order*. Searches, that is, the fields filled in in a given query but not the results recovered, can be saved by clicking on the pushpin icon. In that case the History page is shown on-screen with the message *Your search has been saved*.

Results are then displayed as follows: those which are found in texts which have been recently added to the database are shown first. In case there are results found in texts which have been added to the database the very same day the search is made, the heading *Recently added texts* is shown. The rest of the texts will be shown under the heading *Previously added texts*.

As previously said, a user may want to indicate his/her preferences as regards fragments. When queries which require fragment generation are made, there are two possibilities: firstly, by indicating that the search is to be made in a

particular genre. In this case, different scrolling menus will appear, namely, *Text fragments*, *Text analysis*, *Fragments in X* and *Analysis in X*, where X stands for the specific genre. Secondly, the user may not indicate that s/he wants to make a query in a given genre and so the scrolling menus that will appear by default are *Text fragments* and *Text analysis*. All of these scrolling menus will include the item which has been searched for in the field *Content*. If the item is chosen in *Text fragments* and *Text analysis*, the user will be directed to the pages *Fragments* and *Analysis*. If the item is chosen in *Fragments in X* and *Analysis in X*, s/he will be also directed to the pages *Fragments* and *Analysis*, but the fragment construction and the analysis will be only made in the genre specified.

Every fragment generated provides a link to the page *Full text*, where the whole text is shown. The location of a given fragment is indicated by means of background colour.

Examine is the page where the list of all texts is shown. The texts are organised by upload date and the ones shown first are the most recently added. The data indicated here include *Upload date*, *ID number*, *Author*, *Title*, *Year*, *Genre*, *Topic*, *Dialect*, *State* and *Word count*. Of these, the *ID number* is given by the application once a new text is uploaded, and *State*, either open or closed, indicates whether or not there is a user with administrator privileges working on it at the time another user is having a look at this page.

Texts in this page can be chosen by ticking on the box placed at the right and so several tasks can be performed. The tasks that are allowed by the application are included in a tool bar both at the top and at the bottom of the table. Several icons are used for such a purpose:



Figure 3. Icons used in the page *Examine* (taken from <http://dryicons.com/free-icons/preview/coquette-icons-set/>).

The magnifying glass icon allows the user to make searches in the texts. Clicking on the bar chart icon will generate a wordlist and the word count. The red star icon can be used to add texts to *Favourites* so that the user can make a selection of texts s/he a priori knows s/he wants to work with. The locked and the locked

padlock signs are used to change the status of texts from *Available to all users* to *Available to administrator users* only. The icon of the sheet of paper with a red X sign at the bottom allows administrator users to delete texts from the corpus. The green tick icon is used to select all texts from the corpus that are visible in the same page, but not the others as shown in other pages. The red X icon is used to deselect them.

The next page in the interface is *Favourites* which aims at allowing the user to create a subcorpus of texts. This facilitates working with texts without having to make searches once and again in the whole corpus, or without having to use the page *Examine* to go through all the texts. Texts in *Favourites* are shown in tables containing the following information: *Upload date*, *ID number*, *Author*, *Title*, *Year*, *State* and *Word count*. As in other tables, there is a checkbox at the right so that users can select them to perform certain tasks. The icons used are the following:



Figure 4. Icons used in the page *Favourites* (taken from <http://dryicons.com/free-icons/preview/coquette-icons-set/>).

As indicated by the icons, the tasks that can be performed with the texts in *Favourites* include searches, word count, deleting texts from *Favourites*, and selecting and deselecting texts. Other tasks available in the *Examine* page are not available in *Favourites* since *Favourites* is not aimed at providing users with the possibility of altering texts, contrary to what happens with the texts in the *Examine* page.

In all the pages described up to now and whenever the user comes across the title of a text, s/he can click on it and so be directed to a page where the text can be read. In this new page, there is another tool bar which permits him/her to do certain tasks. As usual, some icons indicate what can be done:



Figure 5. Icons used in the page *Full text* (taken from <http://dryicons.com/free-icons/preview/coquette-icons-set/>).

The icon *Refresh* allows the user to make again the last query, if there was any at all. In this page, texts can be downloaded as different files, namely, as .xml, .html and .pdf. By using the rest of the icons, the user can add the text to *Favourites*, create wordlists, change its status, edit it in case changes are intended to be done, and remove it from the corpus, respectively.

The *History* page shows all searches made by the user, but searches must have been previously saved by clicking on *Save search*. This information is organised in tables as well, i.e. *Date*, *Search*, *Sex*, *Year*, *Word count*, *Genre*, *ID number*, *Delete*, *Search again*. *Date* contains the exact date and time the search was made. *Search* shows the query made as understood by Sphinx and so the fields where items were introduced are preceded by the @ symbol and then followed by the item itself, i.e. @ *content shall*. The headers *Sex*, *Year*, *Word count*, *Genre* and *ID number* will display some details just in case these fields have been selected as filters to make the searches. When no restrictions were specified, *All* is shown. *Delete* allows to remove saved searches. *Search again* permits to make queries again and so the page *Search* is loaded again providing the results that were firstly obtained.

The *Upload* page allows to add texts to the corpus, but not all users have access to it; only administrator users can upload texts. In order to do so, users have to fill in a form with text data. Data are organised into four main sections, namely, *Authors*, *Titles*, *Other data* and *Content*. The data included under the section *Authors* are *Name*, *Surname* and *Sex*. The information regarding *Titles* is introduced in two ways, that is, *Complete title* and *Short title*. Other data include *Year*, *Place of publication*, *Publishing house*, *Genre*, *Topic*, *Dialect* and *Transcriber*. Finally, *Content* is the section where the administrator user has to select the file from his/her computer, i.e. *Examine*, and then submit it, i.e. *Submit*, so that it is uploaded to the database. As stated earlier, OnICoMt only admits plain text files which must have been saved as a .txt file using UTF-8 codification.

OnICoMt is able to detect errors in the uploading process, mainly related to missing data in the form. In case an error of this type occurs, the *Upload* page is loaded again and a message dealing with the specific errors is displayed on top of it so that the user knows what should be amended. No text will be uploaded to the database in such a case. If the text is successfully uploaded, a message indicating this is shown on-screen. Moreover, text data as typed by the user are also shown together with other data including word count which is calculated by the application at the time of uploading.

Help is the page where the user can find instructions to use the application and tips to solve some problems s/he may encounter. *Configuration*, on its part, is the page where the user has access to several options as regards adjusting screen appearance and the way the results are shown, i.e. *Show results*. The *Administration* page can only be accessed by administrator users and there they can control who accesses the application, i.e. *User list* and *User registration*. They can also give OnICoMt the order to rebuild the index of texts stored in the database, i.e. *Reindex*. OnICoMt does finally allow users to view messages, i.e. *View messages*, which have been sent by using the page *Contact*, where users can send messages to both the developers and administrators of OnICoMt.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the corpus of study used in this thesis, that is, CoER. CoER is an electronic compilation of recipe texts covering different periods of the English language, i.e. Middle, early Modern and late Modern English. The texts are chronologically organised mainly on the basis of the indications provided by Taavitsainen and Pahta (1997), that is, the period between 1375-1550 is taken as representative of Middle English, and the period between 1550-1750 is taken as representative of early Modern English. They are also arranged by topic following the categories in Voigts and Kurtz (2000).

I have then assessed the recipe texts in relation to external and internal criteria following a systemic functional approach. While external criteria are those indicating the relationships that can be established between a given text and its purpose in a specific sociohistorical context, i.e. genre, internal criteria are those

related to the internal linguistic features of texts, i.e. text type. This approach has been satisfactorily applied to the study of recipe texts (Carroll 1999; Taavitsainen 2001a; Alonso-Almeida 2008b); it provides a thorough understanding of how texts are linguistically constructed and of other factors, including pragmatic ones, such as writer-audience relationships or authorial stance, among others.

Recipe texts belonging to the medical register are intended to provide their audience with instructions to prepare efficient medical products. They normally consist of a title that indicates what the remedy is for, a list of ingredients, explanations about how to combine them, indications about how to give the medicine to the patient, information concerning how to store the product, and a final statement asserting its efficacy. These are all the possible stages which can be found in recipes: the ingredients and the preparation section appear to be compulsory for a recipe to fulfil its purpose, however, the rest of the sections may or may not be present, and their position within the whole recipe may vary.

In terms of text type features, recipe texts are instructive. From a lexicogrammatical perspective, they are characterised as follows: titles may be realised by a variety of syntactic patterns, but they tend to have positive evaluative adjectives and references to diseases or body parts embedded in them. In the ingredients section, the ingredients are normally coordinated by means of coordinating conjunctions or punctuation, and it includes names of plants or compound substances, numerals and weight measures. The preparation section contains a massive presence of imperative forms of culinary verbs as well as names of ingredients and containers, and time expressions. The application is frequently indicated by verbs with coercive meaning or imperative forms; names of body parts, medical products and time expressions can be found in this stage, too. Imperatives are also found in the storage section together with names of containers. Finally, efficacy statements tend to be complete sentences with nominal or pronominal subjects followed by *shall* or *will* plus a bare infinitive. There is always some reference to recovery from illnesses and, sometimes, to religious matters.

The information retrieval tool which has been designed and implemented to manage CoER has been also described in this chapter. The description firstly focused on the technical features of OnICoMt, mainly on the specifications of

Sphinx, the search engine, in relation to indexing, file attributes and searching. Although Sphinx can manage text data in different formats, in OnICoMt data sources are plain text files that have been saved as .txt files and then uploaded to the MySQL database. Some attributes are attached to texts before uploading them to the database, all of which are useful not only for organisational purposes, but also for filtering out results when performing queries. Sphinx allows the user to make both simple and complex searches. Simple searches are performed by using a traditional Boolean syntax, i.e. using the operators AND, OR and NOT. Complex searches, on their part, need a specific query syntax involving the use of various operators and modifiers. These two types of searches have been also described and illustrated in this chapter.

I have finally described the interface of OnICoMt which have been thought of as a clear and intuitive one so that users can handle it easily. It has been structured by using some navigation tabs placed at the top of the main page which guide the user into the different pages. The tabs include the following: *Home*, *Search*, *Examine*, *Favourites*, *History*, *Upload*, *Help*, *Configuration*, *Administration* and *Contact*. The layout to the pages and the information contained in them have been also described in depth in this chapter.

Chapter 3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical framework which guides this thesis. It combines two of the most influential contemporary pragmatic theories, i.e. speech act theory (Austin 1975; Searle 1969) and relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995). The motivation for choosing these two theories is that they both provide a theoretical sound basis for the analysis of promises in medical texts. However, they do so at different levels: speech act theory will firstly help me in the identification of the illocutionary import of potential promises. Searle's (1969) constitutive rules, i.e. propositional content, preparatory, sincerity and essential, will be taken as the starting point for such a task. In order to arrive at the speaker's intended utterance, as different from the literal meaning of the sentence, contextual information must be taken into account. Speech act theory does not seem to account for an adequate inclusion of context at this stage of the analysis, since, as noted by some scholars, "the complexities of conversational interaction cannot be captured only by speech act theory" (Nakayasu 2009: 46), but it is clearly in order for the interpretation of speech acts.

Relevance theory will assist me here as it has proved to be efficient in the interpretation of a wide range of linguistic and literary phenomena, including speech acts. This theory emphasises the cognitive processes involved in human communication, i.e. linguistic and non-linguistic. Utterance interpretation will be guided by the principle of relevance and by the multiple contextual factors intervening in the communicative event upon which inference will operate, allowing logical deductions to be derived. In the case of efficacy statements, only appropriate contextual enrichment in the processing of such utterances can lead us to determine whether or not these are understood by the recipient as actual promises of efficacy.

It should be noted that the reconciliation of these two theories has been frequently considered to be difficult to make because of three main reasons (Dominicy and Franken 2001: 263): firstly, their units of analysis are different; speech act theory focuses on illocutionary acts and these do not exist as such in relevance theory. Secondly, speech act theory relies heavily on the assumption that, as far as communication is concerned, human beings tend to be *cooperative*. Relevance theory, in contrast, claims that communicators tend to be *optimally relevant*. Thirdly, taxonomical issues play a vital role in the identification of illocutions in speech act theory and this puts a constraint on the sort of examples that are liable to be analysed. However, in relevance-theoretic terms the emphasis is placed on *meaning* as shaped by the communicator's intention when issuing a speech act, allowing for analysis of a wide range of both literal and non-literal uses of language. Moreover, the recipient also participates actively in the communicative situation: s/he has to recover the speaker's intended meaning by working out the contextual effects of the utterance being guided by the principle of relevance.

I shall try to make this combination by focusing on the inferential approach to communication sketched in speech act theory and later on developed in relevance theory. In order to do so, I will first situate the origins of speech act theory by providing some notes as regards the philosophical context which led to its emergence. I shall then offer an outline of the main tenets of the theory which is generally based on the notion that statements can be used not only to describe or state facts, but also, and most importantly, to perform actions. In this light, it provides us with a functional rather than a formal approach to language as utterances are to be analysed within the specific speech situation in which they are issued.

As already pointed out, the understanding of speech acts can be cognitively accounted for in terms of inference and so at this point of the chapter I will introduce the main contribution of speech act theory in this respect. The Gricean view on inference to account for the understanding of speech acts is particularly relevant since it constitutes the point of departure for the formulation of relevance theory. Lastly, I shall present the core of relevance theory by clarifying some principles and concepts that are necessary for its application. In general, relevance theory can be taken as a reasoned account of both linguistic and non-linguistic

processing from a cognitive perspective in which the search for relevance guides the overall understanding of speech acts. I would like to note that every effort has been made to include the latest of references on speech acts and relevance theory in this chapter.

3.2 Speech act theory

Speech act theory (hereinafter SAT) is attributed to John Langshaw Austin. The main point behind his philosophy is that language and actions are connected in such a way that an act can be performed by simply issuing an utterance (apart from the act of issuing the utterance itself). Typical examples of the action character of language are *I christen this ship the Joseph Stalin* and *I now pronounce you man and wife* (Sadock 2004: 54). The action carried out by pronouncing the former is that of christening, while the latter is issued to marry a couple. Austin noticed that some restrictions apply so that not any words pronounced by anyone would do. Roughly speaking, the circumstances must be appropriate and the participants must intend to and, in fact, must conduct themselves subsequently for the utterance to count as a speech act (Austin 1975: 14-15).

Austin's theory was posthumously published as *How to do things with words* in 1962 and later on developed by his pupil John Searle who refined the original formulation. However, the notion of language as action had already been anticipated by some philosophers of language prior to the twentieth century. This is the case of Thomas Reid, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Anton Marty, Karl Bühler, Adolf Reinach and Ludwig Wittgenstein. A brief overview of their contribution to the philosophy of language insofar as it is related to the concept of speech act is in order since it will provide a contextualisation to account for the emergence of the theory proposed by Austin.

3.2.1 Antecedents

The origins of SAT, though timid, might be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century when Thomas Reid introduced a distinction between solitary acts and social operations (Yaffe 2007: 267). Reid noted that they are both

accomplished by the use of language, but there is a substantial difference between them as regards expression and their social dimension: solitary acts do not need to be expressed externally, be it in spoken or written form, to be fulfilled, whereas social operations do indeed have to be communicated. By definition, moreover, the performance of social acts does necessarily involve the presence of at least one participant other than the speaker to whom s/he can direct the expression of the act. In contrast, solitary acts are performed at the speaker's inner level without the existence of any other human being.

Reid did not only offer a definition of the two types of acts human beings can carry out through language use, but also a classification of acts into these categories. Solitary acts include judgments, acts of perception and memory, apprehending, understanding, reasoning, thinking, willing, deliberating and desiring (Schuhmann and Smith 1990: 59). Social operations, on their part, stand as the real breakthrough in Reid's philosophy at a time when the only linguistic concern of philosophers was the study of propositions and their verifiability. Questions, accepting, refusing, testimonies, commands, promises, contracting, threatening, supplicating, bargaining, declaring and plighting belong to the category of social operations (Schuhmann and Smith 1990: 58).

On the whole, there seem to be some similarities between Reid's theory and SAT, at least in two respects: first of all, they share the view of language as a tool to perform actions. In this sense, both Reid and Austin emphasise the role of the utterance as a physical sign which triggers the action. In its absence no social operation in Reid's terminology or illocution in Austin's can be deemed to have been performed. And secondly, social operations and illocutions have a social dimension: they presuppose the existence of another person apart from the speaker to whom these are addressed. But his/her role in the performance of social operations and illocutions is not that of a mere recipient; in fact, it goes beyond that as the addressee has to understand the social operation in question or to provide uptake for the illocution (Nerlich and Clarke 1996: 111). Otherwise, the speaker would not even bother to issue an utterance.

In spite of the fact that Reid's contribution to the study of the action character of language cannot be said to have been thorough, his writings stand as the first treatment of this notion. In order to find any serious attempt to articulate a

theory on linguistic action, it is necessary to go to the beginnings of the 20th century when *The apriori foundations of the civil law* by the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach was published. In this monograph, Reinach claims to have noticed the existence of linguistic actions, namely, social acts, such as commands, orders, promises, questions and requests. Referring to commands specifically, Reinach (1983: 19-20) characterised social acts as follows:

A command is neither a purely external action nor is it a purely inner experience, nor is it the announcing to others of such an experience. This last possibility seems to be the most plausible. But it is easy to see that commanding does not involve an experience which could be expressed but also not expressed, and also that there is nothing about commanding which could rightly be taken as the pure announcing of an internal experience. Commanding is rather an experience all its own, a doing of the subject which according to its nature has in addition to its *spontaneity*, its *intentionality* and its *other-directedness*, also the *need of being heard*. What has been shown for commanding also holds for requesting, warning, questioning, informing, answering and for still many other acts. They are all social acts, which, by the one who performs them and *in the performance itself*, are as it were cast towards another person in order to fasten themselves in his soul.

Social acts, then, are characterised in this passage by being, firstly, spontaneous. In the Reinachian account of linguistic action, spontaneity cannot be confused with the quality of not being planned. In this context, spontaneous acts are those “which consist in a subject’s bringing something about within his own psychic sphere (as contrasted with passive experiences of, say, feeling a pain or hearing an explosion)” (Smith 1985: 325). Social acts have an inner dimension, which Reinach called mental act, a type of psychological experience the individual necessarily undergoes so as to perform them. Besides, Reinach put forward, echoing Reid’s observations about the triggering power of the utterance, that many spontaneous acts have an outer dimension, too, and this is associated with the production of a linguistic utterance.

The second and the third characteristics of social acts mentioned in the quote above, i.e. intentionality and other-directedness, are interrelated. This will become apparent in what follows. These two features, especially intentionality, do not appear for the first time in Reinach’s philosophy of language. The former has a somewhat long history before Reinach’s time. As a matter of fact, its origins are

found in the medieval scholastic tradition, but the revival of the concept in the modern sense took place thanks to the investigations of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl; part of Reinach's writings are heir to them. Generally, intentionality is to be understood as the property of human minds which allows us to generate mental representations about objects, individuals and states of affairs, and so, it is not to be mistaken for the ordinary meaning of the word *intention*, i.e. purpose.

The concept of intentionality was reintroduced by Brentano in an attempt to make a distinction between physical and mental phenomena. Each of these belongs to a different sphere from the perspective of human beings: on the one hand, physical phenomena are part of the world and, as such, they are external. On the other hand, mental phenomena are intrinsically internal. Examples of the former are "colors, figures, a landscape, warmth and cold, and pictures", while instances of the latter are "thinking, judging, remembrance, expectation, doubt, fear, and willing" (Morrison 1970: 28). The relationship that holds between physical and mental phenomena in the Brentanian sense might ultimately be taken as one of inclusion: mental acts contain physical phenomena as an integral part when we create mental representations. In Brentano's words, every mental act has a content where some reference is made to an object in which case objects are intentionally contained in mental phenomena.

Husserl took up Brentano's thesis on intentionality, not without rejecting much of his teacher's ideas on both philosophy of language and psychology, to develop his own theory of meaning. This was based on the concept of objectifying act, that is to say, an act that is directed or targeted towards an object (Liangkang 2007: 67-70). Husserl posited that "every intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has such an act as its foundation" (Smith 1990: 34), and that giving meaning to the uses of language is an intentional experience in itself. Consequently, meaning assignment is an act of representation. Partly motivated by theories on part-whole relations, Husserl drew a distinction between the objectifying act and the object referred to in that act. The emphasis on this differentiation allowed him to postulate that human beings are meaning-making individuals to the extent that we are capable of engaging in those acts.

The notion of object-directedness was sophisticated by Anton Marty in terms of intimation and arousal (Smith 1990: 41). He was fully aware of the communicative purpose of language in social contexts where individuals do not merely use it to express mental states to others, but to induce, i.e. *intimate*, certain psychic processes in them and to influence subsequent behaviour. Thus, speakers may direct spontaneous acts not only towards objects in the strict sense, but also to other human beings so as to bring about certain states of affairs. With this, Marty put the emphasis as his predecessors did on the triggering power of utterances. He was conscious, too, of the fact that directing one's expression to another person was one requisite among others, such as the hearer's being able to form a presentation similar to the one the speaker wanted to awake, i.e. *arouse*, in him by producing such utterance.

The fourth characteristic of spontaneous acts as put forward by Reinach (1983: 19-20), their being necessarily heard, obviously derives from their other-directedness. It is a necessary condition for social acts to fulfil their purpose that they be heard or registered by the individual to whom they are directed. For illustration purposes, Reinach (1983: 19) commented on commands again the following:

Commanding by contrast announces itself in the act of turning to the other, *it penetrates the other (dringt in den anderen ein)*, and has by its very nature a tendency to be heard (*vernommen*) by the other. We never give a command if we know for sure that the subject to whom we turn with the command is incapable of becoming aware of it. The command is according to its essence *in need of being heard (vernehmungsbedürftig)*. It can of course happen that commands are given without being heard. Then they fail to fulfil their purpose. They are like thrown spears which fall to the ground without hitting their target.

Reinach accounted for this characteristic of social acts in terms of second-order intentions, which this time should be understood as *purpose*. A speaker's first-order intention involves the announcing of something to the hearer, which is done in the first place by the production of an utterance. The speaker's second-order intention involves the hearer's registering the utterance. This step within the whole structure of the social act is necessary to ensure potential uptake, which would guarantee complete fulfilment of the social act in question, providing that several other actions are also completed.

All in all, Reinach's social acts and Austin's speech acts have inner and outer dimensions with similar defining features. Austin (1975: 8) noted that "the uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of the act", just as Reid and Marty did, and that "it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether physical or mental actions or even acts of uttering further words". The occurrence of such mental experiences is a requisite for acts to count as performative in the Austinian framework as well, though not only on the part of the speaker, but also on the part of the other participants. The concept of action here is not restricted to the mental; probably, physical actions will be performed, too.

Clearly, this observation draws attention to the communicative function of language and so, goes against Leibnizian conceptions where this is said to be primarily an instrument to carry out cognitive operations, and secondarily and incidentally, a tool to communicate with our fellow humans. This has implications for the pragmatic analysis of language since the relationships individuals can establish through its use and their purposes behind that, among other things, come into play. Nevertheless, the psychological component of speech actions cannot be left aside as it was worked out by Brentano, Husserl, Marty and Reinach, and timidly by Austin as well. This view was defended by many other philosophers like Karl Bühler, to whom we owe the coinage of the term *speech act theory* (*sprachtheorie*). He also adopted this view of language as being used by humans in order to carry out actions.

Bühler's most important contribution to linguistics is the organon model which epitomises the instrumentalist conception of language, closely resembling Marty's approach to language as employed to intimate psychic processes to hearers and to arouse certain responses in them. In the organon model, language is a tool to which different functions can be attached, namely, representation, expression and appeal. To put it simply, it can be used for representing things, for expressing the speaker's states and feelings, and for influencing the hearer's behaviour. As a result, linguistic signs are functionally different depending on their use for representation, expression or appeal. Bühler labelled them as symbol, symptom and signal (Gorlée 2012: 25), respectively. These functions are not mutually exclusive so that more than one can be present in a given utterance, for

example, *it is very cold in here* may be used (i) to indicate a physical reality in a room, (ii) to express the speaker's feelings and /or (iii) to appeal to the hearer to close a window.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is another philosopher of language that I consider to be worth mentioning for a contextualisation of the emergence of SAT. He held a dynamic view of language and, according to him, it does not merely consist of a collection of words; it is an instrument with an infinite number of uses which can be achieved by speakers insofar as words are combined to create sentences by applying certain rules or language-games. The resulting sentences might be uttered by a speaker for several purposes. Wittgenstein (1958: 11-12) listed some such as (i) giving orders, (ii) describing the appearance of an object, (iii) constructing an object from a description (a drawing), (iv) reporting an event, (v) speculating about the event, (vi) forming and testing a hypothesis, (vii) presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams, (viii) making up a story; and reading it, (ix) play-acting, (x) singing catches, (xi) guessing riddles, (xii) making a joke; telling it; (xiii) solving a problem in practical arithmetic, (xiv) translating from one language to another, and (xv) requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

The meaning of language as conveyed by language-games, Wittgenstein (1958: 20) noted, is to be sought in the context in which they are used and so, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". In this view, the emphasis does not fall on the meaning of words *per se*, but on their specific use under certain circumstances which will ultimately shape how they are to be understood in a communicative exchange. Wittgenstein's dynamic perspective on language use reminds us of Austin's (1975: 100) words in relation to context: "the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange".

3.2.2 *The performative/constative distinction*

Austin's formulation of SAT was first sketched in some notes he prepared for a series of lectures entitled *Words and deeds* he was to deliver at Oxford University from 1952 to 1954. A year later, he presented his theory at Harvard University in

his William James Lectures which were posthumously published in 1962 as *How to do things with words* (Urmson 1975: v-vi). The starting point of his thesis is what he termed the performative/constative distinction, which, however, he did not hold throughout. I shall now focus on this distinction.

Aristotle's ideas on the statement-making function of language had remained authoritative well until pre-Austinian times when philosophical attitudes towards language were marked by a firm rejection against any linguistic analysis which did not focus on statements as truth or falsity bearers. This type of analysis is known as truth-conditional analysis. Hussein (2008: 61-62) nicely describes what truth conditional analysis is in the following terms: "speakers use language to say something about the world or describe a state of affairs. They relate between sentences (representational entities) and affairs in the real world (truth-conditional entities). The relation between the two entities is judged as either true or false". Truth-conditional analysis was, in fact, one of the major concerns of the logical positivist philosophers which gave propositions a privileged position in their investigations as a vehicle for conveying truth and falsity values. Austin (1950: 125) reacted against this attitude and coined the term descriptive fallacy to refer to it:

Not merely is it jejune to suppose that all a statement aims is to be "true", but it may further be questioned whether every "statement" does aim to be true at all. The principle of Logic, that "Every proposition must be true or false", has too long operated as the simplest, most persuasive and most pervasive form of the descriptive fallacy. Philosophers under its influence have forcibly interpreted all "propositions" on the model of the statement that a certain thing is red, as made when the thing concerned is currently under observation.

He observed that philosophers had been too much interested in considering statements as the only pieces of language that were worth investigating. These were taken as descriptions of states of affairs and, further, as being susceptible of verificationist analyses, according to which "unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified (i.e., tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless" (Levinson 1983: 227). Austin noted that statements were not the only stretches of language worth inquiring into since, in effect, they constitute just a small part of the vast amount of utterances speakers can produce.

Austin's objection to both the descriptive fallacy and the verificationist theory of meaning had to do with the fact that many utterances in ordinary language, even though they may have the form of statements from a grammatical point of view, are not intended to make statements at all and so they cannot be said to be true or false. For example, take the utterance *I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth* (Austin 1975: 5) which uttered when smashing a bottle of champagne against the stern and under certain other circumstances, i.e. felicity conditions, is not supposed to record information about what the speaker is doing. The utterer is not describing his/her doing anything; rather, s/he is actively doing things, namely, christening a ship with the name Queen Elizabeth. As such, this utterance resists truth-conditional analysis.

The introduction of the terms constative and performative served him to set out to formulate SAT. He was initially interested in establishing a distinction between the two, an attempt which he solved by binding together the term constative with utterances which have assertoric force and the property of being true or false, and the term performative with utterances upon whose saying doings were accomplished. For illustration purposes, consider the instances below:

- (26) I now pronounce you man and wife
- (27) I apologise for being late
- (28) My sister lives in Switzerland
- (29) Robert came back from Manchester yesterday morning

(26)-(29) are all declarative sentences which, according to verificationism, could be assessed as true or false in relation to their truth-conditions or their correspondence with observable facts. However, Austin's proposal in this respect would sound somewhat differently. In contrast to (28) and (29), he claimed that (26) and (27) are not primarily intended to report anything about particular states of affairs in the outside world; they are not uttered to describe anything truly or falsely. Instead, they are issued to accomplish certain actions, that is, marrying a couple in (26) and apologising in (27).

In addition to this, it should be noted that utterances of the sort shown in (26) and (27) are conventionally governed, but not strictly in the same way in each case. In the Austinian framework, (26) is to be uttered in the wider context of social conventions where there is a specific conventional procedure involving (i) specific participants and circumstances, (ii) the uttering of specific words and (iii)

subsequent participants' behaviour accordingly. Convention in (26) is to be understood as an integral part of institutions, specifically, the institution of marriage. In the case of (27), the sense in which convention is used is restricted to the surface realisation of the speech act. Austin (1975: 103) considers it "to be conventional in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula": the speech act of apologising is made explicit by the formula *I apologise*. The explicit formula is also present in (26), i.e. *I pronounce*.

The concept of convention is one of the issues which lies at the core of SAT in the senses of both social institutions and explicitness of illocutionary force. Still, Austin did not solve the question as to what is the exact role of convention in the performance of speech acts. Much has been written after the publication of *How to do things with words* about the relationship between speech acts and conventionality, mainly in the form of attempts to tackle the issue straightforwardly in terms of intentions (Grice 1957, 1975; Strawson 1964). Since intentions do certainly have important implications for the formulation of relevance theory, this issue will be addressed later on in this chapter Section 3.3 (page 87). But, for the time being, let me introduce one of the most important contributions which, at the same time, stands as a critical revision and improvement of Austin's conception of convention: Strawson (1964).

Austin and Strawson took how conventionality relates to performatives in essentially distinct ways. While the former claimed that in the absence of conventions, speech acts cannot be performed (Millikan 2005: 139) and, as such, conventions govern every single speech act that is performed, the latter differentiated between two kinds of performatives, those that are essentially conventional and those that are not. Strawson admitted that conventionality is present in the performance of those speech acts that are ritualistic and ceremonial in nature, i.e. Austin's favoured christening and marrying, but these are not genuine examples of ordinary communicative behaviour. By making slight modifications in Grice's account of non-natural meaning, he was able to explain how everyday speech acts are successful by the recognition of the speaker's intention on the part of the hearer on the basis of his/her having issued an utterance.

In Austin's sense of conventionality other than institutional, the force of the utterance is made explicit by the presence of a formula: formulas are conventional means of indicating the illocutionary force of utterances. In this sense, efficacy statements tend to be formulaic in nature and realised with recurrent syntactic patterns. One of the most frequent patterns consists of a pronoun subject + *shall* + *be* + *hole*. However, the presence of this formula does not always guarantee the utterance having a commissive illocutionary force; sometimes, contextual information hints at another type of illocutionary force such as a simple prediction. Similarly, other utterances where no formula occurs may be intended as promises by the writer. Consequently, the process of contextual enrichment as accounted for in relevance-theoretic terms plays a central role in the recovery of the writer's intended meaning. The relevance-theoretic approach to communication and to speech acts in particular will be addressed later on in this chapter Section 3.3 (**page 87**).

In the Austinian framework, the existence of a conventional formula is not necessary for the utterance to have its intended force. The explicitness/implicitness dichotomy served him as a parameter for classifying performatives. Take the following examples:

- (30) I order you to leave the room immediately
- (31) Leave the room immediately
- (32) I warn you that there is a spider under your chair
- (33) There is a spider under your chair

(30)-(33) are all performative utterances. Yet, there is a major difference between the members of each pair ((30) and (31), and (32) and (33)), even though they share the force of being orders, i.e. (30) and (31) (provided that the speaker has authority over the hearer), and warnings, i.e. (32) and (33) (provided that there is a potential danger for the hearer). In the case of (30) and (32), the verbs *order* and *warn* make explicit the force of the utterance, while in (31) and (33) there are not any such verbs indicating what the speaker is issuing the utterance for. In this situation, then, the force of the utterance is to be recovered by the hearer from implicatures derived from contextual clues.

The fact that (31) and (33) may be successfully recovered by the hearer as an order and a warning respectively imply that there is no actual need for performative utterances to be explicitly formulated by means of a performative

verb like *order* or *warn*. In practice, there is a whole range of performative uses of language in which using a performative formula would result awkward or unnatural. Consider *I insult you*, where the force of the utterance is explicitly indicated, but nobody would ever consider himself/herself as having been insulted by the speaker's sole saying of this. Thus, the utterance would not be taken as intended by the speaker and would fail to be performative at all.

Austin tried to tentatively isolate the characteristics of explicit performatives from syntactic and semantic standpoints. He initially posited that explicit performatives contain a performative verb of the sort shown in (30) and (32) above whose performative nature may, in turn, be reinforced by the addition of the adverb *hereby*. Besides, explicit performative verbs are used in the first person singular of the simple present indicative active, i.e. *I order* and *I warn*. This led him to the performative formula: *I (hereby) verb-present-active X*. He soon realised that there are cases where changes in subject, tense and voice render an equally explicit performative:

- (34) We suggest that you have a balanced diet
- (35) You are fired (Davies 1979: 236)
- (36) Passengers are requested to carry valid photo identification
- (37) I am asking you to give me your sincere opinion on the matter
- (38) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted (Austin 1975: 57)

(34) contains a first person plural subject; (35) and (36) have a second and a third person plural subject with verbs in the passive voice; the verbal form in (37) is in the progressive aspect; and (38) contains an occurrence of an impersonal subject. These examples evince that performative utterances do not have particular grammatical features facilitating their identification, not even when there is an explicit performative verb.

Austin's performative/constative dichotomy did not survive the end of his lectures and finally collapsed in favour of his theory of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The author eventually contended that "there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act" (Austin 1975: 139). Instead of a clear-cut distinction between performatives and constatives, there is overlap. This he explained by showing that constatives like *all men blush but not any men blush*, *the cat is on the mat but I do not believe it is*, and *all John's children are bald but John has no children* (Austin 1975: 48) are

unhappy with respect to the notions of entailment, implication and presupposition, respectively, just as much as performatives may be with respect to breach of commitment, insincerity and nullity.

Moreover, he realised that there are parallelisms between a constative like *the cat is on the mat* and the performative *I promise to be there*. In both cases, certain subsequent conducts will be in order and some others will be out of order: my uttering of the constative implies my believing that the cat is on the mat, and my uttering of the performative implies that I have the intention to be there. Otherwise, it would be pointless to issue them. But he does not overlook the possibility of someone's producing such utterances, which he labelled infelicitous or unhappy. These stand in sharp contrast with those that can be said to be felicitous or happy. It is precisely to his doctrine of infelicities that I now turn.

3.2.3 Felicity conditions

In the Austinian theory, performative utterances are not to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity which, initially, were thought to be characteristic of constatives. Rather, performatives are to be labelled felicitous or infelicitous insofar as some conditions do or do not obtain. These are the felicity conditions: they do not only account for those cases in which an utterance performs an act successfully, but also those where certain things in the speech situation go wrong and the act is, as a result, unsuccessful. One such situation is brought about if, for example, a baby is baptised by someone who does not have the authority within the Christian community to perform the act of baptising; the whole act would turn out to be infelicitous. Austin (1975: 14-15) spelled out the felicity conditions as follows:

(A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B. 2) completely.

(Γ . 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(Γ . 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

The observance of the felicity conditions above is a requisite for speech acts to be successful, but Austin is aware of the fact that speech acts are, on occasion, imperfect. He put forward the existence of infelicities and he classified them into two broad types, namely, misfires and abuses. Misfires can be further divided into misinvocations and misexecutions, and insincerities are to be found within abuses. Furthermore, there are misapplications under misinvocations, and flaws and hitches under misexecutions. Figure 6 summarises the doctrine of infelicities.




Figure 6. The doctrine of infelicities (Austin 1975: 18).

A misfire is a kind of infelicity in which the act is purported but void so that no effect is achieved. This would be the case if any of the conditions A or B do not obtain, e.g. a marriage ceremony is celebrated in an unauthorised place, say, in a church where no notice of intended marriage has been previously given and, in

addition, it is conducted by someone who has not been officially appointed to celebrate marriages. Within misfires, there are misinvocations and misexecutions. The former occur when the act is disallowed because the procedure cannot apply in the intended way or because, simply, there is no procedure at all. For instance, the uttering of the words *I do* on the part of a random speaker cannot be accepted as his/her indulging in marriage, even though s/he has the intention to do so. As for misexecutions, these occur when the act is vitiated as a result of a mistake such as the priest's pronouncing a couple husband and wife by using wrong names. I should like to note that in both misinvocations and misexecutions the act does not succeed.

As regards misapplications (rule A. 2 is not observed) on the one hand, and flaws (condition B. 1 does not obtain) and hitches (rule B. 2 is not followed) on the other, they are kinds of misinvocations and misexecutions, respectively. One example of misapplication of the procedure occurs when a priest marries a stallion and a mare, since there is no convention whatsoever to the effect of marrying animals. Austin (1975: 36-37) referred to flaws as those misexecutions where vague references are employed, e.g. *I bet you the race won't be run today*, issued when there is more than one race scheduled for today. Hitches occur when the procedure is not executed by all participants completely and, again in the marriage ceremony, this would be the case if the bride says *I do* and then the groom says *I don't*.

Under the label abuses, Austin includes those infelicities related to the speaker's feelings, thoughts and intentions, and their occurrence involves his/her violating rules Γ . 1 and Γ . 2. In contrast with misfires, abuses do not prevent the act from succeeding. Insincerities are typical examples of abuses, e.g. *I apologise for having to leave right now*, pronounced when the speaker does not feel sorry at all for having to leave. Or *I advise you to use this device*, uttered when the speaker does not think that it is going to be helpful for the hearer at all to use a particular device instead of another. Or *I swear I will not leave you behind*, said when the speaker does not have the faintest intention of taking the hearer with him/her. Each of these examples involves the speaker's not having the requisite feelings, thoughts and intentions, but the speech act is after all performed.

Austin admitted that (i) the notion of infelicity applies to all speech acts without exception, but specially to those that are conventional in nature; (ii) sometimes, utterances are infelicitous because more than one condition does not obtain, so overlap does actually happen, and (iii) conditions of the sort Γ are rather problematic since it is a complicated task to clearly differentiate between cases where the speaker does not have the appropriate feelings, thoughts or intentions. As pointed out earlier, the concept of intention as dealt with by Austin and refined by Grice and Strawson will be addressed when treating the formulation of relevance theory.

As stated in Section 3.2.2 in this chapter (**page 61**), the performative/constative distinction collapsed. The reason why Austin could not maintain the dichotomy is precisely that he noticed that constative utterances are like performatives in that they are both subject to his felicity conditions. Moore's (Moore 1942: 543) paradox epitomises the way constatives, too, are subject to infelicities. Take the following:

(39) It's raining but I don't believe it is

When *it's raining* or any other indicative sentence is uttered as an assertion, the speaker implies that s/he believes in them, so an utterance like (39) turns out to be absurd. This is also possibly extended to other versions of Moorean assertions such as the ones with the truth-conditions expressed in (40), (41) and (42) (Hájek 2007: 218):

(40) p and I believe that not- p

(41) p and I believe that p is not true

(42) p and I don't believe that p is true

Austin noted that utterances of this sort are not felicitous because they go against condition Γ . 1 or, in other words, in order to produce an utterance with assertive force like the first conjunct of (39), the speaker is supposed to have a specific thought, namely, one of belief in what s/he is saying. Interestingly, infelicities also apply to other utterances where presuppositional relationships do not hold, i.e. (43a-b):

(43a) My sister-in-law is pregnant

(43b) I do not have sisters-in-law

The utterance of (43a) by a speaker presupposes that s/he has a sister-in-law, so it would be completely out of order for him/her to produce (43b). However, the

possibility of a speaker's uttering (43a-b) exists, in which case the resulting utterance is infelicitous because condition $\Gamma. 2$ is not observed, that is, producing (43b) makes certain subsequent conduct compulsory, this conduct being not uttering sentences like (43a).

The performative/constative distinction was substituted for a general theory of speech acts which was articulated around the dimensions present in each speech act: locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act. According to Austin, these are all present when a speech act is performed, not only in performatives but also in standard constatives in the traditional sense. He roughly isolated the characteristics of each of these acts, but, as noted by some researchers (Sadock 2004), it is not easy to do so in practice. This tripartite distinction together with the problems related to their identification and delimitation will be dealt with in Section 3.2.4 (**page 71**). The description of the three-dimensional characterisation of speech acts in the Austinian sense seems to be relevant in the discussion of SAT because later formulations are partially based on his ideas in this respect, specifically, the developments proposed by Searle. A description of Searle's four-dimensional characterisation of speech acts and the constitutive rules which have to obtain for their performance is in order since it will be taken as the starting point for the identification of the illocutionary force of efficacy statements.

3.2.4 Locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts

Apart from the postulation that language has a performative character, Austin's formulation of SAT introduced the notion of speech acts as having a tripartite dimension: when speakers produce an utterance, they simultaneously carry out locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, none of which is separable from the rest and all of which are present when speech acts are performed. I shall concentrate on each of them in what follows.

A locutionary act involves the production of a linguistic expression in which words are combined to create sentences that conform to a certain grammar and that have a particular meaning (Searle 1968: 406). It can be further subdivided into three other acts, (i) a phonetic act, (ii) a phatic act and (iii) a rhetic act (Austin 1975: 92-93). The first one has to do with the physical production of some vocal

sounds or some written symbols. These are combined to construct words, phrases or sentences following certain phonological and grammatical rules together with semantic and pragmatic constraints thus constituting a phatic act. The rhetic act is equated with meaning in the Austinian framework and it includes questions such as reference assignment and deixis.

An illocutionary act relates to the kind of action the speaker intends to bring about by the production of his/her utterance within a conventional system. It is the act performed *in* speaking (Sadock 2004: 54). Typical illocutionary acts are bequeathing, ordering, warning, intending, promising, undertaking, apologising, congratulating, thanking, affirming, denying and informing. In the literature on SAT, the function the speaker's utterance is intended to fulfil is frequently referred to as illocutionary force.

A perlocutionary act concerns the consequences the utterance has over the hearer in terms of thoughts, feelings and/or subsequent action, all of which are beyond the speaker's control and, as such, they may or may not have been intended by him/her. This is the act where the effective aspect of performatives becomes manifest. I shall use one example from Bach (2006: 150) to illustrate the three-dimensional status of speech acts:

(44) The bar will be closed in five minutes

The production of (44) on the part of the bartender constitutes a speech act. Three different acts are realised simultaneously: firstly, there is the locutionary act, that is, his saying of (44) as a consequence of his speech organs being capable of articulating those sounds in a certain order as conforming to both phonetics and syntax of the English language. Certain other semantic and pragmatic factors come into play, namely, reference assignment and time of utterance. The bar he is referring to is the one he runs, and the point in time in which the bar will be actually closed is five minutes from the time of utterance. Secondly, there is the illocutionary act, or the function the speaker wants his utterance to fulfil, and that is the informing to the people present in the bar that it will be closed in a short period of time and, in addition to this, the advising to order the last drink. And thirdly, there is the perlocutionary act; the bartender makes them believe that he is closing the bar in five minutes. On the basis of this, some of them may decide to buy another drink, since there is still time, and some others may decide

to get ready to leave. These two effects are both intended by the bartender, above all if they happen in sequential order.

Searle objected to Austin's tripartite dimension of speech acts, especially to Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, which he refused to accept on the grounds that he included meaning in locutionary acts. According to Searle (1968: 407), meaning in Austin's sense, i.e. sense and reference, is part of the illocutionary force of an utterance, hence the concepts of locutionary act and illocutionary act converge:

The meaning of the sentence determines the illocutionary force of its utterance in such a way that serious utterances of it with that literal meaning will have that particular force. The description of the act as a happily performed locutionary act, since it involves the meaning of the sentence, is already a description of the illocutionary act, since a particular illocutionary act is determined by that meaning. They are one and the same act. Uttering the sentence with a certain meaning is, Austin tells us, performing a certain locutionary act; uttering a sentence with a certain force is performing a certain illocutionary act; but where a certain force is part of the meaning, where the meaning uniquely determines a particular force, there are not two different acts but two different labels for the same act.

Austin seemed to have overlooked what his pupil called the principle of expressibility, i.e. "whatever can be meant can be said" (Searle 1968: 415). This principle operates in such a way that any illocutionary act which can be realised by the issuing of an utterance is part of the meaning of that utterance. The principle also determines the fact that every illocutionary act can be reduced to an utterance whose literal meaning expresses the exact force of the illocution intended to be performed. The existence of the principle of expressibility implies that meaning and force cannot be really discrete aspects of speech acts, as Austin suggested, since the force of an utterance is conveyed through its meaning.

After making some adjustments in terminology, Searle (1969: 23-33) proposed a four-dimensional reformulation of speech acts: utterance acts, propositional acts and, adopting Austin's own concepts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. Utterance acts and propositional acts do roughly correspond with Austin's locutionary acts. The former is associated with the production of speech sounds, and from a speech act theoretical point of view appears to be

rather uninteresting because utterances are not properly communicative *per se*, but only when functions of the illocutionary sort are attached to them.

Propositional acts include both referring and predicating. Referring is in itself a speech act as when one refers to something or someone in an utterance, the speaker is picking out the identity of that something or that someone from a wide range of possibilities. As for predication, this has to do with characterising the referent. According to Searle (1969: 22), when two illocutionary acts share the same referent and predication about it, both of them express the same proposition:

(45) Sam smokes habitually

(46) Does Sam smoke habitually?

(47) Sam, smoke habitually!

(45), (46) and (47) express the same proposition, i.e. *Sam smoking habitually*, if, in the three of them, *Sam* refers to the same individual about whom the same thing is predicated. Let us assume that these two conditions obtain. Consequently, these three utterances realise the same propositional act. But propositional acts cannot be realised independently; rather, when propositions are expressed, they are always so in the performance of an illocutionary act. In the case of the examples above, three different illocutionary acts are performed, namely, stating, questioning and commanding, respectively, and the proposition underlying these illocutionary acts is the same. Context, then, is essential for the identification of illocutionary acts.

