

British propaganda and contingency planning for Spain

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Spain's strategic location and the ambiguous position adopted by the regime of Francisco Franco favoured the country in becoming an active participant in the Second World War in some form. Wartime Spain's alignment with the Axis – characterized by a shared ideology that consisted of conservative, authoritarian, anti-democratic and anti-communist ideas – had its roots in the debt incurred during the Spanish Civil War. However, when the European war broke out in 1939, Franco assumed an official position of strict neutrality. Nevertheless, this was a neutrality which concealed an evident inclination towards the Axis – a position particularly manifested through constant collaboration with Germany in political, economic, logistical, propagandistic and military spheres. Furthermore, and despite Spanish neutrality, the country did not rule out the negotiation of and preparation for its participation in the war alongside Germany. Especially between 1941 and 1943, Spain took a particularly dangerous position, which raised the alarm among the Allies.

The ways in which Spain could be involved in the war, and consequently impact the Allies, were numerous. Spain could, for example, strengthen its cooperation with the Axis, and the Spanish population could succumb to the German influence. Spain could voluntarily participate in the conflict in response to Franco's colonial aspirations and Spain's belief in a short war. Spain could also give up its neutrality by favouring a German attack on Gibraltar or even lose its neutrality involuntarily by succumbing to the military advance of the Third Reich. It was also conceivable that Germany might occupy the Balearic Islands or invade the Canary Islands; the latter were seen by Britain as a strategic alternative to the loss of Gibraltar – its most important naval base in the Mediterranean region. Any of these scenarios would immediately tilt the balance of the war, considerably aggravating the Allied front in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Spain was therefore seen as a dangerous neutral country: a strategic territory that needed to be controlled and persuaded throughout the war. Britain resorted to a number of different options to maintain Franco's strict neutrality and avoid Spanish cooperation with Nazi Germany – such as diplomacy, bribery and economic pressure.¹ However, Britain also prioritized the activation of a propaganda campaign of significant proportions.² Its initial attempts were characterized by a lack

of coordination and ineffectiveness, but the efforts progressively evolved from what was needed to help Britain survive to focusing more on what was required to defeat Germany. The British effort was therefore a combination of diplomacy and propaganda which, although not dispensing with clandestine and subversive movements, always preferred cordial relations and understanding with the established regime.

However, Spain was also within scope of the planning by the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), a clandestine body that organized campaigns of operational propaganda – aimed at complementing military campaigns – in countries usually already occupied by or aligned with Nazi Germany.³ Spain's growing inclination towards the Third Reich and the German advance in Europe alarmed the Allies, who feared Franco's belligerent participation or a Nazi invasion of Spanish territory, especially between 1941 and 1942. If the war reached the Iberian Peninsula, the diplomatic propaganda that had been distributed until then would not suffice. Therefore, the PWE designed several contingency plans which, at least in theory, prepared Allied propaganda for a scenario of greater belligerence.⁴ Although the PWE's contingency plans conceived Spain as a territory involved in the war, a large proportion of the proposed campaigns continued to include neutrality and freedom as prominent symbols within the messaging. The Allied victories of 1942 and 1943 resulted in a slow return of Spain to its official neutrality.⁵ From this time on, British propaganda no longer focused on the potential for enemy invasion, and instead redirected its efforts towards guaranteeing Spain's neutrality for the remainder of the war.

This chapter analyses the propaganda campaigns launched by Great Britain in Spain during the Second World War. Propaganda activities will be examined in three distinct phases: firstly, during the Franco regime's initial phase of neutrality (1939–40); secondly, during Spain's phase of non-belligerence, as distinct from neutrality (1940–2); and finally, during the period in which the Franco regime adopted another position of neutrality (1943–5). This chapter also analyses the instruments and content of British propaganda in a variety of forms to maintain Spain's neutrality when Franco was increasingly tempted to become involved in the war itself. However, this study also devotes special attention to the British design of 'operational propaganda' which, between 1941 and 1942, prepared Spain for various scenarios of war. This chapter will emphasize Spain's prominence on the international stage, the changeable nature of its neutrality and the continual realignment of British propaganda to these changing circumstances. Furthermore, this case study highlights the multiplicity of propaganda campaigns aligned to several alternative projected scenarios, and the potential for operational propaganda, understood as a complement to military operations which, in Spain, continued to be directed towards the shoring up of its neutrality.