It was originally suggested by speech act theorists that there seems to be a relationship between the form of utterances and the functions they are to accomplish or, in other words, between locutions and illocutions, so that declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives are used with the purpose of making statements, giving orders and making questions respectively. Consider (48), (49) and (50):

(48) It is a sunny day

(49) Bring me that newspaper

(50) What's the time?

In these examples, there appears to be a one-to-one correspondence between declarative, imperative and interrogative moods, and the illocutionary acts of stating, commanding and questioning together with the illocutionary forces of commitment to the content expressed by the utterance, attempting to get the

hearer do something and asking for information. Nonetheless, this form-function association amounts to oversimplifying the issue and can result in misleading utterances like (51), (52) and (53):

(51) I am exhausted

(52) Tell me who the first man on the moon was

(53) Can you set the table?

Sentence structure points at (51) being a statement, (52) a command and (53) a question. Even though it is possible to use (51) to state the speaker's state of exhaustion, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where it is issued as a request for help to carry a heavy box. Nor is it infrequent to find a teacher who asks for some information to one of his/her students by using (52), so that it is not a command properly speaking. (53) cannot be taken as a request for information either when it is uttered by a father to his son when they are about to have dinner. He would not be asking him whether or not he is able to set the table, he would be asking him to actually set the table, and so it is a command rather than a question.

There are ways in which hearers are given some sort of help for the identification of illocutionary forces, that help being making the illocutionary force explicit by means of illocutionary force indicating devices (hereinafter IFIDs). IFIDs are elements contained in the syntactic structure of sentences which show "how the proposition is to be taken, or to put it another way, what illocutionary force the utterance is to have; that is, what illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of the sentence" (Searle 1969: 30). In the English language, IFIDs include a wide range of elements such as syntactic arrangement, punctuation, prosody, verbal mood and typical explicit performative verbs.

Very much in the Austinian fashion of felicity conditions, Searle (1969: 36-37) claimed that there are certain rules, i.e. constitutive rules, which have to be followed for the performance of speech acts:

speaking a language is performing acts according to rules. The form this hypothesis will take is that the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules.

These lie at the basis of the performance of speech acts and show content variation across speech act types. He listed four of them: propositional content rules, preparatory rules, sincerity rules and essential rules. He provided a detailed account of the constitutive rules that obtain for promises, but this will be looked at in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.1 (**page 110**) when talking about promises as commissive speech acts. I shall use the analysis Searle extended to other speech acts like asserting, requesting and thanking to illustrate how constitutive rules work:

Type of rule	<i>Asserting</i>	<i>Requesting</i>	<i>Thanking</i>
Propositional content	Any proposition <i>p</i>	Future act <i>A</i> of <i>H</i>	Past act <i>A</i> done by <i>H</i>
Preparatory	1. <i>S</i> has evidence for the truth of <i>p</i> 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>H</i> knows <i>p</i>	1. <i>H</i> is able to do <i>A</i> . <i>S</i> believes <i>H</i> is able to do <i>A</i> 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>H</i> will do <i>A</i> in the normal course of events of his own accord	<i>A</i> benefits <i>S</i> and <i>S</i> believes <i>A</i> benefits <i>S</i>
Sincerity	<i>S</i> believes <i>p</i>	<i>S</i> wants <i>H</i> to do <i>A</i>	<i>S</i> feels grateful or appreciative for <i>A</i>
Essential	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that <i>p</i> represents an actual state of affairs	Counts as an attempt to get <i>H</i> to do <i>A</i>	Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation

Table 4. Constitutive rules for *asserting*, *requesting* and *thanking* (Searle 1969: 66-67).

Constitutive rules of the sort specified in Table 4 regulate the bringing about of the speech acts of asserting, requesting and thanking because of their status as logically dependent on the observance of those rules. In this sense, they provide the specifications required in order to perform speech acts.

Regarding assertion, the propositional content rule determines that any proposition, e.g. *it's raining*, has to be expressed. The preparatory rule obtains if and only if the speaker has evidence, say, visual since s/he has seen through the window that it is raining indeed. Moreover, context does not provide him/her with any conclusive evidence for inferring that the hearer knows that it is raining. The sincerity rule is followed when there is a sincere belief on the part of the speaker that it is raining. As pointed out earlier, *it's raining but I don't believe it is* gives rise to a paradox of the sort described by Moore. Finally, the essential rule for asserting that it is raining implies that there must be an acceptance of *it's raining* as a fact.

As for a request, take for instance *can you pass me the book over there?* The propositional content underlying this utterance is characterised by a hearer's future action which, according to the preparatory rule, s/he is physically able to carry out and the speaker, in turn, considers him/her able to do, too. In addition to this, none of them take this action to be realised by the hearer under normal circumstances unless there is such a request on the part of the speaker. Sincerity is also present in this request if the speaker does really want the hearer to pass him/her the book. The utterance *can you pass me the book over there?* ultimately counts as an attempt on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to pass him/her the book.

Concerning a speech act of thanking such as *thank you for giving me a ride*, constitutive rules are supposed to have been followed when the hearer gave the speaker a ride at some point in the past (propositional content rule). The speaker believes that s/he benefited and, in fact benefited, from the hearer's giving him/her the ride because s/he was late for work and so, s/he was earlier than expected at the workplace (preparatory rule). When uttering *thank you for giving me a ride*, the speaker is sincere about his/her feeling grateful (sincerity rule), and his/her uttering of this counts, as a matter of fact, as an expression of gratitude (essential rule).

Austin's and Searle's conception of speech acts are similar to the extent that certain conditions and rules must obtain for their performance. Certain parallelisms may be established between Austin's felicity conditions and Searle's constitutive rules. In general, violating Austin's felicity conditions A. 1 and A. 2,

i.e. misinvocations, amounts to violating Searle's preparatory rules. And likewise, breaches of felicity conditions $\Gamma. 1$ and $\Gamma. 2$ roughly correspond to violations of sincerity rules.

At first sight, it might seem that drawing the distinction between the dimensions constituting speech acts is nothing but an uncomplicated task. Nevertheless, the difficulties when doing so were already acknowledged by Austin himself and later on by other speech act theorists like Sadock (2004: 55) who put forward that the problem arises when trying to distinguish between locutions and illocutions on the one hand, and on the other, between illocutions and perlocutions. This is obviously the case if we accept Austin's trichotomic view on speech acts, but it is not so if we take Searle's proposal instead, at least as far as locutions and illocutions is concerned.

To my mind, the problem still remains in relation to illocutions and perlocutions since there is no way of determining the extent to which the speaker's intention as underlying illocutionary acts can be clearly separated from the effects or consequences brought about by illocutions. Moreover, perlocutionary acts have deserved little attention in research (Cohen 1973; Davis 1979; Gu 1993; Marcu 2000; Akhimien 2010) when compared to locutionary and illocutionary acts, mainly because scholars take perlocutions to be outside the scope of linguistics: they seem to offer nothing interesting for the understanding of language.

3.2.5 Taxonomies of illocutionary acts

The first taxonomy of illocutionary acts was provided by Austin (1975) in the last chapter of *How to do things with words*, but not without some reservations: he acknowledged that this classification may not be fit when facing specific examples of illocutionary acts in context and that there may possibly be overlap between the categories he identified. According to him, there are five classes of illocutionary acts: verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives.

Verdictives are speech acts in which the speaker provides the hearer with a finding based on some evidence for its formulation. They are typically found in

official settings, but can also occur in others which are not so. Examples of verdictives include *acquit*, *convict*, *find*, *interpret as* and *reckon*.

Exercitives are illocutionary acts where the speaker makes a decision for or against a specific course of action so that the hearer is obliged to advocate for it. These are frequently used in official contexts, as well, such as appointments, elections or resignations, e.g. *appoint*, *dismiss*, *name*, *order* and *warn*.

Commissives are acts in which the speaker is committed to a specific course of action, for instance, *adopt*, *agree*, *contract*, *intend* and *promise*.

Behabitives are speech acts where the speaker expresses his/her attitudes towards others' attitudes and behaviour like *apologise*, *congratulate*, *criticise*, *protest* and *thank*.

Expositives are illocutionary acts in which the speaker exposes his/her views on a particular matter, conducts arguments for or against something and provides clarification. Some examples of expositives are *affirm*, *concede*, *illustrate*, *inform* and *refer*.

Searle found several weaknesses in Austin's taxonomy, the first one of them being that he did not provide a classification of illocutionary acts, but of illocutionary verbs in English, many of which are not even performative. Take, for instance, *intend*, a verb Austin classifies under commissive illocutionary acts. Searle (1979: 9) rightly noticed that to say *I intend* cannot be taken as the speaker's being intending; "intending is never a speech act". In addition to this, he pointed out that there is no consistency for the classification Austin proposed: he used various parameters for assigning illocutionary verbs to illocutionary categories, namely, on the basis of discourse relations (expositives), the existence and exercise of authority (exercitives), and "notions of what is good and bad for the speaker or hearer" (behabitives) (Searle 1979: 10). Derived from its inconsistency for classification, Austin's taxonomy is, moreover, characterised by overlap, not only across but also within categories which hold very distinct types of illocutionary verbs.

Searle proposed an alternative taxonomy of illocutionary acts by taking into consideration several criteria such as illocutionary point, direction of fit and the sincerity conditions expressed in each illocutionary act. Since sincerity conditions have already been dealt with in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4 (page 71) by paying

special attention to speech acts like asserting, requesting and thanking, I shall only clarify now what illocutionary point and direction of fit are by following Searle's own explanation.

The illocutionary point of a speech act should not be confused with its illocutionary force; these are two distinct aspects of illocutions. The former can be defined as "the internal point or purpose of a type of illocution" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 87) or, in terms of inclusion, as "the main component of illocutionary force [...]. Each illocutionary force has an illocutionary point. The illocutionary point [...] of an illocutionary force is what the speaker conventionally intends to do when he performs that illocutionary act of that force" (Vanderveken 1980: 252-253). In this view, commands and requests are said to share the illocutionary point because they are both intended to get the hearers do something, but their illocutionary forces are quite different.

Part of the illocutionary point of a speech act is said to entail a matching of words to the world, or a matching of the world to the words. This matching Searle calls direction of fit of illocutionary acts. Asserting, describing and stating are speech acts whose direction of fit is words to world, while commands, promises and requests are illocutions with world to words direction of fit. These two criteria, i.e. illocutionary point and direction of fit, together with the sincerity conditions and/or the expression of a psychological state, are the parameters Searle used primarily to establish a taxonomy of illocutionary acts. These are specified below together with their corresponding symbolism. In general, this is used following a fixed order so that the first place is occupied by the symbol indicating illocutionary point; the second one is filled by that signalling direction of fit; the third one contains the sincerity condition and/or the psychological state; and, finally, the fourth place holds the propositional content typically associated with specific speech acts:

Assertives are symbolised as $\vdash \downarrow B(p)$. These are illocutionary acts where the illocutionary point is one of commitment on the part of the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. The assertive illocutionary point is indicated by means of Frege's assertion sign \vdash . The direction of fit of assertions is words-to-world and this is so signalled by means of the downwards arrow. Finally, the

psychological state expressed in assertions is that of belief, i.e. B , in the proposition expressed, i.e. (p) .

Directives are symbolised as $! \uparrow W (H \text{ does } A)$. They count as attempts to get the hearer to do something and so this is represented by means of the sign $!$. In contrast to assertives, their direction of fit is world-to-words, which is symbolised by the use of the upwards arrow. The existence of a wish, i.e. W , is in order for directives to count as speech acts, and the wish does necessarily affect the carrying out of an action on the part of the hearer.

Commissives are symbolised as $C \uparrow I (S \text{ does } A)$. C represents the speaker's commitment to the realisation of a future action, which is, in fact, the proposition underlying a commissive speech act, i.e. $S \text{ does } A$. Commissives are similar to directives in that their direction of fit is world-to-words and, for their successful performance, there must be an intention, i.e. I , on the part of the speaker to carry out a certain action.

Expressives are symbolised as $E \emptyset (P) (S/H + \text{property})$. Their purpose is to express, i.e. E , a psychological state (P) about a certain state of affairs as specified in the propositional content behind them. Expressives do not have direction of fit because the speaker is not really trying to match his words to the world, nor vice versa, and so this is indicated by the symbol \emptyset .

Declarations are symbolised as $D \updownarrow \emptyset (p)$. The point of a declaration is to bring about a change in the status of the entity referred to in it, i.e. D . When a declaration is, as a matter of fact, successfully performed, there is a correspondence between the propositional content underlying it and reality, so that, as Searle (1979: 18) put it, "a declaration brings about a fit by its very successful performance". Their direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words, even though they are not aimed at describing anything nor at trying to get someone do something, as are assertives and directives, respectively. This is so because of their very nature as performed within extralinguistic institutions. Apart from this, there is no need of a sincerity condition.

There have been other attempts to improve Austin's taxonomy by paying attention to grammatical or semantic features. For instance, both Vendler (1972) and Fraser (1974) took verb complementation as the grammatical criterion for classifying illocutionary verbs. McCawley (1985), on his part, focused on

performative verbs which can be used in the passive voice to create his classification. As for the semantic criteria used to classify illocutions, Ballmer and Brennesthul (1981) and Wierzbicka (1987) followed patterns of semantic similarities among performatives to differentiate between several classes. However, as noted by Sbisà (2009: 237) Searle's classification is still highly influential. This may be so because other attempts of classification, far from clarifying foundational issues, continue confusing basic aspects such as illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs (for a detailed account of the weaknesses in the attempts mentioned above, see Tsui 1987).

Some scholars have also found weaknesses in Searle's taxonomy, for instance, Ballmer and Brenennstuhl (1981), Edmonson (1981) or Leech (1983). All their criticism has to do with Searle's mistaking illocutionary verbs for acts. Nevertheless, this does not undermine the fact that the parameters he proposed for the identification of types of speech acts are exhaustive and completely justified in order to have a thorough picture of the pragmatic elements intervening in them. These parameters are certainly useful for the identification of commissive illocutionary acts and, in particular, of potential promises of efficacy in our corpus of study as they allow the inclusion of contextual aspects frequently overlooked by speech act theorists.

3.2.6 Understanding speech acts

As pointed out earlier in this chapter Section 3.2.2 (**page 61**), the understanding of speech acts is, on occasion, a matter of convention, but always a matter of recognition of intentions, which is the main problem when trying to ascertain what illocutionary force is to be assigned to specific speech acts. This issue was firstly addressed by Grice (1957) who put forward the idea that human communication is guided by the speakers' having certain intentions which, in turn, are supposed to be shown so that the audience get them recognised. Grice (1957: 385) formulated this in the following terms: “‘*A* meant_{NN} something by *x*’ is (roughly) equivalent to “*A* intended the utterance of *x* to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention””.

The Gricean programme on recognition of intentions is articulated around the cooperative principle (hereinafter CP), which is said to govern conversational

exchanges. The principle, which Grice (1975: 45) defines as “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”, determines the way participants adjust their informational contributions in relation to a number of maxims, i.e. quantity, quality, relation and manner. Grice (1975: 45-46) spelt them out as follows:

QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence.

QUANTITY:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

RELATION: Be relevant.

MANNER: Be perspicuous.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

Central to the Gricean pragmatic framework is the distinction between saying and meaning, a distinction which we may all intuitively derive from the single fact that we sometimes mean more than we say. Grice dealt with this issue formally in his theory by appealing to the notion of implicatures. These “are generated from various nonfulfillments of the CP” (Mooney 2004: 901) and may be considered to be, in general, a way of dealing with cases where speakers do not observe the maxims. Take the following conversational exchange, for instance:

- (54) A: I have just baked a delicious cake, would you like to have some?
 B: The doctor put me on a low-fat diet yesterday

B's reply does not seem to follow the maxim of relation since, to a question of the sort posed by A, one would expect a simple *yes* or *no*, apart from other linguistic elements like *thank you* in order to sound polite. An implicature would be derived by A so as to understand B's reply as an answer to his/her question in spite of the fact that B does not observe the maxim of relation. In order to do so, A would rely on context, linguistic or non-linguistic, and background knowledge (Grice 1975: 50). Together with other ingredients, a cake is made of fat, in which case someone who is on a low-fat diet for medical reasons is expected not to have a piece. This expectation puts A on the track to understand B's reply as a negative answer to his/her question. However, B's intention when uttering *the doctor put me on a low-fat diet yesterday* cannot solely be to imply a negative answer; s/he must be pursuing other goals, for example, to arise in A some interest in his/her health and well-being.

The type of reasoning hearers follow for the working out of implicatures is inferential in nature. Grice (1975: 50) proposed the following path for the recovery of implicatures:

He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.

The recovery of implicatures is ultimately grounded on the recovery of the speaker's communicative intention. There are certain basic requirements for intentions to be recognised by a hearer; first of all, the speaker's intention must be directed towards him/her. Secondly, it must be also intended to be recognised by the addressee. And thirdly, its fulfilment is brought about only when the intention has been recognised.

As put forward in this chapter Section 3.2.2 (**page 61**), Strawson refined Grice's notion of recognition of intentions so as to explain how speech acts can be successful on the basis of the hearer's recognising the speaker's intention when issuing an utterance. Strawson (1964: 447) made some modifications on the Gricean formulation by adding a second-order intention on the part of the speaker

to get the hearer recognise his first-order intention and rendering it as shown below (after Sperber and Wilson 1995: 21):

To mean something by x , S must intend

- (a) S 's utterance of x to produce a certain response r in a certain audience A ;
- (b) A to recognise S 's intention (a);
- (c) A 's recognition of S 's intention (a) to function as at least part of A 's reason for A 's response r .

As noted by Sperber and Wilson, Grice's analysis and Strawson's reformulation can be taken as a starting point for an inferential theory of communication, which is, precisely, how they take it for the formulation of relevance theory. Inference plays a vital role in the understanding of speech acts and, in general, in human communication. Bach and Harnish (1979, 1992) and Harnish (2007), too, endorsed Strawson's theory of intentions and Grice's inferential approach to recognition of intentions.

Bach and Harnish (1979) proposed a speech act schema, a general inferential schema for the detection and understanding of illocutionary forces and attitudes expressed in speech acts (Ifantidou 2001: 26). The schema is primarily based on the way inferences operate on mutual contextual beliefs, i.e. background information which is activated by the contextual situation and which is entertained by both speaker and hearer. This information is necessary for the computation of inferences. The schema takes the following form (Bach and Harnish 1979: 61-66):

1. S is uttering e .
2. S means ... by e .
3. S is saying that $*(\dots p\dots)$.
4. S , if speaking literally, is F^* -ing that p .
5. S could not (under the circumstances) be F^* -ing that p .
6. Under the circumstances there is a certain recognizable relation R between saying that $*(\dots p\dots)$ and some F -ing that P , such that S could be F -ing that P .

7. S is *F*-ing that *P*.

Bach's and Harnish's inferential path is guided by the derivation of inferences from already achieved conclusions in the path together with mutual contextual beliefs and the communicative presumption (Bach and Harnish 1979: 62-65), that is, the mutual belief existing in a linguistic community by means of which when a speaker says something in the language of that community to another member, s/he is doing so with an illocutionary intent which is supposed to be recognisable by the hearer. In the case of indirect speech acts, this account must be extended to include other conversational presumptions, namely, relevance, sequencing and sincerity. These apply in such a way that, depending on the stage of the talk exchange, the speaker's contribution has to be relevant, appropriate and sincere, respectively (Ifantidou 2001: 27).

Sperber's and Wilson's theory is similar to Grice's, Strawson's, and Bach's and Harnish's approaches to the understanding of speech acts in that they take not only intention but also inference as the starting point for the development of their theory. Nevertheless, relevance theory is far richer because it provides an account of human communication, both linguistic and non-linguistic, in terms of the cognitive processes that are triggered whenever human communication occurs successfully and/or unsuccessfully.

Section 3.3 (**page 87**) below will be devoted to present the main tenets of the relevance-theoretic approach to communication and, particularly, to the understanding of illocutionary acts. As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the theoretical machinery of SAT says but little about the cognitive processes involved in the understanding of speech acts, albeit providing the necessary tools for the initial identification of the illocutionary import of utterances. Relevance theory, however, provides us with a principled and systematic way of working out what contextual factors actually operate on the understanding of speech acts by using a single principle, i.e. the principle of relevance.

As will be shown, context in relevance-theoretic terms includes the preceding linguistic environment in which the utterance occurs and the set of assumptions that allow hearers to recover the intended interpretation, including other assumptions retrieved from (i) the very communicative situation, (ii)

observation of the immediate environment, (iii) common sense, (iv) cultural knowledge, and (v) any other item of information the hearer has access to at the time of interpretation. Being guided by the principle of relevance and on the basis of the contextual information at their disposal, hearers can recover speakers' intended meaning, intentions and attitudes underlying the issuing of a speech act. All of this will be explained in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

3.3 Relevance theory

Tightly connected to Grice's theory, relevance theory (hereinafter RT) explains human communication in terms of recognition of the speaker's communicative intention. Rules governing language are not enough for hearers to recognise his/her interlocutors' communicative intentions, and so they have to rely on other mechanisms, mainly inferential, to carry out such a task. The inferential account provided by RT and, particularly, the ostensive-inferential model of communication it proposes, tries to offer an explanation, in realistic terms, of the cognitive processes that take place in our mind when we communicate. The remainder of this chapter will deal with RT in depth.

3.3.1 Encoding, decoding and inference

The code model, which can be traced back to Shannon's and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication (Shannon 1948), accounts for communication in terms of information's being encoded by the speaker into a signal which is later on decoded by the hearer (Wilson 1998). In this theory, successful communication occurs when there is an exact reproduction into the hearer's brain of the information the speaker encoded after a decoding process. The following diagram shows how the code model works for human communication:




Figure 7. Human verbal communication following the code model (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 5).

This hypothesis of how human communication works had been highly influential in Western culture from Aristotle's times up until modern semiotics. However, it presents an important deficiency: human communication does not consist in the mere duplication of the speaker's thoughts into the hearer's mind. Consequently, encoding and decoding cannot be the sole mechanisms involved in comprehension.

The inferential theory of communication served as an alternative to the classical code model. According to it, communication occurs successfully when the hearer recognises the speaker's intention to convey some information on the basis of his/her identifying a stimulus produced by the speaker with this purpose. As put forward earlier in this chapter Section 3.2.6 (**page 82**), Grice set the basis for the inferential model which was later adopted by Sperber and Wilson, and developed into the ostensive-inferential model of communication.

Ostensive stimuli are central to the ostensive-inferential theory of communication. An ostensive stimulus is primarily designed to attract the hearer's attention. It can be defined as a particular kind of behaviour which is explicable only if one assumes that the speaker wants to provide evidence of his/her intention to communicate. This evidence, then, is intentionally provided by the speaker so that the hearer achieves certain conclusions, i.e. the ones presumably foreseen by the speaker. In this model of communication, communicators are said to have two intentions, namely, informative and communicative. The former refers to the intention to inform the hearer of something, while the latter refers to the intention

to inform the hearer of the informative intention. In this framework, utterances are ostensive stimuli. Take the following for illustration:

- (55) A: Are you leaving?
(B takes her coat and purse)

A and B have just had an argument at A's place. A sees B is heading towards the spot she left her belongings when she arrived, so he asks her *are you leaving?* She does not provide him with a straightforward *yes*; instead, she produces evidence which, combined with other contextual assumptions such as *after having had an argument, one might not feel in the mood to stay with whom one has argued* and *someone who wants to leave a place does normally take his/her belongings with him/her*, allows him to derive the conclusion that, in fact, she is leaving.

Even though Sperber and Wilson grant the existence of coded communication, they take the code model alone to be insufficient to explain complex communication processes. Natural languages can be considered to be codes since they pair phonetic and semantic representations of sentences, but sometimes there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the propositions underlying them (Moya-Pardo 2006: 34). This is especially manifest when context-dependent expressions like deictics are used, mainly because they do not encode their referents. In these cases, the code is not enough to guarantee successful communication. Apart from this, there are other occasions on which the code is wrongly applied, i.e. slips of the tongue, but successful communication occurs anyway because hearers are eventually able to recover the speaker's intended meaning.

All things considered, human communication involves complex forms of communication where both coding and inference play a part. Sperber and Wilson claim that the differences that exist between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts to be conveyed by utterances may be overcome by inference instead of more decoding. This means that in order to achieve verbal comprehension, human beings have to make use of both decoding and inference. What is more, they say that decoding involves the performance of some inferential tasks.

Encoding, decoding and inference are combined in RT in such a way that in a certain communicative exchange, a speaker produces a stimulus, that is, a verbal utterance which will serve as evidence for the hearer to infer the speaker's

intended meaning. The hearer is supposed to decode the information encoded in the utterance to use it as part of the evidence which will allow him/her to infer the speaker's intended meaning. This s/he will do by combining the decoded information with appropriate contextual information being guided by the principle of relevance.

3.3.2 The principle of relevance

In the relevance-theoretic approach, the appropriateness of the contextual information against which the understanding process occurs and which ultimately allows the hearer to infer the speaker's intended meaning is determined by a general cognitive principle, or what Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260) call the first principle of relevance:

The First Principle of Relevance

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.

According to this general principle, relevance is a property of any sort of observable phenomena in the external world. Phenomena, in general, and stimuli, in particular, may serve as input for cognitive processes to an individual at any time. However, human cognition does not attend to every phenomena or stimuli. In order to operate efficiently, its resources have to select those phenomena or stimuli which are likely to provide the individual with an epistemic improvement; otherwise, his/her cognition would dismiss them as irrelevant. Take, for instance, a situation where an individual has just gone to bed in a house where there is no one else but him/her. There may be several stimuli in the environment which s/he does not attend to such as the ticking of the alarm clock or the sound of the wind blowing outside. S/he would pay attention, nevertheless, to a sudden noise coming from downstairs.

The sort of information likely to bring about an epistemic improvement and so improve the individual's representation of the world, i.e. provide him/her with positive cognitive effects, is not that which is completely new and unrelated in any way whatsoever to his/her existing representation. Positive cognitive effects result from different cognitive operations, namely, (i) the confirmation of already existing assumptions, i.e. contextual strengthening, (ii) the contradiction and

elimination of information already held, i.e. contextual contradiction and elimination, and (iii) the acquisition of new assumptions that can only be achieved by the combination of new and old assumptions, i.e. contextual implications (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 251). Consequently, inputs will be relevant if and only if their processing yields positive cognitive effects.

Furthermore, relevance assessment is a matter of degree. Our cognition does not simply tend to be geared to pick out relevant stimuli; it tends to pick out the most relevant ones from the available alternatives. In order to assess the relevance of stimuli, there are two basic parameters which must be taken into consideration: processing effort and cognitive effects. The processing of any stimulus always involves some effort, but the cognitive effects its processing yields may or may not be worth achieving. Relevance is, then, a matter of balance between the expenditure of effort needed to process inputs and the contextual effects possibly achieved after their processing. Since it is not an absolute category, relevance is better defined in terms of extent conditions (Sperber and Wilson 2002: 252):

Relevance of an input to an individual

Extent condition 1: Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Extent condition 2: Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Consider the following situation adapted from Wilson and Sperber (2002: 252) to illustrate how relevance assessment works: Jules and Elle are talking about James' and Kate's last night dinner to celebrate their first wedding anniversary. Jules does not know whether or not they gave anything to each other as a present, but Elle knows because she phoned Kate right after the dinner. She may tell Jules any of (56)-(58):

(56) James gave Kate a bouquet of flowers

(57) James gave Kate a bouquet of roses

(58) Either James gave Kate a bouquet of roses or 10^2 is not 100

Any of (56)-(58) would be relevant to Jules in the same situation, but some of them would be more relevant than the others in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort. As such, (57) would be more relevant than (56) because it

entails the latter, so that the processing of (57) would not only yield the conclusions derived from the processing of (56), but many more. (57) is also more relevant than (58): in spite of the fact that they both have the same contextual effects, the information conveyed in the second disjunct has no relation whatsoever with the context and so yields no contextual effects at all. Nevertheless, its processing requires some extra effort such as the introduction of deductive rules to infer that the second disjunct is false and the first one is true.

As noted above, relevance is better defined as a comparative rather than a quantitative notion, but this does not mean that comparisons are always feasible. In any case, the comparative view seems to be more plausible from a psychological perspective: it is highly improbable that, every single time human beings are to process an utterance, they numerically calculate how much effort and how many processing effects it would have; it is easier to make approximate estimations and compare them. In addition to this, there are many features of human cognition which cannot be measured at all. These two reasons back Sperber's and Wilson's (1995: 131) conception of effort and effect as non-representational properties.

Our cognitive tendency to pay attention to potentially relevant stimuli is not that much of a choice, but a result of the evolution of human cognitive resources through time. The more general, first principle of relevance has some important implications for the explanation of human communication. As a matter of fact, this tendency "is exploited in ostensive-inferential communication" (Vega-Moreno 2003: 308). How is this so? The relevance-theoretic approach claims that, since the existence of the first principle of relevance is innate in all human beings, when we want to communicate something, we exploit our natural tendency to focus on the most relevant stimuli in our environment. The production of an ostensive stimulus should be such that it must appear to be relevant to the audience, that is, it must call for little processing effort while producing as many as possible positive cognitive effects. In other words, the stimulus must be worth the audience's attention and their cognitive processing. This is the core of the second principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260), which cannot be formulated without reference to the presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270):

The Second Principle of Relevance

Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

The Presumption of Optimal Relevance

The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it.

The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences.

Every act of ostensive communication does, in itself, raise expectations of relevance in the audience, that is, the audience presumes that whatever the producer of the ostensive stimulus wants to communicate is going to be relevant enough for them to pay attention to it and to process it. But what is the degree of relevance they are allowed to expect? Maximal relevance appears to be an inadequate notion as it has been noted by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 266-271), and Higashimori and Wilson (1996: 112-113): there is a wide range of reasons why a speaker might not use the most relevant stimulus to communicate with his/her audience such as that s/he cannot think of a more relevant stimulus at that time or, simply, that s/he is not willing to produce the most relevant stimulus even though s/he might be well aware of its existence. This is the main motivation behind the second clause in the presumption of optimal relevance where the communicator's abilities and preferences come into play. In any case, communicators are expected to produce stimuli, i.e. utterances, which are as relevant as possible.

3.3.3 Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure

The presumption of optimal relevance suggests a comprehension procedure which is characterised by "check[ing] interpretative hypotheses in order of accessibility, that is, follow[ing] a path of least effort, until an interpretation which satisfies the expectation is found; then stop" (Carston 2002: 45). Wilson and Sperber (2002: 259) spell out the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure as follows:

Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure

Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

Moreover, the procedure can be divided into a number of sub-tasks (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 261):

Sub-tasks in the overall comprehension process

Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the explicit content (in relevance-theoretic terms, EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.

Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED PREMISES).

Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS).

Consider a situation in which Kate's birthday is going to be soon, and Jules and Elle have planned to buy her something. They have considered the possibility of asking James if he wants to participate. Jules asks James the following and he provides her with the reply below:

- (59) a. Jules: Will you join us in buying Kate's birthday present?
 b. James: I have already spent all my money from my salary this month

The process to construct hypotheses which will ultimately allow Jules to understand James' reply is guided by the principle of relevance. It might proceed as follows: Jules firstly recognises that James has produced a linguistic stimulus in a language she knows. This provides her with assumption (60a). As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 177) note, "a linguistic stimulus triggers an automatic process of decoding", which employs an assumption like (60b) as a starting point. While decoding alone would allow Jules to recover the logical form of (60b) as shown in (60c), both decoding and inference would permit her to obtain its fully propositional form as shown in (60d) (Wilson and Sperber 1993: pp.). (60d) is the explicature derived from (59b) and it can only be obtained after reference assignment, temporal resolution and pragmatic enrichment have been carried out.

(60a) James has spoken to Jules

(60b) James has said to Jules “I have already spent all my money from my salary this month”

(60c) x has said to y at time $t1$ that z has spent all the money from his salary at time $t2$

(60d) James Ford has said to Jules Cobb at 12.00 p.m. on May 5 2010 that James Ford has already spent all the money from his salary at 12.00 p.m. on May 5 2010

There are other assumptions that Jules entertains in the comprehension procedure. One of them is (60e) since, in relevance-theoretic terms, his utterance constitutes an act of ostensive communication which comes, say, with a tacit guarantee of relevance. The expectations raised by the second principle of relevance together with the fact that an answer to the question posed by her is the most relevant thing she can expect make her entertain assumption (60f).

(60e) James’ utterance will be relevant to her

(60f) James’ utterance will be relevant by answering Jules’ question about James’ participation in buying Kate’s birthday present

At this point, the comprehension process may proceed in the following way: Jules extends the context by accessing the encyclopaedic entry of “birthday present”, which, for ease of exposition, I shall consider as a single concept. Its encyclopaedic entry probably contains the factual assumption in (60g) which is added to the context in which (59b) is processed. Probably, the assumption which occurs to Jules next is (60h), which is an implicit premise of James’s utterance. By following deductive rules of the sort *modus ponendo ponens* (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 87) as shown in (60i), she derives the implicated conclusion (60j).

(60g) In order to buy a birthday present, one needs money

(60h) If one spends one’s money from one’s salary, one cannot buy somebody a birthday present

(60i) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P
(ii) (If P then Q)

Output: Q

Input: (i) James has spent all his money from his salary
(ii) If James has spent all his money from his salary, he cannot

buy Kate a birthday present

Output: James cannot buy Kate a birthday present

(60j) James cannot buy Kate a birthday present

(60k) James would like Jules to lend him some money to buy Kate’s birthday present

(60j) finally satisfies Jules' expectation of relevance when processing James's answer to her question: he is not going to participate in buying Kate a birthday present. This is the strongest implicature conveyed by (59b) and, as a matter of fact, it has to be supplied if (59b) is relevant at all. In this case, James is said to be responsible for Jules's supplying it (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 199). The processing of (59b) might lead to Jules's supplying other weaker implicatures, for instance, (60k), but only with an appropriate enrichment of the context with background information about James's habit of borrowing money from people and his sincere willingness to buy Kate a birthday present.

3.3.4 Logical forms, factual assumptions and concepts

At this stage, there are certain terminological aspects which I should like to touch upon, above all, those that have been raised in the explanation of the comprehension procedure of (59b). In order to do so, I shall start commenting briefly on the relevance-theoretic conception of the mind. According to RT, the mind is roughly organised in different modules, all of which are in charge of carrying out specialised tasks. In this respect, Sperber and Wilson follow the Fodorian view of the structure of the mind (Fodor 1983). As far as communication is concerned, both input systems and central systems are essential. The former can only process information coming from our senses while the latter is in charge of transforming the information processed by the input systems, apart from other obtained from memory, into conceptual representations. The function of the central system two-fold: firstly, it combines conceptual representations so as to generate new information and secondly, it stores information which may be important in its memory (Pons-Borderia 2004: 27).

The nature of the combination of conceptual representations so as to yield new information is considered to be inferential in RT (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 71) and this constrains what the conceptual representation system is like. Conceptual representations must necessarily have logical properties to undergo inferential processes, i.e. implication, contradiction and deduction. The logical properties of a conceptual representation constitute its logical form, which depending on its specific structure undergoes formal logical operations. Logical forms can be, furthermore, propositional or non-propositional: propositional

logical forms are those which are semantically complete and, consequently, can be true or false, whereas non-propositional logical forms are semantically incomplete and cannot be true or false. However, they can undergo logical processing and be transformed into well-formed assumptions thanks to contextual information; the only requisite for them is to be well formed. Consider (61), (62) and (63):

- (61) He brought a piece of it with him
- (62) He brought something with him
- (63) No one brought anything
- (64) James Ford brought a piece of cheesecake with him

The sense of (61) is non-propositional because deictics like *he*, *it* and *him* have no definite reference and so, it cannot be said to be true or false, but it is still a well-formed logical form as it entails (62) and contradicts (63), in which case it can definitely undergo logical processing. Contextual information would render (61) as a roughly semantically complete propositional form of the sort shown in (64).

Logical forms are stored in memory in certain specific ways, that is, they are stored with certain attitudes attached to them. For instance, (64) may be entertained as a true description of a state of affairs. The central system is also responsible for evaluating information and assigning truth values to it. True information is the only one that seems amenable to be stored because false information would contribute nothing to human beings' understanding of the world. The sort of information stored and entertained as a true description of the world, i.e. fact, is called factual assumption and, according to RT, "factual assumptions are the domain par excellence of spontaneous non-demonstrative inference processes" (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 75).

Factual assumptions are not only derived from (i) sensory perception, but also from (ii) linguistic decoding, (iii) conceptual memory and (iv) deductive processes (Pons-Bordería 2004: 31). As pointed out earlier, stimuli coming from sensory perception are transformed into conceptual representations. Linguistic stimuli, on their part, trigger decoding processes whose result is not a conceptual representation, but a logical form. Conceptual memory is where assumptions and assumption schemas are stored and these are used as premises in deductive processes where certain conclusions are obtained. Let us now focus on the structure of conceptual memory.

Information is stored in conceptual memory as structured sets of constituents which are called concepts in relevance-theoretic terms. A concept is, say, an address in which three different types of information are stored, namely, a lexical entry, an encyclopaedic entry and a logical entry. Lexical entries contain “information about the natural-language counterpart of the concept”, that is, its phonological and morphosyntactic characterisation. Encyclopaedic entries contain “information about the extension and/or denotation of the concept”, for instance, information related to the prototype of a certain category. Logical entries contain “a set of deductive rules which apply to logical forms of which that concept is a constituent” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 86). Take the following examples:

- (65) *Alegría por las desgracias ajenas*
Logical entry: Hyponymy-hyperonymy relations
Encyclopaedic entry: Ideas related to the concept
Lexical entry: Ø
- (66) *And*
Logical entry: &
Elimination of the conjunction
Encyclopaedic entry: Ø
Lexical entry: Conjunction
- (67) *James*
Logical entry: Ø
Encyclopaedic entry: Ideas related to the concept
Lexical entry: Proper name

The lexical entry of a concept like *rose* contains phonological information, and morphosyntactic information, i.e. noun, singular. There are concepts which may lack lexical entries because they are not lexicalised. This is the case of the example provided by Pons-Bordería (2004: 41) about German *Schadenfreude*, which in Spanish remains as the non-lexicalised concept *alegrías por las desgracias ajenas*, as shown in (65).

As noted above, the encyclopaedic entry of a concept holds information regarding its extension and/or denotation in the form of both assumptions and assumption schemas about the concept in question. They typically show variation across speakers since we do not all entertain the same assumptions in the same way about the same concept. Moreover, the information contained in the encyclopaedic entry of a concept may be constantly changing by the addition of new assumptions. Take again the concept *rose*: its encyclopaedic entry can

contain assumptions like *a rose is a type of flower*; *a rose has a pleasant smell*; *a rose can be red, pink, white or yellow*; *a rose can have thorns* and so on. There are also concepts which lack encyclopaedic entry such as conjunctions (Pons-Bordería 2004: 41), because they do not refer to any object or event in the world, and so, there are no assumptions related to them. This is the case of conjunctions like *and* in (66).

Deductive rules, on their part, can be found in the logical entry of a concept. RT emphasises the role of deductive rules in the performance of inferential tasks where the truth of the conclusions arrived at is guaranteed by the application of those rules. This point contrasts with the Gricean account of inference in which the truth of the conclusions depends, instead, on the observance of the CP and the maxims. How the principle and the maxims work in an inferential process to achieve a conclusion is barely specified in Grice's writings. For that end, he proposed an informal way of reasoning which I quoted in Section 3.2.6 (**page 82**) when commenting on the derivation of implicatures. Sperber's and Wilson's proposal bring about some improvements on the explanation of the role of inference in human communication by the introduction of deductive rules: logic guarantees the truth of the conclusions obtained.

Inferential processes allow human beings to obtain new information by applying deductive rules to sets of premises. There are two types of deductive rules, namely, analytic and synthetic. Roughly speaking, analytic rules apply in the derivation of a conclusion by taking only one assumption as a premise. This is due to the fact that the content of the premise is included in the content of the conclusion, as in (68). Synthetic rules apply in the derivation of a conclusion by taking two assumptions as premises, as in (69).

- (68) *Premise*: James bought a bouquet of roses
 Conclusion: James bought a bouquet of flowers
- (69) *Premise 1*: Kate does not hand in her assignment
 Premise 2: If Kate does not hand in her assignment, she will fail the subject
 Conclusion: Kate will fail the subject

The conclusion derived in (68) is determined by a lexical relationship of hyperonymy because the sense of *roses* includes the sense of *flowers*. As for (69), the conclusion can only be derived via the combination of the two premises and

none of the two premises alone would allow the derivation of the conclusion that Kate will fail the subject.

Specifically, premises may be related to yield a conclusion by applying rules of (i) *and*-elimination, (ii) *modus ponendo ponens* and (iii) *modus tollendo ponens*. These are shown below (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 86-87):

(70) *And*-elimination

(a) Input: (*P* and *Q*)

Output: *P*

(b) Input: (*P* and *Q*)

Output: *Q*

(71) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) *P*

(ii) (If *P* then *Q*)

Output: *Q*

(72) *Modus tollendo ponens*

(a) Input: (i) (*P* or *Q*)

(ii) (not *P*)

Output: *Q*

(b) Input: (i) (*P* or *Q*)

(ii) (not *Q*)

Output: *P*

In (70), there is a single premise whose constituents are conjoined by *and*. After applying *and*-elimination rule, one of the constituents is removed, and the conclusion contains the other. In (71), the input takes two premises, one of which contains a condition. The conclusion is derived from obtaining that condition. (72) takes as input two premises, one of them being a disjunction and the other the negation of one of the disjuncts. The other disjunct is then derived as conclusion. Just as some concepts may have empty encyclopaedic and lexical entries, there may be others which do not have logical entries, for instance, proper names like *James* in (67).

3.3.5 Relevance-theoretic approach to speech acts

The relevance-theoretic approach to speech act interpretation differs substantially from the speech act theorists' own. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 243) observe that the data speech act theorists have been concerned with since the inception of SAT do not, in principle, appear to be interesting for a pragmatic theory. Their main

contribution is, instead, their putting forward the need for analysing non-declarative sentences, which is, precisely, where relevance-theoretic scholars agree with SAT. The most important assumption made by SAT in this respect is that successful communication occurs when the speech act intended to be performed by the speaker is recognised by the hearer (Blakemore 1990-1991: 198; 1992: 91-120; 1995; Sperber and Wilson 1995: 244; Wilson and Sperber 1998a; Wilson 2000).

RT claims that not all speech acts have to be recognised in order to be successfully performed, so it makes a distinction between those acts which have to be recognised for their successful performance, i.e. communicated acts, and those which do not, i.e. non-communicated acts (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 245; Blakemore 1990-1991: 200-202; Nicolle 2000). The former category includes acts such as *bidding two no trumps*, *declaring war*, *thanking* and *promising*, while the latter includes others like *asserting*, *claiming*, *denying* and *warning*. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 246) add another category which includes speech acts like *asking*, *saying* and *telling*. I shall briefly refer to the second and third categories so as to have a general vision of speech act interpretation in RT.

The second category referred to in the previous paragraph, that is, non-communicated acts, include speech acts like *predicting*, *suggesting*, *threatening* and *warning*. Consider the speech act below:

(73) You are going to spill all the juice

(73) may be issued as a prediction in which no explicit performative verb, i.e. *predict*, is used. What makes this utterance a prediction is the relationship between the propositional content of the utterance and a future situation (Pons-Bordería 2004: 60). It could be also used as a warning, in which case the relationship is again established between the propositional content and a future event. On this occasion, the event does further cause a potential problem for the hearer. In neither case is it necessary that the speaker had the intention to predict or warn for the hearer to understand (73) as a prediction or a warning.

As for *asking*, *saying* and *telling*, later speech act-theorists and relevance-theorists noted that “the correlation between syntactic sentence types and generic speech acts cannot be maintained” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 247). In relevance-theoretic terms, syntactic features are indicators by means of which hearers may

recover the illocutionary force of an utterance. In order to do so, hearers do also use the very cognitive activity in which they are engaged and the guidance of the principle of relevance.

RT defines the speech act of *saying that P* as “communicating that the thought interpreted by P is entertained as a description of an actual state of affairs” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 247). Consider (74):

(74) I found the movie compelling

According to the definition provided above, a hearer of (74) would take this utterance as a literal interpretation of the speaker’s thought. S/he would then recover assumptions (75) and (76):

(75) The speaker has said that the speaker found the movie compelling

(76) The speaker found the movie compelling

If (74) achieves relevance in this way, it is an assertion. However, (74) may have been uttered ironically, so that the most relevant interpretation would be achieved by recovering assumption (77) instead:

(77) The speaker did not find the movie compelling

In the case of (74) being issued as an ironical utterance, nevertheless, there must be other assumptions to be recovered so that a hearer can understand it properly; otherwise, the speaker would have produced (78) so as not to cause the hearer to make extra processing of deriving the assumption that the speaker implicated the opposite of what s/he said.

(78) I did not find the movie compelling

As regards *asking P* or *asking Wh-P*, echoing Escandell-Vidal (1999), Pons-Bordería (2004: 60) notes that there are occasions on which they are not used as a request for information, even though they may have a rising intonation, as in exam questions or rhetorical questions (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 251). Depending on the sort of question one is dealing with, that is, *yes or no-question* or *Wh-question*, the propositional form will be recovered differently. Consider (79) and (80):

(79) Were you at the meeting yesterday?

(80) Where did you go yesterday?

(79) is an example of *asking Wh-P*. The expected answer must be of the sort *yes or no* and so, two fully propositional forms originate, namely, *Yes, I was at the meeting yesterday*, and *No, I wasn’t at the meeting yesterday*. The very question

guarantees a relevant answer if the thought interpreted by *P* is true and the only thing the speaker has to do is to choose between one of them. In (80), by contrast, no fully propositional form can be recovered, but only a *Wh-question* and a less-than-propositional logical form such as *I went to _____ yesterday*. The completion of the thought interpreted by *P* will be relevant if true.

Lastly, the interpretation of *telling to P* can be similarly accounted for. Take (81) and (82) for instance:

(81) Go and fetch me a coffee

(82) Mind the step

Firstly, the hearer has to recover the propositional form of (81), which, being an order, will be similar to *the speaker is telling the hearer to P*. In the relevance-theoretic framework, *telling the hearer to P* is then analysed as “communicating that the thought that *P* interprets is entertained as a description of a desirable state of affairs” for the speaker (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 251). In (82), the recovery of *the speaker is telling the hearer to P* and *telling the hearer to P* is analysed rather differently: there is a change in perspective because the state of affairs is desirable not for the speaker but for the hearer, in which case (82) is not a straightforward order but a warning. The hearer has to derive this by carrying out inferential tasks being guided by the principle of relevance.

Assumptions of the form *the speaker has said that _____* and *the speaker is telling the hearer to _____* are higher-level explicatures in relevance-theoretic terms. These result from the development of the logical form of an utterance and its being embedded into appropriate propositional attitudes or speech act descriptions (Wilson and Sperber 1993) on the basis of contextual information. Higher-level explicatures are crucial to account for understanding the illocutionary force of an utterance in RT. Wilson and Sperber (2002: 274) put this point as follows:

The recognition of irony, like the recognition of illocutionary acts and expressions of attitude, involves a higher order of metarepresentational ability than the recognition of the basic proposition expressed by an utterance, whether literal, loose or metaphorical. More generally, on both Gricean and relevance-theoretic accounts, the interpretation of every utterance involves a high degree of metarepresentational capacity, since comprehension rests on the ability to attribute both informative and communicative intentions.

The understanding of illocutionary force is ultimately derived from our cognitive ability to use metarepresentation in verbal comprehension. Metarepresentation can be generally defined as “a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it” (Wilson 2000). Blakemore (1995) illustrates the role of higher-level explicatures in the understanding of illocutionary force with the following examples:

- (83) a. I promise you that Tom will be there
b. The speaker is promising the hearer that Tom will be there
- (84) a. I warn you that Tom will be there
b. The speaker is warning the hearer that Tom will be there
- (85) a. I guess that Tom will be there
b. The speaker is guessing that Tom will be there
- (86) a. I assert that Tom will be there
b. The speaker is asserting that Tom will be there

The higher-level explicatures in (83b) and (84b) are the result of the development of the logical form of (83a) and (84a), respectively. These higher-level explicatures are considered to be a description of the speech act the utterer of (83a) and (84a) is said to perform, that is, promising and warning. However, the presence of the explicit performative verbs *promise* and *warn* cannot be considered to be IFIDs in the relevance-theoretic approach to speech acts: they simply guide the hearer in the enrichment of the logical form of the utterance to recover the higher-level explicatures. These will gain relevance by allowing the hearer to derive the contextual implications of (83a) and (84b).

In contrast, relevance-theoretic scholars do not take the speakers of (85) and (86) to be performing any kind of speech act. Instead, they claim that the higher-level explicatures in (85b) and (86b) are just descriptions of the speaker’s attitude towards the propositions expressed in (85a) and (86a). In these examples, *guess* and *assert*, very much in the fashion of *promise* and *warn* above, help the hearer in the identification of the speaker’s attitude. Blakemore goes further into the relevance-theoretic approach to speech acts by positing that there are certain differences between promising and warning, guessing and asserting, mainly because promises have to be recognized by hearers in order to be understood, while the latter do not. In fact, the identification of utterances as warnings, guessings and assertions is seen as a consequence of their understanding. The

interpretation of promises, moreover, does also require some knowledge regarding institutional and cultural aspects of their formulation.

In this respect, Pons-Bordería (2004: 59) points out that linguistics is in charge of the identification of this sort of speech acts. Nicolle (2000: 235) seems to enrich this idea by proposing an analysis of institutional speech acts following RT, an approach dismissed *a priori* by Sperber and Wilson (1995: pp), Blakemore (1990-1991: 199, 1995) and Carston (2002) on the basis of their being of no real interest to pragmatics. The formulation of promises, then, should be analysed taken into account both linguistic and cultural factors because they are linguistically expressed within specific cultural frameworks. Chapter 4 (**page 109**) focuses on commissive speech acts and, particularly, on promises.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the theoretical framework which guides this research. The identification of those utterances which can be taken as promises in medical texts will rely on SAT. I have firstly contextualised the emergence of the theory by making reference to its antecedents as found in the work of some philosophers of language, notably Reid, Reinach, Brentano, Husserl, Marty, Bühler and Wittgenstein. Their contributions somehow anticipated the notion of language as action which is, in fact, the main point behind Austin's formulation of the theory.

I have then described the theoretical basis of the theory by touching upon the tenets that appeared in Austin's (1975) original formulation such as the performative/constative distinction, felicity conditions and the tripartite dimension of speech acts. This has been crucial to understand the developments proposed later on by Searle (1969), mainly in relation to the four-dimensional characterisation of speech acts and the constitutive rules which have to obtain for their performance. The way these rules regulate the bringing about of speech acts has been illustrated with three examples, namely, *asserting*, *requesting* and *thanking*. Chapter 4 Section 4.2.1 (**page 110**) will focus on the way these rules operate with special reference to promises.

In addition, I have introduced Grice's (1957) proposal to account for understanding speech acts. According to Grice, understanding speech acts always involves the recognition of the speaker's intentions which is done by performing inferential tasks. However, Grice's account of the way inferential tasks are performed for the recognition of intentions seems to lack psychological plausibility because it frequently appeals to the code model of communication, as noted by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 24). Grice's account is precisely the starting point for the development of RT, which is the theoretical framework I will be using to interpret my data, that is, efficacy statements, so as to ascertain whether or not they are actually understood as promises of efficacy by the recipient of the recipes.

In the relevance-theoretic approach to communication, the Gricean maxims and the CP are superseded by the principle of relevance. This principle shapes the production and the processing of utterances. According to it, when we engage in a communicative situation, we do not only produce utterances but also communicate our belief that our utterances are optimally relevant. At the same time, hearers always take our utterances to come with an implicit guarantee of their optimal relevance. Hearers are then supposed to process our utterances in such a way that they obtain as many contextual effects as possible for as little processing effort as possible.

As we have seen in this chapter, context is of central importance in RT: both speaker and hearer participate actively in the communicative event. The utterances produced by the speaker constitute an immediate given context for the hearer to interpret subsequent utterances, together with encyclopaedic and/or environmental information. All of these factors shape a range of possible contexts; the selection of a particular context will be determined by the search for relevance. It is against the chosen one against which utterances are to be processed.

I have also shown the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and the sub-tasks into which it can be divided. After that, I have also introduced some concepts such as logical forms, factual assumptions and concepts, all of which have been raised in the explanation of the comprehension procedure. Finally, I

have described the relevance-theoretic approach to speech acts with special reference to the speech acts of *asking*, *saying* and *telling*.

Chapter 4. The promise: Definition and methodological considerations

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the promise, the specific type of speech act which will be analysed in this thesis. In the context of the sixteenth-century medical recipes to be analysed here, efficacy statements may be considered as promises that the administration of certain medical products can bring about a positive outcome of a disease. The bulk of literature in promises comes from research in philosophy, philosophy of language and law (Durrant 1963; Driver 1983; Mulligan 1987; Scanlon 1990; Kolodny and Wallace 2003; Owens 2008). The first relevant contribution, at least as regards the pragmatic approach I am taking in this work, was Reinach's description of promises as social acts (Mulligan 1987). However, there had been previous accounts of promissory acts dating back to ancient times, i.e. Aristotle. The interest in promises continued during the Middle Ages, above all among ethical theorists like Aquinas, and extended over the 17th and the 18th centuries with new perspectives, mainly legal and political (Habib 2008). The 20th century saw the appearance of even more diverse standpoints, being of special interest to this thesis those by Austin (1975) and Searle (1969). They discussed the status of promises as commissive speech acts by paying attention to the requisite conventions for an act to count as a promissory one. What their contributions have in common is that promises are said to exist under certain socio-cultural constraints and further contextual concerns. This chapter will be devoted to offering an overview of the requirements which have to obtain for the successful performance of promises and how these might be linguistically manifested. It should be noted that, the analysis of promises, as the analysis of speech acts in general, raises no little methodological problems which become

even more acute when we are dealing with historical texts. These methodological issues will be also addressed in this chapter.

4.2 What is a promise?

This section is meant to offer a thorough description of promises. In order to do so, I shall firstly concentrate on providing a general definition to then focus on the constituent elements of promissory speech acts. In this respect, I will follow Reinach's (1983) description of promises as social acts. The Searlian concept of constitutive rule will be invoked at this stage as well so as to specify what conditions have to obtain for a promise to count as such. As will be apparent from this discussion, obligation and commitment come to occupy an important position in the characterisation of promises, so they will be both commented on in Section 4.2.2 (page 118). Section 4.2.3 (page 122) will be devoted to efficacy statements. They are related to promissory speech acts in the sense that promises are expected to be found in the recipe genre whenever the producer of the text attests the efficacy of the remedies; in other words, these utterances can be intended as promises that patients will recover from their illnesses by using certain medical products.

4.2.1 Definition and constituent elements

A promise can be roughly defined as a statement by means of which someone says that something will certainly happen, frequently, that s/he will definitely do something. As a starting point, let us take the definition supplied by the *Oxford English Dictionary* which reads as follows:

Something which has been promised; (esp. with *to claim*) the fulfillment of a promise (*promise 1, n.*).

A declaration or assurance made to another person (usually with respect to the future), stating a commitment to give, do, or refrain from doing a specified thing or act, or guaranteeing that a specified thing will or will not happen (*promise 2, n.*).

To make a promise of (something), to give verbal assurance of; to undertake or commit oneself to do or refrain from (a specified thing or act) or to give or bestow

(a specified thing). [...] Usually to the benefit or advantage of the person concerned (*promise, v.*).

These entries provide us with several key elements of promissory speech acts, that is, (i) the existence of at least two participants, one issuing the promise and the other receiving it; (ii) the undertaking of a commitment; (iii) the coming into existence of a claim; (iv) the benefit of the promisee; and (v) the reference to the future. These can be all found in and thoroughly commented on by Reinach's (1983) contribution to the study of promises which, as a matter of fact, stands as the first relevant contribution to their analysis as social acts. I will briefly refer to his theory on promises to then concentrate on Austin's and Searle's ideas in this respect.

Reinach approached the analysis of promissory acts from the perspective of the apriori theory of right within the broader realm of law. He carried out a thorough attempt to dissect promising and, in order to do so, he relied on the theory of constituency previously used by some of his successors like Husserl (Mulligan 1987: 31). Reinach's (1983: 8) characterisation of a promise reads as follows:

One man makes a promise to another. A curious effect proceeds from this event, an effect quite different from the effect of one man informing another of something, or making a request for him. The promising produces a unique bond between the two persons in virtue of which the one person – to express it for the time being very roughly – can claim something and the other is obliged to perform it or to grant it. This bond presents itself as a result, as a *product* (so to speak) of the promising. It can, according to its essence, last ever so long, but on the other hand it seems to have an inherent tendency towards meeting an end and a dissolution. The thing promised is *performed*; in this way the bond seems to find its natural end. The promisee *waives*; the promisor *revokes*. Even in this way, though it seems to us less natural, a dissolving of the promise can sometimes occur.

Reinach's preliminary description of a promise emphasises the coming into existence of a bond between promiser and promisee when a promise is issued. The bond results in an obligation to do the act promised on the part of the promiser and a claim to get the act promised done on the part of the promisee. In other words, the promiser is obliged to do what s/he has promised to do and, on the basis of this, the promisee has a right to claim for the performance of the action

promised. When a promise is issued, both promiser and promisee enter into a complex relational network. This may be diagrammatically represented as shown in Figure 8 below where solid frames are used to indicate independent existence of the constituent; single lines represent one-sided dependence relations when they run from broken to solid walls; and double lines stand for mutual dependence relations:




Figure 8. Constituency of promises (Mulligan 1987: 60).

Drawing on Mulligan's explanation of the relationships that are established among the constituent elements of promises, I shall try to clarify the diagram. In the first place, the agents involved in the making of a promise, that is, promiser and promisee, exist independently of one another as well as of any other element involved in promissory acts. Obligation and claim exist in a dependence relation to promiser and promisee respectively. Moreover, they both stand in a mutual dependence relation since each of them will exist as long as the other exists and, if one ceases to exist, the other will disappear too. Different elements constitute the very act of promising: the promiser produces a certain utterance with a certain meaning (p2) and a certain force, i.e. signs, matter and illocutionary force. They are all one-sidedly dependent on the promiser's experiencing something internally, that is, his/her intention to do something in the future (his/her willing that p1). In addition, they all stand in a mutual dependence relation to (i) what the promisee perceives either by auditory or visual means, (ii) the meaning s/he associates to the signs received (meaning p3) and (iii) the force attached to the

utterance which s/he has to grasp necessarily. It should be noted that meaning p1, meaning p2 and meaning p3 are, in principle, equivalent and their being referred to with different numbers simply indicates that they are mentally entertained at distinct points in time.

Reinach's application of the theory of constituency provides us with the most basic elements of promissory acts. Austin, on his part, extended the analysis by focusing on the rules which should be followed for the successful performance of speech acts, and thus of promises. It requires the observance of certain rules, namely, felicity conditions, all of which have been commented on in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.3 (**page 67**). The first felicity condition, which I conveniently quote again, is that "there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances" (Austin 1975: 14). Emphasising the role of conventionality, Austin (1975: 119) later on added that "there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means employed are conventional".

As put forward in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4 (**page 71**), Searle developed Austin's position by distinguishing between two types of rules, that is, regulative and constitutive. These are distinct with respect to the dependence relations that can be established between the rules themselves and the sort of activities they are used to regulate. The rules which regulate activities which can exist by themselves with any reference whatsoever to those rules are regulative, whereas the rules which govern activities which can only exist by reference to those rules are constitutive (Searle 1964: 55, 1969: 33-42). Consider, for instance, the examples Searle employs to illustrate how these rules work: the rules of etiquette for polite table behaviour when eating and playing chess. Eating exists independently of the rules of etiquette which, consequently, regulate an existing form of behaviour. This means that they are regulative. In contrast, the rules which govern playing chess are necessary in order to effectively play the game and so, playing chess would not exist as such without those rules. That is the reason why the rules for playing chess are constitutive.

Searle's working definition of institution invokes the concept of constitutive rule: an institution is a system which works by virtue of its constitutive rules, and these Searle (1969: 55) equates with conventions: "Now the institutions that I

have been talking about are systems of constitutive rules. The institutions of marriage, money, and promising are like the institutions of baseball or chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules or conventions". For him, promising is, in itself, an institution. Searle (1969: 57-61) defined the speech act of promising in the following terms:

Given that a speaker *S* utters a sentence *T* in the presence of a hearer *H*, then, in the literal utterance of *T*, *S* sincerely and non-defectively promises that *p* to *H* if and only if the following conditions 1-9 obtain:

1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. [...]
2. *S* expresses the proposition that *p* in the utterance of *T*. [...]
3. In expressing that *p*, *S* predicates the future act *A* of *S*. [...]
4. *H* would prefer *S*'s doing *A* to his not doing *A*, and *S* believes *H* would prefer his doing *A* than his not doing *A*. [...]
5. It is not obvious to both *S* and *H* that *S* will do *A* in the normal course of events. [...]
6. *S* intends to do *A*. [...]
7. *S* intends that the utterance of *T* will place him under an obligation to do *A*. [...]
8. *S* intends (*i-I*) to produce in *H* the knowledge (*K*) that the utterance of *T* is to count as placing *S* under an obligation to do *A*. *S* intends to produce *K* by means of the recognition of *i-I*, and he intends *i-1* to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) *H*'s knowledge of the meaning of *T*. [...]
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by *S* and *H* are such that *T* is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain. [...]

Condition 1 is related to the most basic requirements which should be met for any sincere promise and, in fact, for any speech act, to count as such in terms of both utterance production, i.e. input conditions, and understanding, i.e. output conditions. Input and output conditions demand (i) that both speaker and hearer master the same language, (ii) that they can speak without any physical hindrance, (iii) that they are fully aware of what they are doing or (iv) that they are not play-acting or joking, to mention just a few.

Conditions 2 and 3 concern the expression of the proposition underlying the promissory act. As in the case of condition 1, this is constrained by the necessary occurrence of some features like the predication of a future act which must be carried out by the speaker. No promise can be deemed to have been made about any past action and, similarly, no one can promise that someone else will do something.

Conditions 4 and 5 contain the requirements for a promise not to be defective from the point of view of both speaker and hearer. From the speaker's viewpoint, there must be the belief that the hearer prefers his/her carrying out the action expressed in the proposition than his/her not carrying it out. From the hearer's perspective, s/he must be clearly inclined towards the speaker's doing (rather than not doing) the action promised. Any promise in which the promiser does not believe that the promisee wants the action promised to happen and the promisee does not really want the action to happen would not meet condition 4. In addition, whatever action the speaker promises to do, it cannot be one which s/he would do anyway, that is, following the normal course of events; otherwise, condition 5 would not obtain.

Condition 6 has to do with the requisite of promises as far as sincerity is concerned. When a speaker formulates a sincere promise, s/he must have a certain intention, namely, the intention to perform the act he has promised to perform, or, at least, s/he must take responsibility for having that intention. According to Searle (1969: 62), the reason why this is so is that "a promise involves the expression of an intention", but promises may still be insincere.

Condition 7 holds the essential characteristic of a promise, that being that a promiser does always undertake the obligation to perform the act promised. The obligation to keep a promise derives from the fact that promising is an institution with constitutive rules so that when one promises to do something, s/he necessarily adheres to the rules of promise-making. Searle's (1964, 1969: 175-198) well-known derivation of *ought* from *is* is precisely justified by how the institutional facts associated with promise-keeping entail the obligation to keep a promise.

Finally, conditions 8 and 9 are such that the recognition of the speaker's intention is achieved: the meaning of the words uttered by the promiser is

determined by the semantic rules of the language spoken by both speaker and hearer. These semantic rules do ultimately allow the hearer to recognise the speaker's intention to undertake an obligation by conventionally associating the uttering of certain words with the formulation of a promise.

Roughly speaking, conditions 2 and 3 stand for the propositional content conditions; conditions 4 and 5 correspond to the preparatory conditions; condition 6 is the sincerity condition; and condition 7 is the essential condition. Take *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* as an illustration. The way constitutive rules obtain for a promise like this can be summarised as follows:

Type of rule	<i>Promising</i>	<i>I will help you with the packing tomorrow</i>
Propositional content	Future act <i>A</i> of <i>S</i>	<i>S</i> will help <i>H</i> with the packing tomorrow
Preparatory	1. <i>H</i> wants <i>A</i> to happen. <i>S</i> believes <i>H</i> wants <i>A</i> to happen 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>S</i> will do <i>A</i> in the normal course of events	1. <i>H</i> wants <i>S</i> to help him/her with the packing tomorrow. <i>S</i> believes <i>H</i> wants him/her to help <i>H</i> with the packing tomorrow 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>S</i> will help <i>H</i> with the packing tomorrow
Sincerity	<i>S</i> intends to perform <i>A</i>	<i>S</i> intends to help <i>H</i> with the packing tomorrow
Essential	Counts as a promise that <i>A</i> will occur	Counts as a promise that <i>S</i> will help <i>H</i> with the packing tomorrow

Table 5. Constitutive rules for the promise *I will help you with the packing tomorrow*.

The propositional content underlying a promise like *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* is that of a future action which will be carried out by the speaker, i.e. s/he will help the hearer with the packing the day after the utterance is issued. The preparatory rule obtain if (i) the hearer wants the act promised by the speaker to be performed and, at the same time, the speaker believes that the

hearer wants his/her help with the packing tomorrow, and (ii) none of them thinks that the speaker will help the hearer in the normal course of events. For *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* to count as a promise, the speaker must be sincere in his/her intention to perform the act of helping. Finally, the utterance itself counts as a promise.

Alonso-Almeida (2010) applies Searle's constitutive rules to specific examples of efficacy statements in a corpus of Middle English healing charms in order to show how they are understood as promises. For illustration purposes, I shall quote below one of these examples:

Type of rule	<i>He Schal be Hole</i>
Propositional content	<i>S</i> (tatement) states future healing of patient
Preparatory	The <i>W(riter)</i> believes that this charm will cure the patient <i>W</i> believes that the charm is good for the patient <i>W</i> believes that the <i>R(eader)</i> believes that <i>A</i> is good for <i>R/patient</i>
Sincerity	<i>W</i> declares <i>A</i> will happen
Essential	<i>S</i> is a commitment of <i>W</i> that <i>A</i> will happen

Table 6. Constitutive rules for the promise *He Schal be Hole* (Alonso-Almeida 2010: 9).

The propositional content rule for the promise *He Schal be Hole* is the issuing of an utterance (*S*) which states that the patient will heal at some point in the future. The preparatory rule obtains if the following conditions are met: (i) the writer (*W*) believes that the charm will bring about the cure of the patient; (ii) the writer believes that the charm is good for the patient; and (iii) the writer believes that the reader (*R*) believes that the action (*A*) is good for the reader and/or the patient. The declaration of the writer that he believes that the patient will be cured by using the charm stands as the sincerity rule. Finally, if the utterance is to count as a promise, the issuing of the utterance creates a commitment on the part of the writer that the charm will cure the patient, and so the essential rule obtains.

Alonso-Almeida (2010: 8) notes that, although some of these utterances may be formally similar, the context in which they occur importantly shapes their interpretation. He illustrates the point with *He Chal be Hole tho Grace of God*. In order to interpret this utterance in contrast to *He Schal be Hole*, the reader will need extra processing because of the addition of *tho Grace of God*. Context will have to be extended in various ways to include assumptions about God's healing powers, and the efficacy of a combination of the charm and the presence of God's grace in the life of the patient. The interpretation process as occurring in relevance-theoretic terms will allow the reader to recover the assumption that the cure of the patient seems to be dependent on the presence of God's grace in his/her life. Consequently, the degree of commitment attached to the promise issued here is lower than that in *He Schal be Hole*.

4.2.2 *Obligation and commitment*

The notion of obligation lies at the core of many philosophical debates in relation to promises mainly in the form of whether or not promises raise obligations in promisers (Hamlyn 1961-1962; Durrant 1963; Kading 1971; Dyche 1973; Pitson 1988; Scanlon 1990; Kolodny and Wallace 2003; Vallentyne 2006; Owens 2008; Seidl 2010). As we have seen, Reinach, Austin and Searle take obligation to be a necessary component in the making of a promise, so much so that no promise can be said to exist without the promiser's recognising his/her obligation to perform the act promised (Searle 1964: 45, 1969: 178). The coming into existence of an obligation is precisely what differentiates promises from other types of speech acts (Driver 1983: 221).

A related notion is that of commitment which, together with obligation, is frequently invoked as a parameter for distinguishing between promissory acts from other sorts of speech acts. As Searle (1964: 45-46, 1969: 178) points out "the crucial distinction between statements of intention on the one hand and promises on the other lies in the nature and degree of commitment or obligation undertaken in promising". This concept has been used by speech act theorists since the inception of SAT and it is inherently connected with commissives. Nevertheless, it is not only used in SAT, but also in other linguistic areas of research such as

modality and evidentiality, and in dialogue/argumentation studies (De Brabanter and Dendale 2008: 1). It can be defined as follows (Hickey 1986: 70):

Commitment is basically the binding of oneself to a certain course of action. The binding is usually of a moral nature, that is one sees it as one's moral responsibility to fulfill that which one has committed oneself. It can however also be a legal responsibility.

Commitment is furthermore something which is given verbally. This also implies a hearer, as no commitments are made as monologues under normal circumstances. Thus, there is a second, passive partner to the commitment. But he is only verbally passive: the hearer's role is essential because a commitment is made to a person or persons.

Commitment is here defined as a two-dimensional phenomenon which involves the existence of active and passive subjects. The individual who commits himself/herself to a certain course of action is the agent who provides verbal evidence for such a commitment to come into existence. Then, responsibility for its fulfilment, either moral, legal or of any other kind, arises. But there must exist another individual at the other end to receive the commitment made by the speaker. The recipient is, consequently, passive, though only to some extent, because commitment needs to be accepted by the hearer (Hickey 1986: 70). The relationship between commitment and promises is one of inclusion: the former "is a quite wide-ranging phenomenon and the narrower act of promising should be seen in this broader context" (Hickey 1986: 69).

As for the linguistic realisation of commissive speech acts, this may take diverse forms ranging from those where commitment is directly expressed to those where it is issued indirectly. Nevertheless, in both cases the circumstances surrounding this type of speech acts have to be necessarily taken into account as shown in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4 (**page 71**) when commenting on the difficulties of form-function association. Following Hickey's (1986) work on commissive speech acts, I shall now summarise the most typical ways of expressing commitment and, specifically, promises in English.

Hickey's approach to the expression of speech acts of commitment differentiates between direct and indirect manifestation. Roughly speaking, direct manifestation of commitment occurs when an explicit illocutionary verb is used while indirect manifestation does not involve the employment of any specific

linguistic device; any utterance may have a commissive illocutionary force as long as its propositional form contains some sort of reference to the speaker's binding himself/herself to a certain course of action.

Within the group of speech act verbs which indicate directly the speaker's commitment to a future course of action, Hickey establishes a distinction in terms of the varied types of commitment that may be actually expressed. The verb *promise* seems to epitomise the expression of the highest degree of commitment, but I should like to note again that its presence in an utterance does not always automatically generate a promise in its purest sense, not even a promise at all. Take examples (87), (88) and (89) (Hickey 1986: 71-72):

(87) I promise not to forget your birthday

(88) I promise not to speak for more than an hour

(89) I promise not to bore you with my lecture

The utterances issued in (87) to (89) all express commitment to a future course of action: to not forgetting the hearer's birthday, to not speaking for more than an hour and to not boring the hearer with the speaker's lecture, respectively. (87) and (88) appear to be promises in the strict sense, i.e. constitutive rules obtain. In (87), the speaker will not forget the hearer's birthday (propositional content); the hearer wants the speaker not to forget his/her birthday and the speaker believes that the hearer wants him/her not to forget it (preparatory); the speaker intends not to forget the hearer's birthday (sincerity); and the utterance in (87) counts as a promise (essential). Similarly, in (88) the speaker will not speak for more than an hour (propositional content); the hearer wants the speaker not to speak for more than an hour and the speaker believes that the hearer wants him/her not to speak for more than an hour (preparatory); the speaker intends not to speak for more than an hour (sincerity); and the utterance in (88) counts as a promise.

Hickey emphasizes the role of shared knowledge as a key factor for the interpretation of (87) and (88) as promises and, in these particular examples, in the form of desirability as applied to action: in (87) speaker and hearer share some assumptions about the fact that it is desirable to remember somebody else's birthday. In (88) participants share the knowledge that speaking for more than an hour is not appropriate in a context in which, say, lectures are not supposed to last more than sixty minutes and so, the speaker's taking more than an hour for delivering the lecture is not desirable.

Example (89), in contrast, cannot count as a commitment speech act and, as a result, as a promise either. The reason why this is so is that the actions promised to be performed in genuine promissory acts have to be liable to be performed by the promiser, that is, it has to be possible for him/her to carry out the action promised, physically or otherwise. What the speaker of (89) is “promising” the hearer is not to produce in him/her the effect of being bored, something which is not really under the speaker’s control. Those utterances such as the one shown in (89) where there is an apparent form of commitment are called optatives (Hickey 1986: 72). They express a wish rather than a commitment on the part of the speaker to produce some sort of effect in the hearer.

Coming next in the scale of expression of commitment after *promise* are verbs such as *accept*, *assume* and *assure*. The expression of commitment in *accept* and *assume* is, however, restricted to their occurrence together with specific nouns, e.g. *responsibility*. Consider (90), (91) and (92) (Hickey 1986: 73-74):

(90) He agreed to accept responsibility for the trip

(91) He assumed responsibility for the organisation

(92) I assure you I’ll be there in time

In these examples, the expression of commitment is derived from the semantic properties of the sequences *accept* + *responsibility* and *assumed* + *responsibility*, but there are differences between them. On the one hand, in (90) the use of *agreed to accept responsibility* suggests that responsibility was taken by the subject in question after initial rejection. On the other hand, *assumed responsibility* in (91) suggests that responsibility was taken by the individual of his/her own accord. The degree of commitment expressed is, then, higher in (91) than in (90).

As regards *assure*, the expression of commitment attached to it relies heavily on context, above all, on the relationships established between promiser and promisee and, more specifically, on the knowledge the promisee has about the promiser’s tendency to keep nor not to keep his/her word: if the promiser has frequently given his/her word to do something and s/he has, in fact, done the thing promised, then the promisee can rely on his/her commitment to carry out the action promised as in (92). In English, moreover, differences in the kind of commitment are lexicalised. For instance, *assure* indicates verbal commitment, while *insure* indicates financial commitment.

Hickey (1986: 74-76) goes on commenting on some verbs such as (i) *offer* and *volunteer*, (ii) *dedicate* and *undertake*, (iii) *swear* and *vow*, and (iv) *guarantee* and *pledge*. *Offer* and *volunteer* are included in a group of verbs in which commitment comes into existence when the hearer accepts the offer made by the speaker. They stand in sharp contrast to *dedicate* and *undertake*, in which commitment is expressed regardless of the hearer's reaction. *Swear* and *vow* are used within institutions and their employment tends to be associated with doing something else apart from the issuing of an utterance, i.e. raising one's hand. *Guarantee* and *pledge*, on their part, both indicate commitment and they are said to further suggest "retribution for the person to whom the commitment is made should the speaker default in his undertaking" (Hickey 1986: 76).

Lastly, there are other ways of expressing commitment indirectly, that is, by using means different from explicit commissive speech act verbs. Take (93) (Hickey 1986: 76):

(93) I'll give up smoking after my final examinations

The utterance in (93) can be taken as a commissive speech act with the illocutionary force of a promise: the proposition underlying this utterance predicates something about the speaker; s/he has the intention to give up smoking at some point in the future, i.e. after his/her final examinations. Nevertheless, context is crucial to understand it as a promise: giving up smoking must be something that the hearer wants to happen, for instance, because the hearer has been worried about the speaker's health lately.

4.2.3 *Efficacy statements as promises*

Broadly speaking, promises are expected to be found in the recipe genre whenever the producer of the text attests the efficacy of the remedies; in other words, these utterances can be intended as promises that patients will recover from their illnesses by using certain medical products (Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 137, 139). This sort of expressions have been previously labelled in the literature as statements of efficacy (Hunt 1990) and efficacy phrases (Jones 1998), whose function in the overall structure of the recipe is that of providing the user with grounds for believing that the medical product will be effective.

Hunt (1990: 23) refers to a statement of efficacy as “a formula asserting the value of the treatment”. Jones (1998), on her part, defines efficacy phrases as differentiated from tag phrases. Both of them are defined in relation to three parameters, i.e. (i) position, (ii) content and (iii) function. Efficacy phrases and tag phrases are similar with respect to position and function in that they are both found at the end of recipes and used as a way of prognostication. Tag phrases, in contrast to efficacy phrases, can be also employed as a conventional closing element which might visually signal that the recipe has come to an end; this idea was firstly suggested by Cameron (1993: 40). As for their content, they are distinct: Jones (1998: 199) points out that while tag phrases “add no further necessary information in order for the text to be used”, efficacy phrases “attest the value of a given remedy” (Jones 1998: 203-204). She further categorises efficacy phrases into (i) stock phrases, (ii) specific phrases and (iii) ‘proof’ efficacy statements. In both stock phrases and specific phrases, reference to the cure of a patient is provided; however, while in the former the illness is left unspecified, in the latter it is clearly indicated. The third type of efficacy phrases, i.e. ‘proof’ efficacy statements, are those containing the word *proof* or any of its variants.

Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002) propose a revision of the three criteria used by Jones to characterise efficacy phrases and tag phrases in an analysis of promissory speech acts in medieval English medical recipes. They feel that the criterion of position should be less limited so as to be able to draw a clear distinction between the two types of phrases as they are both typically found at the end of recipes. As regards the criterion of function, the only aspect which distinguishes between them is that tag phrases can be employed as conventionalised closing elements. Consequently, the prognostication function seems to be somewhat redundant. As for the criterion of content, the authors think that the distinction drawn by Jones in this respect is devoid of clarity, at least, in the data she uses for illustration. Apart from this, they rightly put forward that both types of expressions are aimed at validating the efficacy of a medical product without offering “further information for the text to be used”, initially only applicable to tag phrases according to Jones.

This thesis shares with the work by Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002) the view that efficacy phrases and tag phrases do definitely pursue the same function in the context of medical recipes, that is, to attest that a given

remedy will help patients in their recovery. The identification of this function relies heavily on the analysis of the context in which these expressions are embedded and so RT turns out to be a useful tool for such a purpose. As stated in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1 (**page 24**), this research also adopts the terminology used in Alonso-Almeida (1998-1999, 2002b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002), where this sort of expressions are referred to as efficacy statements rather than efficacy phrases because they are frequently complete sentences. In the remainder of this thesis, these expressions, then, will be referred to as efficacy statements (hereinafter ES).

As already stated, the analysis of ES carried out in Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002) is of special interest to this thesis since the authors follow a relevance-theoretic approach to account for the understanding of this sort of utterances in the medieval period. They show that (i) cognition plays a vital role in the recognition of ES as promises; and (ii) the syntactic and lexical features of ES, i.e. the use of a future-indicator *schal* in simple constructions and compound sentences introduced by logical markers, tend to shape their understanding as promissory speech acts. Let us illustrate the point with the following example from G.U.L. MS Hunter 185 (Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 146), where spelling and punctuation have been preserved as in the original, and abbreviations have been silently expanded:

(94) For the goute festred Tak avaunce archangel hayhoue beteyne verueyne ana &
tak most avaunce & boyle hem in wyn • & let þe seke drynke þerof ferst and last &
he • schal • be hol• (ll. 1329–1333)

The sequence under consideration in this instance is & *he • schal • be hol•*. If it is taken in isolation, it can only be interpreted as a declaration of the possibility that someone will recover health. However, it is part of a whole recipe where the context plays a role for its understanding as a promise. In relevance-theoretic terms, its processing is carried out by following a path of least effort which allows the reader to achieve the highest cognitive effects. The recovery of possible interpretations is marked by their order of accessibility and so, the most accessible interpretation for & *he • schal • be hol•* in the context in which it is embedded is that of the utterance being a promise that the patient will recover health by taking the medicine. Even though it is not immediately obvious, the fact that the patient will be healthy is dependent on his/her taking the medicine in question. This

conclusion can be achieved by means of deductive rules of the *modus ponendo ponens* type:

(95) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P
(ii) (If P then Q)
Output: Q

Input: (i) let þe seke drynke þerof first and last
(ii) If (let þe seke drynke þerof first and last) then (& he • schal • be hol•)
Output: & he • schal • be hol•

In this light, the promise that the patient will recover from his/her illness has to be understood as fulfilled on the condition that the medicine is all drunk by him/her. If s/he fails to do so, the positive effects of the product will not be achieved.

Apparently, example (94) does not present difficulties in its interpretation as a promise, but there are other instances in which the interpretation recovered by the reader does not necessarily correspond to the writer's communicative intention, i.e. issuing a promise. Take example (96) (Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 147):

(96) For the hed ache a good medicine Tak camamylle & bete yt in a mortere & tak a sponeful of þe draf & ale & a sponeful of comyn & a sponeful of floure & wommanes melk þerto als muche • as nedep & put al þis in a panne & set it on þe fuyr & make þerof a plaster & ley yt þer as þe hed ys sorest & vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe & he schal be hool bi godes grace (ll. 1350–1358)

The ES & *he schal be hool bi godes grace* would be taken at first sight as a promise that the patient will recover from his/her illness after using the medicine. The sort of deductive rule which would allow the reader to derive such a conclusion is *modus ponendo ponens*, i.e. If *P* then *Q*, just as in the previous example:

(97) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P
(ii) (If P then Q)
Output: Q

Input: (i) vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe
(ii) If (vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe) then (& he schal be hool bi godes grace)

Output: & he schal be hool bi godes grace

The initial context in which the ES is processed may consist of information related to (i) an individual's having a headache, (ii) the administration of a given medicine in order to deal with the pain, and (iii) the belief that God is a healer. Nevertheless, if the reader makes an extra processing, it is possible for him/her to get an extended context in which the interpretation may not coincide with what the writer actually wanted to communicate, that is, a promise. The extension of the context may proceed as follows (after Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 147): some encyclopaedic information about headache, medicine and pain-killers may be added. Furthermore, the context can be also extended by adding information stored in the reader's short-term memory, i.e. *the medicine is a plaster*. Extra encyclopaedic information related to certain religious beliefs, in particular, that *the grace of God and God himself can heal people* can be added. Finally, the assumption that *the combination of the use of the plaster together with the grace of God can heal the patient* can be included.

The deductive rules which may come into play at this stage of the comprehension process can be *modus ponendo ponens* or *modus tollendo ponens*, where *P* stands for *vse þe plaster*, *Y* for *bi godes grace* and *Q* for *he schal be hol*.

(98) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: If (P and Y) then Q
 (ii) P and Y

Output: Q

(99) *Modus tollendo ponens*

Input: (i) P and Y
 (ii) not Y

Output: not Q

If the comprehension process proceeds in the way indicated by the *modus ponendo ponens* rule, the promissory speech act will be performed *if and only if* conditions *P* and *Y* obtain because of the occurrence of the biconditional logical connective *and*. In case the comprehension process leads the reader to the application of the *modus tollendo ponens* rules, s/he will not draw the inference that the writer has issued a promise since "there is no implied manifestation of promise of efficacy" (Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 148).

4.3 Methodological approach to promises

Speech acts are eminently pragmatic phenomena which can be analysed from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives. As for the diachronic perspective, a wide range of approaches can be adopted not only for the analysis of speech acts, but also for the analysis of communicative practices, genres, registers, and linguistic functions in historical texts (Fitzmaurice and Taavitsainen 2007: 1). Scholars working in the field have noted that the task of analysing the history of speech acts in particular cannot be taken carelessly. Echoing Bertucelli-Papi's (2000) words in relation to the study of the history of the English language in general, Taavitsainen and Jucker (2008: 3) make an analogous claim and point out that "researchers can take different starting points when they investigate the history of individual speech acts or individual classes of speech acts and they can use different tools, but they always have to be aware of the slippery and treacherous nature of their endeavour".

This will be my concern here since this thesis pursues to investigate how promissory speech acts are linguistically realised and how they may be pragmatically interpreted in a particular genre, i.e. recipes belonging to the medical register written between 1500 and 1600. As shown in Chapter 4 Section 4.2 (**page 110**), promises are expected to be found in this genre whenever the producer of the text attests the efficacy of the remedies so that these statements can be intended as promises that patients will recover from their illnesses by using certain medical products.

The methodological approach I shall follow in this thesis can be labelled as historical speech act analysis. My aim is to identify the linguistic forms associated with potential promissory speech acts as realised in historical texts, i.e. medical recipes, to then discuss whether or not they are understood as such by virtue of their pragmatic features. I shall do so by paying attention to the cognitive mechanisms involved in the identification of the illocutionary import of the utterances. The pragmatic analysis will rely on both SAT and RT because they allow for (i) the identification of the illocutionary force value of the ES, and (ii) the inclusion of context in a principled manner to account for their interpretation as actual promises of efficacy, respectively.

4.3.1 *Historical speech act analysis*

The investigation of speech acts from a historical perspective is a relatively young research topic in the pragmatic arena; in fact, there are still dissenting views as regards its feasibility. Jacobs and Jucker (1995: 19) put forward Stetter's (1991: 74) position in this respect: speech acts cannot be looked into from a historical standpoint because there is no way of knowing exactly what intentions the speakers had when performing them. Obviously, "texts may be preserved across time, while contexts may not" (Vagle 2006: 222), and Stetter may be right if one considers texts in themselves as the only source of information for the analysis. It is also true that having a precise knowledge of every single factor governing communicative situations in the past with high degrees of specificity appears to be impossible, but still, "the key to interpretation is the context of utterance" (Taavitsainen and Jucker 2008: 4). Historical pragmatics may rely on other disciplines to inform analysis, such as ethnography, history, sociology, and so on. Nevertheless, a detailed account of the contextual factors governing communicative situations where speech acts were performed, i.e. cultural setting, historical context, participants, social relationships, among others, would prove to be helpful in their identification (Jacobs and Jucker 1995: 19).

As a young field of research, there are several theoretical and methodological issues yet to be discussed and refined. Some of these are raised in Bertucelli-Papi's (2000) introductory paper to the first issue of the *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*, which, as a matter of fact, is devoted to research in historical speech act analysis. Bertucelli-Papi (2000: 57) notes that many of these difficulties in the historical approach to SAT are rooted in the very synchronic viewpoint where little agreement has been reached in relation to definitions and terminology, suitability of methodological research procedures and data themselves. In this light, divergences are also to be expected when tackling its historical dimension.

Some of the problems dealt with in this paper cover various aspects of SAT and to what extent they are relevant for a historical pragmatic account. They include the relationships that can be established between (i) propositional, speaker and illocutionary meanings, (ii) grammatical structure and illocutionary force, i.e. correlation hypothesis and (iii) IFIDs and speech act identification, as well as (iv)

the role of context, i.e. conventions, intentions and cognition, in the whole of SAT.

The relationship between propositional meaning and speaker meaning occupies a central position in SAT. They have been traditionally taken as, say, different levels of meaning: the former is the most basic type of meaning and as such it may be truth-conditionally analysed. The latter is some sort of extension of the basic meaning of an utterance and it encompasses the whole range of speakers' intentions so that illocutionary meaning is considered to be part of it. The supposed existence of these two (and even three) levels of meaning is the reason why speakers may mean something else than the mere propositional content of the sentences they utter. However, it is not that easy to establish clear-cut distinctions between these levels of meaning since, for instance, there may be overlap as for the linguistic indicators of propositional content and illocutionary force. In any case, these linguistic indicators may show formal or functional variation and so are liable to be analysed from a historical perspective (Bertucelli-Papi 2000: 59).

Something similar happens in the case of the relationship between grammatical structure and illocutionary force. As put forward in Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4 (**page 71**), speech act theorists originally suggested that certain syntactic constructions are associated with the accomplishment of certain speech acts: the declarative mood is used to make statements, the imperative to give orders and the interrogative to make questions. It was soon realised that this one-to-one correspondence between grammatical structure and illocutionary force cannot be easily kept in all instances. Recall, for example, (51), (52) and (53) in which, under appropriate contextual conditions, *I am exhausted* and *tell me who the first man on the moon was*, being declarative and imperative sentences, respectively, can be used as requests for help and information. Similarly, the interrogative *can you set the table?* can be meant as an order.

Nevertheless, as Bertucelli-Papi (2000: 60) emphasises, there is a wide range of elements in the grammars of all languages in general, and in the English grammar in particular, which do certainly shape the illocutionary force of utterances, i.e. IFIDs. These grammatical elements are obviously subject to historical variation. IFIDs may indicate illocutionary forces with varying degrees

of explicitness. The explicit/implicit distinction as regards the ways in which a speech act may be performed can be historically investigated as well because “the very degree of explicitness of illocutionary force may be different from one age to another” (Bertucelli-Papi 2000: 62). Research in this aspect should pay special attention to the contextual factors governing the communicative situation in which speech acts occur. This does not only apply to historical speech act analysis, but more generally to the study of the pragmatic implications of the interpersonal function of language

Lastly, context plays a vital role in SAT in order to determine illocutionary force. It is to be understood in a broad sense: in the Austinian formulation of the theory, the situational parameters governing the communicative exchange did not only include the characteristics of the participants and their relationship, but also, and most importantly, the conventional nature of speech acts, both linguistic and social, i.e. institutional. The Searlian approach highlighted participants’ intentions and their identification as one of the central components of speech acts. The inferential perspective towards their understanding started to gain relevance in the development of the theory and helped to deepen into the cognitive processes that are triggered in speech act production and reception.

Context so understood, that is, as a complex relational network of conventions, intentions and cognition, can be obviously investigated from a historical viewpoint (Bertucelli-Papi 2000: 62-63): (i) linguistic and social conventions change over time and the historical setting does certainly have implications in those changes; (ii) intentions are also shaped by the immediate context surrounding individuals, being primarily regulated by social relationships; and finally, (iii) human cognition and the way it works are based on cognitive environments, i.e. beliefs and assumptions achieved by perception and/or inference, and so, they are ultimately shaped by socio-historical aspects.

All the theoretical and methodological difficulties listed and discussed by Bertucelli-Papi (2000) do not make it impossible to have a positive answer to the question she poses at the beginning: a historical SAT is then feasible and, what is more, “a diachronic speech act analysis is possible and fruitful” (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000: 68). What follows tries to provide evidence for such a claim and, in order to do so, I will review some of the most relevant papers which have

contributed to the development of historical speech act analysis and, consequently, of historical pragmatics. At the same time, evidence from research in the field will provide me with arguments for validating my analysis of ES as promissory speech acts from a relevance-theoretic approach.

As regards the existing literature in historical speech act analysis, the pioneering works focus on languages which are not English, mainly German. The research by Schlieben-Lange (1976, 1983) stands as one of the first contributions to the field. Her point of departure is the search for linguistic units that are functionally similar to speech acts. She employs different sources in order to get data: dictionaries, text themselves and historical, institutional and legal information. The use of dictionaries constitutes the first step in her investigation and they serve as a source to get performative or speech act verbs. Afterwards, she analyses texts so as to determine how speech acts are performed and accomplished, but with an eye on history and institutions since they influence the conception and realisation of performativity. She comes to the conclusion that there is no such thing as universal speech acts (Schlieben-Lange 1976: 114): their linguistic realisation, the role they play within institutions and/or society and their understanding is always dependent on socio-historical concerns.

Analyses of a more specific type can be found in Lötscher (1981), Bax (1981, 1983 and 1991), Schwarz (1984) and Gloning (1993). Lötscher (1981) studies two related kinds of speech acts, i.e. swearing and insults in 15th and 16th century Swiss German. Comparing the results with present day usage, he concludes that swearing and insults used to be more vulgar as there were much more references to sex and excretory language. Nowadays, this type of speech acts are characterised by having frequent references to mental or physical handicaps and less than frequent appeals to religion. Bax (1981, 1983 and 1991), on his part, analyses the linguistic manifestation of the speech act of duelling and how its interpretation can be affected by the order in which utterances appear.

Schwarz (1984) concentrates on the pragmatic aspects of the speech event of declaring love as present in literary texts, i.e. Tristan poems. He touches upon the intentional nature of the speech act in itself, the circumstances surrounding it, the content of the declaration, the level of explicitness in the performance and its perlocutionary effects, among others. Gloning (1993) investigates historical texts

dealing with how to use language appropriately. This study throws some light on the way the use of address formulas was mainly conditioned by social relationships so that when an individual addressed another without observance of the rules, his/her behaviour was considered to be disrespectful. Apart from this, women were not to be interrupted while they were talking, and they were supposed to obey as instructed when men gave them orders.