British propaganda and Spain's fluctuating neutrality (1939–45)

Spain has always played a prominent role on the international stage and its strategic position was once again enhanced between 1939 and 1945. Its territory was in the

middle of important trade routes, at the crossroads of strategic communication routes and the intersection of three continents. The Spanish coasts were an ideal refuge for the Axis ships and the country's territory also offered direct access to Gibraltar. 'The Rock', as Gibraltar is known, was Great Britain's main naval base in the Mediterranean region and its fall, or at least rendering it useless for military activity, was consequently a vital strategic military objective for Germany. Understanding this led to British military planners drawing up contingency plans for military action in the Canary Islands, considering the archipelago to be an excellent alternative naval base in the Atlantic.

Exhausted by the effects of its own Civil War and unable to mobilize a new war effort, Franco declared Spain's neutrality when war broke out in September 1939. However, and despite this status of official neutrality, the Spanish government prepared for its participation in the war and was not shy in demonstrating its ideological preferences, especially in two distinct phases. The first of these was after the fall of France in June 1940 when Spain adopted a position of 'non-belligerence', rather than strict neutrality, which favoured the Axis powers. Between August 1940 and February 1941, Europe witnessed a critical moment of negotiations between Spain and Germany, which, although it did not finally culminate in the formal military participation of Spain, it did reinforce its involvement in the war. This phase of temptation towards belligerency by Franco was later intensified – between June 1941 and June 1942 – with the German advance on the Soviet Union and the revival of Spanish anti-communism, which justified renewed Spanish interest in the war,⁶ manifested, for example, through the dispatch of the Blue Division to the Eastern Front.⁷ Economic and diplomatic pressures exerted by the United Nations (as the United States, Great Britain and other Allied nations fighting the Axis were described at the time) resulted in Spain slowly returning to its official status of neutrality after the Allied victories of 1942. However, the actual change in Spain's foreign policy only took place at the end of 1943, when the new military achievements of the Allies finally tempered the blatant Germanophilia of the Spanish government.⁸

For the Francoists, both France and Great Britain were the sacred enemies of the Spanish nation – a perception that was reinforced not only by the memory of the Napoleonic invasion and the popular resentment over Gibraltar but also by the Allies' position in the Civil War. The Francoists shared nothing with the democracy, monarchy and the Anglicanism that generally defined British politics and culture. And to top it all, Britain allied with the Soviet Union from the summer of 1941, which endowed Franco's anti-Allied cause with an anti-communist crusade component. The Spanish regime led its own national struggle against democracies and communism that hindered Franco's sympathies with the Allies and favoured Spain's alignment with the Axis. Even though Spain did not finally participate in the war, the Franco government offered constant collaboration with Nazi Germany, which included the trade in war materials, the use of the Spanish merchant navy and the supply of German submarines in national ports. The Spanish government offered support to the espionage, intelligence and subversion activities deployed by the Reich, also contributing to the development of its propaganda campaign while hindering the one promoted by the democracies.⁹ The ambiguous position adopted by the Franco government activated the alarm of the

Allied powers, who feared that the Spanish territory would become a new war front – directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Therefore, Great Britain attempted to control Franco's neutrality through different campaigns: diplomatic, economic, clandestine, strategic and, most importantly for this study, propagandistic. Spanish territory was the scene of a propaganda battle of significant proportions that involved the very powers that were killing each other on the front lines. Hitler's Germany kept Spain in a prominent position in its planning, by mounting a persuasive campaign that had the connivance and support of the Franco regime. Nazi propaganda was channelled from Hans Lazar's Press Office within the German Embassy in Madrid.¹⁰ Along with Ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer, Lazar tried to exploit Franco's Germanophilia to the greatest extent by emphasizing totalitarian solidarity and undermining Allied propaganda campaigns – such objectives were set out in the German *Grosse Plan* [translating as 'Great Plan']. France and Britain rolled out their persuasive efforts in a measured way, fighting against the obstacles imposed by the Spanish regime, and, given Germany's advantageous position, just trying to ensure survival of Allied messaging. Although France mobilized its activities in an uncoordinated and ineffective manner, the French initiative led the Allied campaign at the beginning of the war and, indeed, its early moves triggered increased interest from the British agencies.