As for the analysis of speech acts in the English language in particular, the papers published in the first issue of the *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* are of great importance. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) provide us with an interesting framework to investigate speech events, specifically, insults, from a historical perspective. The basic assumption is that speech acts are subject to synchronic and diachronic variation both formally and functionally. The different realisations of a given speech event is dependent on factors such as context, culture and time, and its analysis would benefit from looking into other related speech acts. Their data covers several periods of the history of the language, from Old English to Present-Day English, and many different literary and non-literary genres are also represented, namely, court proceedings, letters, plays, poems and internet news groups. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000: 92) argue that “medieval flyting, Shakespearean name-calling and present-day flaming are not realizations of one and the same speech function of insult but they are different speech functions located in the pragmatic space of antagonistic behaviour”.

The contribution by Culpeper and Semino (2000) proposes a distinct methodological approach to examine speech acts in the early Modern English period. They consider those speech act verbs that are employed to refer to witches' curses and try to trace their semantic and pragmatic characteristics over time. They firstly specify the meanings attached to the verbs under consideration, i.e. *curse* and *wish*, by ascribing them into the taxonomies of illocutionary acts proposed by Austin, Searle, and Bach and Harnish, and then apply the notion of constitutive rules to emphasise the differences over time. After that, the application of Levinson's (1992) concept of activity type allows them to identify the sort of activity which can be taken as the diachronic space where variation occurs, i.e. witchcraft activity type. Their paper proves that recent pragmatic theories can provide us with efficient tools for the study of historical texts.

Another relevant work as for the development of historical speech act analysis is Arnovick (2000), where the methodological perspective adopted is that of function-to-form mapping, in spite of Kohnen's (2001) reservations in this respect. The speech acts analysed in this monograph are varied and they include insults, curses, terminal greetings, blessings and promises. The speech events of flyting and flaming are formally distinct and occur in essentially different cultural contexts, but they are looked into in relation to the speech act that lies behind them, namely, the agonistic insult which is typically found in oral cultures. As far as curses are concerned, these are speech acts which show a very specific functional development: they were initially declarative and, as such, the person uttering them had to have some institutional or religious authority. Later on, they turned to be expressive speech acts whose function was that of conveying the speaker's emotions, mainly anger. In the last phase in their development, curses are simply used as a way of aggression. Arnovick notes that curses have undergone a process of subjectification by means of which "meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state, or attitude toward what is said" (Traugott 1989: 35).

Arnovick also analyses the parting greeting *good-bye* whose origins can be traced back to the formula *God be with you*. While *God be with you* originally functioned both as a blessing and an implicit way of greeting, *good-bye* is only used as a polite way of closing a conversation. The change from an eminent illocutionary function, i.e. blessing, to a pure discursive function, i.e. ending a conversation in a polite manner, is called discursisation (Arnovick 2000: 116-118). She also explores the speech act of blessing as realised by the linguistic form *bless you*, which is said after someone has sneezed. At least four functions are identified in the diachronic evolution of this item: (i) a declarative speech act which could only be performed by a religious authority; (ii) a superstitious blessing; (iii) a wish; and (iv) an expressive speech act by means of which the utterer conveys his/her concern about the person who has sneezed. This evolution, where both subjectification and discursisation have taken place, can be accounted for by the already mentioned process of secularisation.

4.3.1.1 *Historical analysis of promissory speech acts*

Specially relevant to this thesis is Arnovick's (2000) analysis of promises. She takes Wallis rules as the starting point. These rules indicate how the speech acts of promising and predicting are to be linguistically manifested from a prescriptive point of view: while promises in the first person should make use of *will* and those in the second and third persons should do so with *shall*, predictions take just the opposite form, that is, *shall* is to be used with first person and *will* with second and third persons. Even though these rules were not followed in actual language use, grammarians' attempt to fix them in this specific way is to be seen as a move towards trying to linguistically differentiate between deontic and epistemic meanings. It is precisely in terms of deonticity and epistemicity that she accounts for the development of promising: she notes that nowadays modals like *shall* and *will* are not enough to mark deontic obligation as typically associated with promising. Instead, promises can be said to be performed by using extra verbal work, i.e. expanding discourse (Arnovick 2000: 67-70). In earlier periods of the English language, however, promises could be issued by the use of the modal, because the sense of strong obligation was inherently attached to it. The change, consequently, has been from deonticity to epistemicity.

Another monograph devoted to the history of speech acts in English is the one edited by Jucker and Taavitsainen (2008). It comprises a number of essays dealing with different speech acts, namely, directives and commissives (commands, requests and promises), and expressives and assertives (greetings, compliments and apologies), together with other papers where methodological issues are addressed, mainly, in relation to data retrieval. The papers dealing with commissive speech acts are Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008), Pakkala-Weckström (2008) and Valkonen (2008).

Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008) analyses commissive speech acts in relation to requests. They are both characterised by having the same direction of fit, that is, world-to-words: requests are intended to get the hearer to do something and in commissives the speaker commits himself/herself to doing something. Her corpus of study is made up of nineteenth-century business letters. In general, the formulation of these speech acts is highly influenced by rules of polite social interaction and so, directives and promises are frequently modulated, i.e.

downgraded and upgraded, respectively, which means that illocutionary force is very much a matter of degree (Sbisà 2001). Commissives in particular are specifically formulated by the employment of *I/we shall/will* + a positive adjective such as *glad, happy* or *ready*.

Pakkala-Weckström (2008) focuses on binding promises in medieval literary works like Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. She puts forward the need to look into promises in relation to the context in which they are embedded since, sometimes, the issuing of certain formula typically associated with promising does not automatically imply the formulation of a promise and, other times, binding promises may not be issued by employing typical promise-like formula at all. She observes that there is a major difference between the way promises are formulated in Present-Day and Middle English: having the requisite feelings and intentions plays a central role in contemporary English, but this was not so in earlier stages of language development. The mere uttering of a promise, whether or not the speaker had the intention to fulfil it, was binding. Several lexicogrammatical ways in which binding promises can be formulated are identified in her data, for example, the use of the verbs *trouthe*, *swaeren*, *plighen* and *bihighen*.

Valkonen (2008), on his part, works out certain lexical and grammatical patterns to try to search for promises in *A Representative Corpus of Historical English Registers* and the *Chadwyck-Healey Eighteenth Century Fiction Database*. In order to do so, he employs Wierzbicka's (1987) list of verbs for promises so that he only searches for explicit promissory speech acts like *guarantee*, *pledge*, *promise*, *swear* and *vow*. This research is developed in two steps: firstly, he uses a small corpus for a pilot study in which he looks for any of these verbs and he then extends the search to larger patterns in which these verbs appear embedded in a larger corpus.

All of these works focus on explicit promissory speech acts and so there are no apparent problems for their retrieval in an electronic corpus. However, promises are not normally formulated by means of explicit illocutionary verbs in the recipe genre, even though preliminary searches in the corpus under investigation will include explicit illocutionary verbs so as to cover all cases. The problems related to both data and corpus-based research will be addressed below.

4.3.2 Data and corpus-based research

The development of historical pragmatics has been characterised by a frequent concern about the availability of data amenable to study (Jacobs and Jucker 1995: 6-10; Jucker 2006: 321), mainly because pragmatics traditionally deals with the analysis of spoken language in which case, when we try to investigate language from a historical perspective, this issue becomes even more problematic. Researchers do not have at their disposal any possible means of analysing spoken language from the past, but historical pragmatic accounts have proved to be feasible thanks to the existence of written records which can be said to provide approximate evidence about the real language spoken in the past. Moreover, written texts can be equally the object of historical pragmatic investigations since they offer information about their writers and their audience, and their context of production, so that they can be taken as communicative events in their own right (Jucker 2006: 321).

To the fact that “it is natural to encounter obscurity, vagueness and ambiguity of language use in the material products of distant cultures with no direct access to the speakers and original contexts of production” (Taavitsainen and Fitzmaurice 2007: 11), we have to add the difficulties that arise as a consequence of the use of electronic corpora such as the reliability of our interpretations in the light of the data and methods used by researchers: it is not easy to use corpus-based approaches for the study of speech act functions since, normally, there is not a unique linguistic manifestation for a given speech act which can be used as a query in concordance programmes (Valkonen 2008: 247).

Corpus-based approaches to the historical analysis of speech acts has been specifically characterised by two important issues (Kohnen 2007: 139-141): first of all, the impossibility of making an inventory of all the potential manifestations a speech act may have and, secondly, the existence of “hidden manifestations”. In relation to the first difficulty, orthographic variation and lack of standardisation in earlier stages in the development of the English language make the task of using electronic corpora extremely complicated if we were to trace the history of any speech act. As for the second, and being strongly related to the first problem, it does not seem to be cautious to make generalisations about the historical development of speech acts since no exhaustive account of all its possible

manifestations can ever be provided, except by carrying out a careful reading of all the texts to be analysed.

Since there are endless ways of formally performing speech acts, thus making automatic searches possibly unlimited so as to account for a single speech act, it seems that an efficient manner of starting to deal with this problem is to try to delimit an initial selection of forms that might be considered to be a manifestation of the speech act under scrutiny (Kohnen 2004: 237-238). This I shall attempt to do in the present thesis by taking Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002) as a starting point for an initial inventory of linguistic elements typically found in promissory speech acts which will be searched for in CoER by using OnICoMt. Computerised searches will be then checked manually after micro-analysis of the texts.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have characterised the specific speech act type which will be analysed in this thesis, that is, the promise. In the context of the medical recipes of my corpus, ES can be taken as promises since these utterances serve the purpose of asserting the validity of the remedies. In other words, they may stand as promises that patients will recover from their illnesses by using certain medical products.

The characterisation I have provided here is based on their constituent elements which, roughly speaking, are as follows: for a promise to count as such, it must be issued by someone who undertakes the obligation to perform the act promised. The promise must be directed to someone who, on the basis of this obligation, can claim the performance of the act promised. The act promised must bring some benefit to the promisee and, finally, the act is to occur in the future.

Searle's constitutive rules for promises have been also specified and illustrated in this chapter because they will guide me in the identification of promises in medical texts: the propositional content rule predicates a future act to be performed by the promiser. The preparatory rule obtains if (i) the promisee wants that action to happen; (ii) the promiser believes that the promisee wants that action to happen; and (iii) it is not obvious to both promiser and promisee that the

latter will do the action in the normal course of events. The sincerity condition, on its part, obtains if the promiser is sincere in his intention to performed the act promised. Finally, the essential condition obtains if the utterance counts as a promise.

I have then described the status of ES as promises in the context of medical texts. In order to do so, I have commented on two contributions that are relevant for this thesis, namely, Jones (1998) and Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002). The former stands as the first attempt to categorise this type of utterances, and the latter offers a revision of the criteria used by Jones (1998) to establish her categorisation. To date, this is the most satisfactory revision of the taxonomy proposed by Jones (1998). Moreover, Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002) follow a relevance-theoretic approach to account for the understanding of these utterances, emphasising the importance of context in their processing. I have then illustrated the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure with specific samples of ES.

This chapter has also touched upon methodological issues as for the analysis of speech acts in a historical perspective. Not all scholars agree that speech act analysis from a historical dimension is feasible, i.e. Stetter (1991). However, Bertucelli-Papi's (2000) paper raises some aspects of speech acts that are indeed liable to be analysed from such a standpoint. These include the following; (i) propositional, speaker and illocutionary meaning, (ii) grammatical structure and illocutionary force; (iii) IFIDs and speech act identification; and (iv) the role of context. Her view is supported by evidence from research, so at this point I have provided an overview of contributions to historical speech act analysis, including promises, which validate the analysis I undertake in this thesis.

The approach adopted here for the analysis of promissory speech acts in medical recipes has been specified, as well. It has been labelled as historical speech act analysis and it consists in analysing how a communicative function is linguistically realised and interpreted in terms of up-to-date pragmatic theories. In this research, I shall analyse the linguistic manifestation of promissory speech acts in the form of ES in a corpus of sixteenth-century medical recipes. Finally, I have described some of the problems encountered by scholars when performing historical speech act analysis when using corpus-based approaches. In order to

solve these difficulties, I shall follow Kohnen's (2004) methodological proposal as for the selection of some linguistic forms which can be taken as typical manifestations of a given speech act. I will take Alonso-Almeida's and Cabrera-Abreu's (2002) work as reference to carry out this task.

Chapter 5. A stance approach to ES in CoER (1500-1600)

5.1 Introduction

The identification of the illocutionary force of speech acts involves, among many other aspects, ascertaining the speaker's attitude towards the propositional content. In the case of ES, there is a wide array of disparate linguistic elements that intervene in the expression of the speaker's seemingly positive attitude towards the use of the medical products such as modal verbs, evaluative comments and evidential material. This chapter provides a general overview of these elements since they have implications for the pragmatic analysis of promissory speech acts.

These linguistic resources may not only have several semantic interpretations; for instance, in the case of modals, they may have deontic or epistemic interpretations. They may also have several pragmatic functions and effects depending on the specific contexts in which they are used. In the light of the polysemous and polypragmatic functions and effects the aforementioned devices may have, SAT will only serve as the basis for the initial identification of potential promissory speech acts in the form of ES. This theory alone is not enough to determine authorial attitudes and so other theoretical insights have to be taken into consideration so as to arrive at a comprehensive formal and functional understanding of ES. Resources like modals, epistemic and/or evidential expressions, and evaluative language may be satisfactorily included under the label of stance. This is precisely the perspective adopted here as it offers a unified approach to the analysis of such elements, all of which have a strong interpersonal component which have an impact on the pragmatics of ES.

This chapter is organised as follows: the next section offers a brief overview of the linguistic resources which have an influence in the determination of the illocutionary force of the utterances as found in ES. These include modal verbs,

evaluative language and evidentials. I shall offer a set of illustrative examples to further clarify the formal characterisation of this type of statements in the corpus of study. Section 5.3 (**page 147**) presents the stance approach adopted in this thesis. Special attention will be given to the notions of modality, evaluation and evidentiality and the role modals, evaluative language and evidentials have as indicators of authorial stance. Finally, Section 5.4 (**page 164**) presents the conclusions of the chapter.

5.2 Formal description of ES

Of the inventory of IFIDs proposed by Searle (1969: 30), i.e. performative verbs, prosody, punctuation, verbal mood and word order, only an explicit performative verb such as *promise* would allow the automatic recovery of ES in the recipes analysed. However, not a single instance of it has been found in the corpus. Following the methodological approach adopted by Kohnen (2004) as for the initial selection of linguistic forms which can be taken as manifestations of directive speech acts, I have made searches of an initial list of linguistic items typically associated with commissive speech acts.

As shown in the research carried out by Alonso-Almeida and Cabrera-Abreu (2002), and Alonso-Almeida (forthcoming b), modal verbs and, specifically, *shall* and *will* are expected to be found in promises. I have firstly instructed OnICoMt to search for these items as well as their spelling variants by using the symbol *. The results generated by the automatic search were then checked manually so as to exactly determine if the contexts in which these items occurred pointed at the formulation of a promissory speech act. Moreover, careful reading of the texts was in order to identify all the potential pieces of discourse which are actually aimed at validating the efficacy of the remedies. The findings gathered after micro-analysis of the texts reveal that there is a variety of routinised forms which can be initially taken as promises of efficacy.

5.2.1 Modal verbs

Pieces of discourse which can be potentially categorised as promises of efficacy tend to have the modal verbs *shall* and *will* embedded in them. These appear in

complete sentences whose structure consists of a subject pronoun or a noun phrase followed by *shall* or *will* plus a bare infinitive and a complement. When the infinitive is a copula verb like *be*, this is followed by a subject complement. Consider the following recipe texts:

(100) For blered eyes. Take the ioyce of wormwode and medle it with water made of the whyte of an egge and putte it to thyne eyes **and it shall put the blode and akynge away** (TPM)

(101) For the playster in may. capxiv. Take Polypone leues and the leues of Elenacampana, and daysy leues, and bete them smal, and temper them with oile of bay as thou semest best to make a playster, and laye it there the sore is, euen and morowe, **and he shall by the grace of god be hole** (MGH)

(102) Here followeth an electuarye of a wonderful verte in the tyme of pestilence [...] But in them that are infecte alreadye, and are taken wyth the pestilence, yf they drynke of it but one sponefull, as shall be sayde hereafter, (specyally after lettynge bloode yf it be conuenient to the patient) and laye hym downe and sweate vpon the same, yf the venyme hathe not vtterlye ouercome the harte, **he shall vndoubtedlye recouer** (RLP)

(103) Fyrst let ye matter be put back with the ioyce of Playntayne or morel and Vyneger anointing the temples therwith, then make a cosse or cappe of waxe terebintine and womans milke and put vpon the head, **for it wyll ease the paynes and prouoke the pacyent to sleape** (THM)

(104) For a Canker. Take hearbs Robert, red Sage, hearb Grace, of ech lyke much, stampe them in a mortar with good ale. When ye haue so done, put the hearbes in a linnen cloth and wet your cloth with the hearbes to your tooh at nyght and in the mornynge in lyke maner, **and by the grace of God it wyll draw out the Canker** (BSM)

(105) A Sauceffleme or redde pympled face, is helped with this medicine following. Take Enula Campana, fowre ounces, and seethe it with vinegar tyll the vinegar be sodden in: then stampe it small, and then put thereto quycksyluer and brimstone, of eyther fowre drams, and Barrowes grease, fowre ounces: and beate them all together, and make thereof a plaster, and laye it to the enfected or spotted place in the face, all night: and on the morrowe wash it of with warme water. Doo thus sixe or seuen nightes, **and it wyll helpe it without doubt** (TNT)

As shown in these examples, ES where the modals *shall* and *will* are used tend to have fairly definite syntactic structures. It is also frequent that they are further modified by adjuncts such as the stance adverb *by the grace of God* in instances (101) and (104), or the epistemic stance adverbials *vndoubtedlye* and *without doubt* in instances (102) and (105). As we will see later on, they are key in the process of contextual enrichment so as to recover propositional attitudes.

5.2.2 Evaluative language

The writer's purpose to express his/her positive opinion as for the efficacy of medical products can be realised by introducing evaluative comments. These have an important interpersonal component and so play a central part in the argumentative development of discourse. In the recipes analysed, evaluation is realised by certain lexico-grammatical choices. Take the recipes below for illustration:

(106) A quilt for the rewme, a speedie remedy, proued full often. Take of Olibanum, Benguein, Storax calamita, of ech of these halfe a dram, of Labdanum ii.drams, of nutmegges, cloues, of ech halfe a dram, of comyne a scroppill, masticke halfe a dramme, of maces halfe a scroppill, of Iugula Romana a dram, of bay beries a scroppill, of the flower of roses, of camemyll, of violets, of ech a dram, of the flowers of betony a scroppill, beate all these into grosse powders, and so let them be quilted with good red scarlet flockes, in a pece of black sarcenet, and so quilted, and to be laid vpon ye head to the nape of the necke, and let it lye there ye space of xx. howres, and then turne it, and thus for the rewme **it is most excellent** (TPH)

(107) Another for the same. Take rawe creme made of Ewes mylke and putte it abrode on the botom of a fayre scoured bason / than take a vessel that hathe standen with ale .vi.or.vii. dayes / and powre out the ale and whelme the pot or vessel ouer the bason all a nyght / than putte it in a box tyll thou nede it / **for it is good** (TPM)

(108) **The herbe that is called sparrows tonge healeth**, yf it be dronke (THM)

(109) The Coales of a Byrch tree made in powder, and put into a wounde or great sore, **healeth it perfectly without any other thing**. It was crediblie tolde me that the Moscouits vse it much, and esteemes it greatly (TNT)

The use of evaluative adjectives is also frequent in the expression of ES, mainly those indicating positive values such as *excellent* and *good* in (106) and (107), respectively. They can be further modified by intensity adverbs like *most* in (106), and suffixless adverbs (adverbial forms which are identical to the adjectival form) like *marvellous* and *wonderful* which are aimed at emphasising the good quality of the medicine. Lexical verbs such as *healeth* in both (108) and (109) have been included under the heading of evaluative language since they also present the authorial evaluation of the medicines by predicating on their healing properties.

The most frequent evaluative adjective in the corpus is *good*. However, it should be noted that its occurrence is not only restricted to ES. It can be found in

other stages such as the ingredients and the application sections, as in the examples below:

(110) An other. Take a sponeful of mustardeseed and another of Bay buryes, make them in pouder and stampe them with a handful of earthe wormes, splitte and skraped from their earth, and a litle oyle of Roses, or of Camomyll, or capons grece and lay it on the grefe. Also **it is good** to take ye iuyce of Iui leaues mixte with oyle, and vinegre, to rubbe therwyth your temples, and your nosethrilles (RLP)

(111) For the windy colycke [...] Also **it is good** to lette hym drynke a dramme of hicra picra simplex, with .ii. ounces of water of cardo benedictus, or purcelane or wormewood, and to make a playster of lecke leaues fryed in oyle and vinegre, and layed vpon the bellye (RLP)

(112) To make Oyle of Galbanum. Take the purest Galbanum that thou canst gette, and put it into a glasse, close luttet: then sett it in balneo Mariae vntill it bee dissolued, then distill it with a softe fire [...] This Oyle dooeth mollifie and soften, and draweth forth thorns, splinteres, or shiuers, and cold humours, beeyng mixed with any conuenient vnguent. **It is good** to anoint the side against the stopping and hardnesse of the Milte. The perfume or sent of this Oyle, driueth awaie Serpentes from the place where it is burned [...] (FKP)

In these examples, the adjective is predicatively used to introduce the ingredients section as in (110) or to introduce the application section as in (111) and (112). In all instances, *good* is followed by a verb in the infinitive form, i.e. *to take*, when preceding the list of ingredients, and *to lette hym* and *to anoint*, when indicating how the medical product is to be applied. These will not be considered to be ES as such because contextual information does not point at their being used to validate the efficacy of the resulting medical product, but as indications about the appropriate way in which the elaboration of the product should proceed and its right application.

5.2.3 Evidentials

ES can be also realised in the form of evidential comments which do not only include references to the author's source of knowledge, but also to the degree of reliability of that knowledge. The examples below epitomise some of the most typical forms that can be found in the corpus:

(113) **Auicenna sayth that who soeuer taketh an onion and drynketh it in mylke fasting in a morning he shal be safe that day from al infections of the pestilence** (RLP)

(114) This following is an excellent remedie for them yat be broken bellyed, or brusten. Take nine redde Snayles, and put them between two tyle stones, so that they slide not away, and drye them in an Ouen, so that you make them in pouder [...] **I had this out of an old Booke wherin was many excellent Secretes, and I heard one affirme it to be a true and a tried thing** (TNT)

(115) Prymrose leaues stamp, and layd in the place that bleedeth, stancheth the bloud. **This hath bene proued** (TNT)

(116) A Medicine for the heate of the Raines, and to auoide blistering in the mouth. Take Liuerwoort, Sorell, Balme, and Succory, Ana, one ounce and seeth these in quart of Whay, hauing been well clarified, and let the Patient Drinke halfe a pynt thereof at the least, euery morning. **Probatum est** (RST)

Evidential material seems to play a vital role in the expression of ES. The employment of evidential lexical verbs such as *sayth* in (113), and *heard* and *affirme* in (114) indicates the author's source of information. In addition, they clearly mark the epistemic space on which discourse is articulated, allowing writers to move in a continuum from commitment to lack of commitment towards propositional information. For instance, *affirme* expresses an absolute commitment towards the truth of the narrated information, while hearsay reportatives evidential verbs such as *sayth* and *heard* allow for lower levels of commitment. Moreover, writers support their arguments as for the beneficial use of medicines by attributing propositional information to sources other than their own: by putting in the foreground authoritative figures and so making explicit reference to earlier literature, they both create persuasive arguments and apparently reliable justification to recommend the use of medicines. This overt indication of the dependence relationship that exists between the text itself and contextual knowledge results in the expression of the authors' subjective attitude towards the efficacy of the products.

Instances (115) and (116) contain examples of what have been traditionally taken as expressions of efficacy in earlier literature on medieval and early Modern English recipe texts, that is, *This hath bene proued* and *Probatum est*. This type of formula seems to be aimed at indicating that the medicine has been tried or tested at some point in time prior to the writing of the recipes. However, there is not much scholarly agreement as for their identification as ES without any further discussion. These ideas will be developed in Chapter 6 Section 6.3.2 (page 185).

5.3 Stance

This section will be devoted to reviewing some issues concerning modality, evaluation and evidentiality, all of which can be satisfactorily included under the general label of stance. Stance is a complex linguistic construct in which many theoretical and methodological predicaments seem to have found their way. Complexity in the stance panorama may have been brought about because of the huge variety of linguistic and paralinguistic resources, i.e. lexis, grammar, prosody, that can signal authorial attitudes. As a matter of fact, definitions and categorisations as proposed in the literature are not always equivalent across scholarly works. What is more, sometimes the same linguistic resource is labelled differently depending on the author.

The way language may be used to express opinion has been analysed from a number of perspectives such as corpus linguistics, functional linguistics and sociolinguistics. The use of so much varied methodologies has led to a terminological maze and little agreement on what each term is said to cover has been reached. Some of the terms put forward include connotation (Lyons 1977), affect (Ochs 1989), attitude (Halliday 1994; Tench 1996), intensity (Labov 1984), hedging (Holmes 1988; Hyland 1996), appraisal (White 2004; Martin and White 2005; Martin and Rose 2007), and evaluation (Hunston and Thompson 1999).

While connotation appears to be restricted to the study of single linguistic expressions, affect and attitude focus on the language user, i.e. writer's attitude. According to Leech (1974: 15-18), the study of connotative meaning is related to "the 'real-world' experience one associates with an expression", and the study of affective meaning is related to "the personal feelings of the speaker". For Martin and White (2005), appraisal is divided into three subcategories, that is, (i) affect, (ii) appreciation and (iii) judgement. Bybee and Fleischman (1995) also propose a triple division of modality into (i) epistemic, (ii) deontic and (iii) evaluation. According to them, evaluation shows the writer's attitude towards something as desirable and undesirable. The sense of epistemicity is shared by other linguistic phenomena like hedging which is defined as "any linguistic means used to indicate either a) a lack of complete commitment to the truth value of an accompanying proposition, or b) a desire not to express the commitment categorically" (Hyland 1998: 1).

As shown here, terminologies are varied and, sometimes, overlapping, so much so that Hunston and Thompson (1999) have opted for using a different one which seems to encompass those used in the previous literature, and that is evaluation. Hunston and Thompson (1999: 5) define it as follows:

broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values.

Evaluation and stance seem to be equivalent concepts in that they both refer to the general notions of attitude and epistemicity, but, for the purposes of the present thesis, the term stance as used in Biber and Finegan (1988), Biber et al. (1999), Conrad and Biber (1999), and Precht (2000) will be preferred as it is a theoretically generous superordinate term where the analysis of modals and modalised expressions, evaluative adjectives and adverbs, and evidential material can be included. Apart from this, the theoretical framework offered by these authors presents a fine-grained categorisation of stance markers which has been successfully applied to diachronic studies.

The stance approach adopted in this thesis is the one developed in the *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English* (hereinafter LGSWE) (Biber et al. 1999) with some minor theoretical adjustments which will be commented on in due time. My working definition for the concept corresponds with the one operationalised here which defines stance, referring to content other than propositional, as the expression of "personal feelings, attitudes and value judgments, or assessments" (Biber et al. 1999: 763). Stance is then taken as a superordinate term which covers the meanings individuals can convey in addition to the propositional content, and this includes both attitudinal and modal meanings.

Stance can be conveyed by means of lexis, grammar and other paralinguistic features. While lexical stance markers include nouns, adjectives and verbs that have a primarily evaluative function, grammatical stance markers involve the following: (i) stance adverbials, (ii) stance complement clauses, (iii) modals and semi-modals, (iv) stance noun + prepositional phrase and (v) premodifying stance adverb (stance adverb + adjective or noun phrase).

The stance model has been successfully applied from a diachronic perspective in a number of studies. Biber, Conrad and Reppen (1998) document a historical pattern of change in the use of modals, i.e. domain of obligation/necessity, over the last three centuries which is characterised by a shift from lower uses of modals to higher uses of semi-modals. Taavitsainen (2001b) carries out some research into the way authorial stance is expressed in late Middle English and early Modern English scientific writings through the use of modals and other modalised expressions and how this is related to the source of knowledge. Similarly, Fitzmaurice (2003) focuses on the use of modal verbs as pragmatic resources for the expression of politeness in the eighteenth century English epistolary genre. Biber (2004) identifies the patterns of change in the grammatical marking of stance in the ARCHER corpus in the past three centuries. He observes a decrease in the use of modal verbs and an increase in the use of semi-modals, stance adverbials, and stance complement clause constructions. Recently, Alonso-Almeida (2009) analyses the expression of stance in Middle English charms as realised by the employment of lexis, grammar and person marking. The analysis reveals that stance markers are indicators of authorial attitudes both towards their texts and their audience.

The definition of stance as used in the LGSWE is a broad one and so allows for the inclusion of other approaches to the study of authorial attitudes, for instance, the evaluation framework proposed by Hunston and Thompson (1999) and the disjunctive perspective on evidentiality adopted by Cornillie (2009). All of these and their implications for the analysis of ES will be commented on in the remainder of this section. Since there is much overlap between these categories, I shall organise the presentation of information under the general labels of modality, i.e. as realised by modal verbs; evaluation, i.e. as realised by evaluative adjectives and adverbs, and lexical verbs; and evidentiality, i.e. as realised by lexical evidential verbs.

5.3.1 Modality as realised by modal verbs

Although modality stands as one of the most frequently addressed issues in research, not a unique definition of the term can be put forward. Descriptions and categorisations still arise much controversy among scholars so much so that some

of them opt for a relativistic standpoint claiming that “modality and its types can be named and defined in various ways. There is no correct way” (Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 80). While admitting the existence of divergence in the issue, efforts should be made so as to try to usefully delimit the category for research purposes.

To begin with, modality has been traditionally taken as a semantic rather than a pragmatic category. As noted by Narrog (2005: 166-167), as a universal, meaning allows for cross-linguistic validation, that is, as speakers of any language (and no matter how different languages can be), people share the mechanisms, cognitive or otherwise, by means of which linguistic expressions are associated to the ideas they represent. Thus, modality can be taken as a semantic basis for cross-linguistic comparison and only later can the pragmatic uses and effects generated by this formal category be looked into.

The study of modality is inextricably connected to the study of meaning and, more specifically, to the study of speaker’s meaning as constructed by the hearer’s interpretative role in a communicative situation. This idea somehow underlies much of contemporary scholarship concerning modality as it can be generally defined as the linguistic codification of the speaker’s stance, i.e. attitudes, beliefs and opinions, among other aspects, towards the communicated proposition.

Von Wright’s (1951: 1-2) work on modal logic set the path for research on descriptive and taxonomical issues of modality. He made a distinction between four types of modality, namely, (i) alethic, (ii) epistemic, (iii) deontic and (iv) existential. Roughly speaking, the first type is concerned with the truth of propositions; the second type has to do with matters of knowledge; the third type is related to obligation; and, finally, the fourth type is associated with existence.

Borrowing Aquinas’ terms, he further distinguished between modality *de dicto* and modality *de re* which apply to alethic and epistemic modality only: while alethic modality *de dicto* refers to “the mode or way in which a proposition is or is not true” (Von Wright 1951: 8), alethic modality *de re* refers to “the mode or way in which an individual thing has or has not a certain property” (Von Wright 1951: 25). Epistemic modality *de dicto*, in turn, refers to “the mode or way in which a proposition is or is not known (to be true)” (Von Wright 1951: 29).

Epistemic modality *de re* refers to “the mode or way in which an individual thing is known to possess or to lack a certain property” (Von Wright 1951: 33).

Later classifications of modality are frequently and partially based on Von Wright’s modal logic model. There is a tendency to divide modality into two classes, for instance, Lyons (1977) makes a two-fold distinction between epistemic and deontic modalities: the former “is concerned with matter of knowledge, belief” (Lyons 1977: 793) or “opinion rather than fact” (Lyons 1977: 681-682), and the latter “is concerned with the necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents” (Lyons 1977: 823). This division coincides with the one proposed by Biber et al. (1999: 485), but the terminology they used is different:

Each modal can have two different types of meaning, which can be labelled intrinsic and extrinsic (also referred to as ‘deontic’ and ‘epistemic’ meanings). Intrinsic modality refers to actions and actions and events that humans (or other agents) directly control. Meanings related to permission, obligation, and volition (or intention). Extrinsic modality refers to the logical status of events or states, usually relating to assessments of likelihood: possibility, necessity, or prediction.

Coates’s (1983: 18-21) proposal also takes modality to encompass epistemic and non-epistemic modalities. The former roughly corresponds with Von Wright’s epistemic modality in that “it is concerned with the speaker’s assumptions or assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker’s confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed” (Coates 1983: 18). The emphasis here is placed on the subjective nature of this type of modality as realised by the expression of the speaker’s attitude or opinion towards the truth value of the proposition. Non-epistemic modality, for which Coates does not offer any clear definition, is equated with root modality and this is where she includes deontic, dynamic and existential modalities.

Similarly, Palmer’s (1986) model takes modality to include propositional modality, which involves the expression of the speaker’s judgements about propositions, and event modality, which involves to the expression of the speaker’s attitude as for the likelihood of events in the future. These two subcategories are further divided into epistemic and evidential modality, and deontic and dynamic modality, respectively. Both epistemic and evidential modalities apply to the factual status of information, but the former has to do with

judgements about it and the latter with the evidence for it. In the case of deontic and dynamic modalities, they are differentiated on the basis of the conditions involved, i.e. external and internal, respectively. Senses of obligation and permission belong to deontic modality, while senses of ability and willingness belong to dynamic modality.

Cross-linguistic comparison serves Bybee et al. (1994) to establish a taxonomy of modality with four types, that is, (i) agent-oriented, (ii) speaker-oriented, (iii) epistemic and (iv) subordinating. Agent-oriented modality focuses on “the existence of internal and external conditions on an agent with respect to the completion of the action expressed in the main predicate” (Bybee et al. 1994: 177). Senses such as ability and root possibility, desire, intention, willingness, necessity and obligation are included in this type of modality. Speaker-oriented modality focuses on “the speaker[’s granting] the addressee permission” (Bybee et al. 1994: 179) to carry out some course of action and includes performative uses like positive and negative commands, warnings or the granting of permission, among others.

As used in earlier literature (Von Wright 1951; Coates 1983), epistemic modality is defined in Bybee et al. (1994: 179) in terms of the expression of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of propositions ranging from possibility through probability to inferred certainty. Finally, subordinating modality or, subordinating moods, as Bybee et al. call it exactly, are not clearly defined in their framework. They (Bybee et al. 1994: 180) claim that “the same forms that are used to express the speaker-oriented and epistemic modalities are often also used to mark the verbs in certain types of subordinate clauses”.

5.3.2 Evaluation as realised by evaluative adjectives and adverbs, and lexical evidential verbs

ES tend to have an important evaluative component, i.e. evaluative adjectives and adverbs, by means of which writers show their opinion about the validity of medicines, mainly with persuasive purposes. Generally speaking, the expression of evaluation involves (i) an agent expressing the evaluation, (ii) an object or a subject, a process or a state of affairs being evaluated, and (iii) the type of evaluation being expressed.

It is beyond dispute that adjectives have a strong interpersonal component since they undoubtedly reveal authorial attitudes towards propositional information and even towards the audience itself. Biber et al. (1999: 508-509) point out that, from a semantic perspective, there are two broad groups of adjectives: descriptors and classifiers. Descriptors can be taken as the prototypical adjectives in that they can denote features such as (i) colour, i.e. *black, bright, green*; (ii) size/quantity/extent, i.e. *deep, huge, wide*; (iii) time, i.e. *annual, late, young*; (iv) evaluative/emotive, i.e. *beautiful, good, poor*; or (v) miscellaneous descriptive, i.e. *appropriate, empty, practical*.

Classifiers, in contrast, are used to “restrict a noun’s referent, by placing it in a category in relation to other referents” (Biber et al. 1999: 508). The authors identify three subclasses, namely, (i) relational/classificational/restrictive, (ii) affiliative and (iii) topical/other. The first subclass relates to those adjectives that are used to delimit the referent of a noun in relation to other referents, i.e. *chief, different, previous*. The second subclass is related to those adjectives that are used to designate some sort of affiliation of the referent, mainly, nationality and religion, i.e. *Chinese, Christian, Irish*. The third subclass includes adjectives which are used for “giving the subject area or showing a relationship with a noun” (Biber et al. 1999: 509), i.e. *environmental, legal, phonetic*.

Adjectives are said to express appreciative modality, which encodes the subjective evaluations and judgements of the speaker. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980) puts forward a major distinction between objective and subjective adjectives. She further divides the latter into emotional and evaluative types. The evaluative type is also taken to comprise axiological and non-axiological subtypes as shown in Figure 9 below. This fine-grained typology of subjective adjectives is a useful tool for the identification of the evaluative use of adjectives which convey the writer’s positive assessment of medical products. Kerbrat-Orecchioni’s typology does not seem to be incompatible with Biber et al.’s classification, in fact, it goes deeper into the semantic characterisation of evaluative/emotive adjectives as shown here:

Subjective adjectives		
Emotional adjectives Reflect an emotional state, e.g. <i>sad</i> , <i>unpleasant</i>	Evaluative adjectives Reflect an evaluation in relation to a norm or to an ideology	
	Axiological evaluative adjectives Evaluation in relation to a system of values, e.g. <i>famous</i> , <i>good</i> , <i>interesting</i>	Non-axiological evaluative adjectives Evaluation in relation to norm, e.g. <i>big</i> , <i>new</i> , <i>recent</i>

Figure 9. Typology of adjectives (Kerbat-Orecchioni 1980).

According to this author, emotional adjectives are those which do not only specify a feature of the noun they modify, but also indicate an emotional reaction in the speaker (Kerbat-Orecchioni 1980: 111). Axiological evaluative adjectives, on their part, are those that indicate the speaker's qualitative evaluation of the modified noun in relation to a system of values by adding a positive or negative judgement and so, their use can be said to have implications as for the speaker's favourable or unfavourable position towards the modified noun. Non-axiological evaluative adjectives are those that provide a qualitative or a quantitative evaluation of the noun they modify in relation to a norm. They tend to have a gradual nature.

As far as adverbs are concerned, Biber et al. (1999) make a distinction between three main groups of adverbs, that is, (i) circumstance adverbs, i.e. *eagerly*, *here*, *now*; (ii) stance adverbs, i.e. *apparently*, *clearly*, *frankly*; and (iii) linking adverbs, i.e. *additionally*, *besides*, *nevertheless*. While circumstance adverbs pertain to the propositional content of a sentence, stance and linking adverbs do not essentially contribute to it: the former constitute a comment on that content and the latter signal the relationships that hold between the propositional content of the sentence in which they occur and that of other sentences in a given piece of discourse.

In this light, circumstance adverbs pertain to the representational level of meaning (Ramat and Ricca 1998): they are used as complementisers of verbs or nouns and cannot be elided without disrupting the meaning of the sentence in which they appear. Stance adverbs pertain to the interpersonal level of meaning (Ramat and Ricca 1998): they are used to convey some information about the propositional content of the sentence or about the speech act the sentence is used to accomplish. Consequently, stance adverbs are concerned with the expression of speaker attitudes.

Stance adverbs are frequently addressed in earlier literature together with linking adverbs, above all, when their syntactic behaviour is at stake. In such a case, both stance and linking adverbs are labelled as sentence adverbs, sentence adverbials or sentence modifiers. Whenever a pragmatic perspective is adopted, stance and linking adverbs are clearly differentiated, for instance, in Fraser's (1999) discursive framework stance adverbs have a correspondence with comment pragmatic markers and linking adverbs do so with discourse markers. Quirk et al.'s (1985) refer to disjuncts and conjuncts, respectively, while Sinclair (1990) and Halliday (1994) grouped them together under the label adjuncts. Similarly, Huddleston and Pullum (2002) label them as clause-oriented adjuncts.

I shall focus on those stance adverbs aimed at indicating the validity of the remedies. In so doing, Biber et al.'s (1999), and Conrad and Biber's (1999) semantic categorisation into epistemic, attitude and style stance adverbials will be followed. According to the definition provided in Biber et al. (1999: 854),

Epistemic stance adverbials and attitude stance adverbials both comment on the content of a proposition. Epistemic markers express the speaker's judgment about the certainty, reliability, and limitations of the proposition; they can also comment on the source of the information. Attitude stance adverbials convey the speaker's attitude or value judgment about the proposition's content. Style adverbials, in contrast, describe the manner of speaking.

Epistemic stance adverbials can further convey a number of meanings such as (i) doubt and certainty, i.e. *perhaps, probably, undoubtedly*; (ii) actuality and reality, i.e. *actually, in fact, really*; (iii) source of knowledge, i.e. *apparently, evidently, according to*; (iv) limitation, i.e. *in most cases, mainly, typically*; (v) viewpoint or perspective, i.e. *from my perspective, in my opinion, in our view*; and (vi) imprecision, i.e. *kind of, roughly, so to speak*.

5.3.3 Evidentiality as realised by lexical evidential verbs

Knowledge does always come from a source. Marking someone's source of information shows how an individual got to know or learnt that information; for example, s/he may have some information as for a given event on the basis of having witnessed it, by someone else's report, or by logical reasoning. Sometimes, recipe texts contain indications about how the writer got to know the remedies and, specifically, about how the writer got to know that they have somehow worked in the past, i.e. they are effective therapeutic aid in the prevention and cure of diseases.

Evidentiality is an essentially semantic category which can be broadly and narrowly defined. In the broad conception, evidentiality is taken to refer to both the speaker's source of knowledge and the degree of reliability of that knowledge, in which case evidentiality and attitudinal information, i.e. epistemic modal qualifications, towards knowledge seem to go hand in hand (Chafe 1986: 262). In the narrow conception, however, it is taken to refer to the speaker's source of knowledge alone. This is the view adopted by Bybee (1985: 184) for whom "evidentials may be generally defined as markers that indicate something about the source of the information in the proposition".

Dendale and Tasmowski (2001: 341) rightly point out that, although there seems to be a general intuition that source of knowledge and reliability of information are conceptually differentiated, scholars do not always take evidentiality and epistemic modality as clearly separate categories. As a matter of fact, the issue can be approached from three different perspectives, that is, inclusion (one of them falls within the scope of the other), overlap (there is a point of intersection between the two) and disjunction (they are clearly distinguished from one another).

As commented on earlier in Section 5.3.1 (**page 149**), Palmer (1986) endorses the view that evidentiality is subsumed under the epistemic modal system and, consequently, evidential markers are indicators of the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed. The inclusive sense for which he (Palmer 1986: 51) opts is made manifest in the following passage:

the term 'epistemic' should apply not simply to modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal that indicates

the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says. In particular, it should include evidentials such as ‘hearsay’ or ‘report’ (the quotative) or the evidence of the senses.

This association of epistemicity to the expression of both evidence and certainty is also followed by Aijmer (1980: 11), who claims that “epistemic quantifiers are expressions which say something about the speaker’s evidence and degree of certainty”. Associations of this kind seem to be derived by the widely adopted view that expressing one’s source of knowledge is an indirect way of conveying epistemic attitude or, in other words, that all evidential markers tend to be essentially epistemic.

Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), on their part, choose an overlapping approach. They assume that epistemic modality is “a domain where evidential and modal values overlap [...] where the probability of P is evaluated” (Plungian 2001: 354). Their definition of evidentiality is given in terms of “the indication of the source or kind of evidence speakers have for their statements” (Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 85). Relying on the semantic mapping theory, they postulate that the category of epistemic modality is split up into two meaning regions: (i) epistemic possibility, i.e. uncertainty, and (ii) epistemic necessity, i.e. certainty and a relatively high degree of probability. The meaning regions covered by the evidential category are direct, i.e. visual, auditory and unspecified, and indirect, i.e. reportatives, inferential and unspecified. Their proposal equates inferential evidential readings with epistemic necessity (Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 85; cf. Boye 2010).

Carretero (2004) also deals with the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality from an overlapping perspective. She emphasises the existence of a continuum from evidentiality to epistemicity so that a given expression will fall towards one point or another of the continuum “depending on the commitment to the truth of the utterance which they encode or implicate” (Carretero 2004: 27-28).

Finally, De Haan (1999), Aikhenvald (2004) and Cornillie (2009) adopt a disjunctive standpoint. De Haan (1999) states that “evidentiality deals with the source of information for the speaker’s utterance while epistemic modality concerns itself with the degree of commitment on the part of the speaker for his or her utterance”. Similarly, Aikhenvald (2004: 3) notes that evidentiality “covers

the way in which the information was acquired, without necessarily relating to the degree of speaker's certainty concerning the statement or whether it is true or not". Matthewson et al. (2007) offer a criticism for both De Haan's and Aikhenvald's positions on the basis of their research on American Indian languages where evidentials, as elements which quantify over epistemically accessible worlds, have to be analysed as epistemic modals.

Cornillie (2009), very much after Aikhenvald's fashion, posits that there is not a necessary correlation between the expression of mode of knowing and the expression of epistemic speaker commitment. Drawing on Nuyts's (2001a: 21) definition of epistemic modality, that is, "an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring or has occurred in a possible world", he (Cornillie 2009: 46-47) suggests taking evidentiality as "the reasoning processes that lead to a proposition" and epistemic modality as the evaluation of "the likelihood that this proposition is true".

As Cornillie (2009) notes, evidentiality and epistemic modality are obviously different concepts. To my mind, however, the task of determining to what extent a given item contributes more to evidentiality or epistemicity seems to be difficult to accomplish in practice. This is particularly the case when referring to the interpretation of utterances as carried out by a reader who, in the search for more cognitive effects, is probably led to infer differing degrees of reliability as attached to the information conveyed. In this thesis, then, I shall consider that evidentiality and epistemic modality are closely related so much so that many evidential elements are essentially epistemic, at least from the perspective of the interpreter, and so they do not only indicate the source of information, but also some sort of evaluation concerning the truth of the propositions. This approach has been adopted by Chafe (1986), Palmer (1986), Matthewson et al. (2007), Kranich (2009) and Ortega-Barrera and Torres-Ramírez (2010).

Salient to the discussion of the relationship between epistemicity and evidentiality are the notions of subjectivity and (inter)subjectivity in the sense that modal, i.e. epistemic, and/or evidential meanings are indexical of the speaker's subjective/(inter)subjective attitude (Marín-Arrese 2009). It should be noted that what these notions exactly refer to is still far from clear and, consequently, much

terminological and conceptual confusion occurs across scholarly works. This is probably due to the fact that these concepts have been used in very different linguistic disciplines to refer to very different linguistic phenomena (Nuyts 2012: 53-54). Nevertheless, researchers have made some efforts in order to clarify and mark out the limits of these concepts. In what follows, I shall provide an overview of what they have been taken to mean in the literature, and I shall also specify how they are to be taken in this thesis.

Lyons (1977) firstly (and vaguely) attempts to define subjectivity in contrast to objectivity as dimensions pertaining to modality. The difference between the two lies in the type of evidence an individual has for a modal judgement. Take the following (Lyons 1977: 797):

(117) Alfred may be unmarried

According to Lyons's formulation, this sentence may have been uttered by the speaker on subjective grounds to indicate that s/he is uncertain about Alfred's marital status and so, it expresses the speaker's reservations about providing an unqualified evaluation about the factual status of the proposition. Or, it may have been uttered on objective grounds, in which case it indicates that the speaker does not express any lack of commitment whatsoever as for the factuality of the proposition, but rather that s/he is certain that there is some measurable chance that Alfred is unmarried. As noted by Nuys (2001b: 386), the quality of the evidence governing objective modal judgements in Lyons's formulation can be said to be more reliable than that in subjective ones.

Within diachronic semantics, Traugott (1989, 1995, 2010) and Traugott and Dasher (2002), take the notions of objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity as central in accounting for the semantic development of some linguistic forms, i.e. grammaticalised. In their work, subjectification refers to the tendency displayed by some grammaticalised linguistic forms whose meanings have changed from expressing the objective description of the world to "expressing the speaker's belief state or attitude towards the proposition" (Traugott 1989: 44). Intersubjectification is concerned with the further development of those linguistic forms whose meanings have shifted from expressing the speaker's position towards the objective world to expressing "meanings centered on the addressee" (Traugott 2010: 35).

Langacker's (1990, 1999) cognitive grammar framework also makes use of the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity as related to human conceptualisation processes. The difference between objective and subjective construal is determined by the extent to which the conceptualiser, i.e. the speaker, is offstage as opposed to onstage in the conceptualisation of the object of perception. In an "optimal viewing arrangement" situation, the conceptualiser is offstage and implicit, which means that s/he is not part of the conceptualisation and the focus of attention is on the perceived object. In such a situation, the conceptualiser is construed with maximal subjectivity whereas the perceived object is maximally objective. In an "egocentric viewing arrangement" situation, in contrast, the conceptualiser is onstage and explicit and so s/he is placed in the focus of attention being construed with maximal objectivity while the perceived object gets less objective.

This thesis relies on a less ambitious application of the concepts of subjectivity and (inter)subjectivity, specifically, the one developed by Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, 2012) since it has relevant implications for the analysis of epistemic and evidential values. According to Nuyts (2001a: 34), the concept of (inter)subjectivity is defined in terms of the shared status of the modal evaluation:

The alternatives within this [evidential] dimension could then be phrased as follows: does the speaker suggest that (s)he alone knows the evidence and draws a conclusion from it; or does (s)he indicate that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the conclusion from it. In the former case the speaker assumes strictly personal responsibility for the epistemic qualification, in the latter case (s)he assumes a shared responsibility for it (although (s)he remains responsible too, of course).

In other words, Nuyts's view of (inter)subjectivity has to do with who is to be held responsible for a modal evaluation: if the modal evaluation is presented on the grounds of the assessor's sole responsibility, then it is subjective, whereas if it is presented on the grounds of the assessor's and someone else's responsibility, it is intersubjective. For example, this may be linguistically manifested in the use of personal pronouns in such a way that a first person subject where the assessor is made explicit encodes subjectivity, and an impersonal subject encodes intersubjectivity (Nuyts 2012: 59).

As commented on at the beginning of this section by way of introduction, information may be acquired in several ways, for instance, an individual may have had direct access to a given event, i.e. visual or otherwise involving his/her senses; he/she may have had direct access not to the event itself but to elements that hint at the occurrence of the event; or he/she may have received the information from somebody else's report. Depending on the type of evidence the speaker has for a piece of information, the subdomains of evidentiality can be as shown below:




Figure 10. The semantic domain of evidentiality (Willet 1988: 57).

According to this classification, and semantically speaking, evidentials can be direct or indirect. The former are used when the individual has some sort of sensory evidence for the information, while the latter are so when the evidence for the information has been reported to him/her by someone else, or when s/he has come to know that information on the basis of an inferential process.

Willet's classification above has served as the starting point for many other taxonomies of evidential values such as the one proposed by Aikhenvald (2004: 63-64) who divides evidentials into six types, namely, (i) visual, (ii) non-visual sensory, (iii) inference, (iv) assumption, (v) hearsay and (vi) quotative. While visual evidentials are those which indicate that the information has been specifically acquired through seeing, non-visual sensory evidentials are those which indicate that the information has been acquired through any of the other

senses. Evidentials within the inferential category signal at the information's being acquired on the basis of "visible or tangible evidence, or result" (Aikhenvald 2004: 63). The assumptive category involves evidence's being obtained by "logical reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge" (Aikhenvald 2004: 63). Hearsay and quotative evidentials are associated with the reporting of information, with no reference at all or explicit reference to those reporting it, respectively.

Aikhenvald's categorisation of evidential values seems to present, in my view, some problems with the inferential and assumptive types since it is difficult to determine to what extent logical reasoning and inference are unrelated cognitive processes. Generally speaking, logical reasoning may involve the performance of inferential tasks, in which case, the inferential and assumptive categories as defined here are somewhat fuzzy. Apart from this, Bermúdez (2005: 8) observes that Aikhenvald is not completely consistent in the classification of evidential systems: the author primarily distinguishes between evidential systems in which the source of information is specified and those in which the source of information is not specified. She then goes on making distinctions in the former on the basis of the number of ways in which the source of information can be marked, i.e. up to six different ways which correspond to the classification of evidential values commented on above. This classification results in awkward groupings of very disparate systems because they may mark the same number of evidential values and, conversely, similar systems fall into different categories because they do not mark the same number of evidential values.

Plungian (2001) notes that not all languages make the basic distinction between direct and indirect evidence, as put forward in Willet (1988), but between mediated and non-mediated evidence, including in the latter sensory and inferred evidence. His proposal takes personal evidence vs. indirect evidence as the basic evidential opposition as shown in Figure 11:

Direct evidence	Indirect evidence	
	Reflected evidence (=Inferentials and presumptives)	Mediated evidence (=Quotatives)
Personal evidence		

Figure 11. Types of evidential oppositions (Plungian 2001: 353).

According to this diagrammatic representation, both direct and reflected evidence are included within the personal evidence category. In the case of direct evidence, the information is gained through the individual's senses and so s/he has direct access to the described situation, i.e. visually or by any other of his/her senses, or the described situation is an individual's inner state, i.e. endophoric evidence. In the case of reflected evidence, the information is obtained by performing inferential tasks or by reasoning. Finally, when the individual gets to know some information through mediated evidence, this is indicated by means of quotative evidentials. Assuming that P stands for the described situation and S for the speaker, Plungian (2001: 354) describes his typology of evidential values as follows:

Direct evidence (including direct access to P)

Visual: "P, and I see/saw P".

Sensoric: "P, and I perceive(d) P" [P may be heard, smelled, tasted, etc.].

Endophoric: "P, and I feel (felt) P" [P is the speaker's inner state, cf. I am hungry, I want to sleep, I know the answer, etc.].

Reflected evidence (including direct access to some situation Q related to P)

Synchronous inference: "P, because I can observe some signs of P" [P at T0]; cf. He must be hungry (because he shows signs of it, etc.).

Retrospective inference: "P, because I can observe some traces of P" [P before T0]; cf. He must have slept there (because we see his untidy bed, etc.).

Reasoning: "P, because I know Q, and I know that Q entails P"; cf. Today there must be a fair in Salzburg (because I know the routines of this region, etc.).

Mediated evidence (including neither direct nor reflected access to P)

Quotative: “P, because I was told that P”; cf. They said he’s leaving; He is said to have left, etc.

Plungian’s typology seems to present certain advantages over Willet’s or Aikhenvald’s, for instance, its applicability to larger number of systems in which there is not a correspondence between the epistemic and the evidential scales (Pietrandrea 2005: 48). In this respect, his proposal offers a straightforward distinction between personal and impersonal/indirect evidence. Furthermore, it provides fine-grained distinctions of the subcategories included in reflected evidence avoiding the fuzziness encountered in Aikhenvald’s taxonomy and so becoming an efficient tool to distinguish between the subcategories of evidentiality.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have offered an overview of the stance approach as formulated in Biber et al. (1999). The use of this pragmatic approach and the theoretical insights it provides us with are in order because of the very nature of ES. These are characterised by the occurrence of a wide array of linguistic resources, all of which are crucial for the determination of the propositional attitude and the illocutionary force attached to the utterances. I have opted for this approach because stance is a theoretically generous term which allows for the analysis of modal verbs, evaluative language and evidential material. Moreover, the adoption of this approach is also validated by its successful application to historical studies.

I have firstly introduced the linguistic elements that are generally involved in the formulation of ES by providing a set of examples which illustrate their occurrence in this stage of the recipes. I have then outlined the predicaments behind the stance approach by focusing on notions related to modality, evaluation and evidentiality insofar as they have implications in the expression of authorial stance.

I have revised some of the concepts associated to modality in order to clarify what this notion can be taken to encompass. In general lines, modal verbs may encode the speaker’s stance towards what s/he saying in the form of attitudes, beliefs or opinions. Although terminological variation is tremendous, I have chosen the traditional distinction between deontic and epistemic modality because

their use in research is more widespread. It should be noted, however, that these concepts correspond to intrinsic and extrinsic modality in Biber et al. (1999: 485). As applied to the formulation of ES, the commissive illocutionary force of a promise is partially determined by the deonticity conveyed by the modal verbs, in particular, *shall* and *will*.

As far as evaluation is concerned, this notion applies to those utterances where the author provides a positive assessment of the medical product by making explicit reference to its quality or to its healing properties. Here I have specified Biber et al.'s (1999: 508-509) classification of adjectives into descriptors and classifiers. I shall be focusing on the descriptors category and particularly on evaluative/emotive adjectives since these are the ones more closely related to the expression of authorial attitudes. I have also deepened into this semantic characterisation thanks to the typology of subjective adjectives proposed by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980) as it provides fine-grained distinctions in the semantics of adjectives. As will be shown in the next chapter, axiological evaluative adjectives together with attitudinal stance adverbs and lexical verbs which predicate on the curative properties of the remedies are the preferred means of expressing evaluation.

Lastly, I have pointed out some important issues related to evidentiality and epistemic modality because the occurrence of evidential material indicating the author's source of information and its reliability is a key element in the recovery of the propositional attitude attached to utterances. I concede that evidentiality and epistemic modality are essentially different concepts, but when referring to the interpretation of specific utterances, readers may be led to infer the degree of reliability of the information presented in the search for more cognitive effects. The notions of subjectivity/(inter)subjectivity have been also commented on insofar as epistemic and/or evidential markers may be indexical of the author's subjective/(inter)subjective positioning.

Chapter 6. Promises. Results and discussion of findings

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the corpus of study and the discussion of the findings. The analysis concerns the formulation of promises in English medical recipes written between 1500 and 1600 in terms of ES. RT provides us with a well-articulated theoretical framework for the interpretation of these utterances as for the cognitive processes involved.

In relevance-theoretic terms, the actual interpretation of ES, either as promises or as something different, is crucially determined by the context, i.e. as envisaged by the addresser, in which they are embedded. Moreover, the addressee's role in the interpretation can be said to be active in the sense that s/he has to choose the context from a range of potential contexts in which these utterances are to be processed. Then, the resulting interpretation is derived from the interaction between the linguistic choices made by the addresser and the contexts selected by the addressee.

According to the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, the addressee follows a path of least effort when computing cognitive effects in the interpretation of ES, which may be interpreted as promises of efficacy of the medical products. However, greater cognitive effects may be possibly achieved at the expense of major cognitive effort so that other meanings different from promises of efficacy may be inferred. In terms of optimal relevance, the most relevant interpretation to occur to the addressee is the first one as it provides him/her with an appropriate balance between cognitive effort and effect.

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 (**page 168**) contains the general results of the analysis as for the different resources writers employ for the expression of ES in medical texts, namely, modals, the lexical items *proved* and *probatum*, evaluative expressions, matrices and other strategies. Section 6.3 (**page 171**) focuses on discussing their interpretation following a relevance-theoretic

approach in order to determine whether or not they are understood as actual promises of efficacy. Section 6.4 (**page 197**) summarises the evidence found in the analysis of particular examples of ES in order to affirm or deny their status as promises. Lastly, Section 6.5 (**page 200**) contains the conclusions of the chapter.

6.2 Results

This section contains the general results derived from the analysis of the corpus. It specifies the linguistic resources used by writers in the expression of ES which can be grouped into the following categories: (i) modal verbs, mainly *shall* and *will*, (ii) the lexical items *proved* and the Latin counterpart *probatum*, (iii) evaluative expressions such as *and it is good therefore* (TPM) and *for it healeth myghtly* (THM), (iv) matrices such as *And this I know to be and excellent thing* (GHI), and (v) other strategies including anecdotes and narrative material. Their distribution in the corpus shows the following results:




Figure 12. Distribution of the resources used to formulate ES in the corpus (percentages).

The results shown above reveal that modal verbs are by far the most frequent resource employed by writers in the formulation of ES accounting for 80.90% followed by the items *proved/probatum* with 9.83% and evaluative expressions

with 7.61%. The distribution of the use of matrices and other strategies of the sort specified above does not seem to be quantitatively significant, accounting for 0.97% and 0.69% respectively.

Their frequency of occurrence normalised to 10,000 words per text is provided below:

	Modals	Proofs	Evaluative expressions	Matrices	Other strategies
TPM	46.19	4.03	2.57	0	0
MGH	74.19	0	0	0	0
RLP	4.57	1.33	5.33	1.14	0
THM	28.58	11.23	24.28	0.50	0.66
PIV	44.64	3.88	0	0	1.94
BSM	67.59	5.48	0	0.91	0
TNT	20.31	5.49	2.68	2.30	0.13
FKP	13.94	0	0	0	0.96
TPH	35.73	8.52	3.28	0	0
RST	69.13	12.57	2.51	0.31	0
GHI	27.47	0	0	0	0

Table 7. Distribution of linguistic resources used to formulate ES per text (frequencies of occurrence are normalised to 10,000 words).

As shown here, there is not a single text where modals are not the predominant resource in the expression of ES. The highest frequencies of occurrence are found in MGH with 74.19, followed by RST with 69.13 and BSM with 67.59. The frequencies of occurrence vary in range across the rest of the texts, but they are all below 50 occurrences per 10,000 words, for instance, TPM contains 46.19 occurrences and this is followed by PIV with 44.64, TPH with 35.73, THM with 28.58, GHI with 27.47 and TNT with 20.31. FKP and RLP present the lowest frequencies of occurrence with 13.94 and 4.57 occurrences per 10,000 words, respectively.

These results invite the inference that, in general, the authors of the texts in the corpus may have chosen the modals *shall* and *will* as the preferred linguistic resource to codify seemingly promises of efficacy in contrast to any of the other resources because of their intrinsic potential to convey a set of meanings typically associated with promissory speech acts, i.e. at least in a more explicit way than

any of the other resources would do. These meanings will be looked at in depth in Section 6.3 (**page 171**) below when addressing the role of modals in the formulation of ES, but, for the time being, I should like to posit that they include (i) the future orientation of an action, (ii) the expression of an intention and (iii) the undertaking of a commitment. These meanings are tightly connected to some of the constitutive rules which have to obtain for a promise to count as such (Searle 1969: 57-61), namely, (i) the propositional content rule, i.e. there is a predication of a future act; (ii) the sincerity condition, i.e. there is an intention to perform the action; and (iii) the essential condition, i.e. the obligation to perform the action. However, as will be shown later on following a relevance-theoretic approach to comprehension, these aspects may or may not be instantiated in particular examples of ES, rendering this type of utterances as either actual promises of efficacy or as something different such as simple future predictions.

The next preferred resources are the item *proved* and its Latin counterpart *probatum*. The highest frequencies are found in RST with 12.57, THM with 11.23 and TPH with 8.52 occurrences per 10,000 words. TNT and BSM present very similar frequencies with 5.49 and 5.48 occurrences, and they are followed by TPM with 4.03, PIV with 3.88 and RLP with 1.33 occurrences. Not a single occurrence of these items has been found in MGH, FKP and GHI. The codification of supposed promises of efficacy as realised by the use of these items emphasises the role of evidentiality in the formulation of ES in the texts analysed. The employment of these two items stands as an appeal to prior experience and probably testing which can be taken as the source for asserting the efficacy of the products. Both prior experience and testing seem to offer an implicit guarantee of reliability of medical knowledge which, as will be shown later on in this chapter, is manifested in varying degrees depending on the linguistic context in which *proved* and *probatum* occur. Moreover, different degrees of authorial commitment may be also inferred on the basis of contextual information.

The use of evaluative expressions as a means of indicating the efficacy of medical products comes next. Their frequency of occurrence is unevenly distributed across the texts in the corpus, being the highest the one found in THM with 24.28 occurrences. In the rest of the texts, the presence of evaluative expressions is significantly lower, with 5.33 occurrences in RLP, 3.28 in TPH, 2.68 in TNT, 2.57 in TPM and 2.51 in RST. In the rest of the texts, authors do not

make use of evaluative expressions for this purpose. Evaluative expressions, including stance adjectives and adverbs as well as lexical verbs, provide a positive qualification of the product by conveying either the author's direct positive assessment of the medicines or a description of the positive outcome of the disease after the application of the product.

Matrices and other strategies such as anecdotes and narrative material present the lowest frequencies of occurrence. Matrices have been registered in five of the eleven texts in the corpus, specifically, in TNT with 2.30 occurrences, in RLP with 1.14, in BSM with 0.91, in THM with 0.50 and in RST with 0.31. As for other strategies, these have been found in four of the eleven texts with 1.94 occurrences in PIV, 0.96 in FKP, 0.66 in THM and 0.13 in TNT. Matrices tend to have mental predicates which are used to frame the propositions allowing the reader to retrieve indications as for the source of information, its reliability and the author's degree of commitment. Evidential values may be also derived from the processing of anecdotes which are primarily used as evidence for asserting the efficacy of the remedies.

6.3 Discussion

This section presents the discussion of the findings which will be illustrated with relevant examples of potential promissory speech acts as realised by ES in medical texts. The issue of whether or not these potential promises of efficacy can be actually taken as tokens of this type of commissive speech acts will be addressed following both RT and the stance approach. For ease of exposition, this section will be divided into sections which correspond to the five main linguistic resources employed by writers to possibly assert the efficacy of the remedies, i.e. modals, the lexical items *proved* and *probatum*, evaluative expressions, matrices and other strategies.

6.3.1 Modals

As commented on in Section 6.2 (page 168), utterances containing the modal verbs *shall* and *will* are the preferred linguistic resources used by writers in the expression of ES. I have suggested that this may result from the fact that these two

modals may be used to convey a number of meanings which are conventionally associated with the expression of promises, at least in the Searlean sense, including the future orientation of an action, the expression of an intention and the undertaking of a commitment. A pragmatic analysis, then, seems to be in order so as to identify the type of speech acts these modals may express.

The notion of futurity as related to these modals and, in particular, to *will*, has been the object of attention of numerous semantically-driven studies (Hornstein 1990, Huddleston 1995, Sarkar 1998, Declerck 2006, Matthewson 2006). The concern has been on its status as a tense marker, a modal marker or an ambiguous marker between these two positions (Jaszczolt 2005: 471). Although the concepts of tense and modality are, in principle, different, it is also true that it is difficult to determine their boundaries (Fleischman 1982, Comrie 1985, Palmer 1986).

The debate as to whether or not items such as *shall* or *will* contribute more to tense or modality falls outside the scope of the present thesis, however I should like to point out that “both future time reference and modality [may] coexist” (Sarkar 1998: 93), that is, *shall* and *will* may simultaneously contribute to the tense system and modality. In the light of the instances found in the corpus, both *shall* and *will* can be taken as future tense markers and so they are used to place the actions being referred to as occurring after the time of the utterance. In addition to this, they may also participate in a number of modalities on the basis of contextual information as will be shown later on.

Just as ostension comes with a tacit guarantee of relevance, the formulation of a promise inevitably expresses both the promisor’s intention to carry out the action promised, and his/her “commitment to the intention that it be a promise” (Searle 1989: 545-546), i.e. his/her binding to its fulfilment. Locutionary utterances with *shall* and *will* may have an illocutionary act potential of promises as well as of predictions. I would like to foreground Wallis rules as formulated in the second half of the 17th century in this respect. There is no consensus as regards the extent to which these rules were simply the result of prescriptivist grammarians to instruct people in the correct use of *shall* and *will*, or if they reflected actual language use (Gotti 2002: 301-302). They, nevertheless, capture the pragmatic uses of these modals in terms of “speaker attitude and involvement”

“mak[ing] formal distinctions of modality which are central to the utterance of a speech act” (Arnovick 2000: 48).

Wallis rules elaborated on the specifications of the speech act values attached to these modals. These read as follows: “in order for a speaker to make a promise [...], he or she should use *will* in the first person and *shall* in the second and third persons. The forms for making a prediction [...] are reversed: *shall* in the first person, *will* in the second and third persons occur in predictive statements (Wallis 1972 [1653]: 339)” (Arnovick 2000: 42). The distinction on the combinations of subject pronouns with *shall* and *will* result in associations of locutionary utterances with the agents of illocutionary acts signalling speaker attitudes of volition, i.e. deontic modality, or expectation, i.e. epistemic modality.

The analysis of the samples will show that the harmonic combinations of subject pronouns and modals captured within the Wallis system do not automatically generate deontic or epistemic readings, and that only contextual information can assist the reader in retrieving the intended interpretation. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, readers are not passive recipients of the information conveyed; they have an active role in the construction of meaning interpretation. The analysis of the samples will be organised from the simplest to more complex ones.

6.3.1.1 *Shall*

This section is devoted to the pragmatic analysis of samples of ES containing *shall*. Formally speaking, the sequences may be more or less complex. They are complete sentences with noun phrases or pronouns as subjects followed by *shall* and an infinitive with its corresponding complementation. Other adjuncts may be added resulting in more complex structures. Let us begin the discussion with examples (118), (119) and (120) below:

(118) For them that may not se / or them that haue blered eyes. Take Ginger and rubbe it on a whetstone into a fayre bason and putte therto as moche salte and temper it in wyne with the ioyce of Sufrage and lette it stande a nyght and a day and than take the rynde or the clerenesse that houeth aboue and put it in a glasse and with a fether whan thou goes to bedde / or as ofte as thou layes ye downe to slepe anoynte therwith thyne eye lyddes within and without **and thou shalbe hole** (TPM)

(119) Of consumption or leanesse [...] Take butter wythoute salte, oyle of roses and of vyolettes, of ech .i. ounce the fatte of rawe porke, halfe an ounce, waxe, a quarteron of an ounce, make an ointment wherwyth the chylde muste be rubbed euery daye twyse, **thys with god feding shall encrease his strength by the grace of God** (RLP)

(120) Another for the same. Take Rewe Heyhoue Betayne Veruayne Myntes [...] and make a playster on ye molde as hote as it may be suffered and make a garlande of a keuercheffe to kepe it on and with fyue playsters **thou shalbe hole on warantyse** (TPM)

The recipe in (118) contains a simple structure consisting of the pronominal subject *thou* plus the contracted form *shalbe* followed by *hole*, all of which is introduced by the conjunction *and*. The illocutionary force of the utterance as derived from its interpretation in context is indeed a promise of efficacy and so *shall* is to be taken as signalling deontic modality. Once the information has been computed following the path of least effort, the most accessible interpretation for this utterance is that the patient will recover his/her sight again or that his/her eyes will stop being inflamed by the application of the product in the way specified. In other words, the promise of efficacy can be retrieved once the assumption (i) the product must be applied in the way specified, i.e. P, is understood as a condition which have to obtain for the successful outcome of the disease. *Thou shalbe hole*, i.e. Q, would then be processed against P whose occurrence brings to the foreground of the deductive process the *if... then* concept, allowing for a *modus ponendo ponens* rule to be applied. This rule makes manifest that the actualisation of Q is dependent on the actualisation P, and so P stands as a necessary condition for the product to provide the expected results. The reader would, then, come to the conclusion that the patient's recovering his/her health is dependent on the preparation and application of the medical product as indicated in the recipe. In this case, the reader cannot infer anything else but a promise regarding the healing power of the medicine.

The instance in (119), however, cannot be readily accepted as a promise, although they are formally similar. This is so because of the addition of the stance adverbial *by the grace of God* which crucially determines the way the context has to be enriched for an optimal processing of the utterance. In this case, the subject position is occupied by the noun phrase *thys with god feding*, rendering the clause with an inanimate subject. The referent of the head of the noun phrase can be

easily retrieved from context; it refers anaphorically to *an ointment wherwyth the chylde muste be rubbed euery daye twyse*. The deictic item is further complemented with *with god feding*, resulting in an implicitly formulated condition for the fulfilment of the action in the predicate.

Disregarding the presence of the stance adverbial *by the grace of God*, the processing of this utterance would proceed in a similar way to the one in instance (118), provided that the condition that the application of the ointment as indicated in combination with good feeding are recognised as necessary. However, the addition of *by the grace of God* does certainly have pragmatic implications in the process of utterance interpretation. The context must be firstly enriched by using encyclopaedic information so as to include assumptions related to the belief that God has the power to heal people. Processed in the context of the whole recipe, the reader is able to infer that this stance adverbial stands as an extra condition for the actualisation of *thys with god feding shall encrease his strength*. A *conjunctive modus ponens* rule operates on the existing premises as follows:

Conjunctive modus ponens

Input: (i) If (P and Q) then R
(ii)P

Output: (If Q then R)

P = thys with god feding

Q = by the grace of God

R = shall encrease his strength

The truth value attached to the premises conjoined by the biconditional operator *and* is the same, and both of them have to be actualised for the fulfilment of R. The modal meaning conveyed by *shall* maybe deontic or epistemic depending on the extent to which the presence of the grace of God in one's life is thought to be beyond human control. In case the help of God is completely beyond human control, the utterance can be said to retain the illocutionary force of a promise and so *shall* is deontic. In case the help of God is dependent on, say, the individual's religious practices, the modal value of *shall* is epistemic as it conveys tentative possibility. Although nothing in the context can lead us to favour one reading or the other, the very occurrence of the stance adverbial *by the grace of God* implies some lowering in the degree of authorial commitment to the truth of the proposition modalised by *shall*.

As a stance marker, the employment of *by the grace of God* indicates the author's attitude towards the text and the audience. On the one hand, it clearly reveals the author's position as for his actual religious beliefs, creating appeals to the readership's beliefs as well. On the other, since there are certain requisites for the medical product to be successful, including the presence of the grace of God in the patient's life, a possible failure could be attributed not only to a lack of expertise on the part of the practitioner, but also and most importantly, to inefficient religious practices. Consequently, this stance adverbial can be taken as a strategy which allows the writer to maintain a positive image.

The recipe in (120) contains another stance adverbial embedded in the ES, i.e. *on warantise*. The processing of the sequence *thou shalbe hole is*, again, is similar to the one in example (118), being the underlying condition for the medicine to be effective that five plasters are applied, i.e. *and with fyue playsters thou shalbe hole*. If this condition obtains, then the actualisation of the proposition modalised by *shall* is supposed to take place in the normal course of events. The writers assured position as regards the effectiveness of the product is contextually implied by the occurrence of the epistemic stance adverbial *on warantise*.

At this stage of the comprehension process, the initial context has to be extended, probably by adding chunks of encyclopaedic information which may further activate assumptions about the degree of certainty in the truth of the proposition as expressed by the writer. This adverbial actually codifies a high degree of certainty in the future realisation of the action, emphasising on the efficacy of the remedy and on the trustworthiness of the information presented. In this sense, *on warantise* is used by the writer in order to boost the readership's confidence in the value of the recipe. The deontic meaning of *shall* in this example is contextually strengthened by the occurrence of *on warantise*, rendering the utterance as an actual promise of efficacy. The unequivocal expression of certainty may ultimately allow the reader to infer authorial responsibility for the truth of his/her words.

The use of adverbial stance markers such as *by the grace of God* or *on warantise* have been frequently found in the texts analysed. In the examples above, they occupy a final position in the clause, but they may also occur in initial, pre-verbal or post-verbal position. In terms of processing of information,

the position stance adverbials occupy within the clause matters; for instance, as noted by Conrad and Biber (1999: 71), earlier occurrence within the clause serves the purpose of framing the proposition before presenting it. Consider example (121) in this respect:

(121) Medicines for bledying of the nose. [...] Moreouer, it is good for the pacyente to holde in his hande egremonie, with the rote and all, and drinke ye iuyce of knotgrasse, **and without doubt ye blood shall staunche anon** (RLP)

The sequence under consideration in this recipe for nosebleed is *and without doubt ye blood shall staunche anon*. It is introduced by the stance adverb *without doubt* and this is followed by the subject of the clause, i.e. the noun phrase *ye blood*, and the predicate which is further complemented by the adverb *anon*. *Without doubt* falls into the category of epistemic stance adverbials in the taxonomy proposed by Biber et al. (1999) and Conrad and Biber (1999). As an epistemic stance adverbial, it comments on the status of the information in the proposition and, specifically, on the degree of certainty/uncertainty with which the author entertains it, providing a “comment about the truth-value of what is said” (Greenbaum 1969: 43; Quirk et al. 1985: 620). In this sense, epistemic stance adverbials expressing certainty/uncertainty may convey “a full spectrum of certainty states ranging from doubt to complete conviction in the truth of a statement” (Rubin et al. 2006: 62-63).

The placement of *without doubt* in theme position in the sentence actually determines the development of the comprehension process since the timing of linguistic items in the unfolding discourse has been found to be crucial in its orderliness. Clause position in itself is important when processing information because, as noted by Aguilar (2009: 115), “cognitive load or effort may [...] vary depending on factors, like the length, the quantity of metadiscourse, the time and the place it is uttered”. As occurring in initial position, the processing of *without doubt* contributes to diminishing the range of potential contexts available to the reader for interpretation, thus reducing the cognitive effort while allowing him/her to achieve high cognitive effects. Pragmatically speaking, the commissive, i.e. promissory, illocutionary import of the utterance is contextually strengthened by the occurrence of the stance adverb. Its placement in initial position clearly shapes the understanding of what comes next in fairly specific ways. In particular, it

leads the reader to entertain the proposition with a high level of certainty, ultimately operating as a persuasive device.

Adverbial expressions other than those explicitly signalling authorial stance as for the validity of the remedies are used in the formulation of ES. One case in point is the adverb of time *soon* which indicates the time position for the occurrence of the event designated with the respect to the time of the utterance. In the context of promissory speech acts, however, they may have stance nuances related to the author's positive assessment of the remedies. Take the following example:

(122) An other for the same. Take lanberd, and make poudere thereof, and then let the sicke drinke thereof with whyte wine, **and he shall pisse soone, for this medicine hath bene proued** (TPH)

The adverb *soon* linguistically encodes that the designated event, i.e. the sick person is to urinate, is to take place at some point within an interval which is close to the time of the utterance. The author may then be understood as saying a wide range of things such as *the sick person is to urinate in a few minutes/in a few hours/in a few days after the administration of the product*. The reader's task is, in principle, to decide the time interval the author had in mind. In relevance-theoretic terms, the reader has to "look for an interval narrow enough to yield an interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance" (Wilson and Sperber 1998b: 14, Wilson and Sperber 2012: 181).

By using *soone* instead of a precise specification of the supposed time in which the remedy will produce the expected results, the writer is causing the reader a great cognitive effort which, according to the presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270), has to contribute to the achievement of great cognitive effects. Some assumptions may be activated during the interpretation process, for instance, (i) the author does not want to provide the reader with the precise information as regards the time interval, or (ii) the author cannot provide the reader with the precise information as regards the time interval. In the context of medical literature, the reader may safely infer that the writer cannot not provide him with the exact information and may further infer the authorial degree of certainty attached to the utterance. *Soon* is consequently

understood as an epistemic device (Alonso-Almeida 2009: 22) showing some level of lack of confidence in the truth of the propositional content.

The epistemicity conveyed by this adverb obviously affects the illocutionary force of *he shall pisse*, which cannot be taken as a promise in the strictest sense. In this context, this utterance stands as an estimation of a likely possibility and so the modal is to be interpreted epistemically. However, the epistemic sense of *shall P* in this context is semantically modified by the occurrence of *for this medicine hath bene proued*. This has a scope over the entire preceding clause reinforcing the illusion of promise, even when the meaning of items such as *prove* is overestimated at the time. As to the use of tokens such as *proved* and *probatum*, see Section 6.3.2 (page 185) below.

In the light of the examples analysed here, it seems that the less modalised an ES, the more likely it is to be taken as a promise of efficacy. The occurrence of stance adverbs, epistemic or otherwise, generally undermines the commissive illocutionary force of the utterances by arising some level of doubt in the readers and so they are frequently led to epistemic interpretations. The wide range of pragmatic effects generated by the interplay of linguistic resources signalling (i) commitment, (ii) detachment and (iii) evidentiality will become apparent in the analysis of ES where *will* is used since, as will be shown now, they tend to be more complex.

6.3.1.2 Will

In this section I shall take into consideration some examples of ES in which *will* is used. The relevance-theoretic approach reveals that their pragmatic functions are varied and that contextual assumptions as raised by the linguistic choices made by the authors are important in order to determine whether or not they are actually issuing promises of efficacy. The most marked feature of the following samples is, perhaps, that their level of complexity in terms of formulation is higher than that in the examples with *shall*, making manifest that the patterning is highly variable (Mäkinen 2011: 158, 165).

I would like to point out that all the examples chosen for discussion in this section display some evidential nuances because of the occurrence of items such as *tried* in (123), *proued* in (124) and (125), and *sure experiment* in (126). For the

time being, let us say that their evidential nature obviously influences the whole sequences in which they are embedded, rendering evidential interpretations on the basis of the experimental testing suggested by their semantics. These items will be discussed in depth in Section 6.3.2 (page 185). Consider example (123) below:

(123) Baye Salt well beaten into powder and syfted, and incorporated, and mixed well with the yolke of an Egge, and so layde vpon any Carbuncle, plague sore, botche, byle, or impostume: **assuredly (by the grace of God,) it wyll drawe to it selfe all the venome of the plague, or the sore: and breake any byle, or other thing. So that in short tyme the same wyll be healed. A tried thing (TNT)**

The sequence is introduced by the adverbial stance markers *assuredly* and *by the grace of God*, both of which are used to frame the propositions modalised by *will*, i.e. *it wyll drawe to it selfe all the venome of the plague, or the sore: and breake any byle, or other thing*, and *So that in short tyme the same wyll be healed*. These devices are used to encode the speaker's commitment to the proposition and so they convey the attitude underlying the propositional form of the utterance. As commented on in example (121), initial position adverb placement contributes to help lowering the reader's processing effort in the derivation of higher level explicatures so as to embed the proposition in a certain propositional attitude.

Adverbs are considered to be the "purest" expressions of epistemic force, at least in the West Germanic languages: "they are the most precise way and specific means available for marking the degree of likelihood of a state of affairs" (Nuyts 2001a: 55). *Assuredly* expresses a high degree of certainty in the truth of the propositions, resulting in an evaluation of the situations described in terms of probability. Nevertheless, the explicit mention of the author's certainty somehow implicates that the truth of the propositions cannot be granted, creating a shadow of doubt, thus changing the epistemic force value of the modals from probability to possibility.

As I have shown earlier with reference to examples of ES with *shall*, in particular in recipe (119), the adverbial *by the grace of God* influences the reading of the modal it accompanies so that it may be interpreted deontically or epistemically depending on the extent to which the help of God is thought to be beyond the individual's control or not. In instance (123), however, the sense of epistemicity, i.e. possibility, conveyed by *assuredly* exerts an influence over the prepositional phrase *by the grace of God* which, consequently, is understood

epistemically as well. Pragmatically speaking, these stance adverbs can be taken as speech act modifiers which turn the promise of efficacy into a mere possibility.

The increasing level of complexity in the formulation of ES seems to go hand in hand with the addition of extra linguistic resources including evidential ones. Obviously, the processing of these complex structures requires higher cognitive effort on the part of the reader but, as will be apparent from the analysis of the examples, the extra effort will bring about higher cognitive effects. Take the recipe below:

(124) The goom of a Chery tree dissolued in white wine, and so geuen to them that are grieued with the stone: **it wyll helpe maruelously. Mizaldus affyrmes that it is certainly proued** (TNT)

Several linguistic resources intervene in the formulation of the ES in this example which consists of two complete sentences. The first one contains a third person singular pronominal subject *it* plus the modal *will* followed by the lexical verb *helpe* and the adverbial complementiser *maruelously*. The second one is a matrix clause whose subject is the noun phrase *Mizaldus*. The matrix verb is *affyrmes* and it is complemented with a *that*-clause. If the first part of the whole sequence was taken in isolation, its processing would indeed yield a deontic interpretation if only because the reader infers that the administration of the remedy is a covert condition for the fulfilment of the proposition. As such, this utterance cannot be taken to convey less than a validation of the remedy.

The addition of the matrix clause leads the reader to interpret the whole sequence rather differently. This clause has an evidential value as it specifies the source of information the writer has for the proposition expressed in the embedded clause. The reader is prone to infer that the type of evidence the writer has for the information is indirect and, specifically, mediated or quotative (Plungian 2001: 354) as the explicit reference to the source is provided. The use of the verb *affyrmes* highlights the factual status of the proposition and its corresponding truth, but the epistemic adverbial stance marker *certainly* in the embedded clause does at the same time provide some lowering in the degree of speaker commitment. This is so because of the gradable nature of the adverb, so that in its processing the reader probably achieves higher cognitive effects if he confronts this concept with other such as *more certainly* or *less certainly*. This

inferential process leads him/her to come to the conclusion that there is some authorial level of doubt implicated in the use of this adverb.

The asymmetry in the expression of different degrees of commitment as encoded in *affyrmes* and *certainly* in the matrix clause implies that the default truth value for the whole utterance is less than certain. The interpretation of *will* in the preceding utterance is definitely determined by the epistemic sense of the matrix clause and so the whole sequence is to be understood as an epistemic judgement on the part of the author rather than an expression of promise of efficacy.

As shown above, the employment of evidential structures is common in ES containing *will*. Lexical evidential markers, in particular, are considered to be important in the development of authorial argumentation and in the creation of author-reader relationships in a text because they explicitly indicate the source of information authors have for their claims (Boye and Harder 2009). The processing of evidential material does certainly have an impact on the interpretation of the modal, providing the reader with higher cognitive effects which allow him/her to derive authorial attitudes both towards their utterances and their audience. Consider examples (125) and (126):

(125) This following is a proued medicine for the ache in the huckle bone, called the Sciatica. Take a pounce of good black Sope, one pint of good Aquavite, half a pynt of Sallet oyle, and a quarter of a pynt of the iuyce of Rew, seethe them and sturre them all together ouer an easie fyre, vntyll it be something thicke, and that it maye be made in a plaster: then spreade some thereof vpon a peece of lether, and apply it to the ache or payned place, and let it lye thereon vnremoued, three dayes and three nights: and yf the payne be not then gone, then applye such an other plaster thertoo, and remoue it not of so long, **and it wyl helpe it certainly. This was tolde me by one that knew it often proued** (TNT)

(126) Take a Frogge, and cutte her through the myddes of the backe with a knife, and take out the Lyuer, and fouled it in a Colewoort leafe, and burne it in a newe earthen pottle well closed: and geue the ashes thereof vnto him or her, that hath the falling sycknesse to drinke with Wyne, and it wyll helpe him. And if the partye be not healed at once: then do so by another Frogge, and so doo styll, **and without doubte it wyll heale him: if he vse it. This was tolde me for a sure experiment** (TNT)

The processing of the sequences *and it wyl helpe it certainly* and *without doubte it wyll heale him* is similar to the one commented on in the analysis of recipes (121)

and (124) with special reference to the items *without doubt* and *certainly*. The use of the structure *This was tolde me* in these two instances, nevertheless, makes an important difference as it indicates that the information communicated in the proposition has been obtained by verbal report. In none of the statements does the writer explicitly indicate whether or not s/he believes in the truth of what s/he is saying, nor does s/he specify the source of information. The very authorial choice of this reportative structure suggests something about his/her stance through an invited inference: “Inferences of this kind are invited in the sense that they are suggested by the context” (Evans and Green 2006: 721). In the relevance-theoretic framework, the use of a reportative structure like *This was tolde me* can be accounted for in terms of the descriptive and interpretative uses of language (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 224-231). Ifantidou (2005: 1337) summarises the way this notions operate as follows:

any lexical item which marks a certain part of an utterance as an interpretation of an utterance or thought attributed to someone *other* than the speaker marks this part of an utterance as *interpretatively* used. A lexical item which marks part of an utterance as an interpretation of the speaker’s *own* thought is *descriptively* used.

Tolde, then, can be taken as an interpretative-use marker whose pragmatic function is that of marking the ground-floor assertions or implied assertions contained in *by one that knew it often proued* in (125) and *for a sure experiment* in (126) as interpretations of thoughts that are attributed to someone other than the author him/herself. Interpretative uses of language of this type inevitably activate assumptions regarding both authorial commitment to the truth expressed and degree of reliability of the information communicated.

It has been argued that the use of evidential markers in languages where this category is not grammaticalised tends to result in the removal of “the degree of responsibility of the speaker for the reliability of information” (Paducheva 2012). Specifically, information which has been acquired on the basis of a report is considered to be less reliable than that which has been acquired by having direct access to a given situation. The attribution of the information presented to a source other than the author him/herself results in the expression of low commitment, at least lower than that expressed by means of a plain, unmodalised assertion. The use of this reportative evidential affects the claim by conveying both implicit authorial detachment and shift of responsibility.

The evidential and epistemic interpretations of the reportative structure pervade the whole statement and so in these examples *will* has both evidential and epistemic readings, none of which blocks the other since they may coexist as has been shown in Cornillie (2009). In the context of medical recipes, the illocutionary point of these utterances cannot be taken to be the expression of the author's compromise as for the future efficacy of the remedies in any case, because there are too many linguistic resources that prevent the reader to come to such a conclusion after processing them.

Moreover, *this was tolde me by one that knew it often proued* in (125) contains the linguistic codification of some important information which is worth-mentioning here. Firstly, the verb *knew* encodes cognitive attitude and, specifically, one of knowledge. In other words, the information framed by *knew* can be considered to be a piece of knowledge. However, it cannot be attributed to anyone in particular because its referent cannot be inferred from the linguistic context nor the immediate physical environment, hence reducing the already low level of commitment attached to the whole utterance because of the occurrence of the reportatives *tolde*. Secondly, the adverb *often* encodes information regarding the frequency with which the medicine has been supposedly proved, and so it is aimed at expressing that the medicine has been successfully applied on numerous occasions. The reader may stop at this interpretation if s/he finds that it satisfies his/her expectations of relevance, but s/he may also continue so as to achieve higher cognitive effects. S/he may arrive at the conclusion that there is some inherent vagueness conveyed by the use of this adverb and so there is some degree of tentativeness attached to the proposition.

The derivation of propositional attitudes is crucially determined by the occurrence of epistemic stance adverbials such as *assuredly* or *certainly*. As shown in this section, it does not even matter that their semantics point at a high degree of certainty and commitment towards the actualisation of the propositions, because their gradable nature and the explicit mention of authorial certainty activate assumptions about the fact that the truth of the propositions cannot be granted. In addition to the epistemic readings, *will* may also have evidential ones derived from the presence of material indicating the author's source of information embedded in the same ES. The indication of source of knowledge is linguistically encoded in the use of specific lexis, such as lexical evidential verbs

like *affyrmes*, *tolde* and *proued*, which allow for contextually inferred meanings of authorial commitment and reliability of information. *Proved* and any of its variant forms, in particular, are frequently used in ES. They will be looked at in depth in the following section.

6.3.2 Use of the lexical items *proved* and *probatum*

The employment of the items *proved* and *probatum* as well as some variant forms stands as the second preferred linguistic resource used by writers to mark potential promissory speech acts. Generally speaking, the commentary style attached to utterances containing them is primarily evidential with different nuances as for the indication of the source of information. In an analysis of early scientific writing, i.e. late Middle English and early Modern English, Taavitsainen (2001b: 27) observes that there is a correlation between evidentiality and scientific thought-styles in the following terms:

Scholastic science relies on authorities and axioms. It is logocentric: the focus of interest is on language and the aim to reconstruct the meanings of ancient authors. Empiricism relies on sensory evidence and aims at detecting the laws of nature by observation. Rationalism, by contrast, relies on the deductive mode of knowing combining reason with innate ideas as the source of knowledge, and the modern approach, e.g. to medical science is statistically based, and its clinical applications rely on probabilities.

As will be shown in this section, ES containing *proved* or its Latin counterpart may convey authorial source of information and/or mode of knowing as well as his/her degree of commitment towards the supposed efficacy of the medical products; a number of linguistic features are used to this end. Take the examples below:

(127) A drinke for the paine of the mother. Take a dram of Mithridatum, and dissolue it in an vnce and a halfe of water of wormewood, and giue it to the woman for to drinke afore that she goeth to meate 4. houres, and lett her not drinke a good whyle afterwarde: **proued** (TPH)

(128) A souerayne medycyne that helpeth a mannes sight and purgeth and claryfyeth his eyes be they neuer so blered [...] Also take a coluer and let it blede on the right vayne vnder the wynges and anoint thyne eyes with ye blode .ix. dayes and .ix. nyghtes and more yf it be need / **for this medycyne hase ben proued many tymes** (TPM)

(129) A very good Medicine for any burninge with fire. Take Blacke Vernish, and with a Feather, anoint the place well which is burned, and it wyll asswage ye heate thereof, and yt will heale it as faire as euer did any other Medicine, and soe vse yt continually, vntill such time as you bee perfect whole. **This hath beene truly and sufficiently proued** (RST)

The recipe in (127) contains the item *proved* alone occupying a closing position. In its processing, the reader accesses the encyclopaedic entry of the concept so that some information about its extension in the form of assumptions or assumption schemas is brought to the foreground. S/he may probably have access to assumptions like *to prove something is to demonstrate its truth* or *in order to prove something there must be evidence for it*. Further extensions of the context and the completion of assumption schemas may allow the reader to infer the propositional attitude conveyed by the utterance.