After the fall of France, Britain took the lead in seeking to control Spanish public opinion for the remainder of the conflict. Although the British initially mounted a weak, defensive and uncontrolled campaign, their activities progressively evolved. Its activities were conducted mainly through diplomatic and clandestine channels, which were also mobilized by British residents and Spanish citizens. Britain's campaign sought to maintain Spain's neutrality, weaken the Axis image and guarantee post-war economic and commercial interests. Britain's propaganda mission was leveraged by the British Ministry of Information (MoI) through a diverse network of specialized sections – such as the Foreign Publicity Department, the Overseas Planning Committee, the Roman Catholic affairs section and multiple geographic subdivisions – that included Spain as a priority. The section responsible for propaganda in the Iberian zone was initially controlled and directed from London by William (Billy) McCann. Michael Stewart and Denys Cowan were in charge of the Spanish area, while the Lord Chancellor was responsible for propaganda policy in Portuguese territory.¹¹ Their stances were also overseen by the War Office and the Foreign Office, which, alongside the embassy and the consulates established in Spain, helped to coordinate the propaganda campaign in the neutral territory.¹²

In Madrid, the office was initially supervised by Thomas Pears, who, although he gave an initial boost to the persuasive activity in the country, launched a campaign that was limited in effect.¹³ It was Franco's rapprochement towards Nazi Germany – from the summer of 1940 – that catalysed the actions of Great Britain, which then reinforced its diplomatic, strategic and propaganda activities in Spain. The mission began with the arrival of a new Ambassador, the influential former Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. He came to Madrid with the brief to keep Spain out of the international conflict by maintaining an amicable understanding with Franco without dispensing, however, with instruments of pressure and persuasion. Nonetheless, the main boost to British

propaganda in the country came from a new press attaché, Thomas Ferrier Burns (1906–95), who left his post at the MoI's Roman Catholic affairs section to coordinate propaganda activity in Spain.¹⁴ In Barcelona, the British established a second semi-diplomatic press section run by Paul Dorchy, a talented British citizen, polyglot, with great social skills and experienced in advertising and propaganda.¹⁵ In the rest of the country, propaganda was channelled through the consular authorities, which spread the propaganda messages to all the territories alongside the British community and Anglophile Spaniards who wished to play their part.¹⁶ Despite the ambassador's refusal to use subversive and clandestine tactics, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) representative in Gibraltar – Hugh Quennell – also promoted some propaganda campaigns in the country.¹⁷

Despite Spanish interference, Great Britain channelled its propaganda through multiple channels and instruments. The press was the most censored channel, and it was therefore difficult to influence. Therefore, the British directed their efforts towards exploiting printed material in the form of leaflets, pamphlets, flyers, magazines and newsletters. The BBC Spanish Service from London became the most combative and influential medium, while film was intended for diplomatic or private events. However, the British also took advantage of the potential of spoken and social propaganda while giving special attention to religious campaigns. Moreover, the SOE was responsible for transmitting manipulated rumours that sought to weaken the enemy from within. Great Britain emphasized its role as a nation that protected freedoms, in a struggle between good and evil that would be won by Allied power and unity. The propaganda themes highlighted the Allies' military, socio-economic and political strength while attacking the weakest points of the enemy powers: their ruthless actions, exploitation of neutral countries and tendency to lie.¹⁸

The toying with belligerency by the Spanish regime, and the constant threat of German expansion between 1941 and 1942, intensified Great Britain's propaganda campaigns in Spain. Its channels, messages, instruments and agents were multiplied in an effort to maintain the country's neutrality. However, the British also resorted to designing operational propaganda that would be deployed to complement their potential military interventions in the country if these ever materialized. They prepared the propaganda activities for a scenario where Spain joined the war in some form.

British strategy in Spain and planning operational propaganda (1941–3)

War propaganda is an instrument of recruitment and persuasion deployed when a country is involved in a conflict. However, not all war propaganda campaigns are directly related to military and strategic action in a narrow sense. As we have seen, a large proportion of the persuasive campaigns launched in Spain during the Second World War pursued well-defined political, socio-economic, ideological or cultural objectives: the maintenance of neutrality, the alignment of support, the reduction of enemy influence, the search for economic advantages and the preparation for the

post-war period, among many others. Only one part of war propaganda – operational propaganda¹⁹ – is actually designed to support direct military activities. It uses persuasive campaigns that prepare the ideological and sociocultural ground for the deployment of military operations (invasion, advance, occupation or counterattack). This form of propaganda is usually aimed towards active areas of conflict, for example, war fronts, occupied areas or enemy territories. However, operational propaganda campaigns can also be designed for neutral countries, which are understood as strategic locations that, although not part of the war, may become a part of it either forcibly or voluntarily. Operational propaganda was part of the government machinery of the belligerent powers. For instance, the Psychological Warfare Division and the PWE were responsible for controlling Allied operational propaganda, especially from the summer of 1941 onwards.²⁰

Although Spain never left its position of neutrality, the Franco regime adopted a position of non-belligerence, which, in practice, meant a clear swaying towards the Axis powers. For the Allies, the main risk of Spain's position between 1941 and 1942 was its possible involvement in the war or the German occupation of its territory. If this new war front became a reality, it could completely tilt the balance of power, diminish British control in the Atlantic basin and the western Mediterranean, aggravate maritime communications with French ports in North Africa and, at the same time, make any offensive in the area more difficult. To prevent Spanish belligerence, the United Nations used instruments of diplomatic and economic pressure, intelligence activities and subtle propaganda campaigns. However, the threat of Spain no longer being neutral was becoming increasingly concerning for Britain. This situation favoured Britain including Spain in the planning of the armed forces, intelligence agencies and subversive propaganda departments. Spain was a target of Allied military planning, which, in a context of aiming to forestall a German advance and avoiding the potential for Spain to join the war, also considered interventions in either the mainland or in the Canary Islands.²¹ The planning of military manoeuvres also required thorough strategic and propaganda preparation. While the intelligence services of the armed forces gathered strategic information to facilitate any military intervention, the agencies in charge of operational propaganda designed persuasive campaigns that, at least in theory, sought to clear the ground for military campaigns through creating a propitious attitude and opinion among Spanish citizens.²²

Between 1941 and 1943, the PWE drew up operational plans for Spain. Besides providing examples of subversive propaganda material, these plans included a description of core themes and persuasive instruments that could be used in case a war situation was declared. Its operations aimed to persuade the Spanish population to reject their country's belligerence by withstanding any external invasion and accepting the assistance of the United Nations – mainly the United States and Britain. Even though its plans were designed in the abstract, ahead of events and viewing Spain as a territory at war, the PWE's campaigns still considered neutrality as the main symbolic reference in propaganda slogans. These messages portrayed national resistance as an act of patriotism and Allied intervention as a liberalizing movement, all aimed at defending the freedom and inviolability of Spain – both that of its soil and its neutrality.

Between May 1941 and December 1942, the PWE drew up its most important contingency plan under the title *Plan for political warfare in the contingency that Spain or the Balearics are invaded by the Axis*.²³ The plan, which was overseen by the Joint Intelligence Division and also involved the US State Department and the US Office of War Information, prepared Allied propaganda activities in Spain in the event of military intervention in the country. To this end, two potential scenarios were considered. On the one hand, the possibility that the Germans would force Franco to declare war against the United Nations in order to use his territory for military operations, or that Franco himself would allow German troops to pass through without a declaration of war. And on the other hand, the possibility that the Germans would invade Spain and face the resistance of the Spanish Army. In any of these potential scenarios, propaganda was to be radicalized and disseminated subversively through radio broadcasts and the dropping of leaflets – especially in areas such as Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville and the islands. To maintain Spanish unity against the enemy, propaganda themes would deliberately not evoke episodes from the Spanish Civil War or include class or ideological matters. Despite the fact that ‘Latinity’ was a prominent component of Franco’s propaganda campaigns – as an evocation of Spain’s imperial and glorious past – it was also part of the British operational theme that tried to reinforce the unity and strength of the Spanish resistance struggle.