The process of contextual extension to derive the authorial attitude as for the way s/he entertains the proposition will be constrained by syntactic means, in particular, by the use of the perfect construction which indicates that the designated action is referred to as having occurred in the past. The relevance of its past occurrence extends up until the present and even the future. This construction, then, is used to claim for the validity of the remedy on the grounds that it has already worked in the past. The reader may infer the author's level of certainty in what s/he is saying and s/he may probably come to the conclusion that s/he has some evidence for asserting that the recipe will be successful. The type of evidence as suggested in the use of *proved* seems to be experimental, but in the absence of any explicit indication in this regard, the reader infers that the author is not completely certain; otherwise s/he would have used it as evidentiary justification.

Recipes in (128) and (129) present formal variations in the use of *proved*. In example (128), the sequence with *proved* is introduced by a *for*-conjunctive and this is followed by noun phrase *thys medicine* in subject position plus the predicate and the adverbial complement *many tymes*. Similarly, the example in (129) consists of the deictic pronoun *this* followed by the predicate where some adverbial modifications are included, namely, *truly* and *sufficiently*. This time the use of the perfect structures *hase ben proued* and *hath beene [...] proued* are not the only elements contributing to the identification of the propositional attitude. The adverbial complementation, i.e. *many tymes*, and *truly and sufficiently*, can be

taken as devices which linguistically encode some important information in this sense.

Many tymes stands as a quantifier over the times the medicine has apparently resulted in some sort of help for the patient; however, it does not provide the reader with an absolute quantity reference, but rather with a relative one. Similarly, *sufficiently* emphasises the adequacy in the number of times the medicine has been proved, but the lack of specificity may raise some level of doubt in the reader. *Truly*, on its part, contributes to help the reader recover the propositional attitude in a substantially different way, that is, by highlighting the author's confidence in the previous testing of the medicine. After the processing of these elements in the context where they occur, the reader cannot infer that the author is completely sure about the healing power of the remedies. The strength of his/her claim of efficacy is consequently lessened to the extent that there is no promise at all issued in these utterances.

As shown in examples (127) to (129), the absence of explicit indications as for the agency of the testing of the remedies partially determines that the propositional attitudes recovered by the reader tend to be those with a less than certain degree of commitment and so the propositions are entertained as probabilities or even possibilities, i.e. depending on the extra linguistic choices made by the writers. Let us now focus on recipes (130) to (133) where some indications of the source of information are offered:

(130) If the pestilence commeth with greate excesse of heate, drinke it vpon rosewater, and vynegre, but yf yt fele it colde, take it in a draught of wyne, and couer ye, wyth clothes, so that ye may sweate as longe as is possible, **for wythoute doute, it is a present remedie as I my selfe haue oftentimes proued** (RLP)

(131) A playster for all maner of sores, and specially for greene sores. Take of fyne Suger and Burnet, of ech lyke much, and bruse them in a mortar, and wash the wound with the iuse of the same [...] then take them from the fyre, and let them stand a while, then put it into a bason of fayre water, and so worke it out into roules, as before is taught, in ordering the wound. **Prob.per T. Colby** (BSM)

(132) Item in the mouth of the paciente being open put a sticke as a gagge and marke well the place of the aposteme and prycke it wyth a sharpe stycke, **for manye Authores haue oftentimes proued the same** (THM)

(133) To heale a greene wounde. Take the hearbe Salindine and Houselyke equal quantitie, then bruse them in a mortar, and take the iuse of them, and put it in the wound, and annoynt the same therwith: that done, fyl the wound with part of the

brused hearbs, and so bynde it vp, **and in short tyme it wil heale the sore: as by prooffe hath bene seene** (BSM)

The recipe in (130) contains an ES which is introduced by the stance adverbial *wythoute doute*. This adverbial helps, in principle, to frame the understanding of the proposition presented after it, but its epistemic sense, i.e. certainty, may be modified because of its interplay with other epistemic devices included in the utterance. The author then provides a positive, direct evaluation of the medicine in the form of an assertion, i.e. *it is a present remedie*. The reason for his/her assertion is finally introduced in the form of an evidential comment with the item *proved* embedded in it, i.e. *as I my selfe haue oftentimes proued*.

The use of the first person singular pronoun *I* clearly marks the agency of the action, so the author him/herself stands as the very source of information to claim for the validity of the remedy. The use of this strategy “helps to build [authorial] credibility and to achieve the reader’s subsequent confidence in [the author’s] medical knowledge” (Quintana-Toledo 2009a: 35). The causal relationship existing between the utterances *it is a present remedie* and *as I my selfe haue oftentimes proued* can be accounted for in terms of the evidential nature of the item *proved*: the author is somehow entitled to claim the effectiveness of the product as it derives from his own experience. Nevertheless, the item *oftentimes*, just as *many tymes* in recipe (128), encodes a degree of imprecision which renders the utterance an interpretation of epistemic possibility. In this sense, these items may be taken as examples of vague language.

Vagueness can be defined as “a particular kind of uncertainty about the applicability of a predicate” (Barker 2006: 294). Jucker et al. (2003: 1739) argue that vagueness can be accounted for in terms of interaction and that, when speakers are vague, they do so for strategic reasons. According to these authors, the appropriate use of vague language is determined by context: while in some contexts higher degrees of precision are required, in others speakers are somehow entitled to be less precise. In the context of medical literature, writers are expected to be precise so that they provide their audience with accurate instructions as regards the preparation and application of medicines. The use of vague terms such as *oftentimes* can be taken as a hedging device which is aimed to reduce the force of the predicate. The epistemicity pervading the whole utterance ultimately obscures its promissory illocutionary force; it can only be taken as

“communicating that the thought interpreted by P is entertained as a description of an actual state of affairs” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 247) or, in other words, the speaker is simply *saying that P* with little authorial commitment as for the efficacy of the medicine.

Recipe (131) provides an example in which the ES is given in Latin, though in its abbreviated form. Research shows that code-switching has been frequently found in this stage of the recipe (Pahta 2004: 92). This item conveys an evidential meaning on the basis of supposed testing which in this case is not attributed to the author him/herself nor left unspecified since the name of the agent, i.e. *T. Colby*, is provided. The attribution of knowledge to someone else as encoded in the use of this sequence stands as an interpretative use of language in relevance-theoretic terms which, as commented on earlier in this chapter with reference to examples (125) and (126), determines the recovery of attitudes signalling less than high commitment. This item falls into the category of inter-textual metadiscourse put forward by Ifantidou (2005) since it provides reference to an author other than the writer him/herself.

Although the interpretative use of language captured by the employment of *Prob. per T. Colby* is primarily aimed at conveying authorial detachment from propositional content, the explicit mention of an authority in medicine can be also taken as an attempt to achieve credibility as it “help[s] writers to establish a persuasive epistemological and social framework for the acceptance of their arguments” (Hyland 2004: 22). In this same line of thought, the language choice, that is, Latin rather than English, activates assumptions related to learned traditions of medicine possibly pursuing “to lend an aura of credibility and prestige [...] by association” (Pahta 2011:116).

The ES in example (132) is similar to the one in (131) in the sense that it is used to represent a thought which cannot be attributed to the speaker but to *many Authores*, so that it is suggested that the writer cannot be held responsible for a possible unsuccessful application of the medicine. Again, no promise of efficacy can be deemed to be issued with this utterance. This lack of commitment typically associated to interpretative uses of language conflicts with the authorial intention to achieve credibility by mentioning supposed trusted authorities whose experience s/he uses to claim the quality and the trustworthiness of the recipe.

The evidential nature of the ES in the last example is partially given by the experimental testing suggested by the item *prooffe*. In addition, the item *seene* contributes to build on the indication of the acquisition of information by pointing at a sensory mode of knowledge, i.e. visual, creating appeals to an empiric rather than a scholastic thought-style. Assuming that there is a correlation between the mode of knowledge and the degree of reliability with which that knowledge is entertained, the employment of a direct evidential seems to suggest that the information presented is indeed reliable. Nevertheless, the degree of reliability is somehow weakened because of the linguistic choices made by the writer in the rest of the ES, i.e. *in a short tyme* and the use of the passive voice in *as by prooffe hath bene seene*. As shown earlier in the case of *many tymes* in recipe (128) and *oftentimes* in recipes (130) and (132), the degree of specificity conveyed by this adverbial cannot be high in any case and so its use results in the expression of epistemic possibility. The use of the passive voice, on its part, emphasises the action rather than its agency, resulting in the implicit expression of authorial detachment.

As already stated in Section 5.2.3 (**page 145**), ES containing the items *proved*, *probatum* or any of its variant forms have not been easily accepted as ES properly speaking in earlier literature. Stannard (1982: 70-73) notes that this sort of statements should be taken with caution since it is not really clear whether or not they were aimed at showing readers that the recipes were indeed experimentally tried. Totelin (2011: 84-85), in the same line, points out that “the phrases ‘*expertum est*’ or ‘*probatum est*’ do not carry the modern implications attached to the notions of experimentation and proof, but rather indicate that the remedies marked in this way had, at some point, attracted the attention of a reader, who had tried them out”.

Mäkinen (2011: 159), echoing Jones’s (1998: 206) words, also notices that the use of the term *proved* does not necessarily imply that the medicine had been actually tested in any systematic way: it “may have been derived from the scholastic scholarly texts where the proof of the efficacy of a medicine was not a result of a series of laboratory tests but rather a logical outcome of a textual discussion in which contemporary theories of medicine were considered with respect to the recipe in question”.

In this regard, it should be noted that scholastic science was not very much concerned with discovering new data on the basis of empirical testing, but rather with identifying the causes of events already taken as factual and perpetuating the tradition. Eamon (1994: 55-56) observes that saying that something had been proved in the scholastic sense only meant that it had been witnessed, or, as Olsan (2003: 356) puts it, saying that something had been proved indicated that the formula had worked in the past.

6.3.3 Evaluation

The use of evaluative expressions is the third preferred linguistic resource in the marking of potential promises of efficacy. Evaluative expressions include not only the employment of items which explicitly convey a positive qualification of the medical product such as adjectives and adverbs, but also verbs predicating on the healing properties of the medicine. Consider the following examples:

(134) For the Tey of the eyes. Temper Arinent with Hony and a lytell of ye whyte of an egge and lay it to thy eyes whan thou goes to bedde. Also the gall of an Hare temper it with Hony **and it is good therefore** (TPM)

(135) A purgation for colike commynge of fleume. Take .v. drammes of diafinicon,iii. ounces of wormewood water, and make a drinke, the whyche receyued fasting, iiij. or .v. houres afore meat, **is verye profitable** (RLP)

(136) Another for the same. Take Bay salte, Smallege, white Frankencense and Plantine leaues, of each of them a handefull, beate them in a Morter vntill they be very smalle [...] and when you perceiue your fit coming, drink it warme, and eate the cruste, you must vse this drinke dueringe all the time of your sicknes, **for it is very wholesome** (RST)

(137) For stoppynge of the splenne. Take the Elder rote and seethe it in whyte wyne vnto the thryde parte and drynke therof **for it cureth merueylously** (TPM)

(138) Let the rote of rape Vyolet or Sowbread be sodden in water wherin let the nape of the necke be washed and afterward anointed wyth the oyle of the Decoction of Rape Violet or Sowbread **for it healeth myghtly** (THM)

Instances in (134) to (136) contain ES where the authors provide a positive assessment of the medicines by using axiological evaluative adjectives (Kerbat-Orecchioni 1980), i.e. *good*, *profitable* and *holesome*. In instances (137) and (138), authors make use of the lexical verbs *cureth* and *healeth*, both of which predicate on the curative and healing properties of the medicine, together with attitudinal stance adverbs (Biber et al. 1999: 854), i.e. *merueylously* and *myghtly*.

Evaluative language may be used to perform certain speech acts (Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010: 70). In the case of the adjectives used in examples (134) to (136), they encode the author's stance as for the validity of the product. When processing these sequences, the reader accesses their encyclopaedic entries so that a number of assumptions are brought to the foreground. In the case of *good* the reader is not entitled to infer that the remedy will provide the patient with complete health restoration, but rather that it is adequate to offer him/her some degree of health improvement. The employment of *profitable* and *holesome*, in contrast, implies that the medicines are indeed conducive to a healthful state.

In utterances where *good* is used, then, the reader alone would be responsible for assuming that a promise of efficacy is issued here since the semantics of the adjective does not allow for that. In instances (135) and (136), there is nothing in the linguistic environment which may prevent a reader from understanding these fragments as promises of efficacy as long as s/he is able to retrieve the assumption that the medicines have to be given or applied in the ways specified. The inferential process is, in fact, a simple one since the reader may arrive at that conclusion by applying a *modus ponendo ponens* rule as already illustrated in example (118). The occurrence of the item *for* in (136) introducing the utterance helps constraining the way the inferential process develops since it linguistically encode a resultative sense.

Moreover, the author does not modalise his/her assessment of the medicine by using any mitigating device, in which case the degree of commitment attached to these utterances is by default high. In other words, in the context of medical literature, there are certain standards related to what can/cannot be considered to be effective, i.e. on the grounds of providing health restoration. Consequently, if a remedy "meets or satisfies relevant standards" (Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin 2010: 70), it can be safely assessed as *profitable* or *holesome*. In this light, there is no reason to suppose that an author would claim the efficacy of the product without any mitigating device whatsoever, unless he was fully committed to the truth of his/her utterance.

Recipes in (137) and (138) are similar in that they both contain ES which consist of simple structures introduced by *for* which is then followed by the subject pronoun *it*, the lexical verbs *cureth* and *healeth*, and the attitudinal stance

adverbs *merueylously* and *myghtly*, respectively. These attitudinal stance adverbs are used to convey the author's value judgement about the extent to which the remedy can be said to be effective, i.e. in an extraordinary manner. They do not pose any problems for the reader from a processing perspective; they simply activate assumptions on the author's attitude by virtue of their very encyclopaedic entries.

Tense, in contrast, is worth-mentioning at this point as the use of the present tense, i.e. *cureth* and *healeth*, has certain pragmatic implications. Generally speaking, tense contributes "to the determination of reference time by giving a clue to the temporal reference intended" (Smith 1990: 85). This is obvious from any account on tense markers. In the relevance-theoretic approach to comprehension, the addressee relies on tense, among other syntactic features of the utterances together with relevant contextual information, so as to narrow down the time reference up to the point where the utterance can be deemed to be expressing something that is optimally relevant. Tense markers are considered to be "generalised existential quantifiers: they assert that [...] there is some relatively past/present/future time at which the situation described held/holds/will hold" (Smith 1990: 83).

The predication described in (137) and (138) cannot only be taken to hold over the present time, i.e. the time the reader is actually reading the text, because in the context of medical literature, a future time reference is presupposed. In other words, the user of the text reads a text in a given point in time so as to take some course of action after that time, in which case the use of the present in these instances is a futurate one.

Obviously, the predication of the verbs *cureth* and *healeth* as referring to the future could have been more relevantly communicated by means of another linguistic form, in particular, a futurate construction with modals like *shall* or *will*. Nevertheless, the extra processing effort the reader has to make in order to arrive at the futurate interpretation will be somehow rewarded by the cognitive effects that s/he can achieve. It should be noted that "in addition to its time reference function, tense can also signal epistemic distance" (Evans and Green 2006: 394). In this sense, Langacker (2011) posits that rather than saying that the use of the present tense implies that the event described coincides with the time of speaking,

it may be taken to indicate “epistemic immediacy of the profiled process” (Langacker 2011) so that “a present tense indicates that the designated situation is immediate to the speaker, i.e., that it belongs to her ground” (De Wit and Brisard 2009). Pragmatically speaking, the use of the present is intended to arise in the reader certain assumptions about the immediate relationship existing between the administration or application of the medicines and the recovery of the patient, in which case these utterances are indeed understood as promises.

6.3.4 Matrices

Matrices other than the ones which have been already commented on in previous examples are not so frequently employed by writers in the formulation of ES in the texts analysed. This may be so because they require a higher processing effort, at least with respect to those utterances where modals, *proved* and *probatum*, and evaluative items are used. Take the following instances:

(139) Also **it is proued, that the vryne of a bulle, is a singular remedy to mudifie the sores, and to lose the heares by the rootes, without any payne or pille** (RLP)

(140) Cautharides wrapt in a spyders webbe, and hanged ouer one that hath the Quarteyn ague, **it is sayde it cures or delyuers him or her thereof perfectly. Mizaldus** (TNT)

(141) Fox bloud fresh dronke brekith the stone, **for it is knowen that yf a stone be put into it, it wyl breake** (THM)

(142) There is no presenter helpe to ease the tormentes of the Gowte, both in the handes, and in the feete, then a young whelpe, especially of one colour, if the same be put to the griefe: Leuinus Leminus. But the whelpe ought to be cut out, or clouen in two partes thorow the myds of the back: and the one halfe with the inner side hotte, to be layde vnto ye griued place: **and this I know to be an excellent thing** (TNT)

Recipe (139) contains a matrix where the evidential item *proued* is used, in fact, the information that constitutes the whole recipe appears to be flanked by *it is proued that*. This instance makes manifest the structural complexities of ES where matrices are utilised, though the evidential value of the sequence as conveyed by *proued* which occurs in initial position makes its processing somewhat easier. The syntactic choices made by the author, i.e. the construction in the passive voice where explicit reference to the agency of the action is avoided, may allow the reader to infer some degree of detachment on the part of the author.

The matrix *it is sayde* in (140) linguistically encodes an indirect source of information for the embedded proposition, i.e. hearsay evidential, which, in principle, appeals to a low degree commitment and reliability, which is contextually strengthened by the passive construction. Again, there is no linguistic codification for the authorial persona in this ES, so the thought is to be attributed to other individuals. In this case, the author includes to whom it can be attributed, i.e. *Mizaldus*. As shown in the analysis of previous examples, i.e. (131), the inclusion of an authority in medicine serves as an appeal to the credibility of the efficacy of the recipe.

In recipes (141) and (142), the author employs the verb *know*, i.e. *knownen* and *know*, which indicates cognitive attitude. According to Capelli (2007: 156), it is generally assumed that, under normal circumstances and in the absence of any explicit evidential or epistemic element, hearers are normally led to infer that the information communicated constitutes a piece of knowledge. Then, the use of a cognitive verb like *know*, which explicitly signals that the information stands as a piece of knowledge, has certain pragmatic implications.

In the examples above, the employment of *know* may suggest that the author has some sort of reliable evidence for asserting the information conveyed in the embedded proposition, and so s/he chooses to foreground this fact by framing the propositions with this cognitive verb. Nevertheless, there are certain differences as for the surface linguistic manifestation of these two structures, which, again, allow readers to infer differing degrees of speaker commitment to the truth attached to the propositions. The passive voice suggests some lessening in the degree of speaker commitment by foregrounding the action. Since no agent is mentioned, the reader would probably attribute this knowledge to popular belief, which, depending on the value s/he assigns to popular knowledge may result in crediting or discrediting the value of the recipe. In (142), the evaluator of the situation designated in the embedded clause is foregrounded by the use of the first person singular pronoun in subject position in the matrix clause. In this case, the degree of commitment inferred by the reader is high, at least, by virtue of the syntactic characteristics of the sentence in contrast to those in recipe (141).

Additionally, these two structures differ in the degree of subjective/(inter)subjective positioning. In recipe (142), the use of the first person

singular subject explicitly marks that the information is presented on the grounds of the assessor's sole responsibility and so indicates subjectivity. In recipe (141), in contrast, the impersonal construction suggests that the information is presented on the grounds of someone else's responsibility, and so indicates (inter)subjectivity.

6.3.5 Other strategies

This section focuses on the pragmatic analysis of other strategies used by writers to mark potential promises of efficacy. Under this heading, I have included narrative and anecdotal material which stands as the least frequently used resource for this purpose, in fact, examples are scarce. Consider the fragments below:

(143) **In Tuscia ther was a certayne man deliuered and healed of thys disease, of a certayne husband man, by onli ordering or dressing of wild rue and afterwarde were manye healed, after the same maner (THM)**

(144) **A certayne old woman healyd men which were almost full of the dropsye, with the ioyce of planten sodden to half, it might also be made in a syrope (THM)**

The processing of anecdotal and narrative material relies on the reader's accessing prior knowledge against the newly presented information so as to draw inferences. The linguistic context provides him/her with some clues which constrain the way the process proceeds. In these cases, many elements have to be considered, for instance, the employment of the past tense, i.e. *healed* and *healyd*, marking information as factual. Moreover, the referents of the expressions *a certayne man* and *a certayne old woman* are not given. Contextual information, i.e. immediate linguistic context or physical environment, cannot be used by the reader in order to disambiguate the referent of those expressions. This lack of specificity may lead the reader to infer that there the writer has some reservations as for the certainty with which he entertains propositional information.

This type of strategy may have influenced readers towards a positive consideration of the recipes because of their evidential nature, that is, they present anecdotes which may be taken as evidence for asserting the efficacy of the medicines. The strength or the degree of reliability of the evidence presented here as inferred from the linguistic manifestation of the ES cannot be taken to be high because of the asymmetrical correspondence derived from the use of the past

tense, i.e. indicating factuality and a higher degree of certainty, and the ambiguity attached to the referential expressions.

6.4 Are, then, ES expressions of promise?

The relevance-theoretic approach to comprehension as applied to the understanding of ES allows us to infer that not all ES can be taken as expressions of promise in the strictest pragmatic sense. Context, understood as a complex network of assumptions which derive from (i) the interpretation of utterances occurring earlier in the communicative exchange, (ii) the addition of encyclopaedic information, and (iii) the addition of information which is immediately observable from the environment, constitutes a key factor in the interpretation process. Moreover, both addresser and addressee are active participants in this process: on the one hand, the linguistic choices made by the writers crucially constrain the process of context extension and, on the other hand, readers have to choose the context against which ES are to be processed so as to determine whether or not they are actual promises of efficacy.

Several features of the ES have been found to influence their interpretation: their very morphosyntactic features and the occurrence of modal expressions as well as other stance elements, including evidential ones, are indicators of the authors' attitude towards the validity of the remedies. Depending on the extent to which the reader is willing to achieve higher cognitive effects, s/he may follow a path of higher cognitive effort so as to arrive at interpretations which depart from seemingly promises of efficacy.

Generally speaking, both *shall* and *will* may be used to express a promisory speech act and so these modals are interpreted deontically. In these cases, the illocutionary force of the utterance is derived from the reader's recognising the covert conditions for the fulfilment of the *shall/will* proposition. In relevance-theoretic terms, such a task may be accomplished by the application of simple deductive rules of the *modus ponendo ponens* type. The conditions tend to be related to the administration or application of the medicine as specified in the recipe. When promises are indeed issued, authorial commitment towards the factuality of the event being referred to can be said to be high, but the occurrence

of adjuncts in the form of stance adverbs, epistemic or otherwise, results in modifications in the level of compromise towards the actualisation of the event. Under those circumstances, the type of speech act which is actually performed is not a promise at all.

The role of context selection and of the organisation of the assumptions in the individual's cognitive environment are crucial in the process of interpretation. This is particularly relevant when processing the stance adverb *by the grace of God* and its variant forms. Utterances containing this adjunct may be interpreted deontically, i.e. if the reader assumes that the help of God is beyond human control, or epistemically, i.e. if s/he assumes that this issue has to do with the individual's religious practices. Consequently, whether or not ES containing *by the grace of God* can be understood as promises of efficacy is ultimately dependent on the reader's already stored assumptions about his/her religious beliefs.

The presence of other stance adverbs such as *certainly* or *without doubt* contributes to the creation of an epistemic space for the processing of sequences where these items are included. The explicit mention of the author's certainty as linguistically codified in these epistemic stance adverbs poses an implicit doubt in the factuality of the propositions, leading the reader to infer epistemic rather than deontic interpretations. In these cases, ES cannot be taken as promises of efficacy but as expressions of possibility or potentiality regarding the predicated actions.

Time or frequency adverbials like *soone*, *many times* or *oftentimes* are also indicators of authorial stance. The level of unspecificity conveyed by these adverbs leads the reader to make a higher cognitive effort so as to determine the time interval they are used to refer to. However, their relevance is given by their function in the completion of propositional attitudes. These are characterised by a lack of confidence in the truth of propositional content, conveying a sense of epistemicity and so rendering the utterances as estimations of likely possibility.

The employment of the evidential elements *proved* and *probatum* is, in principle, aimed at strengthening the commissive illocutionary force value of the ES in which they are embedded. As such, they are used to assert the value of the remedies on the basis of the experimental testing suggested by the content of their encyclopaedic entries. Nevertheless, these elements may convey differing degrees

of authorial commitment depending on the extra linguistic choices made by the writers. For instance, the use of the first person singular pronoun indicates authorial involvement and commitment as it indicates direct access to the information presented. The use of the passive voice, on its part, emphasises the action while backgrounding its agency, resulting in lower degrees of compromise towards the efficacy of the medicines. In the relevance-theoretic framework, these strategies correspond to descriptive and attributive uses of language, respectively, which have pragmatic implications as regards the responsibility for providing some information, i.e. the supposed efficacy of the medicines.

ES with *proved* and *probatum* are frequently formulated with extra evidential material which does not only point at the source of information but also at its reliability in differing degrees. The asymmetry brought about by the employment of resources which indicate high speaker commitment together with others which signal low speaker commitment is resolved by assigning a low confirmation value to the propositions involved, and so the expression of epistemic senses of possibility are abundant. In any case, as put forward by some scholars (Jones 1998; Mäkinen 2011), the value attached to the items *proved* and *probatum* cannot be considered to be evidential in the strictest sense, but rather as derived from the scholastic tradition.

The use of axiological evaluative adjectives, i.e. *good*, *profitable* and *holesome*, explicitly mark a positive evaluation of the medical product. However, the encyclopaedic entry of *good* does not allow the reader to infer that the medicine will be indeed effective, i.e. it will provide complete health restoration, but rather that the administration or application of remedy will be a mere help. Then, the only assumption that is mutually manifest is that the remedy will be of some help to the patient. The employment of *profitable* and *holesome*, and the lexical verbs, i.e. *cureth* and *healeth*, in contrast, makes mutually manifest that the medicine will bring about complete health restoration. Moreover, the use of the present tense suggests epistemic immediacy and, consequently, factuality. Locutions where these adjectives and lexical verbs of this type in the present tense are used can be taken as promises of efficacy.

As for ES consisting of matrices other than the ones already mentioned, these tend to have evidential verbs which give some clues not only about the

author's source of information, but also about its reliability. The employment of several morphosyntactic features contributes to the completion of propositional attitudes, mainly the use of the passive voice, hedges and referential ambiguity, all of which allow the reader to infer authorial lack of confidence in the actualisation of the proposition. All of these elements, then, undermine the commissive illocutionary import of the utterances, which can no longer be taken as promises of efficacy.

Lastly, anecdotal and narrative material is intended to provide the reader with evidence to support the value of the medicines. On the one hand, the use of the past tense situates the designated actions before the time of writing, and so they can be taken as pieces of knowledge about past events. On the other, several resources such the ambiguity displayed by referential expressions contribute to lessening authorial commitment and to increasing his/her detachment from the supposed trustworthiness of the recipe.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the results of the analysis and the discussion of the findings. I have firstly provided the general results of the corpus of study concerning the different strategies used by authors for the expression of ES. Five main categories have been identified, namely, (i) the use of the modal verbs *shall* and *will*, (ii) the lexical items *proved* and its Latin counterpart *probatum*, (iii) the use of evaluative expressions, (iv) matrices, and (v) other strategies, i.e. anecdotal and narrative material.

The distribution of these resources has been shown in percentages and their frequencies of occurrence have been normalised to 10,000 words. Figures indicate that the most frequent resource used by writers for such a purpose is modality. The rest of the resources presents significantly lower frequencies of occurrence with respect to modals which are followed by the use of *proved/probatum*, evaluative expression, matrices and other strategies in this order.

The discussion of the results has been carried out by following a relevance-theoretic framework since it provides us with a unified framework for the evaluation of the illocutionary force of these utterances as promises of efficacy or

as something different, i.e. a future possibility, in terms of the cognitive processes involved. This is so because RT allows for the inclusion of context, understood in a broad sense not only as the immediately preceding utterances and observable information from the physical environment, but also any assumption activated during the processing of information in the reader's cognitive environment, in a detailed manner.

In addition, the theoretical insights proposed by the stance approach to the interpersonal in language have been useful at this stage of the research because they allow us to have a complete picture of ES both formally and functionally. The importance of the linguistic elements intervening in the formulation of ES and having an impact on the determination of the illocutionary import of the utterances insofar as they are indicators of authorial attitudes has become apparent in the pragmatic analysis of the samples.

The linguistic choices made by the writers and their contextual interpretation allow the readers to infer authorial attitudes of commitment towards the future actualisation of the propositions, i.e. the utterances are understood as promises of efficacy, or detachment from the truth values attached to them, i.e. the utterances are understood as estimations of probability or possibility. Indications of mode of knowing are frequently employed by writers and these tend to express not only source of knowledge, but also differing degrees of reliability.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

This thesis stands as a contribution to the field of historical speech act analysis and, more generally, to the field of historical pragmatics. It has been shown that modern pragmatic theories such as SAT, RT and the stance approach to communication and text construction may be successfully applied to the analysis of historical texts, and that these theories are, in fact, efficient tools that allow us to understand in detail their pragmatics. The discussion of the examples has benefited from the relevance-theoretic approach to utterance comprehension as it provides us with a principled way to account for the contextual enrichment processes the reader follows in order to derive the illocutionary force value attached to the utterances. Additionally, the stance approach has given us a more complete picture of the pragmatics of ES in medical recipe texts written between 1500-1600.

The main objective of this research, that is, the analysis of the formulation of promises in English medical texts written between 1500-1600 from a relevance-theoretic approach, has been fulfilled. It has been achieved by the completion of several other objectives leading to the main thesis. I summarise them below:

Firstly, I have described the corpus of study, i.e. CoER, and the information retrieval tool which has been used in the computerised searches, i.e. OnICoMt. I have referred to the general characteristics of the electronic compilation and I have assessed the recipe texts in terms of text type features and genre characteristics. I have then focused on the technical specifications of OnICoMt and on the type of queries that may be performed thanks to the extended query syntax of its search engine, i.e. Sphinx.

Secondly, I have set the starting point for the analysis by tracing the history of SAT. As I have commented on, this is necessary to provide a frame of

reference for any study on speech acts, both synchronically and diachronically. I have described the original formulation of the theory as proposed by Austin (1975) and the developments carried out by Searle (1969). This seems to be in order so as to get a full picture of the theoretical and methodological machinery behind the theory. I have then focused on the Searlean taxonomy of illocutionary acts and on the constitutive rules which have to obtain for the performance of speech acts. This has served as the basis to determine the potential commissive illocutionary force of ES.

Thirdly, I have established the connection between SAT and RT (Sperber and Wilson 1995) by focusing on the inferential approach to the understanding of speech acts as sketched in SAT and developed in RT in the form of the ostensive-inferential model of communication. This has served me as a way of introducing the main tenets of RT and, specifically, the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.

Fourthly, I have described the promise in terms of the constituent elements following Reinach's (1983) contribution to the study of promises as social acts. I have further characterised this speech act on the basis of Searle's (1969) constitutive rules, which have already been successfully applied to the study of promises from a historical standpoint in Middle English healing charms (Alonso-Almeida 2010). As for the recipe genre in particular, I have introduced the way RT operates in order to account for the understanding of ES as actual promises of efficacy. I have also commented on some methodological issues concerning historical speech act analysis and, specifically, promissory speech acts. Works such as Arnovick (2000), Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008), Pakkala-Weckström (2008) and Valkonen (2008) actually validate the feasibility of the analysis of promissory speech acts from a historical perspective.

Fifthly, I have outlined a stance approach to the analysis of ES as a proposal for enriching the pragmatics of this type of expressions. This seemed to be in order because of the polysemous and polypragmatic functions of the wide range of linguistic resources having an impact on the determination of the illocutionary force of ES. I have opted for this pragmatic perspective as it satisfactorily accounts for aspects such as modality, evaluation and evidentiality, all of which have proved to be frequent in the formulation of ES in the texts analysed.

Sixthly, I have shown the results derived from both the computerised search and micro-analysis of the texts. The results reveal that the preferred linguistic resources employed by writers in the formulation of potential promises of efficacy are the modals *shall* and *will*. I argue that this may be so because these modals are intrinsically related to the expression of a set of meanings that are typically associated with promissory speech acts, at least in the Searlean sense described in this thesis. These meanings include (i) the predication of a future action, (ii) the expression of an intention, and (iii) the undertaking of a commitment. I have shown that in the instances where these modals are used the future orientation of the action being referred to is clear since, in the context of medical literature, a future time reference is presupposed. However, the occurrence of stance elements, mainly epistemic, crucially determine the way the comprehension process proceeds. These elements allow the reader to infer differing degrees of speaker commitment towards propositional information and so modals may be interpreted deontically or epistemically depending on the surrounding co-text. In general, the less modalised an ES, the more likely it is to be interpreted as a promise of efficacy as the occurrence of stance markers undermine the commissive illocutionary force by arising doubts in the reader as for the actualisation of the propositions involved.

The lexical items *proved* and *probatum* as well as any of their variant forms are the second linguistic resource used by writers in the marking of potential promises of efficacy. The encyclopaedic entries of these items suggest experimental testing and so, in principle, they may be taken as assertions of the value of the remedies on the basis of the author's or some authority's previous testing of the medical product. Their occurrence with other epistemic and/or evidential elements tend to carry implications for the degrees of reliability attached to the information conveyed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the seemingly evidential value attached to these items does not appear to be so in the light of the scholastic commentary style still present in recipe texts at that time.

In relation to those passages where writers provide a positive evaluation of the remedies in the form of axiological evaluative adjectives such as *good*, *profitable* and *holesome*, or lexical verbs such as *cureth* and *healeth*, their commissive illocutionary force is dependent on their encyclopaedic entries. The use of the axiological evaluative adjective *good* does not make manifest the fact

that the medicine will provide complete health restoration, but rather some degree of recovery, in which case there is no implied promise of efficacy. On the contrary, the encyclopaedic entries of the evaluative adjectives *profitable* and *holesome*, and the lexical verbs *cureth* and *healeth*, make manifest that the medicine will provide complete health restoration, rendering the passages as actual promises of efficacy.

Matrices and anecdotal and narrative material stand as the least frequent resources used by writers to codify apparent promises of efficacy. Matrices tend to have evidential verbs indicating both the author's source of information and its degree of reliability. Many elements such as the use of the passive voice, epistemic stance adverbs and hedges, tend to undermine the commissive illocutionary force of the utterances which, as a result, are interpreted as estimations of possibility rather than as promises of efficacy. Anecdotal and narrative material cannot be taken as promises of efficacy in the strictest sense because they normally involve predications about past rather than future events. Nevertheless, these passages obviously play a role in the rhetorical organisation of the recipes since they stand as evidence of the value of the remedies, contributing to persuading readers to use them.

This thesis has shown that the traditional consideration of ES as promises of efficacy cannot be maintained, at least in the Searlean sense. The occurrence of stance elements such as modal verbs, epistemic stance adverbs, evaluative adjectives and adverbs, and evidential lexical verbs certainly shape their interpretation as actual promises of efficacy or as mere estimations of probability and/or possibility as for the actualisation of the recovery of the patient. These elements constrain the development of the comprehension process as well as the derivation of the illocutionary force of the utterances in fairly specific ways. It has been shown that, in the search for more cognitive effects, readers may be led to infer various degrees of speaker commitment and different levels of reliability of information on the basis of the lexico-grammatical choices made by the writers and the context against which a given ES is interpreted. Then, these stance elements may be taken as speech act modifiers, rendering many of these expressions only as apparent rather than actual promises of efficacy.

Future research may focus on the formal variation in the formulation of promises of efficacy as well as on its pragmatic implications from a diachronic perspective so as to trace to what extent this variation is subject to the advancement of knowledge in medicine. This may be also looked into in relation to the academic and the remedybook traditions of writing where recipe texts were included. The mediation of medical knowledge through texts belonging to these two traditions is certainly shaped by both their writers and the target audience. Consequently, it would be relevant to account for historical variation in the elements intervening in the formulation of promises of efficacy in relation to both the producers of the texts, i.e. experts, and their recipients, i.e. experts and lay people. The manifestation of stance as formalised in linguistic units may also diachronically account for specific changes in language. That is the case of modal verbs, whose meanings have changed over time to accommodate the expression of authorial viewpoint. These are, among others, possible paths for future research concerning ES.

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sygnes of euerye dysease, wyth the Aphorismes of Hypocrates, and Iacobus de Partybus, redacted to a certayne order according to the membres of mans body, and a compendious table conteynyng the purging and confortatyue medycynes, with the exposicyon of certayne names & weyghtes in this boke contayned, wyth an epystle of Diocles unto kyng Antigonus, at ye request of the right honorable Lord Stafford, for the noble pryncesse and his especial good lady the Duches of Northumberlande.. Imprynted at London in Fletestrete at the sygne of the Rosegarland : by Wyllyam Coplande., [ca. 1550].

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
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UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS PALMAS
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La formulación de la promesa en textos médicos ingleses (1500-1600): Descripción y análisis desde una perspectiva relevantista

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La formulación de la promesa en textos médicos ingleses (1500-1600): Descripción y análisis desde una perspectiva relevantista

1. Introducción

Esta tesis analiza la formulación de las promesas en un corpus de textos médicos ingleses escritos entre 1500 y 1600. Los textos forman parte del *Corpus of Early English Recipes*, una compilación electrónica de recetas escritas en distintos períodos de la lengua inglesa (1375 y 1900). Este corpus electrónico está siendo compilado por el grupo de investigación *Tecnologías Emergentes aplicadas a la Lengua y la Literatura* del Instituto para el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación en las Comunicaciones de la Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. Para la búsqueda de información lingüística se ha utilizado el *Online Interface for Corpus Management*, una herramienta informática que ha sido diseñada e implementada para las tareas de explotación del corpus.

Las recetas médicas escritas antes del nacimiento de la escritura científica moderna parecen ser un género muy adecuado para la inclusión de expresiones con las que los autores pretenden validar la eficacia de las medicinas. Estas expresiones han recibido distintos nombres en la literatura como *incidental data* (Stannard 1982), *statements of efficacy* (Hunt 1990) y *efficacy phrases* (Jones 1998). Estas expresiones podrían considerarse promesas de eficacia porque el autor del texto parece estar aseverando el valor de la terapia. Sin embargo, un análisis detallado del contexto en el que se encuentran puede apuntar a un tipo de interpretación distinta de una promesa en el sentido estricto. Ésta es la hipótesis de partida de esta tesis.

El análisis de estas expresiones se ha llevado a cabo siguiendo la teoría de la relevancia, dado que se ha probado que esta teoría es una herramienta eficiente para la interpretación de fenómenos lingüísticos de naturaleza diversa, incluyendo los actos de habla. Además, la teoría de la relevancia constituye un marco teórico sólido que permite explicar de forma detallada el papel del contexto y su inclusión en el proceso interpretativo. El contexto tiene que ser entendido de manera amplia como una complicada red de supuestos derivados de (i) la interpretación del

discurso precedente, (ii) la adición de información enciclopédica, y (iii) la adición de información observable en el entorno en el que se desarrolla el evento comunicativo. En esta tesis se sostiene que el papel del contexto es crucial para determinar la fuerza ilocutiva de estas expresiones.

De la investigación de la que aquí se da cuenta se desprende que existen innumerables recursos lingüísticos que intervienen en la formulación de aparentes promesas de eficacia. Estos recursos pueden tener múltiples funciones pragmáticas dependiendo de los contextos específicos en los que se utilizan, si bien todos ellos pueden ser considerados como indicadores de la actitud de los autores. Teniendo en cuenta la complejidad formal y funcional de las expresiones de eficacia, y con el objetivo de lograr un entendimiento más profundo de sus características pragmáticas, se ha optado por combinar la teoría de la relevancia con el acercamiento de *stance*.

Esta tesis pretende hacer una contribución al campo del análisis histórico de los actos de habla y, más generalmente, al campo de la pragmática histórica. Aquí se ofrece un estudio de la caracterización pragmática de un acto de habla específico, es decir, de la promesa, cuyo análisis se realiza utilizando teorías pragmáticas modernas como la teoría de los actos de habla, la teoría de la relevancia y *stance*. En este punto me gustaría señalar que esta tesis no pretende ser una aportación a los estudios diacrónicos de la formulación de actos de habla promisorios porque el corpus de estudio no es lo suficientemente significativo para permitir trazar las funciones comunicativas específicas de dichos actos de habla ni sus manifestaciones lingüísticas en distintos estadios de la lengua inglesa.

1.1 Objetivos y metodología

El objetivo principal de esta tesis es la descripción y el análisis de la formulación de las promesas en recetas médicas inglesas escritas entre 1500 y 1600 siguiendo los supuestos teóricos y metodológicos de la teoría de la relevancia. La consecución de este objetivo trae consigo la consecución de otros que se detallan en lo que sigue.

El análisis de cualquier acto de habla en textos históricos tiene que tomar necesariamente como referencia los marcos teóricos formulados en teorías modernas dado que la noción de acto de habla es en sí misma reciente. Si bien aún

existe una falta de consenso en muchos aspectos terminológicos y metodológicos desde una perspectiva sincrónica, los trabajos pioneros de Austin (1975) y Searle (1969) continúan siendo una referencia indiscutible. En esta tesis se siguen los supuestos teóricos y metodológicos propuestos por Searle en lo relacionado con las taxonomías de los actos de habla, ya que por el momento su contribución al desarrollo de la teoría continúa siendo la más exhaustiva. Además, el análisis que propone Searle para las promesas en términos de reglas constitutivas captan en gran medida la caracterización pragmática de este tipo de actos de habla comisivos. Por este motivo, se toman como punto de partida del análisis.

Para la interpretación de aquellos fragmentos que pueden ser considerados como promesas de eficacia, se utiliza la teoría de la relevancia de acuerdo con su formulación en Sperber y Wilson (1995). A pesar de que esta teoría no parece ser del todo adecuada para explicar algunos aspectos del lenguaje como la modalidad (Traugott 2003), su potencial para explicar otros como los actos de habla ya ha sido probado satisfactoriamente, incluso desde una perspectiva histórica (Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu 2002). Esto es así por la plausibilidad cognitiva del modelo de comunicación ostensivo-inferencial que propone.

El acercamiento de *stance* a la comunicación y a la construcción textual también se adopta en esta tesis porque ofrece un valioso apoyo teórico para la identificación de los recursos lingüísticos que intervienen en la formulación de posibles promesas de eficacia. Obviamente, este acercamiento enriquecerá el análisis pragmático de estas expresiones.

Por último, el procedimiento metodológico que se sigue para la cuantificación de los datos combina las búsquedas computarizadas con los análisis manuales. Siguiendo las ideas de Kohnen (2004) sobre la selección inicial de un grupo de formas que se puedan considerar como manifestaciones típicas de un acto de habla determinado, se ha instruido al *Online Interface for Corpus Management* para buscar una serie de elementos que se suelen encontrar en promesas de eficacia, por ejemplo, los modales *shall* y *will*, los elementos léxicos *proved* y *probatum*, o el adjetivo *good*, así como algunas variantes ortográficas. Los resultados de las búsquedas han sido posteriormente comprobados de forma manual. De hecho, el microanálisis de los textos ha sido necesario para poder

cuantificar las “hidden manifestations” (Kohnen 2007: 139) del acto de habla que se estudia en esta tesis.

1.2 Estructura de la tesis

Los contenidos de esta tesis se organizan en siete capítulos. El primer capítulo presenta los objetivos que se pretenden alcanzar con esta investigación así como el procedimiento metodológico que se sigue. La estructura de la tesis también se presenta aquí. El segundo capítulo ofrece la descripción del corpus de estudio, es decir, del *Corpus of Early English Recipes*, indicando los objetivos generales de la compilación, las fuentes, los criterios de selección y la organización interna de los textos. Se presenta entonces la caracterización de los textos en términos del género al que pertenecen y del tipo textual predominante en ellos. A esto sigue la descripción de la herramienta informática que se ha diseñado e implementado para explotar el corpus, especificando algunas de sus características técnicas, y describiendo su interfaz y las posibilidades de búsqueda que ofrece.

El tercer capítulo describe el marco teórico que guía esta tesis: la teoría de los actos de habla y la teoría de la relevancia. Ambas proporcionan una base teórica sólida para llevar a cabo el análisis de los actos de habla promisorios en las recetas médicas, si bien lo hacen a distintos niveles: la teoría de los actos de habla se utiliza para identificar el valor de la fuerza ilocutiva de posibles promesas de eficacia. La teoría de la relevancia se utiliza para explicar el desarrollo del proceso interpretativo así como para determinar si las expresiones de eficacia pueden entenderse en última instancia como promesas en el sentido estricto. En este capítulo se describen los supuestos teóricos de ambas, prestando especial atención al modelo inferencial que se introduce tímidamente en la teoría de los actos de habla y que se desarrolla en la teoría de la relevancia.

El cuarto capítulo contiene la caracterización de la promesa como acto de habla, comenzando con una revisión de los elementos constituyentes de las promesas siguiendo a Reinach (1983) y con la presentación de las reglas constitutivas (Searle 1969) que se tienen que dar para la producción de una promesa. Las expresiones de eficacia se describen entonces en relación con los actos de habla promisorios. El capítulo finaliza comentando cuestiones

metodológicas relacionadas con el análisis de los actos de habla en general y de las promesas en particular desde una perspectiva histórica.

El quinto capítulo presenta de forma sucinta el acercamiento de *stance* al análisis de las expresiones de eficacia. Se especifican los principales recursos lingüísticos que suelen aparecer en estos fragmentos y que además influyen de forma decisiva en la identificación de la fuerza ilocutiva. El acercamiento de *stance* trata diversos aspectos, pero esta tesis se centra en (i) la modalidad, en particular, la expresada por los modales *shall* y *will*, (ii) la evaluación, específicamente, la marcada por adjetivos y adverbios evaluativos, así como por ciertos verbos léxicos, y (iii) la evidencialidad, concretamente, la indicada por ciertos verbos léxicos evidenciales.

El sexto capítulo presenta los resultados del análisis y la discusión de los ejemplos siguiendo la teoría de la relevancia. El último capítulo ofrece las conclusiones derivadas de esta investigación. A esto le siguen la bibliografía, que se divide en referencias primarias y secundarias.