The main objective of the PWE was to frustrate the Axis by encouraging the army, or part of the army, to resist the invasion. In addition, Spanish citizens were to be encouraged to fight for the freedom and neutrality of their country with the assurance of material support from the United Nations. Propaganda was to prepare the nation to make the invader’s path ‘as difficult and dangerous as possible’, appealing to the people’s historical memory of sabotaging previous foreign forces and associating the German invasion with a betrayal represented by the Falange – the political party of the Franco regime. The slogans and themes were clear and straightforward:

Spain has never allowed an invader on her soil without fighting. Those in the Army on the mainland and islands should rally behind the resisting military leaders. The Army in Morocco can help the liberation of Spain by joining with the United Nations Forces in North Africa. The British Government is making immediate arrangements to supply all Spaniards who are resisting with food and arms. . . . This invasion is the culmination of conspiracy on the part of the Falange, who for the purpose of maintaining themselves in power against the will of the remainder of Spain, are betraying their country into vassalage. . . . There are thousands of Germans in Spain, all spies and agents of the Gestapo. Take action to eliminate them now before it is too late.²⁴

The plan included a draft of a militant pamphlet that clearly set out all the necessary thematic guidelines in the event of military mobilization in Spain:

Spaniards: The German attack on Spain has begun. The Nazi tyrant, in a last desperate throw, has violated Spanish soil. For the first time in more than a century, a foreign army is marching against Spain. As the tramp of the invader

resounds on your frontier, the peoples of the world have turned their eyes on you. They know that never in Spanish History have the Spanish people tolerated such a violation and they know that in 1942 all true Spaniards are ready to fight once again for the integrity of their soil.

Spaniards: The time has come for all to unite against the aggressor, to rally round those who have already taken up arms to repel him. In the Pyrenees your fellow-countrymen have set you the example: soldiers and civilians, young and old, they are fighting shoulder to shoulder. Their banner: the sacred name of Spain. Their battle-cry: the age-old sanctity of Spanish soil.

Spaniards: Unite against aggression! Fight against aggression! The South American peoples pledged to the cause of the United Nations look to you to defend the honour and integrity of their motherland, Spain, cradle of the true Hispanidad. The pressed peoples of Europe know that your resistance will bring nearer the Victory which will free them from the Nazi chains which bind them.

Already the tide of war has turned, and behind you, you have the military strength and the vast resources of the United Nations, who will fight on with you till Spain can take her place at the Victory Conference as an independent power, free from foreign interference and free to decide her own destiny.

Spaniards: Long live Spain.²⁵

The messages were to remind the Spanish people of their historic and heroic fighting spirit. Moreover, propaganda campaigns would provide citizens with new reasons to fight, spreading evidence – both real and false – of the Falange conspiracy, Germany's expansionist desires in the Mediterranean, Nazi exploitation of neutral nations or the atrocities carried out by the Axis armies. Simultaneously, propaganda was to serve as a training tool, instructing citizens in the art of guerrilla warfare and sabotage. Finally, propaganda channels were to be used as an instrument of attack against the invader in order to weaken, discourage and frighten the enemy through exaggerations and manipulations.²⁶

In December 1942, the PWE drew up a second plan in which propaganda would support more offensive military operations.²⁷ This plan dispensed with the idea that Spain would join the war because of its own actions or actions by the Axis, and instead envisaged a scenario where the United Nations initiated an intervention in the country. The military actions were again publicized as anticipatory moves against the collaborationist action of the Falange and Germany's expansionism:

The forces of the United Nations have entered Spain in order to forestall an Axis invasion of your country. An Axis invasion has been plotted in concert with Falangist traitors who, for their own ends, have been conspiring to bring about the enslavement of your country to the Axis, which would mean, as it has done in every other country Axis troops have entered, famine and harsher exploitation that you have already known. . . . We bring your arms, food, medical supplies, and clothing. We bring you the massive armed forces of the United Nations to aid you in your task. Immediately the German threat has been removed finally and forever,

our forces will leave Spain – a free, neutral, and strong Spain. It is our desire to see Spain ruled by Spaniards independent of foreign influence, by Spaniards chosen by the people of Spain.²⁸

However, the Allied victories of 1943 and the halting of German expansion reduced the Spanish threat. Therefore, these contingency plans were shelved. Soft and diplomatic propaganda followed its ordinary course in the process of steady expansion that was also favoured by Spain's slow return to its official neutrality and the consequent weakening of the German *Grosse Plan*. Although Spanish interference, such as censorship, was maintained against British propaganda until the end of the conflict, the efforts became easier as it became clearer the Nazi Germany would be defeated. Britain was increasingly able to project a positive image of Great Britain that sought to promote British leadership and Anglo-Spanish understanding in the post-war period ahead.