2. Descripción del corpus

El corpus de estudio se ha extraído del *Corpus of Early English Recipes* (CoER) (Alonso-Almeida et al. en prensa). Esta compilación se está llevando a cabo actualmente en el seno del grupo de investigación *Tecnologías Emergentes aplicadas a la Lengua y la Literatura* del Instituto para el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación en las Comunicaciones de la Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.

En líneas generales, CoER es una compilación electrónica diacrónica y monogenérica dado que persigue aunar únicamente recetas escritas en distintos periodos de la lengua inglesa, en concreto, desde 1375 hasta 1900. El material compilado permite realizar investigaciones en campos como lingüística (histórica), pragmática (histórica), análisis del discurso (histórico) e inglés para fines específicos en diacronía (término acuñado recientemente en Alonso-Almeida y Marrero-Morales (2011)). Además, el corpus puede ser explotado para la investigación gracias a una herramienta informática que ha sido diseñada e implementada con ese propósito.

La motivación del grupo para escoger el género receta reside en el hecho de que éste parece haber tenido una audiencia muy amplia; así lo indica que las recetas estén presentes tanto en la tradición de los *remedybook* como en la tradición académica (Taavitsainen 2001a: 86). En la tradición académica, parecen haber estado dirigidas a una audiencia especialista, mientras que en la tradición de los *remedybook* iban dirigidas tanto al público especialista como al no especialista (Taavitsainen 2001a: 88). Es por este motivo que se considera que estaban dirigidas a un grupo heterogéneo de personas.

Las fuentes que se han empleado para realizar la compilación son las bases de datos *Early English Books Online* y *Eighteenth Century Collections Online*, además de algunos textos en microfilm. En el caso de las bases de datos, se han realizado en primer lugar búsquedas por palabras clave, como *recipe*, *medicine* o *cookery*. Los criterios para seleccionar los textos recuperados tras las búsquedas han sido completamente arbitrarios exceptuando que se han escogido preferentemente primeras ediciones y que los textos tenían que contener un número significativo de recetas.

Los textos que componen el corpus han sido organizados cronológicamente siguiendo las indicaciones que dan Taavitsainen y Pahta (1997) en su artículo *Corpus of early English medical writing*. Aquí se indica una división en dos grandes períodos: desde 1375 hasta 1550, como representativo de la época medieval, y desde 1550 hasta 1750, como representativo de la época moderna temprana. El grupo de trabajo ha optado por incluir también textos escritos entre 1750 hasta 1900 para poder ofrecer una perspectiva más completa de este género. Además de la organización cronológica, los textos se han organizado por su temática siguiendo las categorías propuestas por Voigts y Kurtz (2000). Los textos específicos que se han utilizado para realizar el estudio propuesto en esta tesis datan de 1500 a 1600. Son los que se muestran en la siguiente tabla:

Título	Autor	Fecha	Abrev.
<i>Here begynneth a newe boke of medecynes intytulyd or callyd the Treasure of pore men whiche sheweth many dyuerse good medecines for dyuerse certayn dysseases as in the table of this present boke more</i>	Anonymous	1526	TPM

playnly shall appere

<i>This is the myrour or glasse of helth necessary and nedefull for euery person to loke in, that wyll kepe theyr body from the syckenes of the pestylence: and it sheweth howe the planettes raygne, in euery houre of the daye and the nyght: with the natures and exposicions of the .xii. sygnes, deuided by the .xii. monthes of the yere</i>	Thomas Moulton	1531	MGH
<i>The kegiment [sic] of life wherunto is added A treatyse of the pestilence, with The booke of children newly corrected and enlarged by T. Phayer</i>	Jean Goeurot, Thomas Phayer	1546	RLP
<i>The treasurie of heaith conteynyng many profitable medycines, gathered out of Hypocrates, Galen and Auycen, / by one Petrus Hyspanus & translated into Englysh by Humfre Lloyde who hath added therunto the causes and sygnes of euerye dysease, wyth the Aphorismes of Hypocrates, and Iacobus de Partybus, redacted to a certayne order according to the membres of mans body, and a compendious table conteynyng the purging and confortatyue medycynes, with the exposicyon of certayne names & weyghtes in this boke contayned, wyth an epystle of Diocles unto kyng Antigonus, at ye request of the right honorable Lord Stafford, for the noble pryncesse and his especial good lady the Duches of Northumberlande</i>	Pope John XXI, Jacques Desparts, Dyocles of Carystus	1550	THM
<i>This lytle practice of Iohannes de Vigo, in medcine, is translated our of Latin into Englyshe, for the health of the body of man</i>	Giovanni da Vigo	1564	PIV
<i>A booke of soueraigne approued medicines and remedies as well for sundry diseases within the body as also for all sores, woundes, ... Not onely very necessary and profitable, but also commodious for all suche as shall vouchsafe to practise and vse the</i>	Anonymous	1577	BSM

<i>same</i>			
<i>A thousand notable things, of sundry sortes Wherof some are wonderfull, some straunge, some pleasant, diuers necessary, a great sort profitable and many very precious</i>	Thomas Lupton	1579	TNT
<i>The first part of the key of philosophie</i>	John Hester, Paracelsus, Philippus Hermanni	1580	FKP
<i>A right profitable booke for all disseases Called The pathway to health: wherein are to be found most excellent and approued medicines of great vertue, as also notable potions and drinkes, and for the destillinge of diuers pretious waters, and making of oyles and other comfortable receiptes for the health of the body, neuer before imprinted</i>	Peter Levens	1582	TPH
<i>The good husvvifes iewell VVherein is to he [sic] found most excellend [sic] and rare deuises for conceites in cookery, found out by the practise of Thomas Dawson</i>	A. T.	1596	GHI
<i>A rich store-house or treasury for the diseased Wherein, are many approued medicines for diuers and sundry diseases, which haue been long hidden, and not come to light before this time</i>	Thomas Dawson	1596	RST

Tabla 1. Textos de CoER utilizados en esta tesis.

La receta ha sido tradicionalmente caracterizada atendiendo a cuestiones internas y externas. Los criterios que se emplean para la caracterización externa son aquellos que indican las relaciones que se pueden establecer entre el propio texto y su propósito en el contexto socio-histórico en el que se origina. Esta caracterización es la que se corresponde con el concepto de género. A nivel interno, pueden describirse atendiendo a sus características lingüísticas específicas. Esta descripción se corresponde con el concepto de tipo textual.

El propósito de las recetas médicas es dar instrucciones precisas para la preparación de medicinas. Normalmente, constan de (i) un título que indica para lo que sirve la receta, (ii) una lista de ingredientes, (iii) indicaciones para combinarlos, (iv) indicaciones para dar el producto al paciente, (v) información sobre la manera más conveniente de guardarlo para su uso futuro y, en último lugar, (vi) alguna expresión que hace referencia a la efectividad del producto. Consideremos el siguiente ejemplo:

(1) **(Título)** ¶An Oyle for all manner of Aches, Bruyses, and streyning of the Synewes . / **(Ingredientes)** ¶Take a quart of Neatsfoote Oyle, and a pynt of - Ox gall, ¶Oxe gall, halfe a pynt of Aquavitæ, a pynt of - Rosewater, Bay leaves, Rosemary stamped stripped from the Stalkes, strawberry leaves, roots and - strings, Lavinder Cotton, of every of these halfe a handfull, **(Preparación)** beat them small, and putt them into the - foresaid stuffe, and seeth it over a soft fire of ~- Coles in a Panne of a Gallon, and at your owne - pill lett not the fflame touch your stuffe, lett it seeth very well, and then take it off, and lett it stand vntill it bee almost cold; Then straine it through a course - Lynnen Cloth, but not the bottome of the liquour, **(Conservación)** Then putt it in a glasse, and soe keepe it . **(Aplicación)** And when you are pained, annoynt your greife withall, **(Eficacia)** and you shall fynd present remedy by Gods grace (G.U.L. MS Hunter 93)

Estas secciones son las que aparecen frecuentemente en las recetas, pero no todas ellas son obligatorias. De hecho, sólo los ingredientes y la forma de prepararlos parecen ser absolutamente necesarios para considerar que estamos ante una receta médica. El resto de secciones pueden o no aparecer, y pueden tener una posición variable.

En lo que respecta al tipo textual, las recetas son instructivas. Desde el punto de vista léxico-gramatical, se caracterizan por lo siguiente: los títulos pueden indicarse siguiendo múltiples patrones sintácticos, pero, por lo general, suelen contener adjetivos evaluativos positivos, así como nombres de enfermedades y de partes del cuerpo. En la sección de los ingredientes, aparecen nombres de plantas o de sustancias compuestas que los autores tienden a coordinar mediante conjunciones o signos de puntuación. En esta sección también aparecen numerales y medidas de peso. La preparación contiene formas verbales en imperativo, nombres de ingredientes y de tipos de recipientes, y expresiones temporales. En la aplicación se utilizan formas verbales en imperativo o verbos

con significado coercitivo. Aquí también se incluyen nombres de partes del cuerpo y de productos médicos, y expresiones temporales. En la sección de la conservación aparecen imperativos y nombres de recipientes. En último lugar, la expresiones de eficacia suelen ser oraciones completas con sujetos de tipo nominal o pronominal que suelen estar seguidos de *shall* o *will* más un infinitivo sin el *to*. En esta sección se hace referencia a la curación del paciente y, con frecuencia, a la acción divina.

El equipo de trabajo también ha realizado el diseño y la implementación de una herramienta informática que permitiese llevar a cabo búsquedas de forma sencilla y rápida para explotar el corpus en tareas de investigación. Para ello, se ha trabajado en colaboración con un grupo de estudiantes del Departamento de Informática y Sistemas de la Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. El nombre que recibe la aplicación que se ha diseñado es *Online Interface for Corpus Management* (OnICoMt).

OnICoMt es un proyecto basado en software libre para cuyo desarrollo se han utilizado diversas herramientas informáticas que han sido combinadas y modificadas para obtener una aplicación útil para los investigadores y sencilla de utilizar. Uno de los elementos más importantes es el motor de búsqueda, Sphinx, que permite realizar búsquedas muy rápidas en grandes compilaciones de textos y organiza los resultados obtenidos tras una búsqueda por relevancia.

En líneas generales, aunque Sphinx puede trabajar con distintos formatos de texto, se ha decidido que para el caso de CoER se utilicen ficheros de texto plano guardados con la extensión .txt para posteriormente subirlos a una base de datos MySQL. Cada texto tiene una serie de atributos que se utilizan no sólo por motivos de organización interna sino también para filtrar los resultados de las búsquedas. Los atributos que se emplean para los textos que conforman CoER son los siguientes: *Autor*, *Año*, *Título*, *Título corto*, *Lugar de publicación*, *Editorial*, *Género*, *Secciones del género*, *Tema*, *Dialecto* y *Editor* (quien lo ha editado en el grupo). Como se ha apuntado, permite realizar búsquedas sencillas, para lo que se vale de una sintaxis booleana tradicional en la que se emplean los operadores AND, OR y NOT. Permite igualmente realizar búsquedas más complejas que requieren el uso de una sintaxis extendida ya definida por su desarrollador.

La interfaz de OnICoMt pretende ser fácil de usar e intuitiva. La información está organizada en tablas de navegación como *Inicio*, *Buscar*, *Examinar*, *Favoritos*, *Historial*, *Subir*, *Ayuda*, *Configuración*, *Administración* y *Contacto*.

3. Marco teórico

El marco teórico que guía esta tesis combina dos de las teorías pragmáticas modernas más influyentes en los estudios de lingüística actual: la teoría de los actos de habla y la teoría de la relevancia. La motivación para escoger estas dos teorías reside en el hecho de que ambas proveen una base teórica sólida para el análisis de las promesas en textos médicos, si bien lo hacen a distintos niveles. Por un lado, la teoría de los actos de habla sirve para identificar en primera instancia el valor de la fuerza ilocutiva de posibles promesas de eficacia utilizando las reglas constitutivas que rigen la realización de los actos de habla propuestas por Searle (1969): contenido proposicional, preparatoria, sinceridad y esencial. La información contextual juega un papel muy importante en el proceso interpretativo que sigue el oyente/lector, pero la teoría de los actos de habla parece no ser suficiente para poder explicar cómo se desarrollan estos procesos, no por lo menos desde un punto de vista psicológicamente plausible. En este punto entra en juego la teoría de la relevancia, dado que con ella se puede explicar de forma detallada cómo múltiples factores contextuales determinan el entendimiento del discurso. En el caso de las expresiones de eficacia, sólo un enriquecimiento contextual adecuado puede servir para determinar si el lector las entiende o no como promesas en el sentido searleano.

Siendo consciente de las dificultades teóricas y metodológicas que se han venido notando en la literatura anterior sobre la posibilidad de reconciliar estas dos teorías (Dominicy y Franken 2001: 263), en esta tesis se intenta establecer un punto de conexión mediante el enfoque inferencial que ambas toman como base del entendimiento de la comunicación humana. Hay que destacar que este acercamiento inferencial queda simplemente esbozado en la teoría de los actos de habla, y que la teoría de la relevancia toma este esbozo como punto de partida para la formulación del modelo ostensivo-inferencial de la comunicación humana.

Este modelo no es únicamente aplicable al entendimiento de los actos de habla y, por el momento, parece ser psicológicamente plausible.

La formulación original de la teoría de los actos de habla se debe a Austin (1975), quien observa que durante mucho tiempo se había considerado que la función principal de los enunciados era la de constatar hechos, por lo que se podían analizar en términos del condicional material y de las tablas de la verdad propios de la lógica proposicional. Estos enunciados son los constatativos. Apunta entonces que no todas las emisiones son descriptivas ni pueden ser analizadas como portadoras de los valores de verdad y falsedad. Existen otro tipo de emisiones, que denomina realizativas, con cuya pronunciación se crea una modificación del entorno comunicativo de tal manera que al emitirlas se produce una acción. A estas emisiones realizativas no se les puede asignar un valor de verdad, sino que deben ser analizadas siguiendo las condiciones de felicidad (Austin 1975: 14-15):

(A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B. 2) completely.

(Γ. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(Γ. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Las emisiones realizativas constan de tres dimensiones: el acto locucionario, el acto ilocucionario y el acto perlocucionario. El acto locucionario supone la producción física de una expresión lingüística que sigue las reglas gramaticales de la lengua y que tiene un significado concreto. El acto ilocucionario es el que se lleva a cabo al decir algo. Aquí interviene la intención que tiene el hablante al

emitir el enunciado. La función comunicativa que cumple dicho enunciado se denomina fuerza ilocutiva. El acto perlocucionario está relacionado con las consecuencias que tiene la producción del enunciado sobre el oyente, por ejemplo, pensamientos, sentimientos y otras acciones. Para ilustrar cómo operan estas tres dimensiones en los actos de habla, veamos el siguiente ejemplo tomado de Bach (2006: 150):

(2) The bar will be closed in five minutes

La emisión de este enunciado por parte del camarero del bar constituye un acto de habla. Las tres dimensiones se realizan simultáneamente: en primer lugar, la producción física que da lugar a la emisión de (2) es una consecuencia de la capacidad del hablante de articular unos sonidos siguiendo un orden concreto de acuerdo con la fonética y la sintaxis de la lengua. Otros factores semánticos y pragmáticos entran en juego, entre otros, la asignación del referente y el tiempo de la emisión. El bar al que el hablante se refiere es aquél en el que trabaja, y el momento en el que el bar cerrará es cinco minutos después de la producción del enunciado. En segundo lugar, se produce un acto ilocucionario: con la producción de (2) el camarero está informando a las personas que están presentes en el bar de que cerrará en poco tiempo y, además, parece sugerir pedir una última copa. En tercer lugar, se produce un acto perlocucionario: el camarero hace pensar a los clientes que el bar cerrará en cinco minutos. Teniendo este pensamiento, algunos de ellos podrían decidir pedir una última copa, dado que aún les queda tiempo antes de que el bar cierre, y otros podrían decidir prepararse para marcharse. Se podría decir que el camarero pretende que estas dos consecuencias se produzcan, sobre todo si ocurren en ese orden exactamente.

Searle (1969) continúa con la formulación de la teoría de los actos de habla centrándose en el análisis del acto ilocucionario, que como ya se ha señalado, está relacionado con la función comunicativa que cumple el enunciado o, en otras palabras, con la fuerza ilocutiva. Para Searle (1969: 36-37), la fuerza ilocutiva de un enunciado se puede analizar atendiendo a una serie de reglas en las que se establecen sus circunstancias y su propósito. Estas reglas son las reglas constitutivas. En general, las reglas constitutivas propuestas por Searle son una herramienta efectiva para la localización de actos de habla porque en ellas se muestra la variación de los tipos de contenido presentes en cada uno de ellos. Searle (1969) enumera cuatro reglas constitutivas: (i) las reglas de contenido

proposicional, (ii) las reglas preparatorias, (iii) las reglas de sinceridad y (iv) las reglas esenciales. Las reglas de contenido proposicional especifican el contenido proposicional del enunciado, por lo que están relacionadas con el contenido semántico. Las reglas preparatorias hacen referencia a la existencia previa de unas condiciones que garantizan el éxito del acto de habla. Estas reglas especifican las características contextuales necesarias para su realización. Las reglas de sinceridad tienen que ver con las creencias y los deseos de los hablantes. Las reglas esenciales son las convenciones que regulan que la producción de un enunciado cuente como la realización de un acto de habla determinado. Para los actos de habla *aseverar*, *pedir* y *dar las gracias*, por ejemplo, las reglas constitutivas actúan de la siguiente manera:

Tipo de regla	<i>Aseverar</i>	<i>Pedir</i>	<i>Dar las gracias</i>
Contenido proposicional	Cualesquiera proposición <i>p</i>	Acto futuro <i>A</i> de <i>O</i>	Hecho pasado <i>A</i> llevado a cabo por <i>O</i>
Preparatoria	1. <i>H</i> tiene evidencia (razones, etc.) para la verdad de <i>p</i> 2. No es obvio ni para <i>H</i> ni para <i>O</i> que <i>O</i> sabe (no necesita que se le recuerde, etc.) que <i>p</i>	1. <i>O</i> es capaz de hacer <i>A</i> 2. No es obvio ni para <i>H</i> ni para <i>O</i> que <i>H</i> va a hacer <i>A</i> de manera espontánea en el curso normal de los acontecimientos	<i>A</i> beneficia a <i>H</i> y <i>H</i> cree que <i>A</i> beneficia a <i>H</i>
Sinceridad	<i>H</i> cree que <i>p</i>	<i>H</i> desea que <i>O</i> haga <i>A</i>	<i>H</i> se siente agradecido o reconocido por <i>A</i>
Esencial	Cuenta como la asunción de que <i>p</i> representa un estado de cosas efectivo	Cuenta como un intento de hacer que <i>O</i> haga <i>A</i>	Cuenta como una expresión de gratitud o reconocimiento

Tabla 2. Reglas constitutivas para los actos de habla *aseverar*, *pedir* y *dar las gracias* (Searle 1994: 74-75).

Los trabajos fundacionales de la teoría de los actos de habla no ofrecen ninguna propuesta para explicar cómo se desarrolla el proceso de entendimiento, a pesar de que ésta resulta necesaria para caracterizar estos fenómenos lingüísticos en

profundidad. El primero en formular una propuesta en este sentido fue Grice (1957), quien apuntó que el elemento básico de la comunicación humana es el reconocimiento de las intenciones de los hablantes por parte de los oyentes. Su programa sobre el reconocimiento de intenciones se centra en el principio de cooperación, que opera en todos los intercambios conversacionales. El principio de cooperación dice lo siguiente (Grice 1975: 45): “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”. Este principio regula el modo en el que los participantes ajustan sus contribuciones informativas en relación con cuatro máximas (Grice 1975: 45-46):

QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence.

QUANTITY:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

RELATION: Be relevant.

MANNER: Be perspicuous.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

Existe un elemento central en el marco propuesto por Grice: la distinción entre decir algo o *saying*, y pretender decir algo o *meaning*. Formalmente, esta distinción se resuelve en términos de implicaturas. Éstas surgen cuando se producen distintas violaciones del principio de cooperación (Mooney 2004: 901). Tomemos el siguiente ejemplo para ilustrar este punto:

- (3) A: I have just baked a delicious cake, would you like to have some?
B: The doctor put me on a low-fat diet yesterday

La respuesta de B no parece seguir la máxima de relación porque a la pregunta que le hace A uno esperaría un simple *sí* o *no*, y puede que otros elementos como *thank you* como muestra de educación. Dado que B no sigue la máxima de relación, A tendría que derivar una implicatura para poder entender el enunciado que emite B como respuesta a su pregunta. Para poder derivar la implicatura, A necesita del contexto, tanto lingüístico como extra-lingüístico así como otros conocimientos previos. A podría proceder en su razonamiento de la siguiente manera: una tarta se hace con ingredientes que son altos en grasas, en cuyo caso, se supone que una persona que sigue una dieta baja en grasas por motivos médicos no debería tomar tarta. Esta suposición hace que A tome la respuesta que ofrece B como una negativa al ofrecimiento. Sin embargo, puede que la intención de B al decir *The doctor put me on a low-fat diet yesterday* no sea únicamente la de dar una respuesta negativa a la pregunta de A; es muy probable que B tenga otras intenciones, por ejemplo, generar en A algún tipo de interés por su salud y bienestar.

Este ejemplo pone de manifiesto que el proceso de razonamiento que siguen los oyentes para derivar implicaturas que expliquen de una manera u otra las violaciones del principio de cooperación es inferencial. Grice (1975: 50) explica el desarrollo de este proceso de razonamiento para la recuperación de implicaturas como se indica a continuación:

He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.

La derivación de implicaturas depende en última instancia del reconocimiento de la intención comunicativa del hablante. Existen una serie de requisitos básicos para que el hablante pueda reconocer las intenciones del oyente, por ejemplo, (i) la intención del hablante debe estar dirigida hacia el oyente, (ii) la intención debe ser susceptible de ser reconocida por el oyente, y (iii) el cumplimiento de la intención se alcanza cuando ha sido reconocida.

Como hemos visto, el reconocimiento de la intención del hablante explica la realización exitosa de los actos de habla. Strawson (1964: 447) hizo algunas modificaciones en la formulación propuesta por Grice añadiendo una intención de segundo orden por parte del hablante. Esta intención consiste en hacer reconocer al oyente una intención de primer orden. En otras palabras, el hablante debe tener la intención de que el oyente reconozca su intención principal. Estas modificaciones dan lugar a la formulación que se presenta debajo (siguiendo a Sperber y Wilson 1995: 21):

To mean something by x, S must intend

(a) S's utterance of x to produce a certain response r in a certain audience A;

(b) A to recognise S's intention (a);

(c) A's recognition of S's intention (a) to function as at least part of A's reason for A's response r.

Sperber y Wilson (1995) apuntan que el planteamiento de Grice y la reformulación de Strawson se pueden tomar como punto de partida para desarrollar una teoría de la comunicación inferencial y es así precisamente como los toman para la formulación de la teoría de la relevancia. Hay que destacar que, si bien ha habido otras propuestas inferenciales para explicar el entendimiento de los actos de habla, como Bach y Harnish (1979, 1992) o Harnish (2007), el modelo propuesto en la teoría de la relevancia es mucho más rico ya que no es sólo aplicable a los actos de habla sino a la comunicación humana en general, tanto lingüística como no lingüística. En ella se adopta un punto de vista cognitivo y se hace referencia a los procesos que se activan durante los intercambios comunicativos. Esta perspectiva permite explicar no sólo aquellos casos en los que la comunicación es exitosa en tanto que es efectiva, sino también aquellos en los que por cualquier razón es fallida.

La teoría de la relevancia propone un modelo de la comunicación humana denominado ostensivo-inferencial en el que los estímulos ostensivos constituyen la base de toda comunicación. La producción de un estímulo de este tipo está pensada para atraer la atención del oyente y sólo puede explicarse asumiendo que el hablante quiere ofrecer algún tipo de evidencia sobre su intención de comunicar algo. La evidencia, ofrecida de manera intencionada, es usada por el oyente para

llegar a ciertas conclusiones, en principio, las que el hablante tiene la intención de comunicar. De acuerdo con este modelo, los hablantes tienen dos intenciones: la intención informativa y la intención comunicativa. La primera se refiere a la intención de informar al oyente de algo, mientras que la segunda se refiere a la intención de informar al oyente de la existencia de una intención informativa. En este sentido, la emisión de un enunciado así como la producción de otros muchos estímulos se pueden considerar ostensivos en tanto en cuanto se utilizan de forma intencionada para comunicar algo. Tomemos el siguiente ejemplo:

- (4) A: Are you leaving?
 (B coge su abrigo y su bolso)

Imaginemos que A y B acaban de tener una discusión. A observa que B se dirige al lugar en el que B había dejado su abrigo y su bolso al llegar. A la pregunta que hace A, B no emite un simple *sí*, sino que produce evidencia que combinada con supuestos contextuales como *después de tener una discusión, uno puede no sentirse cómodo en compañía de la persona con la que ha discutido, y normalmente cuando uno se marcha de un lugar suele llevarse sus pertenencias consigo*, le permiten a A llegar a la conclusión de que B efectivamente se marcha.

La teoría de la relevancia no niega la existencia de un modelo de codificación-descodificación, pero sí afirma que un modelo de este tipo es insuficiente para explicar actos comunicativos complejos. Así lo hemos visto en (4), donde no hay ninguna codificación lingüística para la respuesta de la pregunta de A. Además, en numerosísimas ocasiones existe una brecha importante entre lo que uno dice literalmente y lo que se ha querido decir y, aún así, la comunicación sigue siendo exitosa, y hablantes y oyentes se entienden mutuamente. El éxito (y en ocasiones el fracaso) de la comunicación radica en las tareas inferenciales que llevan a cabo los oyentes en el proceso interpretativo basándose para ello en los estímulos y la evidencia producidos por los hablantes, y el uso de información contextual adecuada.

El concepto de contexto es primordial en la teoría de la relevancia, donde se aplica de forma amplia para incluir supuestos derivados de (i) la interpretación del discurso precedente, (ii) la adición de información enciclopédica, y (iii) la adición de información observable en el entorno en el que se desarrolla el evento comunicativo. Así, la información contextual es vital para que los oyentes lleguen a entender lo que los hablantes tienen la intención de comunicar y, en el caso de

los actos de habla en particular, es vital para determinar de forma precisa la fuerza ilocutiva y la actitud proposicional asociada.

La perspectiva relevantista sostiene que la correcta elección del contexto en el que oyente procesará e interpretará la información que le permitirá inferir la intención del hablante viene dada por el seguimiento de un principio cognitivo: el principio de la relevancia. Durante un intercambio comunicativo, el hablante realiza modificaciones del entorno físico del oyente, por ejemplo, produciendo una expresión lingüística, para generar efectos en su entorno cognitivo. El principio de la relevancia garantiza que el hablante pueda lograr el mayor efecto con el menor esfuerzo cognitivo posibles. Es por ello que la relevancia es una cuestión de equilibrio entre el esfuerzo cognitivo que tiene que llevar a cabo el oyente durante el proceso interpretativo y los efectos contextuales que se generan. Consideremos la siguiente situación adaptada de Wilson y Sperber (2002: 252) para ilustrar cómo se determina la relevancia de un estímulo ostensivo: Jules y Elle están hablando sobre la cena de aniversario de James y Kate de la pasada noche. Jules no sabe si James y Kate se regalaron algo, pero Elle sí que lo sabe porque habló con Kate por teléfono justo después de la cena. Elle le puede decir a Jules cualquiera de (5) a (7):

(5) James gave Kate a bouquet of flowers

(6) James gave Kate a bouquet of roses

(7) Either James gave Kate a bouquet of roses or 10^2 is not 100

Cualquiera de estos enunciados sería relevante para Jules en la misma situación, pero algunos serían más relevantes que otros en términos de efectos cognitivos y de esfuerzo procesal. Así, (6) es más relevante que (5) porque la información contenida en (6) implica la contenida en (5), de manera que el procesado de la información contenida en (6) daría lugar no sólo a las conclusiones que se generarían con el procesado de la información en (5), sino muchas más. Igualmente, (6) es más relevante que (7): a pesar de que ambas producen los mismos efectos contextuales, la información contenida en *10^2 is not 100* no tiene ningún tipo de relación con el contexto, por lo que su procesado no genera ningún efecto contextual significativo. Sin embargo, para procesarlo se necesita hacer un esfuerzo extra para introducir reglas deductivas que permitan inferir que la segunda cláusula de la oración disyuntiva es falsa y la primera es cierta.

El procedimiento de comprensión en la teoría de la relevancia se desarrolla de tal manera que el oyente toma el enunciado producido por el hablante y siguiendo la ley del mínimo esfuerzo lo enriquece a nivel explícito e implícito hasta encontrar una interpretación que responda a sus expectativas de relevancia (Wilson y Sperber 2002: 259):

Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure

Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretative hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

Consideremos la siguiente situación: el cumpleaños de Kate va a ser pronto, y Jules y Elle han planeado comprarle algún regalo. Han pensado, además, en proponerle a James que participe en la compra. Jules le pregunta a James (8a) y James le contesta (8b):

- (8) a. Jules: Will you join us in buying Kate's birthday present?
- b. James: I have already spent all my money from my salary this month

El proceso de construcción de hipótesis interpretativas que le permiten a Jules entender la respuesta de James está guiada por el principio de la relevancia. Podría producirse así: en primer lugar, Jules reconoce que James ha producido un estímulo de tipo lingüístico en un idioma que ella conoce. Esto le permite llegar al supuesto (9a). Sperber y Wilson (1995: 177) apuntan que “a linguistic stimulus triggers an automatic process of decoding”. En este caso, el supuesto (9b) se toma como input para dicho proceso de decodificación. Mientras que la decodificación sólo permitiría recuperar la forma lógica de (9b) como se muestra en (9c), tanto la decodificación como la inferencia le permitirían obtener la forma proposicional completa que se muestra en (9d). (9d) es la explicatura derivada de (9b), y únicamente se puede llegar a ella después de que entre otras cosas se haya asignado el referente y se haya resuelto el punto temporal en el que se sitúa el enunciado.

(9a) James le ha hablado a Jules

(9b) James le ha dicho a Jules “I have already spent all my money from my salary this month”

(9c) x le ha dicho a y en el momento $t1$ que z ya se ha gastado todo el dinero de su sueldo este mes en el momento $t2$

(9d) James Ford le ha dicho a Jules Cobb a las 12.00 del día 5 de mayo de 2010 que James Ford ya se ha gastado todo el dinero de su salario este mes a las 12.00 del día 5 de mayo de 2010

Existen otros supuestos a los que Jules puede llegar durante el proceso interpretativo. Uno de ellos puede ser (9e) puesto que según la teoría de la relevancia este enunciado constituye un acto de comunicación ostensiva que viene con una garantía tácita de relevancia. Las expectativas de relevancia junto con el hecho de que una respuesta a la pregunta que le hace Jules es lo más relevante que se puede esperar, hacen que Jules llegue al supuesto (9f).

(9e) El enunciado de James será relevante para ella

(9f) El enunciado de James será relevante al responder a la pregunta de Jules sobre la participación de James en la compra del regalo de Kate

En este punto, el proceso de comprensión podría continuar así: Jules extiende el contexto accediendo a la entrada enciclopédica de “birthday present”, que por motivos prácticos se considera aquí como un único concepto. La entrada enciclopédica de este concepto contiene probablemente el supuesto fáctico (9g) que se añade al contexto en el que se procesa (9b). El supuesto al que llega Jules entonces es (9h), que es una premisa implícita del enunciado emitido por James. Utilizando reglas deductivas del tipo *modus ponendo ponens* (Sperber y Wilson 1995: 87), i.e. (9i), Jules puede derivar la conclusión implicada que aparece en (9j).

(9g) Se necesita dinero para comprar un regalo de cumpleaños

(9h) Si uno se gasta todo el dinero de su salario, no puede comprarle a alguien un regalo de cumpleaños

(9i) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P

(ii) (Si P luego Q)

Output: Q

Input: (i) James se ha gastado todo el dinero de su salario

(ii) Si James se ha gastado todo el dinero de su salario, no puede comprarle a Kate un regalo de cumpleaños

(9j) James no puede comprarle a Kate un regalo de cumpleaños

(9k) A James le gustaría que Jules le prestara algo de dinero para comprarle a Kate un regalo de cumpleaños

El supuesto en (9j) finalmente satisface las expectativas de relevancia de Jules durante el procesado de la respuesta de James a su pregunta: James no va a participar en la compra del regalo de cumpleaños de Kate. Ésta es la implicatura más fuerte que se puede derivar de (9b) y, de hecho, tiene que derivarse de una forma u otra para que (9b) llegue a ser relevante. En este caso, James es el responsable de que Jules la pueda derivar (Sperber y Wilson 1995: 199). El procesado de (9b) puede llevar a Jules a derivar otras implicaturas más débiles, por ejemplo (9k), pero sólo mediante un enriquecimiento contextual adecuado en el que se incluya información previa sobre la costumbre de James de pedir dinero prestado y sobre su sincera intención de comprarle un regalo de cumpleaños a Kate.

4. La promesa: Definición y cuestiones metodológicas

El acto de habla que se estudia en esta tesis es la promesa. En el contexto de las recetas médicas inglesas del siglo XVI, las expresiones de eficacia podrían considerarse promesas de que la administración de ciertas medicinas producirá la curación del paciente. La literatura previa ha analizado las promesas desde la perspectiva de la filosofía, de la filosofía del lenguaje y de la legalidad (Durrant 1963; Driver 1983; Mulligan 1987; Scanlon 1990; Kolodny y Wallace 2003; Owens 2008). La primera contribución relevante para el acercamiento pragmático que se adopta aquí es la descripción que hace Reinach (Mulligan 1987) en la que caracteriza las promesas como actos sociales. Las aportaciones de Austin (1975) y especialmente las de Searle (1969), ya en el marco de la teoría de los actos de habla, son centrales en esta tesis.

La caracterización que hace Reinach (1983) de las promesas resulta muy clarificadora como punto de partida dado que la realiza en términos de elementos constitutivos: en primer lugar, la realización de una promesa implica la presencia de dos agentes, esto es, quien promete y a quien va dirigida la promesa. Cuando se hace una promesa, además, se establece un vínculo entre estos dos agentes: por un lado, quien promete hacer algo se sitúa ante la obligación de llevar a cabo lo que ha prometido, y por otro, la persona a la que va dirigida la promesa tiene el derecho de reclamar la realización de lo que se ha prometido.

Searle (1969: 57-61), por su parte, hace un tratamiento exhaustivo de este acto de habla, definiéndolo de la siguiente manera:

Given that a speaker *S* utters a sentence *T* in the presence of a hearer *H*, then, in the literal utterance of *T*, *S* sincerely and non-defectively promises that *p* to *H* if and only if the following conditions 1-9 obtain:

1. Normal input and output conditions obtain. [...]
2. *S* expresses the proposition that *p* in the utterance of *T*. [...]
3. In expressing that *p*, *S* predicates the future act *A* of *S*. [...]
4. *H* would prefer *S*'s doing *A* to his not doing *A*, and *S* believes *H* would prefer his doing *A* than his not doing *A*. [...]
5. It is not obvious to both *S* and *H* that *S* will do *A* in the normal course of events. [...]
6. *S* intends to do *A*. [...]
7. *S* intends that the utterance of *T* will place him under an obligation to do *A*. [...]
8. *S* intends (*i-1*) to produce in *H* the knowledge (*K*) that the utterance of *T* is to count as placing *S* under an obligation to do *A*. *S* intends to produce *K* by means of the recognition of *i-1*, and he intends *i-1* to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) *H*'s knowledge of the meaning of *T*. [...]
9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by *S* and *H* are such that *T* is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain. [...]

La condición que se indica en 1 especifica los requisitos básicos para que una promesa y, en general, cualquier acto de habla, pueda contar como tal. Estos requisitos incluyen la producción física de un enunciado, es decir, condiciones de *input*, y el entendimiento, esto es, condiciones de *output*. Las condiciones de *input* y *output* hacen hincapié en la necesidad de que el hablante y el oyente (i) compartan el mismo idioma, (ii) puedan hablarlo sin ningún tipo de impedimento físico, (iii) sean plenamente conscientes de lo que están haciendo, y (iv) no estén actuando ni bromeando, entre otras cosas.

Las condiciones 2 y 3 están relacionadas con la expresión de la proposición que subyace al acto de habla promisorio. Como ocurre con la condición 1, tienen

que darse unos elementos obligatorios, entre otros, la predicación de un acto que ocurrirá en el futuro que debe ser llevado a cabo por el hablante. Esto es así porque no se puede prometer hacer algo que ocurrió en el pasado ni el hablante puede prometer en nombre de otra persona.

Las condiciones 4 y 5 contienen los requisitos para que la promesa no sea defectuosa desde el punto de vista del hablante y del oyente. Desde el punto de vista del hablante, éste debe creer que el oyente prefiere que lleve a cabo la acción prometida en la proposición. Desde el punto de vista del oyente, éste debe querer que el hablante lleve a cabo la acción prometida. Si el hablante no cree que el oyente quiere que la acción prometida ocurra o si en realidad el oyente no quiere que la acción ocurra, la condición 4 no se daría. Además, sea cual sea la acción que promete el hablante, ésta tiene que ser una que dicho agente no realizaría en el curso normal de los hechos; de no ser así, la condición 5 no se daría.

La condición 6 está relacionada con la sinceridad de las promesas. Cuando se formula una promesa sincera, el hablante debe tener una firme intención de llevar a cabo el acto que ha prometido o, por lo menos, debe aceptar la responsabilidad de tener la intención. Searle (1969: 62) apunta que “a promise involves the expression of an intention”, sin embargo, las promesas pueden ser aún así insinceras.

La condición 7 especifica las características esenciales de la promesa, es decir, el hecho de que el hablante asume la obligación de llevar a cabo la acción prometida. La obligación de mantener la promesa deriva del hecho de que nos encontramos ante un acto de habla que es una institución en sí misma que se rige por reglas constitutivas de manera que cuando uno hace una promesa debe necesariamente seguir esas reglas.

Las condiciones 8 y 9 tienen que ver con el reconocimiento de la intención del hablante: el significado del enunciado que emite el hablante viene dado por las reglas semánticas del idioma que comparten el hablante y el oyente. Estas reglas permitirán al oyente reconocer la intención del hablante de asumir una obligación puesto que se asocian de forma convencional con la formulación de una promesa.

En líneas generales, las condiciones 2 y 3 se corresponden con las reglas de contenido proposicional; las condiciones 4 y 5 con las reglas preparatorias; la condición 6 con las reglas de sinceridad; y la condición 7 con las reglas esenciales.

Consideremos *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* para ilustrar el seguimiento de las reglas constitutivas:

Tipo de regla	<i>Prometer</i>	<i>I will help you with the packing tomorrow</i>
Contenido proposicional	Acto futuro <i>A</i> de <i>H</i>	<i>H</i> ayudará a <i>O</i> a embalar las cosas mañana
Preparatoria	1. <i>O</i> quiere que <i>A</i> ocurra. <i>H</i> cree que <i>O</i> quiere que <i>A</i> ocurra 2. No es obvio para <i>H</i> y <i>O</i> que <i>H</i> haría <i>A</i> en el curso normal de los hechos	1. <i>O</i> quiere que <i>H</i> le ayude a embalar las cosas mañana. <i>H</i> cree que <i>O</i> quiere su ayuda para embalar las cosas mañana 2. No es obvio para <i>H</i> y <i>O</i> que <i>H</i> ayudaría a <i>O</i> a embalar las cosas mañana
Sinceridad	<i>H</i> tiene la intención de hacer <i>A</i>	<i>H</i> tiene la intención de ayudar a <i>O</i> a embalar las cosas mañana
Esencial	Cuenta como una promesa que <i>A</i> ocurrirá	Cuenta como una promesa que <i>H</i> ayudará a <i>O</i> a embalar las cosas mañana

Tabla 3. Reglas constitutivas para *I will help you with the packing tomorrow*.

El contenido proposicional que subyace una promesa como *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* es el de una acción futura que será llevada a cabo por el hablante, por tanto, el hablante ayudará al oyente a embalar las cosas el día después de haber emitido el enunciado. Las reglas preparatorias se cumplen si (i) el oyente quiere que el hablante lleve a cabo la acción prometida y, al mismo tiempo, el hablante cree que el oyente quiere su ayuda para embalar las cosas mañana, y (iii) ninguno de ellos cree que el hablante ayudaría al oyente a embalar las cosas en el curso normal de los hechos. Para que *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* cuente como una promesa, el hablante debe ser sincero en su intención de ayudar al oyente. Finalmente, *I will help you with the packing tomorrow* cuenta como una promesa.

El análisis de actos de habla promisorios siguiendo las reglas constitutivas de Searle ya ha sido realizado con éxito en textos históricos, en concreto, en un corpus de encantamientos curativos ingleses medievales. Alonso-Almeida (2010) utiliza estas reglas para mostrar cómo las expresiones de eficacia en los

encantamientos pueden ser entendidas como promesas. Éstas se resumen a continuación:

Tipo de regla	<i>He Schal be Hole</i>
Contenido proposicional	El enunciado predica sobre la futura curación del paciente <i>A</i>
Preparatoria	El escritor cree que el encantamiento curará al paciente
	El escritor cree que el encantamiento es bueno para el paciente
	El escritor cree que el lector cree que <i>A</i> es bueno para el lector/paciente
Sinceridad	El escritor declara que <i>A</i> pasará
Esencial	El enunciado es un compromiso del escritor de que <i>A</i> pasará

Tabla 4. Reglas constitutivas para *He Schal be Hole*.

La regla de contenido proposicional para la promesa *He Schal be Hole* se cumple con la producción del enunciado en el que se expresa que el paciente se curará en algún momento en el futuro. La regla preparatoria se cumple si se dan las siguientes circunstancias: (i) el escritor cree que el encantamiento producirá la curación del paciente; (ii) el escritor cree que el encantamiento es bueno para el paciente; y (iii) el escritor cree que el lector cree que la acción que se predica es buena para el lector/paciente. La declaración sobre la creencia del escritor de que el paciente se curará con el encantamiento cumple la regla de sinceridad. Finalmente, el enunciado cuenta como una promesa que expresa el compromiso del escritor sobre la verdad de lo que dice el enunciado, cumpliendo así la regla esencial.

Como ya se ha comentado, en las recetas médicas las expresiones de eficacia se pueden considerar como promesas: en ellas los autores aseveran la validez de los remedios por lo que se pueden tomar como promesas de que los pacientes se recuperarán de sus enfermedades. Estas expresiones ya han sido estudiadas previamente en trabajos como Hunt (1990) o Jones (1998). La función que cumplen en la estructura de la receta es la de convencer al lector de que la medicina es realmente efectiva.

Hunt (1990) define una *efficacy statement* como “a formula asserting the value of the treatment”. Jones (1998) define las *efficacy phrases* en oposición a las *tag phrases* de acuerdo con los parámetros de posición, contenido y función. Las

efficacy phrases y las *tag phrases* son similares en tanto en cuanto ambas se encuentran al final de las recetas y sirven a modo de pronosticación. Las *tag phrases* pueden, además, emplearse como una convención para indicar visualmente el final de la receta. Así lo sugirió en primer lugar Cameron (1993: 40). En cuanto al contenido, Jones (1998: 199) apunta que mientras que las *tag phrases* “add no further necessary information in order for the text to be used”, las *efficacy phrases* “attest the value of a given remedy” (Jones 1998: 203-204).

Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu (2002) proponen una revisión de los tres criterios que emplea Jones para clasificar este tipo de expresiones en un análisis de la formulación de la promesas en recetas médicas medievales desde una perspectiva relevantista. Los autores consideran que el criterio de la posición debería modificarse para poder establecer una distinción clara entre ambos tipos de expresiones de eficacia puesto que las dos se encuentran en posición final. En lo que respecta al criterio de función, el único aspecto que distingue las *tag phrases* de las *efficacy phrases* es que las primeras pueden usarse además como un cierre convencional para las recetas. La función de la pronosticación es igualmente redundante. El criterio del contenido, por su parte, parece ser poco claro, o por lo menos, los ejemplos que utiliza Jones para ilustrarlo, son bastante ambiguos. Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu (2002) observan que ambos tipos de expresiones persiguen validar la eficacia de los remedios sin ofrecer “further information for the text to be used”, algo que en principio sólo se aplicaba a las *tag phrases* según el trabajo de Jones.

En esta tesis se comparte la opinión de Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu (2002) acerca de las *efficacy phrases* y las *tag phrases*, ya que ambas tienen la misma función en el contexto de las recetas médicas: aseverar que un remedio determinado ayudará a los pacientes en su recuperación. Además, el análisis relevantista que se lleva a cabo en este trabajo resulta de especial interés para esta tesis. La identificación de dicha función depende del contexto en el que estas expresiones aparecen, por lo que la teoría de la relevancia se perfila como una herramienta muy útil para el análisis. Este trabajo muestra de forma brillante que (i) la cognición juega un papel central en el reconocimiento de este tipo de expresiones como promesas, y (ii) las características léxicas y sintácticas de las expresiones de eficacia, como por ejemplo, el uso del modal *shall* como indicador de futuro o el uso de marcadores lógicos, suelen determinar que las expresiones se

entiendan como promesas. Ilustremos este punto con un ejemplo tomado de Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu (2002: 146):

(10) For the goute festred Tak avaunce archangel hayhoue beteyne verueyne ana & tak most avaunce & boyle hem in wyn • & let þe seke drynke þerof ferst and last & he • schal • be hol• (ll. 1329–1333)

La secuencia que consideramos en este caso es & *he • schal • be hol•*. Si se analiza sin tener en cuenta el contexto en el que se encuentra, sólo podría interpretarse como una declaración de la posibilidad de que alguien se recupere de una enfermedad. Sin embargo, como parte de una receta médica, el contexto es crucial para determinar si se trata de una promesa o no. Según la teoría de la relevancia, el proceso de interpretación se realiza siguiendo la ley del mínimo esfuerzo intentado conseguir con ello el mayor efecto cognitivo posible. La recuperación de distintas interpretaciones viene dada por el orden de accesibilidad. Atendiendo al contexto en el que & *he • schal • be hol•* aparece, la interpretación más accesible es la de una promesa de que el paciente se recuperará de su enfermedad tomando la medicina indicada. Si bien es posible que no sea inmediatamente obvio, la recuperación del paciente depende única y exclusivamente de la toma de la medicina. El lector puede llegar a esta conclusión aplicando reglas deductivas del tipo *modus ponendo ponens* como se indica a continuación:

(11) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P

(ii) (Si P luego Q)

Output: Q

Input: (i) let þe seke drynke þerof ferst and last

(ii) Si (let þe seke drynke þerof ferst and last) luego (& he • schal • be hol•)

Output: & he • schal • be hol•

Siguiendo esta simple regla deductiva, la secuencia & *he • schal • be hol•* se puede interpretar como una promesa de la recuperación del paciente siempre y cuando el lector entienda que hay una condición indispensable para la curación, esto es, la medicina tiene que ser bebida de principio a fin. Si el paciente no la bebe siguiendo esta indicación, no se producirá la curación.