Conclusion

Great Britain's propaganda mission in the Second World War Spain adds a new dimension to the analysis of propaganda and neutrality. This study highlights the complexity, variability and changeability of Spanish neutrality between 1939 and 1945, which explains the multiple changes experienced by British propaganda activity throughout the war. Propaganda was devised as an instrument of British foreign policy, and it was a weapon that fluctuated in the heat of international events. Britain adjusted its propaganda efforts to the different modalities of Franco's neutrality, both actual and potential: from strict neutrality and non-belligerence to considering the possible active belligerence of the country. Additionally, the British launched a varied and comprehensive network of propaganda types: from soft, cultural and diplomatic propaganda to operational campaigns. Official propaganda emanated from the British Ministry of Information, which channelled its stances through diplomatic press offices located primarily in Madrid and Barcelona. They tried to disseminate subtle and passive messages through multiple channels, from the printing of persuasive material and broadcasting to the holding of film events, spreading rumours and distributing propaganda copies.

Spanish neutrality became both the target and the subject of Britain's propaganda messages. The persuasive contents tried to steer Spanish public opinion towards maintaining its neutrality and rejecting the German enemy. Although Spain never left its position of neutrality, the Franco regime became a constant threat to the Allied powers, especially between 1941 and 1942. The country was not a party to the war but could become one – forcibly or voluntarily – which favoured the planning of potential military responses and the anticipation of propaganda campaigns to pave the way for interventions. The British tried to stay ahead of the events and, through bodies such as the PWE, they designed propaganda plans that considered multiple possible war scenarios: the participation of the Franco regime in the war, the German strategic invasion of the country or the military intervention of the United Nations.

Its campaigns sought to create support for any Allied intervention by encouraging Spain's rejection – both civilian and military – of its country's belligerence and the German occupation of its territories. However, even when belligerency would have meant the end of Spanish neutrality, neutrality itself *did* continue to play a prominent role in the Allied propaganda campaign. Its slogans evidenced the power of neutrality and freedom as propaganda elements in themselves. They portrayed Spain as an occupied territory whose neutrality had been violated or betrayed, both by the political body of the Franco regime and by Germany, as a country that had lost its freedom through the imposition of totalitarian force. Consequently, Spanish neutrality would become a mythicized symbol which, as in Belgium, would be used to build upon the reaction of the Spanish population and justify the armed intervention of the United Nations.

The Allied victories on the international front and the progressive shift of the Franco regime towards a more neutral position between 1943 and 1945 reduced Spain's active threat. Contingency plans for operational propaganda in the country were never executed, and their contents were shelved. As for the British, they adjusted their assumptions and returned to more conventional means of diplomatic and cultural channels. Their campaigns sought to maintain a reciprocal benevolence between Great Britain and Spain in the post-war period ahead, using propaganda slogans promising the survival of the Franco regime against the backdrop of a new struggle scenario: the war against the Soviet enemy in the forthcoming Cold War.

Notes

- 1 Denis Smyth, *Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival: British Policy and Franco's Spain, 1940–41* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Richard Wigg, *Churchill and Spain: The Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940–1945* (London: Routledge, 2015); Ángel Viñas, *Sobornos. De cómo Churchill y March compraron a los generales de Franco* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2016).
- 2 Marta García Cabrera, 'Filias y fobias en acción: propaganda británica en España durante la Primera y la Segunda Guerra Mundial', Doctoral thesis (University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2021) and *Bajo las zarpas del león: La persuasión británica en España durante las guerras mundiales* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2022). Also see Pedro Correa Martín-Arroyo, 'Propaganda Wars in Wartime Spain: Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Embassy, and the British Propaganda Campaign for "Neutral" Spain', Dissertation (Leiden University, 2014) and Christopher Bannister, 'Diverging Neutrality in Iberia: The British Ministry of Information in Spain and Portugal During the Second World War', in *Allied Communication to the Public during the Second World War*, ed. Simon Elliot and Marc Wiggam (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).
- 3 David Garnett, *The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939–1945* (London: St Ermin's Press, 2002) and David Welch, *Propaganda: Power and Persuasion* (London: British Library, 2013), 95.
- 4 The UK National Archives (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office files (hereafter FO) 371/34764, Drafts of Propaganda plan for Spain, 6 April 1943, and FO 371/26953, OPC: Propaganda plan for Spain, December 1941.