Un ejemplo como (10) parece no presentar ninguna dificultad para que el lector lo interprete como una promesa de eficacia, pero hay otros muchos

ejemplos en los que la interpretación a la que llega el lector no coincide necesariamente con la intención comunicativa del escritor, es decir, con una promesa. Tomemos el siguiente ejemplo (Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 147):

(12) For the hed ache a good medicine Tak camamylle & bete yt in a mortere & tak a sponeful of þe draf & ale & a sponeful of comyn & a sponeful of floure & wommanes melk þerto als mucho • as nedeþ & put al þis in a panne & set it on þe fuyr & make þerof a plaster & ley yt þer as þe hed ys sorest & vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe & he schal be hool bi godes grace (ll. 1350–1358)

A simple vista, la expresión de eficacia & *he schal be hool bi godes grace* podría interpretarse como una promesa de que el paciente se recuperará tras la toma del producto. Como en el ejemplo anterior, una regla deductiva del tipo *modus ponendo ponens* le permitiría al lector llegar a esta conclusión como se indica debajo:

(13) *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) P

(ii) (Si P luego Q)

Output: Q

Input: (i) vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe

(ii) Si (vse þis medycyne iij dayes & euery tyme newe) luego (& he schal be hool bi godes grace)

Output: & he schal be hool bi godes grace

El contexto inicial en el que se procesa la expresión de eficacia puede contener información relacionada con (i) el dolor de cabeza, (ii) la toma de una medicina para curar el dolor, y (iii) la creencia de que Dios es un sanador. Si el lector realiza un esfuerzo cognitivo extra, podría extender el contexto de tal manera que la interpretación resultante podría no coincidir con la promesa que probablemente el escritor pretendía comunicar. Dicho enriquecimiento contextual podría desarrollarse como se indica en lo que sigue (Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 147): se podría añadir información enciclopédica sobre el dolor de cabeza y los productos analgésicos. También se podría incluir información guardada en la memoria a corto plazo del lector, por ejemplo, *la medicina es un emplasto*. Igualmente, se podría utilizar más información enciclopédica relacionada con las creencias religiosas, en concreto, que *la gracia de Dios y Dios pueden curar a las personas*. En último lugar, el supuesto *la combinación del uso del emplasto con la gracia de Dios pueden curar al paciente* podría añadirse.

En este punto del proceso interpretativo entran en juego reglas deductivas que pueden ser del tipo *modus ponendo ponens* (14a) o *modus tollendo ponens* (14b), donde *P* representa *vse þe plaster*, *Y bi godes grace* y *Q he schal be hol*.

(14) a. *Modus ponendo ponens*

Input: (i) Si (*P* y *Y*) luego *Q*

(ii) *P* y *Q*

Output: *Q*

b. *Modus tollendo ponens*

Input: (i) *P* y *Q*

(ii) No *Y*

Output: No *Q*

Si el proceso de interpretación continúa de la manera indicada por la regla *modus ponendo ponens*, la secuencia se entendería como una acto de habla promisorio si y sólo si las condiciones *P* e *Y* se dan; esto es así por la presencia del conector lógico bicondicional *and*. En el caso de que el proceso continuara con la aplicación de la regla *modus tollendo ponens*, el lector no podrá inferir que el lector haya hecho ninguna promesa puesto que “there is no implied manifestation of promise of efficacy” (Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu 2002: 148).

Los actos de habla son fenómenos eminentemente pragmáticos que se pueden analizar en sincronía y en diacronía. Para el análisis diacrónico se pueden adoptar distintos procedimientos metodológicos, si bien los investigadores que trabajan en este campo han hecho notar que estudiar actos de habla en textos históricos es una tarea exigente. Haciéndose eco de las palabras de Bertucelli-Papi (2000) sobre el estudio de la historia de la lengua inglesa en general, Taavitsainen y Jucker (2008: 3) apuntan que “researchers can take different starting points when they investigate the history of individual speech acts or individual classes of speech acts and they can use different tools, but they always have to be aware of the slippery and treacherous nature of their endeavour”.

La metodología que se adopta en esta tesis para el estudio de la formulación de la promesa en recetas médicas inglesas escritas entre 1500 y 1600 se denomina análisis de actos de habla histórico. El objetivo principal consiste en identificar formas lingüísticas asociadas a posibles actos de habla promisorios para luego analizar si se entienden o no como promesas en el sentido estricto atendiendo a sus características pragmáticas. Esto se lleva a cabo prestando atención a los

mecanismos cognitivos que permiten al lector identificar el contenido ilocutivo de los enunciados.

El estudio de los actos de habla desde una perspectiva histórica constituye un campo de investigación joven, por lo que aún existen ciertas reservas sobre la posibilidad de que un análisis de este tipo pueda hacerse (Stetter 1991). Sin embargo, la realización de abundantes investigaciones en este sentido en poco más de dos décadas apuntan a que este fenómeno pragmático puede y debe analizarse desde esta perspectiva ya que la aplicación de teorías modernas para analizar textos históricos nos permite tener un entendimiento más detallado de las funciones pragmáticas que los actos de habla cumplen en textos del pasado.

Obviamente, al tratarse de un campo de estudio joven, aún quedan cuestiones teóricas y metodológicas por definir. Algunas de ellas son comentadas en el artículo introductorio al primer número de *Journal of Historical Pragmatics*. Aquí Bertucelli-Papi (2000) se plantea el estudio de una serie de cuestiones relacionadas con los actos de habla, entre otros (i) el contenido proposicional, y el significado del hablante y el ilocucionario, (ii) la relación entre estructura gramatical y fuerza ilocutiva, (iii) elementos indicadores de la fuerza ilocutiva, y (iv) el papel del contexto en términos de convenciones, intenciones y cognición.

Bertucelli-Papi (2000) hace una revisión detallada de estos aspectos y propone una justificación plausible para su análisis desde una perspectiva histórica. La autora sostiene, en primer lugar, que los indicadores lingüísticos de contenido proposicional y de la fuerza ilocutiva pueden mostrar variación formal y funcional en distintas etapas del desarrollo de una lengua, por lo que efectivamente, podrían ser objeto de un estudio diacrónico. En segundo lugar, aunque la existencia de una relación de correspondencia entre la estructura gramatical y la fuerza ilocutiva de un enunciado no se puede mantener, Bertucelli-Papi observa que en las gramáticas de cualquier idioma hay elementos que de alguna manera u otra ejercen una influencia en la determinación de la fuerza ilocutiva, y que estos elementos están igualmente sujetos a variación histórica. En tercer lugar, el contexto es siempre central para poder identificar la fuerza ilocutiva y la actitud proposicional de un enunciado. Éste no debe ser entendido únicamente como el co-texto que envuelve al enunciado, sino que debe incluir otros aspectos situacionales como la relación entre los participantes, sus

intenciones, las convenciones sociales y lingüísticas, y las propias características cognitivas. Todos estos elementos pueden ser obviamente analizados desde una perspectiva histórica.

Por todos estos motivos se puede afirmar que “a diachronic speech act analysis is possible and fruitful” (Taavitsainen y Jucker 2000: 68). Prueba de ello son los numerosos trabajos que se han realizado al respecto, no sólo en lengua inglesa, sino también en otras como el alemán. En inglés en particular, hay que destacar los trabajos de Jucker y Taavitsainen (2000) sobre la evolución de los insultos desde inglés antiguo hasta la actualidad en distintos géneros textuales; la contribución de Culpeper y Semino (2000) sobre las maldiciones de las brujas en textos escritos en inglés moderno temprano; o el estudio de Arnovick (2000) sobre distintos tipos de actos de habla como los insultos, las maldiciones, las despedidas, las bendiciones y las promesas. Sobre las promesas en concreto y por ser relevantes para esta tesis, hay que citar los trabajos de Arnovick (2000), Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008), Pakkala-Weckström (2008) y Valkonen (2008). Estas investigaciones confirman que los actos de habla pueden ser objeto de estudio desde una perspectiva histórica, y que procedimientos metodológicos modernos como las reglas constitutivas de Searle (1969) o la noción de tipo de actividad de Levinson (1992) nos ayudan a comprender mejor el funcionamiento de estos fenómenos pragmáticos.

Una última cuestión que hay que mencionar en este punto sobre la metodología para el estudio de los actos de habla desde una perspectiva histórica tiene que ver con el uso de corpus electrónicos. Kohnen (2007) habla de dos dificultades principales: la primera es la imposibilidad de hacer un inventario de todas las posibles manifestaciones lingüísticas de un acto de habla concreto, especialmente por la variación ortográfica y por la carencia de estandarización en estadios tempranos de la lengua inglesa. La segunda dificultad que plantea el autor es que hay que ser cautos con la realización de generalizaciones sobre el desarrollo histórico de los actos de habla puesto que nunca se podrá elaborar un catálogo detallado de todas las posibles manifestaciones, a menos que se haga una lectura minuciosa de los textos.

Ante estas dificultades, en esta tesis se ha optado por seguir la metodología propuesta por Kohnen (2004): delimitar un grupo inicial de elementos lingüísticos

típicamente asociados con la formulación de las promesas, así como algunas de sus variantes ortográficas, para luego realizar las búsquedas automáticas con la herramienta informática OnICoMt. Para elaborar la lista de recursos lingüísticos asociados a la formulación de promesas se sigue el estudio que llevan a cabo Alonso-Almeida y Cabrera-Abreu (2002). Tras las búsquedas automáticas, los resultados se han comprobado manualmente mediante el microanálisis de los textos.

5. El acercamiento de *stance* a las expresiones de eficacia en CoER (1500-1600)

Para la identificación de la fuerza ilocutiva de un acto de habla es necesario, entre otras cosas, determinar la actitud del hablante hacia el contenido proposicional. En el caso de las expresiones de eficacia, existe un amplio número de elementos lingüísticos que influyen en la expresión de la actitud aparentemente positiva del escritor sobre el uso de ciertos productos médicos, por ejemplo, verbos modales, lenguaje evaluativo y material evidencial.

Estos recursos lingüísticos pueden tener no sólo distintas interpretaciones, como los modales, que pueden tener interpretaciones epistémicas o deónticas. Pueden tener, además, funciones y efectos pragmáticos variados dependiendo del contexto en el que se usan. Atendiendo a la naturaleza polisémica y polipragmática de estos elementos, la teoría de los actos de habla sólo puede tomarse como punto de partida para la identificación del potencial promisorio de los actos de habla en términos de expresiones de eficacia. Para poder analizar las expresiones de eficacia formal y funcionalmente es vital adoptar otros acercamientos teóricos. Recursos como los modales, las expresiones epistémicas o evidenciales, y el lenguaje evaluativo se pueden incluir de forma satisfactoria bajo el acercamiento de *stance*. En esta tesis se adopta este acercamiento porque es capaz de ofrecer una explicación unificada del uso y de la función de estos elementos interpersonales, que inevitablemente tienen impacto en la caracterización pragmática de estas expresiones.

La definición de *stance* que se sigue en esta tesis es la de Biber et al. (1999: 763), es decir, la expresión de “personal feelings, attitudes and value judgments,

or assessments”. Como se puede observar, ésta es lo suficientemente amplia como para poder incluir en ella el análisis de la modalidad, la evaluación y la evidencialidad. De hecho, el modelo de *stance* ya ha sido aplicado al estudio de textos históricos como en los trabajos de Biber, Conrad y Reppen (1998), Taavitsainen (2001b), Fitzmaurice (2003), Biber (2004) y Alonso-Almeida (2009).

La modalidad es uno de los aspectos más frecuentemente estudiados en la investigación lingüística, sin embargo, no existe una única definición del término y, además, la terminología que emplean los autores es muy variada. Probablemente, los términos de epistémico y deóntico de Lyons (1977) (tomados de Von Wright (1951)) son los más extendidos. Por este motivo son los que se utilizan para el análisis en esta tesis, si bien hay que notar que se corresponden con los términos intrínseco y extrínseco que utilizan Biber et al. (1999). La modalidad deóntica (o intrínseca) hace referencia a aquélla en la que se evalúan acciones y eventos sobre los que los seres humanos (u otros agentes) tienen control directo. Aquí se incluyen significados de permiso, obligación y volición (o intención). La modalidad epistémica (o extrínseca) hace referencia al estatus lógico de los eventos o estados para realizar evaluaciones de probabilidad, posibilidad, necesidad o predicción.

En cuanto a la evaluación, este término se aplica a “the expression of the speaker or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of other sets of values” (Hunston y Thompson 1999: 5). En general, la expresión de una evaluación implica (i) un agente que expresa la evaluación, (ii) un objeto o un sujeto, un proceso o un estado de cosas que es evaluado, y (iii) el tipo de evaluación que se expresa.

En las recetas médicas que se analizan en esta tesis, la evaluación suele expresarse mediante adjetivos o adverbios evaluativos, así como verbos léxicos. Se considera que los adjetivos expresan modalidad apreciativa, dado que codifican las evaluaciones subjetivas y los juicios del hablante. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980) hace una distinción entre adjetivos objetivos y adjetivos subjetivos. Los adjetivos subjetivos pueden ser, además, emocionales o

evaluativos. Dentro del tipo evaluativo, nos encontramos con adjetivos axiológicos y no axiológicos. Los adjetivos evaluativos de tipo axiológico son los que indican una evaluación del hablante sobre el sustantivo al que modifican en relación a un sistema de valores, indicando un juicio negativo o positivo. Los adjetivos evaluativos no axiológicos son los que expresan una evaluación cualitativa o cuantitativa del sustantivo al que modifican en relación a una norma.

Los adverbios, por su parte, pueden ser de tres tipos: de circunstancia, de *stance*, y conectores (Biber et al. 1999). Por su valor semántico, en esta tesis nos centramos en los adverbios de *stance* en tanto en cuanto evalúan la validez de los remedios. Biber et al. (1999), y Conrad y Biber (1999) categorizan los adverbios de *stance* en tres tipos, epistémicos, actitudinales y de estilo (Biber et al. 1999: 854):

Epistemic stance adverbials and attitude stance adverbials both comment on the content of a proposition. Epistemic markers express the speaker's judgment about the certainty, reliability, and limitations of the proposition; they can also comment on the source of the information. Attitude stance adverbials convey the speaker's attitude or value judgment about the proposition's content. Style adverbials, in contrast, describe the manner of speaking.

La evidencialidad es una categoría semántica que se puede definir en un sentido amplio como la fuente de información que tiene el hablante y su grado de fiabilidad (Chafe 1986: 262). En un sentido más estricto, la evidencialidad se entiende únicamente como la indicación de la fuente de información (Bybee 1985: 184). En ocasiones, las recetas médicas contienen indicaciones sobre cómo el escritor llegó a conocer ciertos remedios y, sobre todo, sobre cómo llegó a saber que los remedios han sido eficaces en la prevención y la cura de las enfermedades en el pasado.

La evidencialidad puede tratarse desde tres perspectivas distintas: inclusión, solapamiento y disyunción. Palmer (1986) opta por la inclusión; en concreto, considera que la evidencialidad es un tipo de modalidad, por lo que los marcadores evidenciales son aquellos que indican el grado de compromiso del hablante hacia la proposición que expresa. Van der Auwera y Plungian (1998) adoptan la perspectiva del solapamiento asumiendo que la modalidad epistémica es “a domain where evidential and modal values overlap [...] where the probability of P is evaluated” (Plungian 2001: 354). En el marco de la teoría de

los mapas semánticos, postulan que la categoría de la modalidad epistémica puede dividirse en dos regiones: (i) la posibilidad epistémica, o la falta de certeza, y (ii) la necesidad epistémica, o la certeza y un grado relativamente alto de probabilidad. En su propuesta, hay una correspondencia entre las interpretaciones evidenciales inferenciales y la necesidad epistémica (Van der Auwera y Plungian 1998: 85; cf. Boye 2010). En último lugar, De Haan (1999), Aikhenvald (2004) y Cornillie (2009) toman una perspectiva disyuntiva. Concretamente, Cornillie (2009) apunta que no tiene por qué existir una correspondencia entre la expresión del modo de conocimiento y la expresión del grado de compromiso del hablante. Basándose en la definición de modalidad epistémica de Nuyts (2001a: 21), es decir, “an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring or has occurred in a possible world”, Cornillie (2009: 46-47) sugiere considerar la evidencialidad como “the reasoning processes that lead to a proposition”, y la modalidad epistémica como la evaluación de “the likelihood that this proposition is true”.

Como indica Cornillie (2009), la evidencialidad y la modalidad epistémica son conceptos distintos. Sin embargo, desde mi punto de vista la tarea de determinar hasta qué punto cierto marcador se puede considerar más epistémico que evidencial o viceversa resulta difícil de llevar a la práctica. Esto es especialmente difícil cuando se trata de la interpretación que lleva a cabo el oyente, que en la búsqueda de más efectos cognitivos, probablemente infiera distintos grados de fiabilidad de la información. En esta tesis se considera que estas dos categorías están íntimamente relacionadas de tal manera que muchos elementos evidenciales son esencialmente epistémicos, por lo menos desde la perspectiva del oyente. Este acercamiento también es el que se sigue en los trabajos de Chafe (1986), Palmer (1986), Matthewson et al. (2007), Kranich (2009) y Ortega-Barrera y Torres-Ramírez (2010).

Dos conceptos relevantes en la discusión sobre la relación entre evidencialidad y modalidad epistémica son los de subjetividad e (inter)subjetividad puesto que los significados evidenciales y epistémicos suelen indicar el posicionamiento subjetivo o (inter)subjetivo del hablante (Marín-Arrese 2009). En esta tesis, la aplicación de estos conceptos sigue esencialmente las ideas de Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, 2012) al respecto por las implicaciones que tienen para el análisis de los valores evidenciales y epistémicos. En estos trabajos, la

(inter)subjetividad está relacionada con la indicación de quién es el responsable de la emisión de una evaluación modal. Así, si la evaluación modal es responsabilidad únicamente del sujeto que emite la evaluación, nos encontramos ante una evaluación modal subjetiva. Sin embargo, si la evaluación modal es responsabilidad no sólo de dicho agente sino también de alguien más, nos encontramos ante una evaluación modal intersubjetiva.

6. Promesas. Resultados y discusión

Aquí se presentan los resultados del análisis y se especifican los recursos lingüísticos más frecuentes que utilizan los autores en la formulación de las expresiones de eficacia en el corpus de estudio. Estos recursos se pueden agrupar en cinco categorías: (i) los verbos modales *shall* y *will*, (ii) los elementos léxicos *proved* y *probatum*, (iii) expresiones evaluativas como *and it is good therefore* (TPM) y *for it healeth myghtly* (THM), (iv) matriciales como *And this I know to be an excellent thing* (GHI), y (v) otras estrategias como anécdotas y material narrativo. El siguiente gráfico representa su distribución en el corpus:




Figura 1. Distribución de recursos lingüísticos usados para formular expresiones de eficacia en el corpus (porcentajes).

Este gráfico revela que los verbos modales *shall* y *will* son con mucho el recurso que más frecuentemente emplean los autores en la formulación de la expresiones de eficacia con un 80,90%, seguidos de los elementos *proved/probatum* con un 9,83% y las expresiones evaluativas con un 7,61%. El uso de matriciales y de otras estrategias no parece ser cuantitativamente significativo dado que se registran en 0,97% y 0,69% de los casos.

A continuación se muestra los datos de frecuencia por texto normalizados a 10,000 palabras:

	Modales	<i>Proved/probatum</i>	Expresiones evaluativas	Matriciales	Otras estrategias
TPM	46,19	4,03	2,57	0	0
MGH	74,19	0	0	0	0
RLP	4,57	1,33	5,33	1,14	0
THM	28,58	11,23	24,28	0,50	0,66
PIV	44,64	3,88	0	0	1,94
BSM	67,59	5,48	0	0,91	0
TNT	20,31	5,49	2,68	2,30	0,13
FKP	13,94	0	0	0	0,96
TPH	35,73	8,52	3,28	0	0
RST	69,13	12,57	2,51	0,31	0
GHI	27,47	0	0	0	0

Tabla 5. Distribución de los recursos lingüísticos usados en la formulación de las expresiones de eficacia por texto (frecuencias).

Como se muestra en esta tabla, no hay ningún texto en el corpus en el que el recurso predominante para la formulación de expresiones de eficacia no sea el uso de los modales *shall* y *will*. Las mayores frecuencias se encuentran en MGH con 74,19 puntos, seguido de RST con 69,13 y BSM con 67,59. Las frecuencias varían en el resto de los textos, pero todas ellas se encuentran por debajo de 50 puntos por cada 10,000 palabras, por ejemplo, TPM contiene 46,19, seguido de PIV con 44,64, TPH con 35,73, THM con 28,58, GHI con 27,47 y TNT con 20,31. FKP y RLP presentan el menor número de frecuencias con 13,94 y 4,57 puntos por cada 10,000 palabras, respectivamente.

Estos resultados sugieren que en general los autores han podido elegir los modales *shall* y *will* como el recurso lingüístico preferido para codificar posibles promesas de eficacia por su potencial para expresar significados típicamente asociados con actos de habla promisorios, por lo menos de forma más explícita que el resto de recursos. Estos significados incluyen (i) la orientación futura de una acción, (ii) la expresión de una intención, y (iii) la expresión de un compromiso. Estos significados pueden relacionarse con algunas de las reglas constitutivas de Searle (1969), por ejemplo, la regla de contenido proposicional con la predicación de un acto en el futuro; la condición de sinceridad con la expresión de una intención; y la condición esencial con la expresión de un compromiso.

El siguiente recurso preferido por los autores son los elementos *proved* y *probatum*. Las mayores frecuencias se encuentran en RST con 12,57, THM con 11,23 y TPH con 8,52 puntos por 10,000 palabras. No se ha encontrado ninguno de estos elementos en MGH, FKP y GHI. La codificación de posibles promesas a través de estos elementos pone de manifiesto el papel de la evidencialidad en las expresiones de eficacia presentes en los textos analizados. Su uso apela a la experiencia previa y, probablemente, a la experimentación, indicando así la fuente del conocimiento de los autores sobre la eficacia de los remedios. Tanto la experiencia previa como la propia experimentación parecen ofrecer una garantía implícita de la fiabilidad del conocimiento médico, lo que se puede manifestar en distintos grados dependiendo del contexto lingüístico en el que *proved* y *probatum* aparecen. Además, distintos grados de compromiso se pueden inferir atendiendo a la información contextual.

El empleo de expresiones evaluativas para expresar la eficacia de los remedios se distribuye de manera desigual en los textos que conforman el corpus, encontrándose la mayor frecuencia en THM con 24,28 puntos. En el resto de los textos, la presencia de este recurso es significativamente más baja, con 5,33 puntos en RLP, 3,28 en TPH, 2,68 en TNT, 2,57 en TPM y 2,51 en RST. En el resto de los textos, no se utilizan expresiones evaluativas con este propósito. Estas expresiones incluyen adjetivos y adverbios de *stance* y verbos léxicos, cuyo objetivo es ofrecer una evaluación positiva del producto indicando la postura favorable de los autores con respecto al uso de los remedios.

Las matriciales y otras estrategias son los recursos que presentan la menor frecuencia. La presencia de matriciales se ha registrado en cinco textos, concretamente, en TNT con 2,30 puntos, en RLP con 1,14, en BSM con 0,91, en THM con 0,50 y en RST con 0,31. El uso de otras estrategias, es decir, de anécdotas y de material narrativo, se ha encontrado en cuatro de los once textos analizados, con 1,94 puntos en PIV, 0,96 en FKP, 0,66 en THM y 0,13 en TNT. Las matriciales suelen tener predicados verbales cognitivos que enmarcan las proposiciones, permitiéndole al lector recuperar indicaciones sobre la fuente de información, su fiabilidad y el grado de compromiso del escritor. En el caso de las anécdotas, de éstas también se pueden derivar valores evidenciales que pueden usarse como evidencia para expresar la eficacia de los productos médicos.

Consideremos los siguientes ejemplos:

(15) For them that may not se / or them that haue blered eyes. Take Ginger and rubbe it on a whetstone into a fayre bason and putte therto as moche salte and temper it in wyne with the ioyce of Sufrage and lette it stande a nyght and a day and than take the rynde or the clerenesse that houeth aboue and put it in a glasse and with a fether whan thou goes to bedde / or as ofte as thou layes ye downe to slepe anoynte therwith thyne eye lyddes within and without **and thou shalbe hole** (TPM)

(16) Baye Salt well beaten into powder and syfted, and incorporated, and mixed well with the yolke of an Egge, and so layde vpon any Carbuncle, plague sore, botche, byle, or impostume: **assuredly (by the grace of God,) it wyll drawe to it selfe all the venome of the plague, or the sore: and breake any byle, or other thing. So that in short tyme the same wyll be healed. A tried thing** (TNT)

(17) A drinke for the paine of the mother. Take a dram of Mithridatum, and dissolue it in an vnce and a halfe of water of wormewood, and giue it to the woman for to drinke afore that she goeth to meate 4. houres, and lett her not drinke a good whyle afterwarde: **proued** (TPH)

(18) For the Tey of the eyes. Temper Arinent with Hony and a lytell of ye whyte of an egge and lay it to thy eyes whan thou goes to bedde. Also the gall of an Hare temper it with Hony **and it is good therefore** (TPM)

(19) For stoppyng of the splenne. Take the Elder rote and seethe it in whyte wyne vnto the thryde parte and drynke therof **for it cureth merueylously** (TPM)

(20) Cautharides wrapt in a spyders webbe, and hanged ouer one that hath the Quarteyn ague, **it is sayde it cures or delyuers him or her thereof perfectly. Mizaldus** (TNT)

(21) **In Tuscia ther was a certayne man deliuered and healed of thys disease, of a certayne husband man, by onli ordering or dressing of wild rue and afterwarde were manye healed, after the same maner** (THM)

La receta (15) contiene una estructura simple introducida por la conjunción *and* con un sujeto pronominal *thou* seguido de la forma contraída *shalbe* y de *hole*. Tras la interpretación de la secuencia en su contexto, se puede concluir que su fuerza ilocutiva es efectivamente la de una promesa de eficacia, por lo que *shall* indica modalidad deóntica. Una vez que la información se ha computado siguiendo la ley del mínimo esfuerzo, la interpretación más accesible es que el paciente recuperará la vista o que la inflamación de sus ojos bajará con la aplicación del remedio tal y como se especifica en la receta. En otras palabras, la secuencia se interpreta como una promesa de eficacia si el supuesto *el producto debe aplicarse de la manera indicada* (P) se entiende como una condición que tiene que darse para conseguir la curación del paciente. *Thou shalbe hole* (Q) se

procesaría en el contexto de *P*, cuya presencia trae consigo el concepto *si... luego* (*if... then*) en el proceso deductivo, permitiendo aplicar una regla del tipo *modus ponendo ponens*. Esta regla pone de manifiesto que el cumplimiento de *Q* depende del cumplimiento de *P*, por lo que *P* es una condición necesaria para que la aplicación del producto consiga el efecto deseado. El lector llegaría entonces a la conclusión de que la recuperación del paciente depende de la preparación y de la aplicación del remedio como se indica en la receta. En este caso, el lector sólo puede inferir una promesa sobre el poder curativo de la medicina.

En la receta (16) los marcadores adverbiales *assuredly* y *by the grace of God* introducen la expresión de eficacia. Ambos se utilizan para enmarcar las proposiciones modalizadas con *will*, es decir, *it wyll drawe to it selfe all the venome of the plague, or the sore: and breake any byle, or other thing*, y *So that in short tyme the same wyll be healed*. Estos elementos codifican el compromiso del hablante hacia el contenido proposicional, indicando así la actitud subyacente al enunciado. La situación de los marcadores adverbiales en posición inicial contribuyen a disminuir el esfuerzo procesal que hace el lector en la derivación de la explicaturas de alto nivel necesarias para determinar la actitud proposicional.

Los adverbios se consideran como las expresiones de fuerza epistémica “más puras” que existen, por lo menos en los idiomas germánicos: “they are the most precise way and specific means available for marking the degree of likelihood of a state of affairs” (Nuyts 2001a: 55). *Assuredly* expresa un alto grado de certeza en la verdad proposicional, indicando una evaluación de las situaciones descritas en términos de probabilidad. Sin embargo, la mención explícita de la certeza del autor implica que de alguna manera la verdad de las proposiciones no puede ser garantizada, originando una sombra de duda, cambiando así el valor epistémico del modal de probabilidad a posibilidad.

La presencia del adverbial *by the grace of God* tiene implicaciones en la interpretación del modal que acompaña, que puede ser interpretado como deóntico o epistémico dependiendo del punto hasta el que uno crea que la ayuda divina está fuera del control humano o no. En la receta (16), el sentido de epistemicidad, es decir, de posibilidad, que expresa *assuredly* ejerce cierta influencia sobre la secuencia preposicional *by the grace of God*, que por tanto se interpreta de manera epistémica también. Desde un punto de vista pragmático, estos marcadores

adverbiales se pueden entender como modificadores de los actos de habla, ya que hacen que una potencial promesa de eficacia sea finalmente interpretada como una mera posibilidad.

La receta (17) contiene el elemento *proved* al final del texto. Durante su procesado, el lector accede a la entrada enciclopédica del concepto de manera que se activa información sobre su extensión en forma de supuestos y esquemas de supuestos. Probablemente, el lector tenga acceso a supuestos como *to prove something is to demonstrate its truth* o *in order to prove something there must be evidence for it*. Otras extensiones del contexto y esquemas de supuestos ya completados permiten al lector inferir la actitud proposicional del enunciado.

El proceso de extensión del contexto necesario para derivar la actitud del autor hacia la proposición está determinado por las características sintácticas del enunciado, en particular, por el uso de una construcción perfectiva que indica que la acción a la que se hace referencia ocurrió en el pasado. Se puede decir que el hecho de que la acción haya ocurrido en el pasado no la hace relevante sólo en el tiempo pasado, sino también en el presente e incluso en el futuro. Por tanto, esta construcción se usa para expresar la validez del remedio y dicha validez viene dada por que éste ya ha funcionado en el pasado. El lector puede inferir el grado de certeza que tiene el escritor en lo que dice y probablemente llegue a la conclusión de que tiene algún tipo de evidencia para aseverar que la receta será efectiva. El tipo de evidencia que sugiere el uso de *proved* parece ser experimental, pero ante la ausencia de ninguna indicación explícita en este sentido, el lector infiere que el lector no está completamente seguro; de no ser así, lo habría utilizado como justificación de la evidencia.

En la receta (18) hay una expresión de eficacia en la que el autor emite una evaluación positiva del remedio utilizando el adjetivo evaluativo axiológico *good* (Kerbat-Orecchioni 1980). En la receta (19), el autor hace uso del verbo léxico *cureth* para expresar las propiedades curativas de la medicina junto con el adverbio actitudinal *merueylously*. En general, el lenguaje evaluativo se puede utilizar para llevar a cabo ciertos actos de habla (Sinott-Armstrong y Fogelin 2010: 70). El adjetivo *good* codifica la actitud del autor con respecto a la validez del producto. En el procesado de esta secuencia, el lector accede a la información enciclopédica, pero en este caso el lector no puede inferir que el remedio sirva

para curar al paciente completamente; simplemente puede inferir que la medicina causará cierta mejoría. En aquellos enunciados en los que se usa el adjetivo *good*, el lector será el único responsable de interpretar la secuencia como una promesa de eficacia porque la semántica del adjetivo en ningún caso lo permite.

En la receta (19) la secuencia consiste en una estructura simple introducida por *for* seguida del sujeto pronominal *it*, el verbo léxico *cureth* y el adverbio actitudinal *merueylously*. Este adverbio actitudinal expresa un juicio de valor del autor que hace referencia a la manera en la que se puede decir que el remedio es efectivo, esto es, de forma extraordinaria. Desde el punto de vista del procesado, este elemento no presenta ninguna característica especial más que que durante su procesado se activan supuestos sobre la actitud del autor en virtud de su entrada enciclopédica.

El uso del presente en *cureth*, por su parte, sí que es relevante por las implicaciones pragmáticas que tiene su uso. De forma general, el tiempo verbal contribuye “to the determination of reference time by giving a clue to the temporal reference intended” (Smith 1990: 85). En la teoría de la relevancia, el lector utiliza el tiempo verbal, así como otras características sintácticas del enunciado y otra información contextual relevante, para determinar la referencia temporal dentro de la que se supone que el enunciado expresa algo óptimamente relevante. Los marcadores temporales se consideran “generalised existential quantifiers: they assert that [...] there is some relatively past/present/future time at which the situation described held/holds/will hold” (Smith 1990: 83).

La predicación descrita en (19) no sólo se da en el presente, esto es, en el momento en el que el lector lee el texto, puesto que en el contexto de la literatura médica se presupone una referencia temporal futura. En otras palabras, el usuario del texto lo lee en algún punto temporal determinado para posteriormente emprender alguna acción, por lo que el uso del presente en este ejemplo se refiere al futuro.

Obviamente, la predicación descrita con *cureth* para referirse al futuro podría haberse comunicado de forma más relevante mediante algún otro recurso lingüístico, como los modales *shall* y *will*. Sin embargo, el esfuerzo procesal extra que tiene que hacer el lector se verá recompensado con más efectos cognitivos. En este punto hay que resaltar que “in addition to its time reference function, tense

can also signal epistemic distance” (Evan y Green 2006: 394). En este sentido, Langacker (2011) apunta que en lugar de decir que el presente implica que el evento descrito coincide con el momento en el que se emite el enunciado, podría considerarse que indica “epistemic immediacy of the profiled process” (Langacker 2011). Así, “a present tense indicates that the designated situation is immediate to the speaker, i.e., that it belongs to her ground” (De Witt y Brisard 2009). Desde una perspectiva pragmática, con el uso del presente se pretende activar ciertos supuestos sobre la relación inmediata que existe entre la administración del producto médico y la recuperación del paciente, en cuyo caso este enunciado se entiende como una promesa de eficacia.

La matricial de la receta (20) *it is sayde* codifica una fuente de información indirecta para la proposición que introduce, en concreto, es un elemento que indica que la información ha sido obtenida de oídas. En este caso, esta matricial sugiere un grado de compromiso del autor bajo así como escasa fiabilidad, lo que está reforzado por el uso de una construcción pasiva en el mismo contexto. Tampoco existe una codificación lingüística de la voz del autor en el enunciado por lo que éste se atribuye a otras personas. Aquí, sin embargo, se indica a quién es atribuida dicha información, *Mizaldus*. La referencia a una autoridad médica contribuye a dar credibilidad a la eficacia de la receta.

El procesado de material anecdótico y narrativo como en la receta (21) depende de que el lector pueda procesar la información recientemente comunicada en el contexto de su conocimiento previo para derivar inferencias. Las características del contexto lingüístico determinan la manera en la que se desarrolla el proceso, por ejemplo, el uso del pasado en *healed* marca la información como factual. El referente de la expresión *a certayne man* no se especifica, y la información contextual no ayuda al lector en la tarea de asignación del referente. La falta de especificidad hace que el lector infiera que el escritor tiene algunas reservas sobre la certeza en la información proposicional.

Esta estrategia puede haber influenciado a los lectores hacia una consideración positiva de la receta por su valor evidencial porque presenta evidencia para aseverar su eficacia. El grado de fiabilidad de la evidencia que se presenta aquí, inferido gracias a las características lingüísticas del enunciado, no

puede ser alto por la asimetría que se crea con el uso del pasado, que indica factualidad y un alto grado de certeza, y la ambigüedad referencial.

7. Aportaciones originales y conclusiones

Esta tesis se puede considerar como una contribución al campo del análisis de actos de habla histórico y, más generalmente, al campo de la pragmática histórica. Se ha demostrado que teorías pragmáticas modernas como la de los actos de habla, la de la relevancia y la de *stance*, se pueden aplicar satisfactoriamente al análisis de textos históricos y que, de hecho, son herramientas eficientes que nos permiten entender mejor su caracterización pragmática. La discusión de los ejemplos se ha visto ampliamente beneficiada por la aplicación de los supuestos teóricos de la teoría de la relevancia puesto que con ella se puede explicar de forma detallada el proceso de enriquecimiento contextual que sigue el lector para derivar la fuerza ilocutiva de las expresiones estudiadas. Además, el acercamiento de *stance* ha permitido enriquecer la caracterización pragmática de estas expresiones en las recetas médicas escritas entre 1500 y 1600 en lengua inglesa.

El principal objetivo de esta tesis, esto es, el análisis de la formulación de la promesa en textos médicos ingleses escritos entre 1500 y 1600 desde un punto de vista relevantista, se ha conseguido. Su consecución se ha logrado gracias a la consecución de otros objetivos que se resumen a continuación.

En primer lugar, se ha descrito el corpus de estudio extraído de CoER, así como la herramienta informática que se ha utilizado para hacer las búsquedas de datos lingüísticos, OnICoMt. Se ha hecho referencia a las características generales de la compilación electrónica, y se han descrito las recetas en términos del género al que pertenecen y del tipo textual que predomina en ellas. Entonces se han descrito las especificaciones técnicas de OnICoMt y el tipo de búsquedas que se pueden realizar gracias a la sintaxis extendida de su motor de búsqueda (Sphinx).

En segundo lugar, se ha establecido el punto de partida para el análisis, para lo que se ha trazado la historia de la teoría de los actos de habla. Este paso es necesario para establecer el marco de referencia para cualquier estudio de actos de habla en general, tanto en sincronía como en diacronía. Se ha descrito también la formulación de la teoría propuesta por Austin (1975) y los avances derivados de

las investigaciones de Searle (1969), lo que resulta primordial para poder entender el tratamiento teórico y metodológico de estos actos comunicativos no sólo en la literatura fundacional sino también en la posterior. En este punto de la tesis, se ha introducido la taxonomía de actos ilocutivos propuesta por Searle así como las reglas constitutivas que se tienen que dar para considerar que efectivamente nos encontramos ante un acto de habla determinado. Esto se ha tomado como referencia para determinar el potencial ilocutivo, en concreto, el comisivo, de las expresiones de eficacia.

En tercer lugar, se ha establecido la relación entre la teoría de los actos de habla y la teoría de la relevancia, haciendo hincapié en el acercamiento inferencial al proceso de interpretación de los actos de habla. Como se indica en esta investigación, éste se introduce de forma tímida en la primera y se desarrolla en la segunda. En esta última se denomina de forma específica modelo de comunicación ostensivo-inferencial. La descripción de este modelo comunicativo ha servido para introducir los principios teóricos que subyacen en la teoría de la relevancia, así como el desarrollo del proceso de comprensión que en ella se sostiene.

En cuarto lugar, se ha descrito la promesa en términos de los elementos constitutivos siguiendo el trabajo de Reinach (1983) sobre las promesas como actos sociales. Seguidamente se ha caracterizado este acto de habla de acuerdo con las reglas constitutivas propuestas por Searle (1969), que como se ha indicado ya se han aplicado al estudio de las promesas desde una perspectiva histórica, en concreto, al estudio de encantamientos curativos en inglés medieval (Alonso-Almeida 2010). En cuanto al género receta en particular, se ha hecho referencia a la forma en la que la teoría de la relevancia explica cómo las expresiones de eficacia se entienden como promesas propiamente dichas. También se han comentado aspectos metodológicos relacionados con el análisis histórico de los actos de habla y, específicamente, sobre el análisis de las promesas en textos históricos. Trabajos como Arnovick (2000), Del Lungo Camiciotti (2008), Pakkala-Weckström (2008) y Valkonen (2008) ejemplifican cómo el análisis de actos de habla promisorios desde un punto de vista histórico es realmente posible.

En quinto lugar, se ha presentado el acercamiento de *stance* al análisis de las expresiones de eficacia, dado que representa una propuesta teórica que enriquece

el entendimiento del funcionamiento pragmático de estas expresiones. La motivación para escoger esta perspectiva y no otra es que con ella se pueden explicar cuestiones como la modalidad, la evaluación y la evidencialidad, todas ellas muy frecuentes en la formulación de las expresiones de eficacia en los textos analizados, y con un papel importante para determinar su fuerza ilocutiva.

En sexto lugar, se han mostrado los resultados derivados de las búsquedas computarizadas y del microanálisis de los textos. Los resultados revelan que existe una preferencia por el empleo de los modales *shall* y *will* para codificar posibles promesas de eficacia. En esta tesis se sostiene que esto es así porque estos modales están intrínsecamente relacionados con la expresión de una serie de significados típicamente asociados con las promesas, por lo menos en el sentido que describe Searle y que aquí se adopta. Estos significados incluyen (i) la predicación sobre una acción en el futuro, (ii) la expresión de una intención, y (iii) la expresión de un compromiso. En los ejemplos analizados, se ha mostrado que la orientación futura de las acciones a las que se hace referencia está clara puesto que en el contexto de la literatura médica se presupone una referencia temporal futura. Sin embargo, la presencia de marcadores de *stance*, principalmente epistémicos, determinan de forma crucial la manera en la que se desarrolla el proceso de comprensión. Estos elementos permiten al lector inferir distintos grados de compromiso del autor con respecto a la información proposicional, por lo que los modales pueden tener interpretaciones deónticas o epistémicas dependiendo del contexto. En general, se ha observado que cuanto menos modalizada está la expresión de eficacia, es más probable que el lector la interprete como una promesa. Los marcadores de *stance* suelen restar valor comisivo a la locución dado que generan dudas en el lector sobre la actualización de la proposición.

Los elementos léxicos *proved* y *probatum*, así como cualquiera de sus variantes, son el segundo recurso lingüístico más frecuente usado por los autores para codificar posibles promesas de eficacia. La entrada enciclopédica de estos elementos sugiere que tienen un componente experiencial, por lo que en principio pueden considerarse como aseveraciones del valor de los remedios basándose en la experiencia previa del autor o de otras autoridades médicas. Su uso con otros marcadores epistémicos y/o evidenciales suele implicar una variedad de grados de fiabilidad de la información que se presenta. Sin embargo, hay que tener en cuenta

que el aparente valor evidencial de *proved* y *probatum* se ve ciertamente mitigado por el estilo escolástico presente en las recetas de la época.

En cuanto a los fragmentos en los que los autores hacen una evaluación positiva de las terapias utilizando adjetivos evaluativos de tipo axiológico como *good*, *profitable* o *holesome*, o verbos léxicos como *cureth* o *healeth*, su valor promisorio deriva de sus entradas enciclopédicas. La utilización de adjetivos evaluativos axiológicos como *good* no pone de manifiesto que la administración del medicamento vaya a producir una curación completa del paciente; lo único que pone de manifiesto es que puede generar cierto grado de recuperación, en cuyo caso no hay una promesa de eficacia implicada. Por el contrario, en el caso de los adjetivos *profitable* y *holesome*, y de los verbos léxicos *cureth* y *healeth*, sus entradas enciclopédicas ponen de manifiesto que la administración del remedio traerá consigo la recuperación total del paciente, por lo que los fragmentos en los que aparecen estos elementos se interpretan como promesas de eficacia.

Las matriciales y el material anecdótico y narrativo se encuentran entre los recursos menos utilizados por los autores para codificar supuestas promesas de eficacia. Las matriciales suelen tener verbos evidenciales que indican no sólo la fuente de información de los autores, sino también su grado de fiabilidad. Muchos elementos como el uso de la voz pasiva, de adverbios epistémicos de *stance* y mitigadores, suelen reducir el valor promisorio de los fragmentos, por lo que un lector los interpretaría como estimaciones de posibilidad y no como promesas de eficacia en el sentido estricto. El material anecdótico y narrativo, por su parte, no se interpretan como promesas de eficacia porque en ellos se suelen incluir referencias a acciones que ocurrieron en el pasado. Pese a ello, estos fragmentos juegan un papel fundamental en la organización retórica de las recetas porque son evidencia indiscutible de su valor y contribuyen a persuadir al lector sobre su uso.

Esta tesis demuestra que la consideración tradicional de las expresiones de eficacia en recetas médicas como promesas no se puede mantener, al menos en el sentido searleano. La presencia de elementos de *stance* como verbos modales, adverbios epistémicos de *stance*, adjetivos y adverbios evaluativos, y verbos léxicos evidenciales influye en su interpretación como verdaderas promesas de eficacia, o como meras estimaciones de la probabilidad y/o posibilidad de que se

recupere el paciente. Estos elementos determinan igualmente el desarrollo del proceso de comprensión y la derivación de la fuerza ilocutiva de los enunciados de forma concreta. Se ha mostrado que en la búsqueda de más efectos cognitivos los lectores pueden inferir varios grados de compromiso de los escritores, así como distintos grados de fiabilidad de la información atendiendo a las elecciones lexico-gramaticales que se han hecho y el contexto en el que se interpreta la expresión de eficacia. Por tanto, estos elementos actúan como modificadores del acto de habla; las expresiones de eficacia resultan ser aparentes promesas más que promesas auténticas.

Investigaciones futuras podrían centrarse en el estudio de la variación formal en la formulación de las promesas de eficacia así como en sus implicaciones pragmáticas desde una perspectiva diacrónica para determinar hasta qué punto esta variación depende de los avances en el conocimiento médico. El estudio de dicha variación formal también podría llevarse a cabo en relación con las tradiciones en las que los textos receta se incluyen, es decir, la tradición académica y la tradición del *remedybook*. La transmisión del conocimiento médico a través de textos que pertenecen a estas dos tradiciones depende ciertamente de los escritores de los textos y de su audiencia. Sería entonces relevante explicar la variación histórica de elementos que intervienen en la formulación de las promesas de eficacia en relación con los autores de los textos (expertos) y su audiencia (expertos y no expertos). La manifestación formal de *stance* mediante unidades lingüísticas también se puede analizar en diacronía para explicar cambios lingüísticos. Éste es el caso de los verbos modales, cuyos significados han ido cambiando a lo largo del tiempo para acomodarse a la expresión del punto de vista de los autores. Éstas son, entre otras, algunas de las posibilidades de investigación que ofrecen las expresiones de eficacia.

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