- 5 Javier Tusell, *Franco, España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad* (Madrid: Temas de hoy, 1995), 205–86; 419; Wayne H. Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 52–60; Stanley Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 236–52.
- 6 Wigg, *Churchill and Spain*, 12–13; David Wingate Pike, *Franco and the Axis stigma* (London: Springer, 2008), 50; Tusell Gómez, *Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el Eje y la neutralidad* (Madrid: Temas de hoy, 1995), 102; Stanley Payne and Delia Contreras, *España y la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1996), 55–64.
- 7 Denis Smyth, 'The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions', *European History Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (1994): 537–53.
- 8 Gómez, *Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial*, 205–10; 286 and 419; and Payne, *Franco and Hitler*, 236–52.
- 9 Manuel Ros Agudo, *Franco y Hitler 1940: de la gran tentación al gran engaño* (Madrid: Arco, 2009), 23–34 and David Messenger, 'Against the Grain: Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941–45', *Intelligence and National Security* 20, no. 1 (2006): 174.
- 10 Ingrid Schulze Schneider, 'La propaganda alemana en España: 1942–1944', *Espacio Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Historia Contemporánea*, no. 7 (1994): 370–5. <https://revistas.uned.es/index.php/ETFV/article/view/2988> and Mercedes Peñalba-Sotorrió, 'Beyond the War: Nazi Propaganda Aims in Spain during the Second World War', *Journal of Contemporary History* 54, no. 4 (2019): 902–26.
- 11 TNA, FO 371/26951, McCann to FO, 1 August 1941 and FO 371/34766, McCann letter, 2 November 1943.
- 12 García Cabrera, 'Filiás y fobias en acción', 258–65 and Robert Cole, *Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1939–1945: The Art of the Possible* (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 98.
- 13 TNA, FO 371/23170, Thomas Pears' report, 16 November 1939.
- 14 TNA, FO 930/187, Telegram to Hoare, 19 October 1940. Also see García Cabrera, 'Filiás y fobias en acción', 265–79 and Jimmy Burns, *Papa Spy: Love, Faith, and Betrayal in Wartime Spain* (Madrid: Debate, 2010), 53–120.
- 15 TNA, FO 930/179, Press attaché's visit to Catalonia, 20 February 1940.
- 16 García Cabrera, 'Filiás y fobias en acción', 252–8 and 266.
- 17 TNA, FO 371/26952, SOE activities in Gibraltar and southern Spain, September 1941.
- 18 TNA, FO 930/20, Report: propaganda plan in Spain (1941–3), May 1943. Also see García Cabrera, 'Filiás y fobias en acción', 294–356.
- 19 The concept of operational propaganda does not yet occupy a prominent place in historiography. However, parts of its components are present in specialized research or case studies. See, for example, Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda* (London: Routledge, 1976), 29.
- 20 Tim Brooks, *British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 34; Stanley Newcourt-Nowodworski, *Black Propaganda in the Second World War* (London: The History Press, 1996); Charles Greig Cruickshank, *The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1977), 52–4.
- 21 Viñas, *Sobornos. De cómo Churchill y March*, 78–84 and 400–11. Also see Juan José Díaz Benítez, 'Los proyectos británicos para ocupar las Islas Atlánticas (1940–1943)', *Hispania Nova. Revista de Historia Contemporánea* 11 (2013): 3–10.

- 22 See, for example, Marta García Cabrera, 'British Geographic Intelligence during the Second World War: A Case Study of the Canary Islands', *Intelligence and National Security* 37 (2022): 1–19.
- 23 TNA, FO 898/248, Spain: Plan of political warfare, 4 December 1942. Also see Cole, *Britain and the War of Words*, 98.
- 24 TNA, FO 898/248, Spain: Plan of political warfare, 4 December 1942.
- 25 Ibid. Quotation from Government-produced material. Crown Copyright under the Open Government Licence.
- 26 TNA, FO 898/249, Preparatory action section of the Contingency Plan, 11 November 1942.
- 27 TNA, FO 898/249, Propaganda policy in case of contingencies, 13 December 1942.
- 28 Ibid.